Afghanistan and Central Asia

I just finished Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid’s Foreign Affairs piece on US/NATO Afghan and Pakistani policy, titled ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan.‘ Rubin, who has a blog and a forthcoming book, and Rashid are two giants in the field and I was looking forward at what they had to say about the current situation, especially with a new US administration coming in. Here are some of the articles major topics and policy recommendations:

Afghan Troop Surge

The authors frame a likely troop surge begun by Bush and almost definitely followed through by Barack Obama, as a policy that without a major overhaul of regional security issues will almost definitely fail. They posit that greater troop levels could protect local Afghan populations, giving police and administrative institutions a greater chance at growth and progress, and enable US/NATO forces to have to revert less to air attacks, which have resulted in civilian deaths, but they emphasize other policy prescriptions as having a greater chance at success. Another aspect they fail to mention regarding an Afghan troop surge is the possible coming to the negotiation table of certain groups who see the surge as a sign of US/NATO commitment and decide that they should strike a deal, aka the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. Rubin and Rashid are saying nothing new in that the situation on the ground will take more than just more feet on the ground, but their emphasis on the tenuous geopolitical situation of the region, especially Pakistan’s, is worth discussing further.

Pakistani Geopolitics

The best aspect of the whole article is Rubin and Rashid’s analysis of Pakistan’s, or at least their internal perceived, tenuous and insecure geopolitical situation. The authors layout the fears of the Pakistani military and intelligence agency regarding the current Afghan government, specifically regarding the possible long-term presence of US troops and its perceived and real alignment with Pakistan’s archrival, India. To them, Pakistan is a state surrounded by existential enemies, India, an Afghanistan allied with India, and the US, a state that though partnered with the country in the War on Terror, is also a major ally of India, which includes the recent signing of the India-US Nuclear Cooperation Treaty. In Rashid and Rubin’s eyes, these external enemies have led the Pakistani military and government see the Kashmir rebels and Pakistani Taliban as partners at times, willing to help to assist the state’s geopolitical objectives of undermining the Indian and Indian-allied Afghan government. Though I think the authors have gone a bit overboard in describing Pakistan’s external ‘existential’ problems, especially regarding the India-US nuke deal,as the US also works closely, just not publicly, with the Pakistani military on this issue, and I believe they overemphasize the Afghan-India alliance and under-emphasize the historical animosity between Afghan-Pakistan’s Durand Line and FATA situation.

Major Diplomatic Initiative

The main policy prescription given by the two experts is for an international diplomatic compact, which is able to relieve at least most of the region’s geopolitical insecurities. Most of the Initiative has to do with reliving Pakistani fears, which they argue would allow them to be a more productive partner in stabilizing Afghanistan and cooling tensions on the Kashmir issue. Here is a lengthy excerpt which describes some of the give and take between the international and regional participants:

A first step could be the establishment of a contact group on the region authorized by the UN Security Council. This contact group, including the five permanent members and perhaps others (NATO, Saudi Arabia), could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political vision for the future of the FATA from the Pakistani government, perhaps one involving integrating the FATA into Pakistan’s provinces, as proposed by several Pakistani political parties; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on the Durand Line and other frontier issues; involve Moscow in the region’s stabilization so that Afghanistan does not become a test of wills between the United States and Russia, as Georgia has become; provide guarantees to Tehran that the U.S.-NATO commitment to Afghanistan is not a threat to Iran; and ensure that China’s interests and role are brought to bear in international discussions on Afghanistan. Such a dialogue would have to be backed by the pledge of a multiyear international development aid package for regional economic integration, including aid to the most affected regions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, particularly the border regions. (At present, the United States is proposing to provide $750 million in aid to the FATA but without having any political framework to deliver the aid.)

A central purpose of the contact group would be to assure Pakistan that the international community is committed to its territorial integrity — and to help resolve the Afghan and Kashmir border issues so as to better define Pakistan’s territory. The international community would have to provide transparent reassurances and aid to Pakistan, pledge that no state is interested in its dismemberment, and guarantee open borders between Pakistan and both Afghanistan and India. The United States and the European Union would have to open up their markets to Pakistan’s critical exports, especially textiles, and to Afghan products. And the United States would need to offer a road map to Pakistan to achieving the same kind of nuclear deal that was reached with India, once Pakistan has transparent and internationally monitored guarantees about the nonproliferation of its nuclear weapons technology.

Reassurances by the contact group that addressed Pakistan’s security concerns might encourage Pakistan to promote, rather than hinder, an internationally and nationally acceptable political settlement in Afghanistan. Backing up the contact group’s influence and clout must be the threat that any breaking of agreements or support for terrorism originating in the FATA would be taken to the UN Security Council. Pakistan, the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, sees itself as a legitimate international power, rather than a spoiler; confronted with the potential loss of that status, it would compromise.

To the authors credit, they also go into ways US/NATO could assure China, India, Russia, and Iran that their presence is not to endanger their respected interests or security, but only to provide a stable, prosperous region. What the US expects is for the states and main players in the region, specifically the Afghan and Pakistani governments, to commit to combating international terrorism in their territory.

What do you think? What did you think about the article? What did I miss? What did Rubin and Rashid miss?

Last Tuesday and Wednesday, with the latter in a joint news conference with the secretary general of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Afghan President Karzai voiced his displeasure with international NATO presence in his country and called for a timetable of withdrawal. In front of Scheffer, he used more careful language, calling for a ‘timetable for success’, not withdrawal, but the point was made. Karzai went on to say:

“How long will this war go? Afghanistan can’t continue to suffer a war without end.”

These are valid questions anyone involved in this conflict should ask, but why is Karzai now starting to publicly criticize and be so demanding with US/NATO and all the international backing that helped put and keep him in charge? Is it because the Taliban seems stronger than at any point in the past seven years? Is it because he is speaking the voice of most Afghanis who are tired with the lack of progress and international footsteps all over their land? Or is it because Karzai is up for reelection in a matter of months and is using the international troops and presence as a political punching bag to make him appear more powerful and in touch with his citizenry?

All of these in some way probably true. Though the US/NATO/NGOS have made tremendous sacrifices for Afghan democracy and stability, progress in many areas has been minimal and violence is sadly still too much of an everyday occurrence for many Afghani’s, especially in the south. Karzai himself, is an embattled leader trying to show his people that he, not the foreigners, is in charge. It is for this reason why you won’t hear much backtalk from NATO or US officers or government officials (Condi Rice and Scheffer have already sidestepped the issue). The US/NATO want Karzai to appear and be strong to and for his people as they obviously want the Afghanis to take on more of the governing and letting Karzai voice his displeasure with NATO from time to time is part of this deal.

And it is not like there aren’t issues for Karzai and the Afghan people to complain about. The Taliban are still creating havoc in much of their lives and making it very difficult for many to lead normal lives. Civilian casualties literally hit the homefront in many ways, as Karzai has rightly protested against military mishaps that have led to many unfortunate, tragic deaths. The ArmyTimes has pointed out how local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), though have done some great and valiant work, in many ways undermine the local and federal Afghan government in their respected locations.

What do you think is behind Karzai’s public denouncements and calls for a ‘timetable’? How would you react if you were the international presence he was talking about? What would Karzai say if the US/NATO did decide that this was not an effort worth fighting for and then announce a withdrawal date? Can there really be something like a ‘timetable for success’?

With the Taliban showing no signs of retreat and with a new US administration entering office it is an appropriate time for all involved to ponder a NATO retreat from Afghanistan.

During the presidential debates and speeches, Afghanistan was discussed, but the issue of whether or not the US presence was either helping or exacerbating the conflict was not. Obama and McCain both were in agreement that the US should bring more troops to the nation, not less, in the belief that the situation needed more boots on the ground to police the nation and keep the Taliban in check. But are the current contingent of Western forces doing more to defeat the Taliban/Al Qaeda or to incite them to keep fighting on?

International Relations Professor Stephen Walt and Princeton Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter debate this issue. Here is the five minute video. To simply put their arguments, Slaughter is against leaving Afghanistan,asserting that it would give the Taliban/Al Qaeda a ‘major victory,’ while Walt is for withdrawal, arguing that our troop presence is only making the situation worse in what is looking like an ‘endless war.’ Walt persuasively demonstrates that the region of Afghanistan is not all that significant to US interests, being so far away and having such a small economy. This is no surprise as he is a leader of the IR realist school.

What Walt seems to be too quickly dismissing is the ideological nature and mission of many of the US’s enemies in the region and their proven ability to hurt US interests throughout the world. In fact, the CIA just came out with a report concluding that Al Qaeda was increasing its reach around the globe, specifically in Africa.

This debate between Slaughter and Walt is short and doesn’t not cover a multitude of issues as deeply as they deserve, but its an important start nonetheless. I have discussed this issue numerous times, but still feel the mainstream media is not covering it enough. I have also let it be known that I myself feel that the US/NATO effort in Afghanistan is worth the time, life, and treasure, but that we need to continually evaluate our strategy and build, build, build up the Afghan government, police, and military. But whatever my beliefs, it is vital that all of us have a greater understanding of the incredibly harsh conflict that we are in and who it is we are fighting for and against.

The financial crisis that began in the United States has made its presence felt around the globe and Central Asia is no exception. How is Central Asia’s greatest economic power, Kazakhstan, handling this economic crisis and how is the economic downturn effecting the stability, security, and development of the region. These were the main topics of a conference between many regional experts in Astana last month called “New Challenges and Kazakhstan’s Contribution to Stability and Security.”

Muriel Mirak-Weissbach, a scholar of the region’s economic and strategic outlook attended the conference and not only summarizes the major issues and policies discussed, but also provides a historical perspective of past economic crisis’s in Kazakhstan. Here is an excerpt of what Nurbakh Rustemov, the keynote speaker and Chairman of the hosting parliamentary committee, had to say of the economic downturn and its consequences:

“He bluntly stated that the world financial crisis was leading to a “misunderstanding” among geopolitical forces, and carried the danger of a direct threat to humanity, through hunger and poverty.(1) He called for uniting forces internationally, to overcome the financial-economic crisis, which he dubbed the “number one priority.” Rustemov mentioned the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which Kazakhstan is a founding member, as well as the OSCE, which Kazakhstan will chair beginning 2010, as bodies his government would like to utilize to find solutions to the crisis. Two concrete means that his country could use to impact the crisis, would be in securing energy resources, and providing grain and meat exports to alleviate food shortages.”

Rustemov is correct in stating that this economic crisis may lead to following and connected geopolitical disruptions and he’s also right in arguing that regional and multilateral groups, such as the SCO and OSCE, will be crucial in helping the world get through this mess in one stable piece. Another important aspect of his comments is the positive role Kazakhstan can play in impacting the crisis in a productive way and that is in securing energy resources and in providing food stuffs to alleviate shortages in other countries, specifically in harder hit CA states, such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan’s abundance of energy supplies, combined with President Nazarbayev’s prudent planning, have left the nation in good condition despite the tough times. Nazarbayev announced last month that the government would spend $2 billion to stimulate the economy, mainly targeting banks and the construction industry, funds drawn from the nation’s oil fund. Unfortunately, not all CA or world states have an oil fund to fall back on.

What the whole of Central Asia can hope for is sturdy economic stewardship by its regional leader, Kazakhstan, and help from regional bodies, both from the East and West to weather what will most likely be a lengthy recession. During this time, it will be vital to keep the region from falling into disrepair as poverty and extremism would both be on the rise and this may lead to conflict. The US, Russia, China, and the EU all have roles to play in mitigating negative ramifications of this crisis in the region, but a strong and active Kazakhstan is crucial. As Muriel Mirak-Weissbach concludes:

“Kazakhstan has become the foremost interlocutor in Central Asia, not only for Eurasian giants Russia and China, but also for the two major economies of western Europe, Germany and France. If the current world crisis can be overcome through participation of major Eurasian nations, Kazakhstan can become the linchpin in the region for stability and security.”

In addition, the US State Department announced a nuclear safety cooperation with Kazakhstan. Read Below.

The United States and the Republic of Kazakhstan reached a new milestone in a multiyear joint project to irreversibly decommission the Soviet-era BN-350 fast breeder reactor located at the Kazakhstani port of Aktau on the Caspian Sea. The participating governments completed a sodium processing facility that will be used to dispose of coolant from the reactor core. This action demonstrates and reinforces the strength of the U.S.-Kazakhstani strategic relationship, and our joint commitment to preventing the proliferation of nuclear materials.

First off, I would like to thank all the veterans throughout the world who sacrificed for their respective homeland. Military men, women, and families have given up so much so we can live in peace and prosperity and for this we owe them our highest respect and gratitude.

And at this very moment, soldiers, both foreign and domestic, are working to stabilize a dangerous situation in Afghanistan/Pakistan. As the Pakistani army tries to dislodge the Taliban from the strategic Bajaur border area, Afghan officials concluded a conference in Kabul regarding facilitating cooperation on security threats facing the nation and the whole CA region. Leaders of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and officials from Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Mongolia attended the conference, where they discussed ways to enhance border security and strengthen ties between law enforcement agencies throughout the Central Asia region. These two events, the Pakistani army battle for Bajaur and the multilateral conference on regional security issues are two vital components to increasing the chances of successful regional stability and progress. The nations of Pakistan and Afghanistan can not go alone in this conflict, but they need to be willing to make great sacrifices. In the same vein, international groups and nations need to not only provide lip service toward the conflict, but to truly engage themselves.

On another note, here is an update on the CA regional water agreement largely settled a few weeks ago. It appears Uzbekistan is likely to follow the prudent path and hopefully this will save the region’s people much suffering this winter.

On another other note, I started another blog discussing more general foreign policy and international relations issues called Great Power Politics.

(Photo Source: New York Times, Pakistani troops in Bajaur)

Two days ago, a French aid worker was the latest to be targeted by Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan. In this case the aid worker, who was reportedly an education specialist from an unknown NGO, was kidnapped by a small group of Taliban members, who in the process killed a young Afghan civilian. Reportedly 19 humanitarian aid workers have been killed so far this year, which surpasses the 15 victims of 2007.

Why are the Taliban targeting and killing/kidnapping foreign and local aid workers? Is it because they are foreigners who may be proselytizing Christianity or other religions? This probably has something to do with it. Though many of these aid workers are actually Afghans who share the Taliban’s Muslim faith, it is true that there are Western foreigners there from many different NGOs, making them more suspicious.

But I, and Stratfor agrees, believe that they are mainly targeted as way to embarrass/undermine the Afghan government and NATO troop presence. These workers are trying to spread education, health, infrastructure, business, and good governance in the nation, and if they are successful, along with the Afghan government, the Taliban are cooked. As in their ability to replace the government will become less likely. They need to foment instability and chaos in places where the Afghan government is present and solidify their rule where it is absent. Concerning NATO and foreign NGOs, many European nations and groups support for the ISAF and Afghan state building are becoming shaky and less long-term committal, and these aid worker attacks are not making them feel any better. The resolve of the Afghan people, Afghan government, NATO forces, NGOs, and NATO home citizens is being challenged by these Taliban attacks. We have to be ready to meet these challenges, for the alternative is a ruler who believes no one is safe, not even Muslim aid workers building schools.

(Photo Source: New York Times)

In honor of Election Day here in America, how about we remind the two presidential candidates of a tremendously volatile and challenging issue they will all of a sudden be responsible for; Afghanistan/Pakistan democracy and stability. President-elect Obama or McCain will face quite the number of tests, and defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda, bringing good governance to Afghanistan, and helping to stabilize Pakistan will be central to their administration providing international security.

The Bush administration set up a meeting with Obama and McCain’s advisor’s two weeks ago to brief them on the current situation. The meeting featured a who’s who of Afghan experts from the US, NATO, and UN, who briefed two foreign policy aides for each Obama and McCain. The aides were reportedly told that the situation was rather dire and that they would need to start setting up their strategy/policy for the war effort before they take office in January.

“The intent was to ensure that everyone understand that the situation is very fast-moving, and if the new administration spends three months trying to figure out what to do, it’s too late,” said one administration official who participated in the discussion.

The Bush Administration has in recent months been working on a new strategy for the conflict, already involving the addition of 8,000 troops and the naming of Gen. Petraeus as the head of Central Command, and I hope the President-elect and Bush’s administration can work effectively in formulating a comprehensive and stable transition plan.  This plan may have to include a greater willingness of starting negotiations with elements of the Taliban.

The 2008 election will not be decided on either candidates position on Afghanistan/Pakistan, the economy, Bush, and Iraq have trumped it, but the next president had better be ready for what is indeed a troubling and strategic situation in Central Asia.

Yesterday, I made a statement that it appeared that the Pakistani government was implicitly alright with the use of US drone predator missile attacks in their territory, as long they avoided civilian casualties. While according to statements by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry and several members of the country’s ruling coalition, this is not completely true. The Foreign Ministry and several parliament members requested the appearance of US Ambassador Anne Patterson so they could voice their protest of such measures to the US government. The For Ministry stated that the missile attacks should ’stop immediately’ as they argued that not only were they undermining Pakistani sovereignty and legitimacy, they were just adding fuel to the fire and turning the whole Pakistani populace against the US/NATO forces in Afghanistan. A report stated that many Pakistani’s even blamed the recent Marriot Hotel attack in Islamabad on US air strikes.

The US military/government and the Pakistani military/government are both smashed tightly between a rock and a hard place. The US desires to stabilize Afghanistan and keep its troops safe and they believe one of the best way to do this is to go after the Taliban and Al Qaeda elements were ever they may be, as was shown by a similar US strike in Syria against militant forces. The Pakistani government/military are fighting for legitimacy and the right to govern their own lands. Though we all know the issue is more complicated than just these two aims for each side, I would like to think that these goals can have one combined strategy. Afterall, the US would love to have a stronger Pakistani government that could effectively rule over all its sovereign territory and the Pakistani government needs some help in putting down the Taliban, at least to a point where many of them would be forced to negotiate.

How are the goals of the Pakistani government/military and US government/military congruent? Different?

Today I would like to go over recent developments in the conflict spanning the Afghan-Pakistan border as the conflict’s many sides (NATO, Afghans, Taliban, Pakistan military, Al Qaeda, and local tribes) have all recently been in the news for various reasons: The Bush administration has authorized even greater use of missile/drone attacks inside of Pakistan, the Pakistan army has made some headway into the tribal region of Bajur, Tribal leaders have attempted to once again rise up and challenge the Taliban, and Afghan and Pakistan tribal and political leaders have moved ever closer to negotiations with elements of the Taliban.

US forces have been using drones to target Al Qaeda and Taliban units since the beginning of the war, but this strategy has increased greatly of late and has moved ever deeper into Pakistan sovereign territory. Slate’s William Saleton catalogs many recent attacks, including one yesterday in which 20 people were reportedly killed, and argues with evidence from a New York Times article that despite claims from Pakistani officials, their government tacitly supports this tactic.

What the Pakistan government is adamantly against in the presence of US/NATO troops on their territory, as their officials argue it undermines their legitimacy. This is indeed true, but the US needs to see some results from the Pakistani military that these border regions are being governed and policed. While it appears that the Pakistani military, long accused of making deals that favor the Taliban, has made some progress in the Bajur area of the tribal belt. The region has been deemed a ‘mega sanctuary’ for the Taliban militants and after two months of hard fighting the Pak military has caused an outright fleeing of militant elements from the area. However, the holding of this strategic region will be the true test of the will and ability of the Pak military, this is indeed a welcome development.

Another encouraging sign is the slight reintroduction of lashkars, or tribal militias, into the fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in the tribal regions. These tribes and their leaders have been decimated, first by the Pakistani gov in the 1980s (with US help) in their fight against the Soviets, and recently by the Taliban since 2001, who have strongly challenged their rule in the tribal regions. Despite great mortal threat to their lives, many lashkars are rising up, and supporting the Pakistan army in removing the Taliban from their regions. It seems impossible to imagine the Taliban defeated without the help and reemergence of these lashkars.

Lastly, a delegation of Afghan and Pakistani officials met in Islamabad to approach the issue of reconciliation with elements of the Taliban who would recognize both state constitutions and renounce violence. The US remained quiet on this issue, weary of former Pak gov deals with the militants, but has stated that it supports reconciliation with those elements who give up violence. Here is an excerpt:

Pakistani and Afghan leaders vowed Tuesday to seek dialogue with Taliban insurgents, saying the “door is now open” for reconciliation.

The declaration by political and tribal leaders adds force to existing moves in Afghanistan and Pakistan to talk to the militants amid what appears to be growing international recognition that dialogue with moderates is key to ending the violence.

Former Afghan Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah said both countries would talk only with those militants who “accept the constitutions of both nations,” but did not explicitly say they must first disarm.

Another delegate to the two-day talks between political and tribal leaders in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad said that the offer was not open to al-Qaida members blamed for some of the worst violence in both countries.

Just like the reemergence of the lashkars and more strategic uses of attacks in border tribal areas, negotiations with elements of the Taliban that are willing to live peacefully in the region will be necessary for a conclusion to this current conflict.

What do this new, and old, developments and strategies mean for the future of this conflict? Are these positive developments or just one more part of a long, sad story?

(Photo Source: New York Times: Tribal Militias with the Pakistani Army)

How does one reconcile the governmental promotion of atheism in a society with strongly entrenched religious beliefs and customs? The Chinese communist government has tried to square this circle for years now, and the Xinjiang Province’s Uighur Muslim majority has proven its greatest challenge. Edward Wong of the New York Times explores this societal conflict and reports on the most recent Chinese government efforts to control and undermine Xinjiang’s Uighur Muslims.

Here is a portion of Wong’s article where he discusses rising Chinese government attempts to restrict Islamic practices in Xinjiang, emphasizing that a more serious ‘crackdown’ may be in the works:

Many of the rules have been on the books for years, but some local governments in Xinjiang have publicly highlighted them in the past seven weeks by posting the laws on Web sites or hanging banners in towns.

Anti-China forces in the West and separatist forces are trying to carry out “illegal religious activities and agitate religious fever,” he said, and “the field of religion has become an increasingly important battlefield against enemies.”

The Chinese government does indeed face a violent threat from extremist elements in Xinjiang and from foreign sources who support the province’s muslims, but these crackdowns and rules targeting Uighurs are mainly imposed to further expand the government’s rule over the region. Wong details the government’s efforts in controlling Uighurs’ Hajj to Mecca and Ramadan practices, both sacred rights for all Muslims. The Chinese government fears the spread of Islamic radicalization and separatist motivations and organizations, and both of these they believe can be combatted if they strengthen their control over the Xinjiang region and its people. That is why the government has been importing Han Chinese into the region in great numbers, diluting the Uighur majority and their cultural and societal norms, and building infrastructure, specifically railways, which connect the region to Central Asia and more importantly, to eastern China.

How successful do you think the Chinese government’s anti-religious and anti-Uighur custom laws have been and will be? Are these measures, some quite oppressive and restrictive, more likely to sow a more governable and stable state for the Chinese government or are they more likely to foment greater amounts and degrees of radicalization and separatist feelings and actions? What would a McCain or Obama administration policy be towards the Chinese government’s treatment and efforts in Xinjiang?

(Photo Source: New York Times)