Central Asia

Summary:
Central Asia preserved its stability, if nothing else: no cataclysms, massacres, or color revolutions interfered with the business at hand.  This means that in 2007, the work was in details and indicators rather than watershed events.  As a region, the Central Asian Republics made limited progress in the world community.  Each state continued to make half-steps towards globalizing their economies, trying out new techniques and new alliances, but essentially remaining in the same place.  Stagnant, however, is not the same thing as unchanged: as institutions and infrastructure crumble, poor water regimes, high energy prices, and a lack of coordinated effort toward solving issues in common continues to point to political failure in the broadest sense.  Scandals over HIV infections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; the continued over-reliance on poor agricultural practice; election shenanigans in almost every state; and the continuing repression of free media in Central Asia points to the consolidation of post-Soviet fiefdoms rather than modern states.

Progress was also stalled by the waning interest or resources invested by NATO states and by the continuing war in Afghanistan and instability in Pakistan, which diverted funds and focus from Central Asia as a region–and failed to stem increased opportunities for drug trade in Central Asia’s southernmost geographical areas, making the realities of organized crime much more compelling than the closely-related but somehow distinct Global War on Tactics.   Economic progress continues to be challenged by Central Asia’s geographic inaccessibility, remnants of command economy infrastructure, poor media access, and corruption.

Most Critical (and Unexpected) Events:
The year started out with a prime opportunity: the death of Turkmenistan’s president, Sapurmurat Niyazov, Turkmenbashi the Great.  The hand-over of power was seamless, creating numerous diplomatic opportunities which have overall been missed west of the Mediterranean.   Nevertheless, Turkmenistan has made moves toward reducing its isolationism in the person of its new, improved leader Mr. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov.  So far, progress has appeared to move glacially in terms of human rights, media rights, and democratization.  Economic agreements however, have formed the basis for new discourse between Turkmenistan and its neighboring Central Asian states, Russia, China, the EU, Iran, and various firms.

The second critical event, Kazakhstan’s Nurbank scandal, has had repercussions which are still being played out.  President Nazarbaev’s son-in-law Rakhat Aliev committed a crime which could not be swept under the rug.  The resulting scandal has been hushed up in Kazakhstan’s media but also, curiously, in the West, involving Austrian financiers, the fall of the Aliev media empire, and subsequent re-consolidation as a state-run enterprise, the re-organization of Kazakhstan’s politics, the fall of Timur Kulibaev as head of Kazakhstan’s state oil company, and an extradition battle for Rakhat Aliev  that spilled the emotions of dysfunctional family relations into international diplomacy.   However, ugly in public, however, the repercussions of the “Rakhat-gate” scandal are, at a guess, even more cut-throat in private.   There’s a lot of financial monkey-business here that hasn’t reached public scrutiny—what I would allege to be a 24/7 money Laundromat—not to mention the dead bodies of two Nurbank officials.  For more, check Rakhat Aliev entries from this year.

Most Influential Persons:
No. 1: The Smooth Operator
Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbaev.
Without a doubt, only a person as subtle and competent as Mr. Nazarbaev could have turned Rakhat-gate into a governmental reorganization which left him more securely in power and his country as OSCE chair for 2009.  But Mr. Nazarbaev also was able to use high oil prices to develop development plans for Central Asian neighbors such as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, including the new Eurasian Development Bank (EADB).  As the state partner in Kashagan oil field, Kazakhstan was also able to bring ENI to an accounting for problems with producing the field: a negotiation which is continuing. 

No. 2: The Stone in the Shoe
Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov.
In contrast to Mr. Nazarbaev, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan made his influence felt in a different way: by contributing to the continued inertia in Central Asian development.  Because Uzbekistan occupies the central area of the region, major building blocks of Central Asian development, such as roads, utility grids, water conservation, border protections, immigration, tourism, and who knows what else have been put on semi-permanent hold.  A look at the Asian Development Bank’s CAREC plan shows how planners for Central Asia have not been able to obviate Uzbekistan’s spoiler role in Central Asia.  It may be past time to re-draw plans so that they reflect less reliance on Uzbekistan’s centrality—the cold shoulder can be a two-way street.  However, that look at the ADB’s CAREC plan also shows how difficult (but not impossible) such a project would be.

Most Influential Company:
Gazprom is the clear winner for Most Influential Company.  First, the wily and judicious mix of Russian state diplomacy and corporate economic transactions make the firm a hard one to fight on either a corporate or state level.  Second, the infrastructure pretty much runs to Russia before it goes anywhere else.   Central Asia is kind of trapped: and what is more, Gazprom’s success is driving a lot of Europe’s diplomacy toward Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and with Russia as well.  They’re just good at what they do.  Other companies to watch: RozAtomprom, Russia’s nuclear group, with similar relationships as Gazprom to the Russian government; and KazAtomprom, Kazakhstan’s uranium company. 

Most Influential Organizations:
The annual meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization this year was conducted with apparent bonhomie and no mouthing off about the U.S.  Nevertheless, China has choreographed its SCO, the Asian Development Bank, state oil companies, and state-to-state diplomacy in a seamless ballet of permeating, long-term influence in the region.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization stepped in (read: Russia) on security matters, particularly for Tajikistan, moving into the power vacuum created by increased drug trade from Afghanistan accompanied by the de-commissioning of the UN’s Tajikistan mission, UNTOP, after 10 years of post-Tajikistani Civil War monitoring. 

The Taliban/drug lords of Afghanistan are also a potent and influential organization in Central Asia, particularly as more drug trade has increased addiction rates, crime, and HIV transmission in Central Asia.

Most Unexpected Development:
The critical events above—Rakhat-gate scandal and the death of Turkmenbashi—were unexpected.   But it’s well worth highlighting again that Kazakhstan will be leading the OSCE very soon. 

The most heartbreaking development has been the number of children in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan infected by HIV through poor medical practice and corrupt medical procurement.

Best Reporting:
For a region that gets little attention, Central Asia has without a doubt the best group of handmaidens and footmen to the truth in its a coterie of nagging but loving commentators.  The blogroll at right should be considered an honor roll, and there is no one listed there to whom I am not indebted. 

Great blogs such as Registan.net have paved the way for educating the English-speaking from beginner to advanced;  NewEurasia.net, part of Transitions Online, and Global Voices Online have brought Central Asia’s local voices to the world community. 

A lot of fine reporting comes out of Central Asia, through the newly-resurrected IWPR and the courageous Ferghana.ru; International Crisis Group writes fantastic reports; and British Broadcasting Corporation consistently shares Central Asia’s news with the world.  Indispensable in my view, and currently underfunded,  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty writes the most consistent quality reportage on Central Asia. 

Best Book:
Of all the books I’ve read this year in order to understand Central Asia more fully, the one that sticks out the most in terms of Central Asia was not written this year: it’s Alena Ledeneva’s How Russia Works.  The Oil and the Glory by Steve LeVine is a great offering for those of us who wish to understand transition economies and the Caspian oil phenomenon: it covers Eurasia and Kazakhstan. 

Predictions for 2008:
It’s a rash person who makes predictions, but I don’t see any earth-shattering event for next year, just more of the same advance and retreat as Central Asian states cope with increasing limits and increasing opportunities:

1. Kazakhstan: The EU and US will fail to make the most of Kazakhstan’s OSCE chair, by pressing on a variety of globally-accepted issues in public and undercutting this by worrying about oil and gas in private.  The best opportunity is to pick one issue of the social issues– I would choose legal reform, since it ultimately covers everything anyway–and then present a united front on this plus the energy issues—including uranium as well as gas.

2. Uzbekistan: Most likely scenario: the January presidential race in Uzbekistan will leave Islam Karimov in power, with the Uzbekistani people continuing to accept the dismal state of affairs there, or, if possible, voting with their feet to go elsewhere and swelling the already growth industry of poorly paid labor in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. 

3. Uzbekistan Alternate Scenario: The alternate scenario is that Mr. Karimov passes to his post-life reward a la Niyazov, causing an interesting power-play between regionally-entrenched elites within the state, punctuated by isolated demonstrations by people in the Ferghana region, and thus exporting strife to Turkmenistan but especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and adding painful incidents to an already abysmal human rights record.

4. Tajikistan: Continued pressure from the United States on Iran without corresponding spending on Tajikistan’s drug trafficking problems will create increasing Islamization of the state. 

5. Kyrgyzstan: The Tulip Revolution will further regionalize, presenting new opportunities for destabilizing elements.  Bakiev in response will continue to tighten down on security, and democratic gains will be lost.  The best hope here is Kazakhstan’s interest in economic development of its neighbor and the transfer of diplomatic skills to Kyrgyz leadership–a more long-range position for democratization.

6. Turkmenistan: President Berdymukhamedov will continue to look for economic opportunities and will create relations with those who give him the most programs for the least trouble.  The state will remain isolated.  The Trans-Caspian pipeline will mire down in bureaucracy, as Western states will focus upon a variety of issues rather than economic realities.  Russia will continue to have the right-hand place at Turkmenistan’s table, with Kazakhstan as a sometime broker or mediator for various deals.