Afghanistan and Central Asia

On July 22, just days before the Russian-Georgia conflict, US Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher spoke before the OSCE Helsinki Commission regarding Kazakhstan’s democratic and human rights progress before their scheduled 2010 OSCE Chairmanship. Before we get into how the US views their progress so far, it’s never a bad idea to go over official US policy in Central Asia and Kazakhstan specifically.

Boucher stated; ‘We support the development of fully sovereign, stable democratic nations, integrated in to the world economy and cooperating wit one another…to advance regional security and stability. We do not view Kazakhstan or any other Central Asian nation as a part of any external state’s special sphere of influence (Georgia anyone?), and our relations are not based on competition with any other power.” It is interesting, but not surprising, to hear the contrast of China/Russia’s rhetoric toward the CA, basically ‘foreign entities should leave these nations alone,’ to the US’s ‘these nations should be allowed to work with anyone they want.’ Each side is just trying to promote their own interests, but the US/EU include a democratic/human rights element, which is needless to say very important and as we saw in Georgia, potentially destabilizing and dangerous. Boucher went on to describe the US three main goals in their ’strategic relationship’ with Kazakhstan: 1. Advance democratic and market economic reforms 2. Fight terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of WMDs 3. Foster the development of CA’s significant energy resources, supporting US companies.

OSCE Chairmanship Reforms

Boucher emphasized that the decision to grant Kazak the Chairmanship was ‘not one the US made quickly or easily’ and that the process was moved to 2010 to give the state enough time to implement democratic and liberal reforms regarding election laws, media rights, political party liberalization, and Kazak’s concrete support of the OSCE’s Human Dimension and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. So how are they doing so far? Overall, the US asserts that progress has been ‘uneven and slow’, but that the US/OSCE were putting the pressure on.

Election Law - The OSCE’s Central Election Commission has been working with Kazak political parties, including the opposition, to make changes to the law and expects draft legislation to be ready by the end of this year.

Media Law - The government committed to reform their media law, especially regarding reducing criminal liability for defamation in the media and liberalizing registration procedures for all media outlets, and created a working group that has now begun work on new media legislation.

Political Parties - Opposition parties and NGO’s have put forth many recommended proposals to liberalize the nation’s laws and registration barriers, but the government has not yet engaged with the OSCE on legislation.

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights - Unfortunately Kazakhstan has not yet begun to play a ‘proactive’ role in this OSCE Committee.

Boucher mentioned that the US was also pushing for overdue religious freedom reforms. Alas, not much progress seems to have been made (Anyone have evidence to the contrary?), but the fact that the US/EU/OSCE and NGOs are working with the Kazak government on these issues should make a difference, if only a small one. In light of the Georgian-Russian conflict, should the West be more careful in pushing reforms in Kazakhstan? The opposite? What measures or levers could the OSCE pull to get more progress in Kazakhstan regarding these reforms? If major progress is not shown, should the Chairmanship be revoked? What consequences would that have? Where is Kazakhstan heading toward as a nation/government? Toward the West? East? The answers to most of these are murky. In fact, just as Kazakhstan is moving toward ever so slightly democratic reforms, its government is extending its reach over its increasingly powerful energy sector, buying up companies and pushing around foreign investors in ways that remind one of Gazprom. What do these actions portend?

It’s that time of year again. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Annual Summit! The meeting will be held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on August 28, and foreign ministers from all six of its member states have already concluded a meeting going over a few topics to be discussed at the larger summit. The group of ministers decided that no new members, not Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia, or India (all have Observer Status), will be enshrined, but that a SCO Dialogue Partners mechanism will be instituted to increase cooperation between the organization and these important neighbors. During last years meeting, the main topic of media/geopolitical debate was the appearance of Iran’s President Ahmadinejad, who brought with him Iran’s ‘right to have nuclear energy’ and his own bombastic style of speaking and railing against the US. Well, he’s back for more. Iran will lose some spotlight this year, as Russia’s actions in Georgia and China’s Olympic spectacle will take center stage once again. Both dominating members of this alliance will come with their chests bursting.

The debate of the SCO’s nature and actual power, and how these may affect US policy and influence in Central Asia, have been major topics since its existence in 2001. Is it a rival, partner, both? How well does it function? Does it provide benefits to its CA members or does it only provide a venue for China and Russia to dominate them? Well, the host of Summit, Tajik President Rahmon seems to be quite excited about the upcoming meeting and the SCO’s accomplishments so far. “The SCO has demonstrated specific results in the years of its existence, and its future is cloudless.” Rahmon went on to discuss how important its relations with Russia and China were, which is indeed obviously true. The US State Department view of the SCO is not as glowing, but not fearful either, at least not in the words of Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Evan A. Feigenbaum. He acknowledges that the US does not have a clear idea of what the SCO is and does, but is quick to assert that it ‘is no Warsaw Pact’ and that there are many shared interests between the US and the Organization’s professed goals: border security, economic development, Afghanistan stability, and defeating radical terrorist elements. However, Feigenbaum draws a firm line when it comes to supporting the region’s smaller states’ sovereign and independent rights to look in all ‘four directions of the compass’ for economic and strategic opportunities, i.e. he wants the states to be able to look and work with the West, not just be dominated by Russia or China.

A perennial concern for the growth of the SCO as a regional and international powerhouse is the relationship, or lack thereof, between Russia and China. The two have been getting along nicely in past years, and have used the SCO to work out many differences between the two Great Powers, especially regarding border demarcations. But man, oh man, do they have some fundamental differences, as any two large nations would who share an extensive border. In fact, they both desire to use the SCO to cooperate in CA, but also to get their individual interests in the region’s resources further embedded. In many ways, its pipeline vs. pipeline and gas deal vs. gas deal between the two. But there have been very few times of crisis/conflict between the two growing powers and the SCO probably deserves some credit for this smooth management.

So how do you see the SCO changing, evolving in the recent geopolitical context? Are its motivations the same? Is its power the same? Does it help the CA states autocrats keep their hold on power? How will the recent Georgian-Russian conflict and the terrorist attacks in Xinjiang Province affect this year’s meeting and future policies of the organization? What about the Observer States? What about them? Should they allow Iran in and receive energy help but diplomatic pain? Is there any chance in Nirvana that India might become a Full Member?

On a less geopolitically fun note, The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) will have an important summit on September 25 featuring high level officials. Here is a short article discussing the organization’s positive elements and some of its challenges in being an effective force for economic development in the region.

Who’s got a craving for some diplomacy?! I know I do. Here are a couple items of interest. Senate Majority leader Harry Reid and four other US senators are near the end of a diplomatic trip to Germany, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. This trip did not have quite the fan fare as Obama’s recent overseas visit, as it took me a little while to find out what the heck they were doing there. In a general statement Reid said they would focus on ‘progress on terrorism, global climate change, development and democracy.’

The most publicized part of the trip was Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where Reid and the others met with President Bakiyev, urging further political and developmental progress. Reid stated;

“Kyrgyzstan has made tremendous progress as a developing democracy,” said Reid. “What we have seen here has been very impressive, but there is more to do to strengthen this democracy and ensure that it is long-lasting. President Bakiyev has a key role to play in that.”

The group of senators then went on to visit the Manas Coalition Air Base, which hosts US forces on their way to duty in Afghanistan. On August 5, an interesting incident occurred slightly connecting the diplomatic visit and Manas base; Kyrg police raided an apartment rented by US officials and seized what they said were dozens of illegal firearms and weapons. Apparently, US officials explained that the weapons were used to train Kyrg military/police forces and had been put in the apartment because of organizational shortcomings and they promised to solve the problem. So it appears that it was just a misunderstanding, but for the Manas base, and the US presence it allows, this was not the first diplomatic flare up. A US Air Force serviceman shot and killed a Kyrg man in what was called a ’security threat, a US officer went missing for three days and claimed she was kidnapped, and a US tanker jet collided with a Kyrg passenger plane on the runway causing an emergency landing immediately after take-off. The US must be a polite, quiet guest in order to maintain Kyrg citizen and government support, and hopefully Reid’s visit helped in this regard.

Kyrg President Bakiyev and his fellow Central Asian and Transcaucasian leaders Turkmenistan’s President Berdymukhamedev, Tajik’s President Rakhmon, Armenia’s President Sarkisyan, and Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev were treated to breakfast by Hu Jintao in Beijing the day after the Olympic Opening Ceremony’s. Hu called them ‘old friends’ and said that they had been building mutual political trust and scored remarkable results in the cooperation in security, humanitarianism, economy and trade, and energy. The visiting leaders reportedly also heaped praise on Hu and China for its performance at the Opening Ceremony and upcoming Games. Sounds like a good time was had by all, but why wasn’t Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili invited?

This just in, Secretary of State Rice will be traveling to France and then on to Tbilisi, Georgia to help broker a cease-fire that has failed to stick. President Bush also said that American troops will be sent into the troubled nation to oversee a ‘vigorous and ongoing’ humanitarian mission. Also of note, Georgia has pulled out of the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States, and the local Human Rights Center “Citizens Against Corruption” in Kyrgyzstan is advocating for the nation to do the same. This conflict seems to not be going away anytime soon and its impact may be having unforeseen consequences for Russia, China, the West, and of course for all former Soviet states.

The European Union’s ‘Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia‘ has now passed its 1st year of existence and therefore must immediately be judged!  Here are its original stated goals and origins and here is a one year assessment by ISN’s Robert M Cutler.  Now the ’strategy’ is a decade long process that hopefully will go on even longer and its ambitions must be considered rather large considering Europe’s presence in the region has been scant for years, but it is not without use to see how its doing so far.

Cutler calls the project’s a ’slow start,’ but one that has shown potential and should have mutual benefits.  The results have been ‘modest’ in his eyes as steps have been made, but it is too early to see any real change/progress involving relations between the two regions and concrete development on the ground.  Cutler is correct in noting that the EU has made major attempts to diplomatically and strategically engage Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but is also correct in noting that nothing concrete has come from their talks so far.  Though he fails to mention that in April of this year, an EU delegation to Turkmenistan seemed to come close to a gas deal, circumventing Russia with the Trans-Caspian pipeline, though nothing has become official as of yet.  Cutler gives the EU credit for pushing a degree of democratization in Kazakhstan, using their leverage concerning Nazarbayev’s 2010 OSCE presidency.  However, this influence is difficult to truly measure.  Concerning Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the former has been given poverty reduction to support 100,000 people in the southern part of the country and in the latter, the EU has pledged to help alleviate Tajik’s border patrol and drug trafficking problems, especially on its Afghan border.  In the end, Cutler is right in warning against the ‘Strategy’ becoming too disjointed, piecemeal, with individual policies spread throughout, and also acknowledges the EU’s difficult task of trying to garner influence in a region already beset by great powers Russia, China, and the US.

Two quick Euro items to point out; Though much of Europe {though not all} has been resistant to a greater presence in Afghanistan and the greater Central Asian region, France and its executive have made some positive, strong moves of late and its Foreign Minister Kouchner has ‘called on the international community to enhance security efforts in Central Asia and increase engagement in Afghanistan.’  Secondly, a new German embassy was opened in Tajikistan in late July with German ambassador stating ‘this proves that Germany will further remain a reliable partner for Tajikistan, and do everything possible to further expand bilateral cooperation within the framework of the strategy of the European Union.’
If all goes to plan, I will do a post later today about NBC’s coverage of the Xinjiang Province and the latest spasm of violence that has plagued the region.

Yesterday, all Bush’s problems seemed so far away. But now it looks as China’s authoritarian government is here to stay. The Chinese are shall we say displeased about the US House of Representatives resolution requesting China to honor their IOC commitments in regard to human rights, internet blocking, and treatment of its Tibetan and Uighur citizens and about Bush’s meetings with 5 Chinese dissidents. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman called the House measure an “odious conduct” and said the United States should stop “making use of so-called religious and human rights” issues to score political points. I have previously talked about how controversial these Olympics may become, as China’s government fears destabilizing and embarrassing terrorist attacks, political protests from a host of groups, and desperately desires to impress its domestic populace with a well-run games in which they can be proud of (and therefore keep the Communists in power). Having the world’s superpower voicing displeasure toward their policies and way of governance does not fit into this plan.

A story I briefly mentioned days ago, has gotten more bite to President Bush’s chagrin, though he appears to have had no direct role. The House has launched a congressional inquiry into a scandal involving a donation from members of the Kazak government to Bush’s Presidential library in exchange for diplomatic visits from Bush, VP Cheney, and Secretary of State Rice. The main man involved is Stephen Payne, a long-time lobbyist for Bush, who accompanied Dick Cheney on a diplomatic visit to Kazakhstan in 2006, a trip in which Cheney praised the Kazak government and did not mention human rights issues. At the moment, it is unknown how high up Payne received permission to work out such a deal or if the 2006 Cheney visit was a part of any agreement. To make matters worse, John McCain’s adviser Randy Scheunemann has lobbying connections with Payne. US national security and the spreading of human rights and democracy should never be short changed for financial composition. Payne and anyone else involved owes the US and the Kazakhstan citizenry an apology.

Lastly, it appears that there is concrete evidence of Pakistan’s intelligence services’ role in the July 7 terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul. The US also stated that they had evidence that showed the ISI informing insurgent elements of upcoming US attacks. These new details no doubt strain relations between Pakistan and the US and India.

Johannes F. Linn, a former World Bank vice president for Europe and Central Asia and current Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, recently made an extended visit to the region and has written a series of assessments on key issues facing the region. Today, I would like to discuss two pieces in this series in which Linn tackles CA’s water issues in great detail.

‘The Impending Water Crisis in Central Asia: An Immediate Threat‘: In this piece Linn layouts the region’s modern water history and current and coming water ‘crisis.’ On this site we have already discussed how the harsh winter combined with the current drought has cost the region’s energy and water sectors to be under great strain and how this has a dramatic impact on the region’s population, especially its poor. Linn argues that the region is in for a difficult year ahead, comparing its last major drought in 2000-2001, and that situation could quickly deteriorate into a ‘major humanitarian, economic and political crisis.’ This piece concentrates on Tajikistan’s dire situation, with Linn concerned that the upcoming winter may see seven million Tajik citizens with little or no electricity.

Linn highlights the complicated dance between the region’s countries, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan upstream and therefore controlling nations and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan as downstream nations depending on Kyrg and Tajik for water flows from the Amu Darya, Syr Darya, and Kambarata rivers and waterways. He reports that cross-border disputes along Tajik-Kyrg and Kyrg-Uzbek borders had flared up between March and May. The region’s states also failed to come to an agreement over water management during a June 27-28 conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, where Uzbekistan refused to accept Kyrg’s water discharge offer for the coming year.

The situation is very complicated and if you want to get a full picture of the region’s potential coming ‘crisis’ I suggest you read both of Linn’s pieces. So what should the region’s governments and international community do to stop or at least moderate these water/energy issues? Linn offers four steps for regional governments and the international community:

1. Conduct an ‘expert assessment’ of the Central Asian water adn energy shortage and its impact immediately. In other words, find out what the heck is going on.

2. Based on the above assessment, regional governments and international agencies should ‘plan emergency responses.’

3. The UN, international financial institutions, EU, China, Russia, and the US should use diplomatic mechanisms to make sure that the region’s water and energy problems do not develop into ‘open conflict.’ This is crucial.

4. An assessment of the region’s long-term prospects of water and energy balances, with an emphasis on the effect of climate change.

‘Water-Energy Links in Central Asia: A Long-Term Opportunity and Challenge‘: Linn’s second piece goes into more details about region’s dam and irrigation systems, specifically Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam.  Linn posits three options concerning the allocation of region’s transnational water resources:

A. Downstream countries (Uzbek, Kazak, Turkmen) could pay upstream countries (Kyrgf and Tajik) for the summer release of water stored in the winter, as was practiced in the Soviet-ruled days.

B.  Downstream countries could build dams and reservoirs on their territories to catch the waters released by the upstream countries during the winters for summer use.  Linn discusses how this has already been tried and has its setbacks.

C. (Linn’s optimal choice) Build dams and reservoirs along the same river or river system in sequence or as ‘cascades.’  Linn argues this would ‘allow the release of water from the higher reservoir for electricity generation in winter, but catching and storing the water in the subsequent reservoir for summer release.’

I am no expert on this subject, but Linn’s recommendations do seem to make sense, especially because he acknowledges the importance of creating a mechanism for the region’s states to work out these policies together, for if they cannot work together none of his recommendations would come to fruition.  In this regard, Linn suggests the creation of a ‘consortium of partners,’ which include all directly affected countries, regional powers (China and Russia), and international financial partners to help with funding the dams and power plants.

I will keep an eye on Linn and the Brookings Institution’s future pieces about important issues facing Central Asia.

Kazakhstan has found itself in the news lately, firstly, to no one’s surprise concerning energy resources, as the nation has begun building a natural gas pipeline connecting Central Asia to China and Gazprom’s recent announcement that they expect to double the price they pay for Central Asian gas (bad news for their Euro customers as Russia will not be the last entity to foot the bill). However, Kazakhstan’s leader, capital, and 2010 Chairmanship of the OSCE provide just a few other reasons for it to be in Central Asia’s spotlight.

Chairmanship of OSCE - OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb paid a visit to Astana last week and met with President Nazarbayev, leader of Senate, Foreign Minister Tazhin, and political party and civil society representatives. Stubb stated “Central Asia plays a key role in the OSCE, both as a region facing several challenges and as an active participant and supporter of the Organization’s plans to intensify engagement with Afghanistan.’ In reference to Kazak’s future chairmanship, Stubb stated the nation had a “unique chance to demonstrate its leadership by preparing carefully and by adopting and implementing reforms.” Now what could these reforms be, possibly democratic? Indeed, Stubb went on; “we welcome progress achieved so far, and hope to see swift continuation of reforms in fields such as media, elections and political parties.” Stubb went on to be more specific about these reforms, speaking of freedom of assembly, elections, religious freedom and religious associations, and ‘emphasized’ the ‘need for all political forces in society to have a chance to be heard.’ It would be a wonderful thing if Nazarbayev and the Kazak government could respond to these words and the 2010 chairmanship with real reform in these key sectors.

Ban Ki-Moon and Astana and Nazarbayev’s Birthday - UN General Secretary Ki-Moon spoke about Kazakhstan and its capitol and president’s birthday as well, but he left out the part about democracy. He expressed ‘admiration’ with the role the nation plays in the ‘provision of peace and stability’ in the region and gave his ‘warmest wishes’ to Astana’s 10 year jubilee and Nazarbayev’s birthday. Here is a quick history of the Kazak capitol. Nazarbayev has made quite the effort in modernizing the city in recent years and just made a speech detailing future improvements to what he calls ‘Central Asia’s first postindustrial city.’ In the speech, he discussed the development of high technological productions, service sectors, and the hope that the city will continue to become a regional business center. He concluded his speech, ‘Astana will be a city of high standards.’

One more bit of Kazak news: High level meetings have taken place recently between the leaders of Hungary and Kazakhstan as trade between the two states has considerably increased in recent years. A Hungarian diplomat stated that they consider Kazakhstan as a strategic partner.

That’s all folks, I hope I covered at least half of Kazak news.

In an incident that looks like it could be linked to two stories recently discussed on this blog, Russia’s energy policy in Central Asia and Islamic militant groups based in the region, a 20-mile section of a natural gas pipeline, which travels from western Kazakhstan into Russian territory, was shut down late yesterday after an explosion damaged the line.  There were no reported casualties or injuries and Russia nor Gazprom has commented on the incident just yet.  There is no word about what caused the blast and no one has claimed responsibility.  Terrorist and militant groups have attacked pipelines in nearby Pakistan and Nigeria on a regular basis.  It is pure speculation that I linked the region’s Islamic groups to this incident and I will keep tabs on any further developments.

Freedom House put two new reports out in June of interest: Nations in Transit 2008 Annual Report and Supporting Freedom’s Advocates?: An Analysis of the Bush Administration FY2008 Budget Request for Democracy and Human Rights (Follow the link down the page and download the pdf under ‘Past Reports’) These reports are linked in an unfortunate way, the decreasingly open and democratic nature of Central Asia’s regime is key to both of them.

The Nations in Transit report ‘measures progress and setbacks in democratization in 29 countries and administrative areas from Central Europe to the Eurasian region of the Former Soviet Union.’ In its overall analysis of the former Soviet States, specifically in Central Asia, the report stated; ‘In distinct contrast to the trajectories of the other regions, the former Soviet Union has moved toward a more deeply anchored authoritarian, democratic accountability is an ever-scarcer commodity.’ Dierdre Tynan of Eurasianet.org gives an overview and analysis of the report’s findings here.

The Transit report grades each country from 1-7, with 1 being the most free, on 8 different categories and then assigns a overall score. The categories are: 1. Electoral Process 2. Civil Society 3. Independent Media 4. Governance 5. National Democratic Governance 6. Local Democratic Governance 7. Judicial Framework and Independence 8. Corruption. In a sadly similar formula to last year’s Freedom of the World rankings for Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s scores could hardly get lower, ranking near the bottom of the world, 6.93 and 6.86 disrespectfully. Kyrgyzstan received the best score in the region, 5.93, with Freedom House calling its 2005 upheaval now a time of ‘lost promise.’ Tajikistan’s score worsened from 5.96 to 6.07, with Freedom House stating that ‘justice is bought and sold’ in the nation.

Concerning the analysis of the Bush Administration’s FY2009 Budget Request for Democracy and Human Rights, Deirdre Tynan also wrote up another overview and critique (I haven’t had time yet to read FH whole report). Tynan reports that FH is disappointed in the President’s proposed budget for two critical reasons; 1. A lack of transparency as to where exactly the money where go, for instance to help civil society, rule of law? 2. Though the budget request increased overall, funds for most Central Asian states fell. The report argues that the US government needs to put more funds in developing the civil society of the region, particularly Kazakhstan, and has harsh words for Russia’s presence in the region, calling it a ‘negative influence over its former Soviet neighbors’ and as sliding evermore ‘towards increased autocracy.’ Freedom House leaves out hope that Congress will put the money back in when they have an opportunity to appropriate funds.

I couldn’t agree more with Freedom House about greater transparency in the appropriation of these funds, we should know where and to whom they are going. And I am more than sympathetic to their promotion of greater aid to support Central Asia’s civil society, independent media, and promotion of the rule of law and free and fair elections, but there are indeed strategic elements to consider, such as energy supplies and the fact that we need to work with these authoritative leaders at time on issues such as Afghanistan’s security. To leaders like, Islam Karimov, Berdymukhamedov, and Nazarbayev this money is aimed at their removal from power and that can’t sit too well, not to mention that China and Russia both see it as an affront to their regional interests and influence.

However, in the end, these are two informative, important, and brave reports by Freedom House.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has made his second visit to Central Asia, this time stopping by Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan for the second time. Gas was apparently the only thing on the diplomatic menu. Medvedev and his Gazprom officials are wary of European and Chinese influence and engagement in the region’s energy resources, a sphere Russia has dominated for years, and this trip’s purpose appears to keep that monopoly intact.

Medvedev first went to Baku, Azerbaijan and reportedly told the nation that it was willing to buy up all of its Caspian Sea and land gas to keep it from heading to Europe via the BTC pipeline already functioning, or the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines in discussions right now. This would be a tall order for Medvedev to accomplish, as Azerbaijan has been courted by the West and strategically faced that way for some years now.

Immediately after this visit the Russian president visited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan before heading off to the G-8 summit. Russia/Gazprom already dominate gas flow from these two states, but it faces growing competition from Europe and China and therefore wants to solidify its position. Last December, Russia and these two states agreed to build a new pipeline a while later Russia agreed to up its price for their energy resources, both moves to hurt Europe/China’s chances of getting in ‘on the game.’ The purpose of this recent visit also appears to be for Russia to buy up as much of the two nation’s gas as possible in order to stifle any deals the states would make with the EU/China and India for that matter. Russia’s energy policy is not one of just paranoia, as China has just announced the start of construction of a huge, 30 billion cubic meter natural gas pipeline transversing from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and ending in its own Xinjiang Province and EU representatives are in serious talks with Turkmen officials about the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines.

(Photo: Medvedev with Azerbaijan President Aliyev: Source Asianews.it)