In order to put pressure on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan withdraws from the power grid linking the region. Power lines from Turkmenistan deliver electricity to Tajikistan while Uzbek power supplies both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Without steady supplies, these impoverished and mountainous countries will face severe shortages and unheated homes. Kyrgyzstan will get humanitarian assistance from Kazakhstan for the short term, but both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan need to update their own transmission lines in order to secure the needs of their population. Replacing the Soviet-era grid requires a lot of money that these countries don’t quite have, though Kyrgyzstan’s Russian-aid windfall could certainly be put toward this.

Uzbekistan recently completed domestic projects updating their electricity grid, rendering them self-sufficient. Now it wants to increase pressure on its neighbors in order to get exactly what it wants in regards to dam projects, etc. It will still suffer shortages at peak hours, but it is on its way to energy independence. Turkmenistan achieved electricity independence in 2003. For more information on how the Soviet Union built failure into the infrastructure of Central Asia, Jamestown Foundation has an excellent article.

According to the Jamestown Foundation, on October 29, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev promoted his son, Maksim Bakiyev, to lead the Central Agency on Development, Investment, and Innovation. This agency controls all foreign funds entering the country, along with control of major national hydroelectric and gold companies.

Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s network of clients is growing stronger, to the detriment of the country’s population. Kurmanbek has streamlined his power by removing a number of ministries and parliamentary structures, essentially giving himself more power vis-à-vis the bureaucracy. On October 19, Prime Minister Igor Chudinov resigned and Kurmabenk ordered parliament to support his replacement, Daniyar Usenov, who had previously served as the chief of the presidential staff. Family members run the security services. Maksim is also one of the country’s wealthiest entrepreneurs. Now with control of Russia’s $2 billion in credit, and with a governmental regime firmly under his father’s rule, he has nearly no limits on what he can do.

Let’s hope he spends at least some of the money increasing Kyrgyzstan’s domestic capacity for electricity production so as to avoid having gas supplies turned off by Uzbekistan. Currently, Kyrgyzstan is heavily in debt to Uzbekistan and on September 22nd, suspended gas supplies to some cities in the Ferghana Valley. On September 24th, Kyrgyzstan’s government announced plans to ration electricity this winter. With few checks and balances in place, the Kyrgyz people will likely have another difficult winter ahead.

Russia will open a new base in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, later this year. Osh once hosted a Soviet airbase and is strategically located in the Ferghana Valley, extremely close to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The agreement will last for 49 years, to be renewed thereafter. All soldiers there will have diplomatic immunity, a courtesy not extended to the Americans. Also unlike the Americans, Russia is acting as security guarantor for the region, rather than a stop-over point.

And this is what Uzbekistan, and more distantly Belarus, is objecting to. According to a statementpublished by the Uzbek Foreign Ministry’s Jahon news agency, a second base in Kyrgyzstan could aggravate ethnic tensions (Osh has a significant Uzbek population) and provoke terrorism. Uzbekistan has long been trying to assert its own regional influence, and a significant increase in Russian military presence will be another obstacle to Uzbek influence over its neighbors.

The president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, earned 85 percent of the vote, winning the July 23rd election, which came as no surprise to anyone, whether the Kyrgyz population or any of the major powers. His opponent, SDP leader Almazbek Atambayev, ran a weak campaign that few expected to succeed.

It is hard to write this post because the conclusion was so incredibly foregone. I can’t express feelings of dissapointment, because I doubt that a change in leadership would do much. As I have expressed before, Kyrgyzstan lacks the requisite institutions to make democracy work, not a lack of leadership.

Much of the Western media has portrayed Kyrgyzstan’s decision  to permit US troops to use Manas Air Base as a surprise turnaround, painting Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek S. Bayikev as a crafty little leader, capable of pandering to both Russia and the United States as it suits him. Although I have no wish to demean President Bayikev’s new self-determining street rep, it is difficult to imagine Kyrgyzstan as really being that far outside of Russia’s “sphere of influence”, especially considering how eerily close this decision is to Obama’s upcoming visit to Russia. As recently noted, Russia has been sending political advisors to Kyrgyzstan to advise its government over the past year. Furthermore, although crucial to  efforts in Afghanistan, the Manas Air Base deal may not result in a windfall for the United States. Despite the enormous sum of money paid for permission to use the  air base, Manas can now only be used as a transit route for nonmilitary goods and the deal is only to last for one year.

Perhaps the question to be asked in this case is if the recent reversal is a symptom of pragmatic negotiating on behalf of President Obama or whether it is the Kremlin dangling a carrot in front of Washington.  I am inclined to choose the  latter as it is generally Russia that is ready to engage in realpolitik, willing to swap that which ranks lower on its agenda in order to preserve its greater interests. However, there are some signs that the Obama administration is engaging in some bottom line decisionmaking of its own when it comes to keeping a base open in Kyrgyzstan. Journalists have made light of the fact that in keeping Manas Air Base open, the U.S. is effectively engaging in dealmaking with an authoritarian government accused of human rights abuses.

Obama’s visit with Putin and Medvedev should help clarify the trajectory of US-Russia relations over the course of the next year. Whether or not both countries are really willing to play a little game of give-and-take with each other remains to be seen. Whether an event such as the recent one in Kyrgyzstan was a move by Washington or Moscow is not entirely clear. One thing is certain, however, and that is that a chess game is in play.

After intense diplomatic pressure by the United States, including a letter from President Obama, the Kyrgyz Republic has decided to allow US troops to use the Manas air base as a transit stop for the mission in Afghanistan. The US will have to pay $60 million dollars a year, up from $17 million it has paid since 2001. Russia will continue to provide $150 million in aid and $2 billion in loans. The air base will also now be known as a transit center, with Kyrgyz troops securing the base area, rather than the American troops who do so now. There will be no restrictions on transporting weaponry through Manas, as there are in other countries that allow supplies to be transited.

President Bakiyev has played his strong hand well, securing a lot of money from two competing superpowers in economic turmoil. He will likely win in the upcoming elections, not only because he has eliminated viable opponents, but because he has secured so much money for his poor country. Time will tell on what the money will actually be spent.

In the last few weeks, there have been numerous problems with Uzbekistan’s Ferghana Valley neighbors. While incidents have been provoked in the past, there has been a confluence of strife recently, likely due to the anniversary of the Andijon shootings of May 2005.

In Tajikistan, the Uzbeks have erected a checkpoint along some disputed point in the Soghd region. The Tajik governor confirms that Tajiks passing into their own agricultural fields have been forced to pay customs fees and show their papers. No vehicles are allowed in unless fees are paid.

In Kyrgyzstan, only one checkpoint was open until June 4 between the two states after a few violent incidents last week, including shootings in Khanabad and Andijon. Papers are being checked carefully at the crossing and both sides are looking for the as yet not found assailants.

The Uzbeks believe the assailants came from Kyrgyzstan so tensions have been high between the two states. A few days ago, the two states detained each others border guards before releasing them. After having closed most border crossing points, all have been re-opened, so presumably tensions have simmered down, at least for now.

On March 26, at a meeting in Almaty of state-sponsored environmentalists and ecologists, the Syr Darya was declared too polluted to even be used for irrigation in Kazakhstan. By the time the river weaves through the other Central Asian states, including through the Ferghana Valley, the river has accumulated the runoff from massive amounts of industrial and agricultural waste. Clothes are washed in the river and detergents continue downstream. According to the scientists, food grown using this water should be not be eaten and any crops in the field grown with the water should be burned.

Mothers are passing pesticides to the children they nurse and feeding cancer-causing rice to their children. Cancers in general have been increasing. Food security is also an issue as irrigation from the Syr-Darya grows crops and feeds millions. Again, this is an issue that requires regional cooperation, which so far has not been found on a range of issues.

On April 28, the five Central Asian states met to discuss water issues in a summit in Almaty. To no one’s surprise, no agreements of substance were signed. Instead, the leaders bickered and stalled, and in the end, signed an agreement that did not address regional water management.

Continuing to provoke its neighbors, on April 30, Uzbekistan erected a signpost on a disputed Kyrgyz border town. Apparently, the Kyrgyz authorities have not contested the claim, while Uzbek security and provincial authorities have moved in.

On April 15, Henry E. Hale, Ph.D. Harvard 1998, an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington (GW) University in Washington, DC, who specializes in the comparative study of democratization, federalism, ethnic politics, and international integration, came to speak at the University of Washington at Seattle on the “Logic of Regime Change in the former Soviet Union”.

While nothing he said was particularly ground-breaking, he provided a coherent framework for analyzing regime change in the former Soviet sphere. He argues that  a regular pattern has emerged of patron-client relations in institutions and that political exchanges are characterized by punishments and rewards. The president is the institutionalized focal point of politics and divides elites under his rule, though the president and elites are mutually dependent on each other. The president gives the punishments and rewards to the elites, who fall under him in a vertical or pyramidal structure and there is great incentive to fall in line.

The most dangerous time is when the president is expected to leave. The elites do not know who will take over the system as the president becomes a lame duck. They look for someone to rally around and often, the opposition party is strengthened. In the fight for power, Hale argues that public opinion is the decisive factor that can choose a leader and make him seem ‘inevitable’. Public opinion can be used as a weapon in the fight for power as no election can be too obviously fraudulent.

This framework is useful now as Kyrgyzstan is in political turmoil. On April 14, another Member of Parliament, Sanjarbek Kydyraliyev, was shot dead outside his home in Bishkek. That makes him the fifth MP killed since March 2005, when President Kurmanbek Bakiyev took power. The Jamestown Foundation article linked describes how politicians are being enmeshed in the criminal world. This means that organized crime is now part to the system of punishments and rewards in this patrimonial state. This may include Afghan heroin smuggled through the bazaar in Osh. Elections have been announced as thousands protest in Bishkek.

Hale’s final point is that revolutions in this type of state is normal. President becomes lame duck, elites/public coalesce around opposition, they come into power, and fall into the patron-client system with simply different groups and actors. I found this last point important as people can often be so optimistic about change, especially in countries like Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, but caution is more appropriate. Both countries are now considered “less free” by Freedom House’s ratings than before their colored revolutions. As power switches hands in Kyrgyzstan, caution should be used and a path out of the patron-client system needs to be found, rather than simply a change of faces.