Afghanistan and Central Asia

UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon has designated 2008 as the Year of Water Sanitation, a worthy effort which dovetails into public health and climate change issues–and which Central Asian states could use to their benefit.

According to the UN, investing $10 billion a year could halve the proportion of people without basic toilet facilities by 2015.  This grimy state of affairs affects 2.6 billion people worldwide, and not just aesthetically.

Public Health vs. Polio:
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, polio, spread by fecal-oral contact, continues to be a public health problem.  Afghanistan has had an immunization program over the past year at enormous effort; Pakistan needs one desperately.  Dr. Chan at the UN’s World Health Organization has stated that the last pockets of polio incidence are also the most expensive and difficult to reach–Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Nigeria.  Cultural differences, difficulty in understanding the vaccine regime, and security and transportation problems  frequently hinder efforts.  Hardline preachers in the Pakistani tribal areas have forbidden health workers to immunize children, as late as August of this year.

Rotary International, a long-run enemy to polio virus, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are jump-starting the continued effort with a grant to WHO of USD 2 million.

“An estimated 42,000 people die every week from diseases related to low water quality and an absence of adequate sanitation,” U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in a statement announcing 2008 as the Year of Sanitation.   Water-borne diseases such as botulism, cholera, and typhoid mostly affect children.

Climate change:
Add to the fact that climate change hits poor countries the hardest–and water quality in poor countries is the worst.  What this means is that water sources themselves become exploited in a heightened fashion, because water itself is not taken care of downriver.  The effects of climate change in Central Asia’s aquifers and in Xinjiang make it more important than ever to safeguard and safely treat/sanitize the water that is available.  It’s a great program for 2008.  I hope Central Asia officials are busy writing their grants for water sanitation projects–Today–at the very latest., for their major rivers and their dead lakes, their sewage infrastructure, and whatever else that they can think of that will bring water quality up for human use–and for human industry–and human health.

Further Reading: Wikipedia on Poliomyelitus, a disease spread by poor sanitation

Photo: BBC

International Community News:
Since The World Bank (the affectionate name for the United Nations’ International Bank for Reconstruction & Development or IBRD)  is having their annual meetings this month, there’s a lot of development news out there.  Central Asian governments who want to access the Bank’s programs need to know what priorities the Bank is currently working with in order to tailor their requests . . .  especially since the international aid environment is very tight right now.  Partly that low dollar-supply for aid is related to rising energy costs, which make food cultivation and distribution much more expensive for poor and developing states–and for the aid agencies that assist them.  

Agriculture
First, the IBRD is citing a new emphasis on small agriculture world-wide.  Though the report mostly covers Africa, it could be good news for farmers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 

Poverty Reduction, Development
Second, the President of the World Bank Mr. Zoellick will also be visiting China on behalf of poverty-reduction efforts later on this year. 

Third, Mr. Zoellick is also on record as saying that the private sector can take point on many development projects with the IDA and IFC arms of World Bank activities.

Environmental & Energy Issues
Fourth, in time for the Environment for Europe Conference (October 10-12, 2007), two key World Bank reports are out on Central Asia.  “Integrating Environment in Key Economic Sectors in Europe and Central Asia”, and “Integrating Environment into Agriculture and Forestry: Progress and Prospects in Eastern Europe and Central Asia” .  The Conference was held in Belgrade.  Here are some of the findings of the reports:

Failure to integrate environment into agriculture and forestry will have major economic and human health implications. For example, soil salinity in Uzbekistan is estimated to cost that country over €700 million per year, nutrient contamination of the Baltic Sea primarily from agriculture and forestry is estimated to have caused up to €4.5 billion in damages.

These two reports are available at this portal page.

Fifth, the IBRD will be increasing its funding for energy provision, particularly technologies under its Clean Energy Investment Initiative.  The Bank hopes to fund this with USD 10 billion over the next three years–as opposed to the USD 7 billion of the preceding funding period.  

The Asian Development Bank is also earmarking USD 1 billion for China and India for its Clean Energy and Environment Programme. 

Just an update. . . Have a great day, everybody!

. . . . is water, although one wouldn’t think so by the amount of ink and electrons we spend on hydrocarbon disposition.

First, you have to have water to drink, wash, and grow crops; potable water is also required for reliable manufacture of pharmaceutical, cleaning, and other chemical products.  Agriculture employs most of the people in Central Asia and represents in all states a significant part of GDP.  In a region that is aird desert with some rivers, water regimes have always been paramount.  Yet, since 1991, the history of Central Asian water regimes has reinforced the waste of water and unfair dealings by downstream states, who gain the water, and yet rely upon the upstream states to build the infrastructure. 

Trouble in River City
Now that upstream states have investors for upstream projects, who want return for investment, there’s going to be trouble in Central Asia’s riverine regimes.  For one thing, over time and right now, there will be less water available for all functions for which it seems useful.  And as upstream states develop self-help, downstream states cannot rely on state dysfuntion to gain them unpaid benefits.

According to Itar-Tass on August 28, Tajikistan’s president Rakhmon has informed his citizens to prepare for a cold winter, because water levels have decreased this year and the energy hydropower is not forthcoming.  You can bet that if water does increase in output, Tajikistan will be diverting quite a bit of it for power generation in order to increase its ability to develop a viable economy.  Of course, then it does go downstream to Uzbekistan like before, but once all this hydropower investment is made, the water courses are more manageable and can be controlled from upstream. 

In the absence of upstream water management, Uzbekistan sometimes had to contend with flooding, but in general the state did not have to take care of its relationship to Tajikistan in order to get water downstream.  Now Mr. Karimov is going to have to make nice:  well, it’s never too late to learn how, is it?

Specifically, Uzbekistan’s greater power in the we-provide-utilities-and-you-provide-water arrangement is going to change:  in the past, Mr. Karimov could turn the valves on a pipeline any time he wanted to protest a neighbor states’ behavior or policy.  For instance, after the Andijan Massacre in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan held tight to international law and refused to expel Andijan refugees from their country.  Mr. Karimov took immediate revenge on Kygyzstan’s poor by cutting off lack fuel from Uzbekistan that winter. 

Now, the Kyrgyz republic pays for part of the energy it gets from Uzbekistan and barters water for the rest.   But as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan become energy independent, Mr. Karimov’s leverage dwindles.  Furthermore, as Tajikistan (and maybe even Kyrgyzstan) begins to export energy and manage water, the power not only equalizes but tips in the other direction.

If you don’t give, you don’t get:
Therefore, Mr. Karimov’s rather sulky statements during the SCO Summit about water control has some people speculating over future water spats, which could also include military actions (they certainly have done so in the past).  Mr. Karimov, according to Jamiyat at neweurasia.net, told the assembled heads of state that “you have all forgotten the Aral Sea”.

This is not an accurate statement, considering that Kazakhstan has invested in trying to bring the North Aral back to health.  On the other hand, Uzbekistan may not have forgotten but has certainly ignored the plight of the Aral Sea.  It may not have forgotten but has certainly ignored the numerous experts who have tried to achieve sustainable water regimes in the area.  In general, Uzbekistan has been one of the spoilers of every sustainable program–not alone, mind you–but consistently. 

Uzbekistan’s power as the regional center
With all of the dam improvements and hydropower installations going in upstream, the balance of power between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is also undergoing a sea change.  In the past, all water cooperation regimes in Central Asia were like the ICWC, (Interstate Commission on Water Conservation), that is headquartered in Uzbekistan. 

When all of the Aral Sea Basin states were cooperating, at least nominally, then Uzbekistan’s central location made this a reasonable idea.  However,  as seems perennial in Uzbekistani relations, this position of power rarely resulted in acknowledgement of other stakeholders, and (as already noted)  nearly never to upstream stakeholders.  Since Tajikistan has been forced to take this problem into its own hands, Uzbekistan’s hard-line stance has not paved the way for future cooperation–that is, if there is enough water to be had.

The legitimizing factors
When it comes to diverting water, upstream states do have some power, but it is heavily curtailed by international law.  The UN Right to Water notes, and many court cases, have ruled on this issue: along riverine watersheds, all states have a legal stake in the disposition of the water.  Generally, the advantage goes to downstream states because they are usually more greatly populated and have more industry and agriculture (think deltas instead of mountains).  But it will be a very new question when there is not enough water to support life upstream in the mountains as well as down in the flatlands.

Again, Mr. Karimov has not kept the legal high ground.  Not only has water management been lax, but energy needs and exchanges for water between Uzbekistan and upstream states have always been used by Uzbekistan to punish upstream water providers.  Since Uzbekistan regularly cuts of fuel supplies in the winter, whether for non-payment of bills by its less-rich neighbors, it can hardly claim a humanitarian outlook on resource-sharing. 

If Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan cannot depend upon energy supplies or water infrastructure cost-sharing from Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, then they may well argue in international court that they are obliged to provide these commodities for themselves.  This strengthens all hydropower investment claims on their part and leaves Uzbekistan low and dry.

So, hey.  The shoe’s on the other foot.  Or, Mr. Karimov is waiting for the second shoe to drop.  Or, maybe, he is going to have to depend upon a mercy from those to whom he has not shown any.  Yeah, that last one: that’s the one.

But however just or fair this may sound, in the end it’s the people who suffer: all of them.  And these kind of disputes are just one harbinger of the new resource wars and disputes of the future: when in Central Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the American West, there is not enough water in all the places that need it.  It’s water: it’s more important than any other resource on earth to sustain life and build economies.  It just doesn’t get as much ink or as many electrons. . . for now.

The world is an interesting place, and Central Asia among the most interesting regions of the world.  Now getting caught up for the week:

Central Asia General:
–In an interesting counterpoint to most discussion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization written in English, Japan Times has editorialized that the SCO is of benefit to the world community.  

Kazakhstan:
–Son-in law troubles part I.D. 3. b. iii.: RFE/RL reports that charges are mounting in Kazakhstan against Mr. Rakhat Aliev.   It is alleged that the charges are supposed to dissuade Mr. Aliev from testifying in the Kazakhgate case, where illegal transfers of oil and cash paved the way for insider deals and opaque profit-taking.  Oh, and Mr. Aliev’s father, Mr. Mukhtar Aliev, has been charged with excess ordinance in the home.  Hmmm.   Like explosives in the dining room?  Was there going to be a coup?
–Son-in-law troubles part II: Dinara Nazarbaeva’s husband, Timur Kulibaev, was recently fired from his position at Samruk, Kazakhstan’s state holding corporation.  Mr. Kulibaev has served as an executive at both KazMunaiGas.  Mr. Kulibaev and Dinara Nazarbaeva made this year’s Forbes billionaire list, and are also part-owners of Halyk Bank (not Nurbank).
–Besides the trouble at Kashagan field, Kazakhstan’s KMG is doing pretty well: they bought 75% of Romania’s RomPetrol this week to expand their European business.
–Kazakhstan’s opposition is asking for a new election, since a. the election had some irregularities and b. because no opposition gained Parliamentary access, failing to garner at least 7% of seats in the legislature.  I say go for it.
–U.S. expatriate Mark Seidenfeld has been acquitted on first appeals in court on August 20th.  It looks like a few steps more in the process before the end–for instance, New Charges, reported at the Save Mark Seidenfeld site.

Kyrgyzstan:
–Go Alaska!; Go Kids!; Go Pay the Bills!!!!: If the U.S. pays its utility bills at Ganci AFB, it’ll be ahead of Russia on civil-military goodwill immediately.  Right now, the Russian military is using flashlights. . . while the USAF personnel are refurbishing a playspot in the area.   Alaska’s Air National Guard is sending 31 personnel to Kyrgyzstan from Fairbanks for six months, part of a new 150-person deployment to change things up at Ganci.
–When film piracy kills an industry, at Regnum.ru.
–Moving the capital of Kyrgyzstan?  Probably not, but it recalls the North-South divide in Kyrgyzstan’s politics.
–Kyrgyzstan’s government gets more say in the works and profits of its Kumtor mine, by acquiring more shares in a Canadian Mining enterprise.
 
Mongolia:
–Dateline, Ulaan Bataar: President Parvanov of Bulgaria is on a five-day visit ending September 1st to boost Bulgarian-Mongolian trade relations, in mining, tourism, and small enterprises.  
–Also, Mongolia will host talks between Japan and the DPRK September 5-6, in order to normalize diplomatic relations between its two guests.  This is a step the 6-Party Talks process where Mongolia has again been an invaluable aid to dialogue.
–China and Mongolia agree to protect a common cultural heritage: the long-song.  I loved this so much I wrote today’s Casual Friday post on the issue: check it out!

Tajikistan:
–Tajikistan’s new bilateral investment opportunities with Qatar, Afghanistan, and India  were covered earlier this week.  However, Tajikistan can set up all the free economic zones (FEZ) it likes, but needs basic infrastructure and reliable energy before they’ll turn around the economy.

Turkmenistan:
–Russia’s LUKoil sets its sights on Turkmenistani contracts.  In the meantime, the Turkmenistan pipeline to China is underway.
–Turkmenistan’s teachers must wear high-collared dresses with skirts that reach to the ankle.
–Turkmenistan’s farmers, the price of cotton, and unofficial/official rates of inflation inside the state at IWPR. 

Uzbekistan:
–Get in on the betting pool concerning Karimovian non-elections at Registan.net.   Every scenario–from the depressing to the action / adventure option is being discussed, but not really for money.
–Between the rock and the stone: Uzbekistan’s economic migrants face dangers and prejudices in Russia, as reported by Jamiyat at NewEurasia.net.
–Formerly-approved Presbyterian church becomes unapproved, at Forum 18.

Xinjiang:
–Two Xinjiang athletes, one a mountaineer, the other a ‘Dawaz’ acrobat, will carry the Olympic torch for Beijing 2008.
–Second pipeline route is mapped, from Central Asia to the Pearl and Yangtze Rivers.
Due to Xinjiang’s crazy weather this year, the cotton harvest is being delayed.

Bringing you news from the steppes and the mountains in one tidy package.  Almost everyone appears to be lying on their sofas with a cold compress after the heady weeks of SCO activities just past, so this’ll be brief. . . uh, more brief.

Kazakhstan:
–Another attempt to extradite Mr. Rakhat Aliev, according to Thursday’s RFE/RL Newsline.  In that same entry, Mr. Aliev’s “father Mukhtar, a prominent member of Kazakhstan’s Academy of Sciences, was prevented from boarding a flight from Astana to London on August 21 on the grounds that he was involved in an official investigation into possible weapons-related charges.”
–ENI is in trouble: further delays on the Kashagan field have made Kazakhstan weary, and they are now threatening closure on the project due to environmental considerations.  Okay, commentators, be fair: there are environmental considerations such as the seal deaths, and also, Kashagan is an enormously difficult project, more difficult than even ENI forecast.  Changes are due to be made, but ENI can still salvage this with a little proactive corporate diplomacy.
–Pre-SCO Summit,  Mongolia’s President Mr. Enkhbayar visits Kazakhstan with his retinue for talks.

Kyrgyzstan: 
–New arrests for spying in former defense and government officials.  The last two were charged with intrigue with China.  We’re still waiting to hear the details on these two.
–Torture deaths in Naryn, Northern Kyrgyzstan are being investigated by local and international human rights groups.  
–Iran sent a gracious message to Kyrygzstan on Kyrgyzstan’s National Day.
–Dateline, Cholpa-Ata: A meeting of EurAsEc Judicial Ministers in the Issyk-Kul Oblast.
–Russia plans to spend USD 2 billion in Kyrgyzstan’s economy, and beef up its military presence there.  The article talks about forward air base capacity, but I suspect counternarcotics are part of the plan. 
–Kyrgyz volunteers have paid USD 132 into a special fund to pay off USD 200 billion in external debt, because they trust their government that much.  So the government employees finally coughed up another 3632 bucks, I’m sure on their own initiative.

Mongolia:
–Chinalco has purchased controlling interest in Yunnan copper, which means China will be prospecting in Mongolia for the metal.  Canada’s Western Prospects has had site licenses revoked in the state for uranium.  Canada’s Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe are still working on legislative approval for a copper-and-gold deposit.
–Mongolian falcons go to Arabian countries, licensed, or, poached.  See also this longer article.

Tajikistan:
–Panj River Bridge set to open.  Vadim at NewEurasia and FPA Central Asia talked about this months ago, but this article discusses its state-of -the-art construction and the opportunities it presents for Aghanistan and Tajikistan.  Ribbon-cutting ceremony due on the 26th.
–A lot of religious regulations.  A lot of economic regulations. 

Turkmenistan:
–Amnesty for eleven, reported here yesterday.  Eurasianet is saying that this is accompanied by futher secret arrests of other top-level officials, also covered here.
–U.S. Congressional delegation and U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom to visit Ashgabat for increased bilateral ties.
–Austria to seek greater bilateral ties.
–Turkey and Iran to join in a joint venture for power plant in Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan:
–Already reported here at FPA Central Asia: a new report from International Crisis Group on Uzbekistan’s virtually-unseen elections, now picked up by RFE/RL, Bloomberg, BBC. 
–Uzbekistan closed its border with Russia for four days because too much Uzbek produce was being exported to Russia (for higher sales price).  This drove local prices up, so an immediate intervention occurred, creating shortages in Russia’s Siberia and Urals regions.  You know, this is not the way to run an economy.  . . the dots stand for curse words . . .
–Iran sent gracious messages of fellowship to Uzbekistan for its National Day.
–Kazakhstan has extradited 56 Uzbeks in the last two years to Uzbekistan, mostly post-Andijan refugees associated with the Akramiya movement.

Xinjiang:
–Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao visited the XUAR for four days this week.  For those of you following the The Beat, you know that Xinjiang has had one natural disaster after another over the past year: floods, earthquakes, windstorms, and mudslides.  This week, more heavy rain and snow (in August).  Mr. Wen promised to provide earthquake-resistant housing and flood-control measures.  He also stressed the importance of bilingual education so that Uighur minorities could tap into the Chinese economic miracle.  A nice article from CCTV.

Photo: UMKC.edu; Mongolia Times

Have a great weekend, everyone!

The Caspian sea is one home of the sturgeon, a large, unprepossessing fish that provides the world with one of its most tasty delicacies: caviar.  On August 11th, delegates met in Ashgabat in a regular meeting of the Commission on the Biological Resources of the Caspian Sea to discuss revising the quota system between the states for Caspian sturgeon fishing. 

Two big obstacles to fishing controls obtrude: first, there is significant poaching in Caspian waters, which makes quotas unenforceable.  Rampant poaching (estimated at 70% of the annual harvest) undermines the efforts to control overfishing which will decimate the species.  Second, pollution, particularly from oil spills, can severely decimate the sturgeon population.  Sturgeons are bottom-feeders, who nudge earth away from their shellfish dinners.  Therefore, pollution has the ability to kill not just fish, but their links on the food chain.

Politically, the Caspian Sea is still a realm of ambiguity in international law.  Parts of its jurisdiction are held in trust; other aspects of Caspian offshore ownership are owned by states.  The distinction as to whether the Caspian is a ‘Sea’ or a ‘Lake’ sets a precedent for either individual ownership or condominium rights.  Perhaps partly because this distinction has not been settled to Iran’s satisfaction, it is not a member of the Commission.  Without commission membership, Iran pretty much fishes as it will–over 50% of the catch estimated.  However, Iran is making calls for conservation and the use of aquaculture.  They were present at the Ashgabat meeting.

Primitive Fish in the Space Age: Satellite Tagging
In order to preserve the Genus of sturgeon that produce caviar, scientists in Kazakhstan have tagged some sturgeon to study their migratory habits via satellite.  The tagging occurred in May of 2006, shortly after a conference in Ramsar, Iran, of the World Sturgeon Conservation Society.  At that conference, the Ramsar Declaration on Global Sturgeon Conservation was proclaimed.  Iran’s waters are also known for their various sturgeon species, and they are estimated to fish about 50% of Caspian sturgeon each year.

As usual though, the problem is not space, but here on earth: the Ramsar Declaration is available in English and German: but not Russian, Farsi, Azeri, Turkmeni, or Kazakh.

Poaching, oil, lack of enforcement, lack of agreement, lack of translation:

Good luck fish.

Further Reading:
The World Sturgeon Conservation Society (WSCS) in Germany
Wikipedia on Sturgeon and Caviar Production  

Photo: Pew Ocean Science

This week, the Stockholm International Water Institute is celebrating the “World Water Week”.  We’re all pretty focused on oil these days, but in reality, water scarcity is more of a challenge.   

Last year, the UN Development Programme issued a report that highlighted water scarcity and the political and institutional reasons that water remained a tight factor in many world populations: of which Central Asia is one.  Water has a more-or-less pre-set geographical distribution, which can be extended by man-made means–or withheld.

The newest SIWI report, however, focuses on the scarcity of water at the source, and talks about “demand management”–primarily this would eliminate wasteful water practices.

This report is about ten pages (really more like 7), with lots of pictures and graphs. In all, it’s a painless way to grasp the latest thinking on transboundary water management.  For Central Asia watchers, it’s worth knowing these principles, since a lack of both political will and scarcity of resources is affecting Central Asian communities and in many cases, dooming them with an unnecessary poverty.

SIWI has a portal page to more reports.  Although you have to scroll past the registration for the Week at present, it’s still there.

I wanted to go back to a previous post of last week on Kyrgyzstan’s potential hydropower development, because I couldn’t consider all the dilemmas in one post.  One dilemma I started to set up: much of the discussion concerns what kind of capacity would be needed in order to a. serve Kyrgyzstan; b. serve Central Asia’s power needs and develop energy commerce by exporting power. 

So, to paste in from before:  The Kyrgyz legislature has recently privatized two major hydropower installations:

MW Kambarata-1 with a 1900 MW capacity;
Kambarata-2 hydropower plant with a 240 MW capacity.

The two Kamabarata plants have annual generation capacities of 5,100 million kWh and 1,100 million kWh, respectively.  These two plants have the potential to control all of the Naryn River output, which makes them even more important in terms of flood control and a kind of lever against Uzbekistan.  In addition, a third plant, the Thermal Power Plant -1, in Bishkek, with a  MW capacity, is going to be privatized.

 This particular article by Ms. Marat also reports that lawmakers in Kyrgyzstan understand that they require foreign direct investment in order to achieve infrastructure improvement.  The problem lies in first, turning over the installations to some foreign business consortium, and second, meeting the conditions of such a consortium.

Serving Kyrgyzstan
According to IWPR, the plants are only about half-completed, and the existing Toktogul hydropower plants generate 80% of Kyrgyzstan’s current needs.  These plants however, have suffered disinvestment: needing repairs and upgrades.  As Kyrgyzstan develops–which it will–Toktugul plant output would not be able to maintain this 80% of required output, even with repairs.  Second, much of Kyrgyzstan is already underserved by utility grids.  Last of all, the twenty percent remaining is primarily served by Uzbekistan gas, which frequently gets turned off when Uzbekistan’s administration is not pleased with Kyrgyz policy.  To gain energy independence from Uzbekistan can only be a plus.  Yet one must factor in some disadvantages as well: large upgrades such as envisioned with Kambarata-1 and 2 involve a certain amount of speculation and risk.

Exporting power: risks and benefits
Customer base
Advantage: There’s definitely a market for excess utility wattage.  Possible customers for Kyrgyz power could include many neighbor states: Eastern Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Western China; with cooperation from Tajikistan, part of Pakistan and India could also be served.   

Though Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the Xinjiang region of China are increasingly developing oil, and have coal, there would still be benefits to both in accessing Kyrgyz utility power.  First, there is an ease of distribution (locational advantages).  Second, China especially desires access to clean green power in order to mitigate the climate-changing effects of coal.  Other customers, still close but not contiguous, could be developed in partnership with other states.  For instance, in partnership with Tajikistan, the Kambarata projects could bring power to Pakistan and India’s most underserved areas.  Northern Afghanistan could, in the medium or long term, become a customer for Kyrgyz and Tajik hydropower.  In partnership with Uzbekistan, Southeast Turkmenistan could also access some of this hydropower capacity. 

Disadvantage: Yet many of these customers and some of the potential states for cooperation add to the elements of risk involved in this project.  The most underserved market is of course, Afghanistan, which is also the market with the most risk.

Ownership:
Disadvantage: One of the problems for a state that owns upstream water is that it also incurs obligations to downstream states, who have a right to water under international law.  Under such law, the conduct, flow, and so forth of water must be left much the same no matter the improvements or diversions made by the upstream state.  Therefore, water, surely more valuable than even hydrocarbons, cannot be said to have a clear title (international law has unfortunately added to the burdens of upstream states).  If one adds corporate rather than state ownership of dams, hydropower / hydroelectricity plants, it is easy to see why an upstream state like Kyrgyzstan would be protective of what title it does hold to water.

Advantage: At the same time, the ambiguous ownership between domestic and international claimants can be worked out through the use of international law through treaties and/or contracts.  I would think that a production sharing agreement (PSA), where Kyrgyzstan retains its rights to water and gets to buy a share of hydropower production (much like contractual arrangements in the oil industry) should work. 

This can also be attractive to corporations.  For the corporate interests involved, having some state ownership in the project allows them to access the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation, which loans to firms undertaking development, and its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) which insurance of parts of these types of projects.  The World Bank’s IFC also asks for structural reform at that time, i.e., it would require some anti-corruption measures such as separate funding for the project and third-party independent audits.  Income from Kyrgyzstan’s portion of the PSA would also be “earmarked” probably, under a World Bank- led lending syndicate. . .

Extent of debt:
Disadvantages: Understandably, Kyrgyzstan can look at the large costs of hydroelectric development and get cold feet.  The capacity that seems to be planned is in excess of what Kyrgyzstan can use.  Developing utility export customers such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan would also require further investment in infrastructure, such as power lines across mountains and substations in seismically active areas or areas of political unrest. 

Without debt, however, no revenue can be captured and no improvements made.

Engineering and revenue concerns
There is a three-way dilemma involved: what capacity is optimal for use domestically and for export in terms of technology?  What plant capacity (or range of capacities) is mandated by existing/future water flow? What plant capacity makes outside investment attractive?  These are engineering questions and revenue-forecasting questions for which there are answers, and opinions also can underlie these answers.  

Global warming adds to the risk
Environmental benefits and barriers also inform the power plant’s attractiveness to investment.  Some underlying factors include global warming, as glacier melt is expected to increase.  A well-engineered solution could aid Kyrgyzstan and downstream states in flood control.  When the glaciers significantly recede (maybe as soon as 40 years from now according to UNESCO-Almaty) river output to these plants will also dwindle.  That would mean that Kyrgyzstan could be saddled with debt long after the project operates below capacity.

Conclusions/ possible ways forward:
1. Basic and detailed engineering studies for not just the plants, but for utility corridors.
2. Financial studies for capacities versus debt versus revenue;
3. Consulting with third-party experts to verify these figures and studies.
4. Concentrate on least risky customers (Kazakhstan/China) for export figures.
5. Set up arrangements for transparent program, with sequestered funds and quicker payment of debt
6. Set up profit sharing arrangement so that Kyrgyzstan retains part title of infrastructure, full title of resources, and proportionate responsibility for debt.
7. Enjoy energy independence from Uzbekistan.

As far as I know, much of this may have already been done. 

And quite frankly, I’m hoping that some of the folks at NewEurasia-Tajikistan (Vadim, Tajik Boy, are you out there?) or Kyrgyzstan step up to the plate with comments, because several of the Tajikistan blogging community have educated themselves on dams and power wattages.  I am more or less self-educated on utility matters, primarily by subscribing to newsletters on the power industry and reading treatises that don’t stray too far into electrical engineering equations.  Anyone with some specialized knowledge is more than welcome to step in–from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the World Bank or anywhere, in the engineering or utility fields, or, hey, anyone from any field.

Map: Perry-Castaneda Library; Photos: XP.detritus.net; Geoinfo.amu.edu; Edmunds.com 

Every year, a new typhoid epidemic: 

The most famous one in 2003, during the Central Asian Games, hosted in Dushanbe.  Officials made one public service announcement, while residents and visitors continued to get sick.  Tajikistan does better with this obligation now, because they are reporting that:

Right now, in Kulyab, Tajikistan, there are 62 confirmed cases of typhoid, and 17 more in outlying areas of the township. 

The culprit, according to IWPR, is aging water systems, with pipe first laid in the 1930’s under Soviet management, and only partially revitalized in the 1970’s.

According to the US Center for Disease Control (CDC), typhoid results through infection by Salmonella typhi. Only humans contract this disease, through contact with sewage or unclean water or from people who are shedding Salmonella bacteria who have handled food.  Salmonella creates high fever, and if left untreated, compromises the integrity of intestinal walls, creating permeable ulcers, perforation, and death.  This life-threatening illness is therefore a large problem in the developing world, where water safety is not assured.  World-wide, 21.5 million people are affected by this disease.
Much of the typhoid incidence in Tajikistan is also due to insufficient chlorination of water.  The Water Quality & Health Council has a relatively short article on why chlorine is considered optimal for water purification: the main point appears to be that chlorine not only kills existing bacteria such as Salmonella and E. coli, but also has a residual antibacterial affect. 

According to the Chlorine Institute, there are at least three processes used to make chlorine, all three involving electrolyzing a chloride salt.  The oldest and least environmentally sound method (Note: the Chlorine Institute did not go here) uses mercury as the cathode.  During the 1990’s, without Soviet oversight and during the Tajik Civil War, Tajikistan’s existing chlorination plant was damaged or unsupervised, and mercury from these plants has also escaped into the water table.  Revitalizing or re-tooling Tajikistan’s chlorine manufacture is an infrastructure project well worth support by one of Tajikistan’s allies. 

Insufficient or inconstant power to municipal water systems creates another problem in maintaining water purity.  When pumps are sometimes stopped, water does not flow, and untreated water slips into treated water.  Therefore, work toward Tajikistan’s energy security should also be understood as work toward water security as well.

Photos & Diagrams: BBC; Sanger Institute; Greener-Industry.org.

Three stories from the United Nations News Agency, IRIN, point to Tajikistan’s poverty and resulting problems for children, families, migration, and a host of other problems that result from poverty.  All three of these articles show how difficult it is to rise from poor circumstances.  Furthermore, they show that even responsible choices by virtuous people cause these same people to be swept into unremitting economic despair.

First, Vadim at NewEurasia.net noted an article in which an eleven-year-old boy, Abduholik, describes the living conditions at home and why he is not in school.  He works as a shoe polisher in the market, earning about USD 1.35 per day, minus expenses for shoe polish.  His elder brother, fourteen-year-old Shokir, washes cars on the highway for USD 0.58 per car.  His sisters tend the house and chickens so that their mother can sell eggs and milk all day at the market.  Their father passed away in Russia due to illness and poverty while working odd jobs.

Prelude to disaster
This article puts a human face on a second, more analytical article at IRIN about child poverty in Tajikistan.  At a recent presentation I attended, UNU, Brookings, and World Bank presenters talked about “lost human capital”, in other words, irreversible loss of opportunity associated with choices of this kind.  When children drop out of school to make ends meet, they not only lose the chance of education for the present, but find that the chance to re-enter school is also gone.  They become part of the pool of unskilled labor for the rest of their lives, which is the pool of labor that generally fails to benefit from new economic opportunities.  Without intervention, this family is destined to remain poor.  When their situation is multiplied by the large number of households in the same straits, you see the economic fate of the state itself.

Further trouble flies in
In the first article presented by Vadim and linked here, Abduholik says, very simply: “There is no flour in the house.”  In a third article, IRIN is also reporting the beginning of a locust invasion in Tajikistan.  This will undoubtedly affect crop yields in wheat and other foods. 

Usually world news agencies carry stories of famine after they have already proceeded to starve entire populations and a food emergency has arisen.  Tajikistan has lost 45,000 hectares of crops already this year, and the plague is spreading.  This article is an early warning of a bad winter for Tajikistan’s poor.

According to the statistics I looked up yesterday in the CIA Fact Book, 64% of Tajikistan’s residents already live below the poverty line of USD 1 per day.  Life isn’t so good at USD 2 per day either.

World Food Organizations that have relations with Tajikistan:
The World Food Programme, which coordinates relief efforts with Russia, others
The U.S. Government (USAID, others) although USDA 416 (b) assistance , where agricultural surpluses are used for food aid, was terminated in 2003.  It appears to have been revived, according to this 2006 newsletter, and may need to be jump-started again.

World Education Organizations that have relations with Tajikistan:
Aga Khan Foundation
USAID
The Open Society Institute

Note: I will add organizations to this list if others wish to contribute knowledge.  Thanks to Vadim for the heads-up on the IRIN articles.  It brings much that I learned this week to life.  Most of all, I hope these three IRIN articles will bring world public awareness to the plight of Tajikistan’s poor.

Photos: Flickr; BBC; Environmental Agency of the United Arab Emirates