Afghanistan and Central Asia

In the early 90s, I used to listen to a Radiohead song called ‘Electioneering‘ from their groundbreaking album, OK Computer.  The song bitterly bemoans the UK/US electoral process and vote getting tactics by politicians and parties.  Though the song brilliantly and rather accurately portrays some of the unfortunate truths of our electoral system, it is a protest song that could only come from a stable, free state, and many of the items criticized by the lead singer Thom Yorke, would be welcomed in many of the worlds more autocratic states.

This thought came to me after reading Clifford J. Levy’s excellent article detailing the Russian election monitoring process in former Soviet states, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.  In the report, Levy details how the Kremlin is countering Western efforts to judge and monitor elections in the world to see how they measure up, that is how free and fair are they.  This is mainly done by the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Moscow now sends their own election observers, who Levy showcases as just there to put a legitimate stamp on otherwise corrupt and unfair elections.

Why would Moscow want to spend the money and time with their own monitors?  For one thing it gives a countering voice to the OSCE, an organization which called Russia’s own election in 2004, ‘far from fair.’ The process also protects the authoritarian regimes still loyal and dependent on Moscow, such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.  The Kremlin will create an illusionary vision of a fair and free election process to legitimize the process and government in the eyes of the nation’s citizens and its own.

Another reason I believe Moscow makes the attempt to legitimize these corrupt election processes is because of democratic norms that have started to pervade the international system.  Levy discusses how these former Soviet dictators, Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan and Lukashenko in Belarus, desire to be seen as ‘democratic’ to the world.  Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have been brutal dictatorships, but their leaders still hold elections where they receive nearly 90% or greater of the vote.  Why?  They want their the world to see them as legitimate and they think any election process, any at all, will give them more political weight at home and abroad.  Of course there are strategic reasons, such as building closer relations with the democratic West, which helps these leaders diversify their economic portfolio, but that can’t be the only reason.
Back to Russia’s role in these former Soviet states: Moscow desires stability and influence in their ‘near abroad’ and the war in Georgia and recent gas cutoffs to Ukraine have shown that they will push their neighbors around if this is challenged.  Scholar Stephen Blank’s ‘Military Rivalry in Central Asia‘ in great detail describes Russia’s domineering attitude and policies to the countries to their south.  Blank calls them ‘neocolonial’ and basically ‘domestic stability operations’, meaning that Moscow considers these former Soviet states basically just that, Russian states.  All of ‘Stans of Central Asia are authoritarian governments strongly connected to Putin’s government, with one small and important exception, Kyrgyzstan, which had a democratic orientated ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005, that scared the bejeebies out of Moscow.  Since that incident, Moscow, with a little help and competition from China, has tried to even further cement its military and political presence in the region in a desperate move to make sure this does not happen again.

After a lot of bellicose statements regarding confronting Moscow after the Georgian invasion, many have called for restraint and asked the question, ‘what does this have to do with us?’  Though I largely agreed that the US must have a realist viewpoint of the situation and not go overboard with rhetoric or antagonizing of the Kremlin, these stories of Moscow’s domineering attempts to keep pliable dictators in charge clearly shows that the West and United States need to take the great power seriously.  The growth of democracy and liberal ideals is not set in stone and aggressive autocratic powers such as Russia can have a tremendous impact as to how the world is shaped.

On Sunday, the a reported 94% of the people of Turkmenistan participated in the nation’s 4th Mejlis (parliamentary) elections. Turkmenistan’s government run Central Election Commission called the vote a great success and ‘historic.’ The election is supposed to represent a more open and democratic Turkmenistan, as the country’s President Berdymukhamedov earlier this year reformed the constitution, creating a little more space for open discussion and a Mejlis with a greater say in the government’s decision making. However, the election showcased just as many problems and old fashioned authoritarianism as the nation has become famous for.

Though the Mejlis’ 125 seats were contested by 288 candidates, all of them had to be approved by the state, were almost all members of Berdymukhamedov’s Democratic Party, and many voters had no idea who their local candidate was until election day. For the first time in the country’s history, foreign observers were allowed to watch the election process. The UN, OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the CIS all sent representatives to the state, a total of 60 people. However, the OSCE did not send a full monitoring team, saying ‘a genuine contest was impossible.’

Back to Turkmen state’s ability to pick and choose the candidates, journalist, activist Sazak Durdymuradov attempted to be a candidate, but was denied by the government for ‘unknown reasons.’ Sazak stated that he feared for his family’s safety by interviewing with RadioFreeEurope about why he was disallowed from his candidacy. When asked about whether these elections were a positive sign for the new constitutional reforms, Sazak called them ‘all the same games.’

I just finished watching Questar’s Modern Warfare ‘Russia in Afghanistan’ documentary and it contained some great and dramatic footage of the ten year war, which ended in yet another defeat of a world power in the Hindu Kush. Many elements of this bygone war are strikingly similar to the current NATO/Afghan government led war against the Taliban and other insurgents.

Though I could not find an excerpt of the film I watched, here is one from CNN that covers some of the same literal and visual material:

One of the main themes of the Afghan-Russia war was the Russian use of heavy, large military units and vehicles, which were countered effectively by the mobile and translucent mujahideen. The Russians massive mechanical army and tactics, like the insurgents’ small, but dedicated efforts, were visual symbols of the actors in the conflict. The Soviets were a great power with resources and technology at their side and the Pashtun mujahideen were seemingly weak and backward. We of course all now know what was the side to bet on, as the Russians were forced to leave their Soviet-backed government to be overrun at the end of ten years of fighting in 1989.

Many of the reasons for the Soviet defeat can be seen in today’s NATO/US conflict, but there are some ‘hopeful’ differences. The documentary wonderfully shows the beautiful, yet amazingly challenging terrain and weather of the Hindu Kush. The Mujahideen skillfully used the terrain to their advantage forcing the Soviets into bottlenecks and treacherous corridors were they could inflict the most damage. They also used an intricate system of caves to hide and fallback from Soviet offensives. Both of these attributes can be seen today, as the Taliban attack and then retreat into their mountain caves, daring US/NATO troops to come after them.

Another similarity is mujahideen’s growing strategic skills and aggressiveness. As the Soviet-Afghan war went on, mujahideen forces became more and more aggressive and started successfully targeting major military and government bases inside of Afghanistan. These attacks greatly reduced morale and the legitimacy of the Soviet-backed Afghan army. Unfortunately, this tactic has been used somewhat successfully by the insurgents in today’s conflict, as there has been increasing attacks in Kabul against government institutions, a major attack on French held military base, and of course the tremendously successful assault on a large prison, freeing hundreds of captured insurgents. These type of offensive attacks have led people in the West to question are ability to win the conflict. Lastly, the amount of resources, troops and money, being spent in Afghanistan by an outside power, before Russia, now the US, is another accurate comparison. The Russians spent millions updating their military and sending in ever more troops for the conflict and the US is indeed following a similar path.

As much as the similarities are evident in the two Afghan conflicts, there is also much different, with hopefully in a few years a stable, democratic Afghan society being the greatest example. The first major difference that comes to mind is the difference in Soviet and NATO tactics. The Soviets used a much harsher and blunt military and political strategy in the conflict, displacing millions of Afghans and killing hundreds of thousands. Though the US/NATO led conflict has indeed led to the displacement and deaths of thousands, the degree is to much less an extent, and it is definitely not the professed policy to do so. There is also a major difference in the Western and Soviet-backed governments in place during the conflict, as though both lack(ed) full legitimacy, there is still an important difference in degrees. The Karzai government was partially elected and is up for reelection this coming new year and has the support of almost the entire international community. This brings up another key difference, and that is the international and multilateral backing and participation of the current situation, something missing from the Soviet invasion.

Lastly, in a disturbing trend, the use of suicide attacks during this conflict is a dramatic change from the 1980s Soviet war. Though the Soviet war had many elements involving religious sentiments, including support by Saudi Arabia and from Muslims around the world, this current conflict involves tremendous religious overtones and Islam is a major recruiting tool for the Taliban and other insurgent groups. To me there is a stark difference in a guerilla war involving insurgency tactics and motivations and one involving suicide missions. It is a disturbing trend.

There are many similarities and differences between the two conflicts that I may have missed or did not have time to elaborate, so please fill me and my readers in by commenting. Do any of the similarities portend to what the conclusion of the conflict may be? Any of the differences?

With the Taliban showcasing great ‘tenacity‘ and ability to recruit new members from around the region to replace those lost, one must conclude that the Afghan government and its International supporters are in a fight for their lives. Hard decisions will have to made for them to win, including the eradication of the nation’s poppy crops and growers. Last week, I quickly mentioned this article, ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?,’ by Thomas Schweich, a top US drug official in Afghanistan for several years.

Schweich brings three main points to the plate in the article; 1. Karzai and the Kabul government lack the political will to stop poppy production and in fact many major growers of the crop form their powerbase 2. the insurgency is unlikely to end as long as the Taliban can support themselves with the drug money 3. the ’starving farmer’ is a myth, as most poppy growers are already rich and just using the lack of government and ISAF pressure to continue this lucrative practice.

Schweich catalogs the various times Karzai and his other corrupt police and ministry officials have downplayed the importance of poppy eradication, emphasizing that it would just hurt the poor citizens of his country. Citing a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, Schweich rejected the idea that farmers would starve without the poppy. For Schweich the ’starving farmer’ myth allowed…

’some European governments to avoid involvement with the anti-drug effort. Many of these countries had only one or two year legislative mandates to be in Afghanistan, so they wanted to avoid any uptick in violence that would most likely result from an aggressive strategy, even if the strategy wold result in long-term success. The myth gave military officers {US} a reason to stay out of the drug war, while prominent Democrats used the myth to attack Bush administration policies. And the Taliban loved it because their propaganda campaign consisted of trotting out farmers whose fields had been eradicated and having them say that they were going to starve.’

Schweich is especially hard on Karzai, claiming he’s only doing what’s best for his political survival and not the country, and the Pentagon, who he portrays as not wanting any part of the drug eradication business as it is not part of their mission of defeating the Taliban. But Schweich is correct, as Karzai and NATO forces cannot separate the poppy cartel from their efforts of governance and battle against the Taliban. The poppy’s are a crystal clear example of the weakness of the Afghan government, the law does not apply to the growers apparently and this undermines all other laws, and the Taliban need financing and sympathy wherever they can get it and the poppy fields provide both. This situation is very complicated and a lot can go wrong. Here are Schweich’s recommendations: In parantheses (hardest word to spell in the world) will be my comments and questions.

1. Inform President Karzai that he must stop protecting drug lords and narco-farmers or he will lose US support (Does the US have any alternative person to rule the government or to at least pressure Karzai with?) Karzai should issue a decree of zero-tolerance for poppy cultivation this next growing season and order farmers to plant Wheat instead, guaranteeing today’s high wheat prices. At the same time, he must authorize aggressive, force-protected manual and aerial eradication in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces (two of the heaviest growing areas, and bases for support for both Karzai and the Taliban)
2. Order the Pentagon to follow this strategy; create security pockets for the eradicators and help counternarcotic police arrest powerful drug lords (Will have to prove to them how this hurts the Taliban/insurgency, not foments it)
3. Increase the number of DEA agents in Kabul to assist Afghan judiciary in prosecuting key traffickers and corrupt officials (won’t this undermine the current government if tens of officials are arrested, even if its positive in the long term, could this short term instability further erode the government’s legitimacy and power?)
4. Get New Development Projects quickly to the provinces that become poppy-free. The north which already is poppy-free should receive significant rewards.
5. Ask NATO allies to ‘either help in this effort or stand down and let us do the job.’ (But make sure they understand our reasoning)

I am sympathetic to Schweich is all out eradication of poppies and corrupt war lords and officials, but this effort could have major blowback. Barnett R. Rubin, Director of Studies and a Senior Fellow at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation and the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, warns ‘Crop eradication puts more money in the hands of traffickers and corrupt officials by raising prices and drives farmers toward insurgents and warlords.’ But the alternatives are not pretty either. The Afghan government needs to gain legitimacy and halting this illicit activity, which appears to mainly benefit the Taliban and already rich growers, can go a long way in extending its reach in the south and showing its citizens that breaking the Afghan government law will beget punishments. A strong move against corruption and illicit activity could help begin the creation of a culture of lawfulness in the state, a place where the average person believes that their life would be better off following the rule of law than breaking it or letting others break it. A difficult issue to say the least, what do you think?

(Photo Source: New York Times)

Freedom House put two new reports out in June of interest: Nations in Transit 2008 Annual Report and Supporting Freedom’s Advocates?: An Analysis of the Bush Administration FY2008 Budget Request for Democracy and Human Rights (Follow the link down the page and download the pdf under ‘Past Reports’) These reports are linked in an unfortunate way, the decreasingly open and democratic nature of Central Asia’s regime is key to both of them.

The Nations in Transit report ‘measures progress and setbacks in democratization in 29 countries and administrative areas from Central Europe to the Eurasian region of the Former Soviet Union.’ In its overall analysis of the former Soviet States, specifically in Central Asia, the report stated; ‘In distinct contrast to the trajectories of the other regions, the former Soviet Union has moved toward a more deeply anchored authoritarian, democratic accountability is an ever-scarcer commodity.’ Dierdre Tynan of Eurasianet.org gives an overview and analysis of the report’s findings here.

The Transit report grades each country from 1-7, with 1 being the most free, on 8 different categories and then assigns a overall score. The categories are: 1. Electoral Process 2. Civil Society 3. Independent Media 4. Governance 5. National Democratic Governance 6. Local Democratic Governance 7. Judicial Framework and Independence 8. Corruption. In a sadly similar formula to last year’s Freedom of the World rankings for Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s scores could hardly get lower, ranking near the bottom of the world, 6.93 and 6.86 disrespectfully. Kyrgyzstan received the best score in the region, 5.93, with Freedom House calling its 2005 upheaval now a time of ‘lost promise.’ Tajikistan’s score worsened from 5.96 to 6.07, with Freedom House stating that ‘justice is bought and sold’ in the nation.

Concerning the analysis of the Bush Administration’s FY2009 Budget Request for Democracy and Human Rights, Deirdre Tynan also wrote up another overview and critique (I haven’t had time yet to read FH whole report). Tynan reports that FH is disappointed in the President’s proposed budget for two critical reasons; 1. A lack of transparency as to where exactly the money where go, for instance to help civil society, rule of law? 2. Though the budget request increased overall, funds for most Central Asian states fell. The report argues that the US government needs to put more funds in developing the civil society of the region, particularly Kazakhstan, and has harsh words for Russia’s presence in the region, calling it a ‘negative influence over its former Soviet neighbors’ and as sliding evermore ‘towards increased autocracy.’ Freedom House leaves out hope that Congress will put the money back in when they have an opportunity to appropriate funds.

I couldn’t agree more with Freedom House about greater transparency in the appropriation of these funds, we should know where and to whom they are going. And I am more than sympathetic to their promotion of greater aid to support Central Asia’s civil society, independent media, and promotion of the rule of law and free and fair elections, but there are indeed strategic elements to consider, such as energy supplies and the fact that we need to work with these authoritative leaders at time on issues such as Afghanistan’s security. To leaders like, Islam Karimov, Berdymukhamedov, and Nazarbayev this money is aimed at their removal from power and that can’t sit too well, not to mention that China and Russia both see it as an affront to their regional interests and influence.

However, in the end, these are two informative, important, and brave reports by Freedom House.

The battle for power, and political influence which begets it, is as old as human civilization.  Societies and States are not usually left wanting for people who want to be ‘in charge’ or ‘take power.’  However, how this is done, as in the process of acquiring and maintaining political power, depends greatly from one location to another and from one political system to another.  For instance, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, John McCain, Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, and many others very much desired to be the next President of the United States and they competed for this position within the American electoral system, which for all its ills and discrepancies, is rather democratic and fair.

On the contrary, the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan all have a political process that is far from fair and is constantly manipulated by the powers that be.  A few weeks ago I discussed Tajik’s political/governmental problems and this included the mysterious disappearance of Hasan Sadulloev, President Rahmon’s brother-in-law and powerful businessman.  It appears Sadulloev had presidential ambitions and this led to his strange vanishing.

According to a report by Eurasianet’s Farangis Najibullah, the Sadulloev incident is far from abnormal in Central Asian domestic politics.  Najibullah discusses the similar case of Rakhat Aliev in Kazakhstan, a former son-in-law to President Nazarbayev, who was charged with kidnapping, murder, and conspiracy to overthrow the government.  Aliev is now out of the country and faces a long prison sentence if he ever returns home.

Exile, prison, or death await those who threaten the political power of Central Asian leaders.  One should not be surprised by this unfortunately, as these governments are only accountable to themselves and their hold on power.  Even longstanding liberal democracies have their flaws, but they offer their citizens a chance to vet and have a voice in their next leader, something sadly most Central Asian citizens do not.

Najibullah ends her article on a hopeful note, stating that such corrupt stories as Sadulloev and Aliev’s, may continue to frustrate a population which is hungry, unemployed, and dissatisfied with its government and that this may one day lead to change.  He quotes a university professor in Osh, Kyrgyzstan; “It was presidential family members’ greed that brought Askar Akaev’s {former Kyrg President} demise, and it’s not impossible that the same scenario can be repeated in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere in Central Asia any day.”

Tajikistan, already one of the world’s poorest nations, has suffered much this year with a harsh winter, continuing health concerns, and with rising food prices.  But the worse could be yet to come as its President Rahmon’s rule appears to be showing some cracks and news reports about the country have titles such as ‘Who’s in Charge’ and ‘Tajikistan is not in control.’  Not that President Rahmon has gone out of his way to help his people or been at least an ‘organized’ autocrat, but the violent battle for power or overthrow of his rule could send the nation into greater chaos.

Two reports exemplify Rahmon’s weakening power; the strange disappearance of Khasan Sadulloyev, one of the nation’s most powerful business men and the President’s brother-in-law, and the government led attack on the Langariyevs’ household, who had fought ’side by side’ with Rahmon against the Islamic opposition during Tajik’s civil war in the 1990s. These instances seem to portray a government on its heels, trying to eliminate ‘enemies’ and possible power challengers.  Eurasianet.org calls the Sadulloyev incident a sign of presidential ‘dysfunction’ and a leader who does not have control over his own power circle.  The article references the fall of Kyrg’s President Askar Akayev in 2005 as a possible outcome for the Tajik leader.

In other, more positive Tajik news, Kazakhstan’s government has pledged to help build and finance Tajik’s much needed and sought after Rogun Dam project and Rahmon has stated that an ‘international consortium‘ would also help the impoverished nation get the dam operating within 4 1/2 years.  The dam would provide much needed electricity for the nation and the region as well.

Tajik’s Foreign Minister Khamrokhon Zarifi met with US Undersecretary of State for South and Central Asian George A. Krol on June 16 and discussed a ‘broad spectrum’ of issues concerning US-Tajik relations and agreed that the 4th meeting of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) would ‘become another major step towards development of regional trade and economic cooperation.’  TIFA is between the US-CA states and promotes the expansion of trade and investments in the region through the involvement of customs procedures in international standards.  US soft power one might say.

Still staying on the issue of Russia, Mark Dillen, head of an international public affairs consultancy and blog writer for FPA’s 2008 Presidential Election and Public Diplomacy blogs, attended and discussed the World Affairs Council of Northern California’s annual conference which featured a ‘Reading Russia’ series. Dillen discusses that most of the scholars present were pessimistic about Russia and its new President’s future, calling the nation and the leader ‘more authoritarian.’

However, Dillen found a Russian analyst who had a more nuanced view of the great power and its new leader, Dimitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Trenin sought to highlight the fact that though the Russian’s change over of power was anything close to a free and fair a election, it more likely resembled the choice of one really, really Super Delegate, it was still a peaceful, organized step-down and ascension of power in nation without a history of such an occurrence. Trenin also argues that it is in Putin’s interest to secure a ‘mature’ and strong President Medvedev. Trenin states ‘I think the West would be right to read this as a case of regency whose purpose would not be to give Mr. Putin a formal pretext for returning to power but rather to guarantee that Medvedev succeeds.’

We have talked about Robert Kagan’s new book arguing that Russia and China offer the world’s states another model for modernization, one based on authoritative government. And we have also discussed how the Medvedev/Putin changeover would affect Russia’s foreign relations, especially in Central Asia. Will Russia’s peaceful transition of power have any impact on the government and leaders of Central Asia? Most of the CA states have leaders for life or have consistently augmented their constitutions to secure their continued rule. Who do you agree with more, the majority of Russian scholars who are pessimistic about the great power’s authoritative nature and future or with Trenin, who sees some progress in the state’s recent governmental changeover?

In connection to Monday’s discussion of the power dynamics between Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and newly-elected President, Dmitry Medvedev, I want to now examine Medvedev’s liberal credentials. This of course will be discussed in the context that as President, Medvedev will most likely be playing a deferential role to Putin’s Prime Minister Office, but nonetheless he will have and most likely obtain greater power as his term proceeds. Medvedev’s views of governance, civil society, foreign policy, and Russia’s place in Europe, Eurasia, and in world politics, should shine a light on his future policies toward Central Asia. Future posts will go into specifics on Medvedev, Putin, and Russia’s policy toward the CA region under this new political alignment.

 

 

Though many scholars and journalist see a novel, and in some ways liberal, background in Dmitry Medvedev, most still predict that he will largely be just another Russian autocrat and/or Putin’s lapdog. The fact that Medvedev was never a Communist Party or KGB member, does not dissuade them from their beliefs. Nor the fact that in his time as Deputy Prime Minister, his initiatives included: an independent judiciary, an independent public television, and parliamentary oversight of the executive branch. It is widely viewed that Medvedev will continue Putin’s authoritative domestic path and aggressive foreign policy towards the West.

 

Journalist Pavel Felgenhauer argues that there will be little if any ‘liberalization’ or ‘thaw’ in Russian foreign or domestic policy during Medvedev’s new reign, as he believes Putin will amass all the nation’s power and money in his Prime Minister’s White House. Putin sent this message to the Russian and world public when he stated at a press conference with German Chancellor Merkel on March 8; “Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev is freed from the task of having to prove his liberal views, but I can tell you that he is just as much a Russian nationalist in the good sense as I am. I don’t think our partners will find him any easier to deal with.” Analyst Victor Yasmann, from Radio Free Europe, asserts that Medvedev will deceptively put on an exterior ‘face’ of liberalism to appease European and Western diplomats and businesses in order to promote Russian economic and political interests abroad. Both of these observers largely dismiss elements, his earlier mentioned initiatives and lack of security and Communist credentials, suggesting a more liberal, moderate Medvedev, and instead focus on his chairmanship of Gazprom over the last four years and his closeness to Putin.

 

 

Not all view Medvedev as a puppet of Putin or as the newest member in a long line of iron-fisted Russian leaders. Former US State Department special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union, Nicolai N. Petro, sees Medvedev as a ‘young, dynamic, liberal and patriotic leader’ who offers a ‘singular opportunity to re-engage with Russia.’ Petro catalogs Medvedev’s liberal policies; his work in judicial and legal reform, promotion of financially liberal policies, emphasis on a pragmatic foreign policy, and the importance he places in civil society and in NGOs ability to foster them. Petro, and he argues that Medvedev sees the situation similarly, sees the Yeltsin and Putin eras as a necessary period of consolidation, where the Russian government needed to re-establish central authority, shore up the domestic economy, and liberate politics and the media from the control of oligarchs who had been in place for decades during the Soviet reign. He argues that now that the situation has stabilized, Medvedev can ‘shift the focus’ from ‘consolidation to liberalization.’

 

Unfortunately, Yasmann and Felgenhauer’s analysis of the current and future state of Medvedev/Putin’s administration is the most likely scenario. History is hard to ignore when analyzing Russia’s present and in predicting its future, and liberalization does not appear strong in either. If one follows this belief, that Russia will continue to be more autocratic than a liberal society and government, its policies toward the Central Asian states should not change much in the near future. After all, Medvedev, as Chairman of Gazprom for the last four years, played an integral part in Russia’s energy, economic, and energy dealings in Eurasia and no one should predict any significant change in Russia’s policy. The authoritative leaders in Central Asia, specifically Karimov in Uzbekistan, Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan’s Berdymukhamedov, should expect a supportive and protective Russian government that will care more about stability in the region than in any type of political ‘openings.’

 

Is this assessment of Medvedev accurate? Or is he more liberal than most scholars and journalist give him credit for? If Medvedev is in fact more liberal, will he have the power to change Russian domestic and foreign policy? For that matter, what would a more liberal Russian stance toward Central Asia or the world look like?

 

Correction: It was brought to my attention that I misrepresented Freedom House Rankings on several earlier posts regarding each Central Asian nation. I mistakenly listed each nation’s score: Political Rights out of 10 and Civil Liberties out of 15. This was inaccurate, for each nation is given a score from 1-7, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least. The corrections have been made below and I apologize for any confusion.

On March 2, 2008 Dmitry Medvedev won Russia’s presidential election with just over 70% of the vote. He is scheduled to take over the Presidency on May 7, with Russia’s current President, Vladimir Putin, taking over as Prime Minister. This new alignment for Russia’s government raises many important questions for Central Asia and for the world at large:

How powerful will Mr. Medvedev really be? How powerful will Mr. Putin remain? Will they each garner influence in different spheres, with Medvedev being in charge of domestic issues and Putin maintaining his hold in foreign policy and grand strategy? Will the new administration have a new outlook toward the world and its neighbors, or will it be just ‘more of the same?” Will this new administration’s policies toward Central Asia change/evolve? Will Central Asian states’ policies change toward Russia?

These are just some of the relevant questions that will be examined on this page. As of right now, I would just like to make a curt, overall assessment of Medvedev’s rise, Putin’s switch, and Russia’s current and future policy toward Central Asia and beyond.

It can safely be assumed that Putin will retain a great amount of power in Medvedev’s new government and it is important to note that Putin can regain the Presidency in 2012. Putin already plans to represent Russia at next month’s NATO summit in Romania and has laid out an ambitious economic and political program for the country for the next twelve years. Medvedev has even already stated that he hoped to work in an ‘effective tandem’ with Mr. Putin. However, BBC reporter Bridget Kendall correctly argues that Russia has never comfortably had two ‘tsars’ in charge at one time. Kendall also notes that during Putin’s first year in office he appeared rather modest and awkward, much like Medvedev seems presently, but quickly turned into the strong-willed and powerful leader we see today. It is extremely difficult to predict how the power will swing in the Kremlin under this new political alignment.