Central Asia

Today we will discuss two recent developments: An expansion of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO and the first EU/Central Asian Forum on Security Issues held this past week.  What do these two developments individually tell us about Russia and the EU’s role/position in Central Asia?  Which cooperation discussions and pronouncements have or will have the most teeth?  Are the Central Asia states successfully playing one group off the other for their own strategic benefit or are they being pushed around?

Last Friday, CSTO members Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to deploy troops and a missile defense shield in Central Asia to control the situation over ‘tensions in Afghanistan.’  CSTO Sec Gen Nikolay Bordyuzha stated that the deployment will consist of 10 battalions and made the following statements regarding the new alignment’s look and purpose:

“All CSTO members are concerned with fact of military objects appearance around them or such serious structures as anti-rocket shield founded. Such actions stipulate necessity of creation on the CSTO borders of a new military infrastructure, restoration of some its elements of the Soviet Union period.”

“Under ensuring collective security a role of Collective forces of the quick deployment is increased in Central Asia.  Constant attention will be paid to its advancement of fighting preparedness and modernization.”

We discussed this rising development a little over a week ago and as was said then, the move clearly reference’s the US missile defense system in Czech and Poland. Concerning the first quote, I’m not sure the smaller CSTO states are as worried about the Europe/US  missile shield as one specific member, Moscow.  The line about the arrangement having elements from the Soviet Union was also a little surprising, especially with the all the talk about a new Cold War lately, though largely dismissed.  In any form, this is definitely a concrete move by Moscow to increase its military/strategic pull with these smaller states in what it sees as its sphere of influence.

On Sept. 17-18 there were held both the EU-Central Asia Ministerial Troika and the first ever EU-Central Asia Security Forum in Paris.  Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke to gathering about three crucial areas of interest between the two groups: Terrorism, Narco Trafficking/Border Patrol, and energy and environmental issues.  In an interesting choice, Ferrero-Waldner opened up the forum by mentioning Francis Fukuyama’s End of History statement and then quickly acknowledging that the recent events, aka Georgia, have showed us that ‘were not quite there yet.’  Ferrero-Waldner also did not beat around the bush about energy issues as she assertively stated Europe’s and CA’s priority must be to diversify, diversify, diversify!  Here are her poinant words:

“Strengthening our energy partnership with Central Asia is a top political priority for the European Union. The region is central to our strategy of diversification of energy supplies and supply routes, a policy that is all the more pertinent after the events of this summer. The events in the Caucasus have given both Central Asia and Europe food for thought. The security dimension of our energy policies has been thrown into sharp relief. And, while we in the EU are intensifying efforts with regard to the security of our supplies, Central Asia also has a strong interest in diversifying its export routes.

We intend to redouble our efforts to develop energy links between the EU and Central Asia through diversified energy transportation routes and new energy infrastructure, including Nabucco. Making a reality of the long-discussed “southern corridor” must be the focus of our work together in the coming months, and I hope that at our next Baku ministerial in late November we can give new impetus to the creation of a Trans-Caspian energy corridor.”

There was no doubt what the central aspect of this Parisan meeting was all about, energy.  More importantly it was about the EU obtaining closer relations with these states in the middle of a crucial period where Russia is attempting to cement their dominant role in the region after the Georgia conflict.  As many no doubt noted, human rights issues were mainly but under the table during the forum with Ferrero-Waldner mentioning them once in passing.

Back to the questions I raised at the top: what do you think?  Russia? EU? Central Asian States?

Apparently a ‘clash’ occurred in Turkmenistan’s capital of Ashgabat last Friday and Saturday in which heavy fire was exchanged, tanks and armored vehicles were used, and 20 or so Turkmen police officers were killed, who the clash involved besides Turkmen officers and what it was about is still open to debate. Turkmenistan’s state media made no statements about the incident, but their foreign ministry, possibly trying to head off any claims that this was Andijon II, put out this statement: “Special units of Turkmenistan’s law enforcement agencies carried out an operation to seize (the group), as a result of which the above mentioned criminal group was neutralized.” The Turk government went on to describe the incident as one perpetrated by organized criminal drug traffickers. On the other hand, independent websites not controlled by the Turkmen government and the opposition group Turkmenistan’ Popular Democratic Movement, led by Boris Shikhmuradov, claimed that the incident was a government battle against ‘a religious group, possibly radical Islamists.’ In 2005, the Turkmenistan government reportedly brutally suppressed an uprising, which they claimed was an Islamic insurrection, while others claim it was just by poor citizens peacefully protesting against government policies. Hopefully a full and accurate portrayal of the incident arises before too long, though I will not be holding my breath.

(Photo Source: The Associated Press: Turkmen policemen stand guard on a street in Ashgabat)

I did a quick summary of most of the major outcomes of the SCO’s Dushanbe Summit on Monday, but I want to get a bit more into the affect of Russia’s conflict in Georgia and all that has happened since diplomatically and strategically.  As we have read, the SCO’s Dushanbe Declaration came out with a rather neutral sounding statement regarding the conflict, neither supporting Russia nor condemning them.  Russia was no doubt displeased with this, and though they spun the Declaration into a sign of support from China and their Central Asian neighbors, they had to start to question their level of isolation and the usefulness of the SCO in promoting their foreign policy and in confronting what they see as Western encroachments.

Mark N. Katz at Eurasianet and John J. Tkacik, Jr. at the Heritage Foundation each wrote analytical pieces discussing diplomatic and strategic moves after the Georgian conflict and its aftermath, mainly Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence, Katz of Russia and the Central Asian states and Tkacik Jr., China.  Katz argues that Russia came into a rather unfriendly environment at the last SCO summit, facing deteriorating relationships with many Central Asian states and recalcitrant China, eager to have the CA states look to it for leadership.  Though this takes too harsh a view of Russia’s relations and influence in Central Asia, (as there was/is indeed great pressure on the CA states to move toward Russia’s side in this conflict and Russia seemed to have successful visits to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan immediately after the summit), Katz’s analysis rings true that China will use the SCO to move closer to the CA and have its states depend more on its resources, such as for infrastucture investments, and that Russia will start, though in many ways it already does, to lean more toward the Moscow dominated CSTO for regional cooperation.

There are a myriad of reasons why China never came right out and stated its support for Russia in the conflict, but John Tkacik does an excellent job shedding some light on their internal process by detailing their changing diplomatic positions from well before the conflict to today.  The main reason China would be wary about explicitly supporting such actions would protecting their secessionist’s claims themselves, on Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang Province, and several Islands and waters of its coasts.  It would also go against China’s ‘quiet rise’ where they let others talk the hits from the West.  Tkacik states two central motivations for what he sees in the end is China’s implicit support of Russia’s move into Georgia: 1. China considers American and NATO moves to bring Georgia into the network of Western security pacts as a threat to a close Chinese partner, Russia  2. China may want to preserve its own options for taking similar action beyond its own borders.  Now Tkacik is not implying China would use this method in Central Asia, but in the aforementioned regions.

So of course, how China and Russia handle and view this Georgian conflict has strong ramifications for the Central Asia states, who must always remain wary.  Do you think the Georgian conflict has strengthened Russia’s hand in Central Asia?  Or do you think that they may have overplayed their hand and now their current isolation is pushing CA states toward the coffers of China?  Or are the CA authoritative leaders simply just relieved to see the Georgian Rose Revolution leaders punished and checked?  What did the Dushanbe Declaration’s about the conflict signify about the group’s future?  Chinese dominated?

Whose side is Pakistan on in the NATO-led conflict in Afghanistan?  Does the Pakistani government and army want to stop and defeat the Taliban?  Can it?  As a US decision maker, should you be extremely worried about Pakistan’s answers to all of these questions?  Unfortunately, the last question is the only one that should be answered with an authoritative Yes.  With US/NATO drones flying in and out of Pakistan/Afghan’s border region, the Taliban ramping up their activity throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, including in the cities of Kabul and Peshawar, and with a new, untested government in place in Pakistan, we seek answers to these very important questions.

Dexter Filkins has written an excellent report full of first-hand stories, interviews, and analysis from the Afghan/Pak border region and he tries to answer these questions. Filkins, who just finished a book about his experience in Iraq (‘The Forever War’), sees a border situation much like most observers nowadays, academic and in the press, violent, out of control, and maybe most disturbing, they all see a Pakistani government and army either unable to curtail the Taliban-led insurgents and Al Qaeda operatives in any meaningful way or even worse, actually providing support for the insurgency. Through interviews of Taliban members, tribal leaders around the border, militants, and Pak government officials Filkins paints a frightening, but all too real picture of a do-nothing Pak government, taking all the aid the US will throw at them while tacitly and at times implicitly supporting the Taliban’s efforts to destabilize Afghanistan’s government.

Filkins goes over the deals made between the Pak army and the Taliban (he argues that these are the only pacts that can be made as the government is too impotent to be considered a real partner) and comes to the conclusion that they basically have come down to this: you (the border insurgents) don’t attack Pakistan’s mainland and cities, and we (the Pak army) will let you continue your attacks on NATO and Afghan forces across the border.  Now the Pakistan government and army have denied this claim for years now, but as US/NATO increase its missions near the border and drone attacks keep hitting targets inside Pakistan, one has to believe that the US has started to take this as the truth and unilaterally respond as seen necessary.  These aggressive attacks inside of Pakistani territory have caused a diplomatic riff that will hopefully just stay that way and not escalate.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen flew to Pakistan today to meet with Pak civilian and military leadership.  This is Mullen’s fifth trip already to the nation since being named Chairman.  The meeting will no doubt discuss US troop deployment into Pak territory on Sept. 3 and Pakistan’s army chief Kayani response asserting their right to protect their homeland with force.

It appears that both the US and Pakistan are playing a Double Game: Pakistan is taking US money and promising to reign in the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other extremist forces that are causing instability in Afghanistan while at the same time in many ways willfully allowing the Taliban to control large swaths of territory and perform raids into Afghan territory.  The US double game is more out in the open and its objectives are easier to discern:  The US government continues to call the Pakistan government a partner in the War on Terror and provide it aid (such as these F-16’s), while at the same time acknowledging that ISI helped orchestrate the Kabul Indian Embassy bombing and that large regions in and around the FATA were breeding and staging grounds for the Taliban, and in the last few weeks start to launch military missions inside of Pak territory without complete Pak government or military approval.

This is a very complicated issue and region of the world, and I know this piece, just like Filkins’ article, raised more questions than answers.  Before you can win a war you have to know who your enemy is.  We know a lot about the Taliban, they are the ones who burn girls’ schools, banish women from the street, blow up stores selling modern goods, and ‘thrash children for flying kites,’ but what are the forces behind them?  Who exactly are we fighting over there?  Who are our friends?  These are simple questions with complicated, troubling, and in many ways unknown, answers.

(Map Source: New York Times)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 8th annual summit in Dushanbe two weeks ago covered many issues and issued several decrees.  We already discussed how the grouping did not give Russia the diplomatic support regarding the Georgian conflict as they hoped, but the conference also set up joint military manuevers, moved along the process of an Afghan Contact Group-SCO summit, and made progress on the acceptance of new members, or at least putting the group’s observer members on more sure footing within the organization.  The SCO’s official website and the Summit’s Dushanbe Declaration both gave the official line of what was accomplished and agreed upon at meeting.  From inching closer to Iran, India, and Pakistan membership to stopping ‘pscyhotropic substances’, they seemed to cover it all.

1. Joint Anti-Terrorism Exercises - The group agreed and actually already opened on September 3-4, joint anti-terrorism drills in Volgograd, Russia. These drills consisted of practicing ’search and investigative operations to prevent the activity of terrorist groups.’  Though I do not know much about these drills, it appears that they are not quite as large as previous SCO military maneuvers, specifically the two Peace Missions.

2. Economic Cooperation - A memorandum on partnership betwen the SCO’s Interbank Association and the Eurasian Development Bank was signed,  and the members worked toward creating ‘favorable trade and investment conditions,’ development of transportation routes and transit potential, modern information and telecommunication technologies, and hoped to further the usefulness of the SCO Business Council.

3. Observer Status - Work with the SCO’s observer states, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Mongolia, was said to be put on a ‘qualitively new level’ and the SCO’s Head of States approved the Regulations on the Status of Dialogue Partner of the SCO.  An expert group was to assemble to consider a whole range of issues relating to the expansion of the group and to hopefully tell me what  a ‘dialogue partner’ is.  A report stated that Russian President Medvedev said that as  a ‘dialogue partner’ the observers could participate in the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).  Through the years, geopolitics, the real fears by China, Russia, and all four CA states, and organizational roadblocks have kept the group from expanding further, but this Dialogue Partner may be an important step in changing this.  Iran wants to be a member super bad, so does Pakistan, Mongolia and India are a little wary, with the proof being that while Iran’s President Ahmadinejad attended the summit in person, representing India was their Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas.  Which brings us to the next topic.

4. Energy Club- When one looks at the SCO’s official website about the Summit and its Declaration, nary a word can be found about energy supplies.  An odd thing, being that all these nations deal greatly in this area and it defines a large part of their relations with each other. But also not that surprising as Russia and China have and will continue to butt heads in the region fighting for energy resources, and the CA states themselves have tried to make deals with as many partner as possible, even in the west, in order to diversify their portfolio.  However, I was able to find an interesting statement by Kazak President Nazarbayev about what he hopes to the SCO can accomplish in the energy cooperation realm:

‘Projects to set up a single energy market and a common transport corridor of the SCO could be an example of the global appraoch to defining forms and mechanisms of cooperation…..links Russia, China, and the Central Asian countries is already a serioius basis for setting upa single energy space of the SCO.  It is absolutely necessary to draw upa common energy strategy as soon as possible.  There are all components for setting up an energy community in the SCO, within whose framework the interests of producers, shippers, and consumers of energy resources can be harmonized.’

So Nazarbayev is clearly for an SCO energy club, but what about the rest?  I’ll get back to this another time.

5. Afghanistan Contact Group - The group appeared to give much attention to the narcotics trafficking problem in the region, and made steps to increasing cooperation with Afghanistan in this regard.  According to the declaration the SCO leaders decided to ‘intensify the work of the SCO-Afghanistan contact group and launch preparations on the ground for holding a conference on Afghanistan under the aegis of the SCO to discuss joint action against terrorism, illegal drug trafficking and organized crime.’  This is an area where the US/NATO could use some support as the opium situation in Afghanistan is growing out of control and the Taliban are receiving more and more recruits from the CA nations.

6. Georgia Conflict - I have already discussed here how the weak statement put out regarding the Georgia-Russian conflict by the SCO undermined Russia’s stance on this issue even more and caused it to be even more isolated, but here is a Russian source who strongly disagrees.  In the same Dushanbe Declaration he takes a different meaning and claims that behind closed doors Moscow received full backing in its efforts in the conflict.  It seems to me that Russia did not get exactly what it wanted, but it is also true that they were more than welcomed into the bosom that is the SCO.

First off the post below was one done a few weeks ago, but we had to put it back up for so it could be linked to the Brookings Institute newsletter, my apologies for any confusion. Today, will be a glorified link-dump, focusing on Iran in Central Asia, among other topics.

A. Iran

In light of Iran’s most recent effort to join the SCO during the last Summit at the end of August, I thought I should go over a couple stories I’ve had linking the regional power to Central Asia. While, we are on the SCO, here is an article by Adrian Pabst tackling the great power issues surrounding Central Asia. It gives a curt geopolitical analysis of how the interests of Russia, China, and Iran have converged in Central Asia, mainly in their want to oust the US presence. The article was written before the Georgian/Russian conflict, but its analysis of growing Iran/Russian relations is solid and looks better by the day. One can’t discuss a regional power neighbor to the CA states and not mention energy dealings. Iran has also been making a push for CA, mainly Turkmenistan, oil and gas reserves and supply routes. An Iranian state gas industry manager stated that they were ‘full scale ready for transiting, exchanging, and buying Turkmenistan’s’ supplies, claiming that Tehran was the ‘most secure, most economical’ transit route. Just days ago, Iran’s ambassador to Turkmenistan spoke out about the ‘necessity of waging a campaign against extremism and Salafism.’ Going further, he stated; ‘The expansion of Salafism in Central Asia is surely a security threat to Iran, and we are coordinating with the Central Asian countries to impede its expansion.’ This quote could have come from the US ambassador to Afghanistan. Lastly, Iran and Uzbekistan announced that trade between the two nations had increased to $650 million and was hopefully to reach $1 billion in the near future.

Now quickly…

India in Central Asia

I’m not gonna discuss too much here as I plan on doing an update on India-CA relations next week, but here are two pieces, ‘New Delhi looks to Asia for Energy‘ and ‘India Looks to Central Asia for Energy‘, (geez those are similar titles) to give you a little background if you are interested.

SCO Summit

On Monday, or Tuesday at the latest, I will summarize, analyze, and (patronize?) the recently concluded SCO summit in Dushanbe.  But here is the official summary by the organization itself to wet your SCO whistle.

FPA Blogs

Karin Esposito at Religion and Politics just did a great piece on radicalism and religious/women liberties in Tajikistan.

Joel Davis at US Role in World discussed a surge in troops in Afghanistan, which includes an important article by Barnett R. Rubin.

While I hope I provided some interesting stories and things to think about, if not, I’ll try harder on Monday.

It seems like every other post I was link dropping Johannes Linn’s Brooking Institution pieces on Central Asian’s energy, water, and food challenges, but today is the day, my friends, when I actually discuss them!

1. Central Asia’s Energy Challenge - In Linn’s ‘Central Asia’s Energy Challenge; Overcoming the Natural Resource Curse‘ he reports back from an Almaty conference on ‘Institution Building and Economic Development in Central Asia’ and proceeds to break down what the Central Asian leaders need to accomplish and focus on in order to get the most out of their natural resources for their nation, its citizens too, not just themselves.

Important decisions CA leaders have to make:

a. whether to extract the energy resource as quickly as possible or to save it underground in case prices get even higher.

b. whether to run the energy sector as  a state monopoly or to provide open access to national and international private investors

c. whether to spend or save the national earnings from the resources

d. finally, who to bestow the honor of selling the resources to?

One of Linn’s most salient points is that all of these decisions provide opportunities for special interests to abuse.  In other words, many people want to receive these energy resource rewards, and without a transparent government, institutions, and processes certain interests may take advantage to the detriment of society as a whole.  For this has happened to a majority of states ‘cursed’ with energy riches.  So how does Linn propose the leaders and government’s of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan with their oil and gas supplies, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with their hopefully future electricity and water supplies, institutionalize a productive, efficient, and fair way of profiting from their land?  He states four rather general prescriptions that lack actual specifics, but thankfully follows them up with two solid recommendations; 1. effective use of a national resource fund 2. membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, which aims to assist countries with managing natural resource in a transparent and accountable manner.

First his general recommendations;

1. Think long-term, don’t rush

2. Effectively manage the path of extraction, ‘go where the greatest capacity is and where risks of mismanagement are least’

3. Manage the overall fiscal balance along with the non-energy fiscal balance, do not let things get out of whack in other words

4. Most important, introduce transparency and accountability in decision making and implementation

After reading these, I wondered how we are to expect autocrats such as Berdimuhammedow, Nazarbayev, and Karimov to just implement transparency in their greatest controlled asset!  But Linn provides two more specific recommendations to avoid or contain the ‘curse’ and rightly acknowledges that Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan has done a more than solid job managing his nation’s energy supplies.  The instrument of a national resource fund can help a country save for the tougher times of lower prices and curtail wasteful spending and corruption, as Kazakhstan has shown by putting in over $21 billion into their fund and diversifying their economy, building up their infrastructure, and paying off debt.  Linn’s second sound proposal is for all these states to become members of the the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) which publishes annual reports about how well each nation under its watch manages their natural resources, in other words it keeps an eye on graft, poor use, and mismanagement.  Kyrgyzstan is already a member of EITI along with Kazakhstan, but Tajikisan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan are not.  It is the hope that transparency begets responsible government and action that in turn provide the each of nation’s citizenry with the resources they deserve.

2. Water-Food Crisis in CA -  This is a companion piece to Linn’s earlier work on the impending water crisis in Central Asia after last year’s drought and particularly harsh winter, updating on the international response.  In this piece, Linn is reporting back from another conference in Almaty, this one including international and bilateral agencies reviewing the region’s water-food situation and planning a response.  Linn was overall pleased with the response, even calling it ’swift’, by the UNDP, international financial institutions, and bilateral donor agencies in order to help the region’s states to prepare for coming droughts and tough winters.  Though we have just discussed Tajikistan’s water issues, Linn provides a review of the whole region’s situation and cites World Bank statistics and predictions regarding the region’s past and future levels of precipitation, temperature, snow cover, river flows, reservoir levels, and vegetation.  Though there were many ‘normal’ signs of in these sectors, the World Bank report and Almaty conference warned of ’serious economic and social consequences’ for a majority of regions if efforts were not made to solve the region’s water and food situations.  I do not have time to go over all the recommendations, but Linn seemed hopeful that the international community would help the readiness of the region’s governments to respond with effective policies and interventions, instead of just squabble with each other as in the past, to minimize future hardships when, not if, they come to pass.  This is great news that the leaders of CA and of the international community are getting together at a time of relative calm in order to help prepare for a moment of strain and pressure, but until those moments arise one can never really know how much progress was made.

I’ll leave you with some good news, it appears the World Bank and Kazak gov-led Aral Sea project is making some progress, as the northern part of the former great lake has seen its water grow by 30% in the last five years.  We can only hope that this is just a start.

The Aral Sea in 2004 on the right, and today on the left.

(Photo Source: GoogleEarth/PA)

Here in the US, we do not have many discussions about whether our nation is at war in Afghanistan.  It is basically seen as a fact.  After all, we were attacked on our homeland by terrorists from the nation who were backed by its Taliban government at the time.  Only recently, have their been discussions as to whether we could succeed in this conflict, and even those are rather muted.  According to this excellent and provocative Der Speigel article, it is shown that in Germany, questions about the their nation’s role and presence in NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan are the rule and opposition to the mission the majority opinion.

With Afghanistan becoming increasingly more unstable and the Taliban gaining stronger and more numerous footholds in which to launch attacks against the Afghan government and NATO forces, this is a time when a strong will is needed.  Not only a strong will, but a belief that what your mission is is right and that you can accomplish it.  The Germans, who have been placed in the relatively calm Kunduz Province and have avoided major combat missions, have seen the Taliban and the conflict come to them in recent months.  They lost a soldier to a roadside bomb and a German checkpoint mistakenly killed three civilians.  Still there are signs that German citizens oppose their presence in Afghanistan and even their military leaders in the nation have failed to call the conflict a war.  This is a telling comment by the German defense minister and the American leader of NATO troops at a recent press conference:

“Are we at war here?” a reporter asked the defense minister in Kabul the next day, to which an exasperated Jung replied: “We are fighting terrorism, but we are not at war.” Only seconds later, his host corrected him in front of live cameras. War? “Yes, we are waging a war,” said David McKiernan, the American four-star general commanding the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).”

The country and its soldiers have in many ways used a myriad of terms instead of calling the conflict war; they have used “networked security,” a “civilian-military approach,” “stabilization” and “reconstruction assistance.”  According to Speigel, 2/3 of German citizens are opposed to the Bundeswehr’s Afghan mission, and ‘politicians in Berlin read opinion polls more often than reports on the military situation.’  An even more disturbing statement in the article read, “An astonishing commonality unites opponents and supporters {of the Afghan war}. Both are dangerously uninterested in the conflict.”  The problem with this is that if one reads the second half of the Speigel article, one cannot help but see that the Taliban, led by Mullah Salam in Kunduz, are in fact bringing a war to NATO and its German contingency, whether they like it or not.  Attacks, especially of the suicide bomber variety, have increased dramatically along with complex missions against what were thought as safe NATO bases near Kabul and in the north.

The US and several NATO allies have recently been escalating its military reach, performing military mission in Pakistan’s FATA for instance, and are clearly trying to push back the Talibans recent gains.  Will this work?  Is this a long-term strategy?  The US knows that the military is not the only solution to this conflict, but that it has a major and necessary role to defeat this insurgency.  I just don’t see how the Germans, a proud and strong nation and people, could still be sitting on the fence, or even behind, when in front of them is battle worth fighting and an enemy worth defeating.  I’m not trying to say that the Germans and other NATO nations not involved in direct combat in the past few years have not contributed much to stablizing and creating a democratic Afghanistan, they have, but more needs to be done.

(Photo: Der Speigel: A Bundeswehr patrol in Kunduz. At the end of August, a German soldier died and, not long later, soldiers at a German roadblock opened fire on a car, killing three civilians.)

Today I will provide several links to three or so stories which have been developing for days and sometimes weeks now in the region.  Some aspects have to do with items and themes we have covered, ’soft power’ in Afghanistan, another is an issue or event that I have barely mentioned.  Though I want discuss it today, I plan on doing a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit analytical summary later this week, so you have something to look forward to!

1. Afghanistan insurgency/NATO presence - The report of over 90 civilians, including tens of children, killed by a US airstrike in the village of Azizabad has been perculating and gathering steam for two or three days now, with each side, the villagers, Taliban spokesman, and US military, having different accounts.   The US military insists ‘only’ about 5-7 civilians were killed and over 30 militants in the strike.  In any case, the US military was opening up a follow-up investigation and Gen. McKiernan, leader of all NATO forces, stated “The people of Afghanistan have our commitment to get to the truth.”  This case show’s the dangerous of fighting an insurgency embedded in the local populace and the ramifications of doing so with air power.  We will see what develops in the next few days.

2. Dexter Filkins has written a long article titled ‘Talibanistan’ for the New York Times Magazine.  I have not had time to read through the whole thing, but it show’s the Taliban’s advancements in the Afghanistan and describes how they would lead the region again if they continued to garner more authority and support.  I will hopefully discuss this in greater length this week.

3. A few days ago the US military admitted that they performed a helicopter-led raid into Pakistan to target major insurgent leaders.  Here is a press conference by the US State Department discussing the US reasoning and some information about the attack.  And just hours ago, the US launched several missiles from a predator drone inside of Pakistan’s North Waziristan, aimed at prominent Taliban leaders.  These efforts of course come on the heels of a secret meeting between the Pakistan Army Chief and senior US/NATO military officials aboard an aircraft carrier and provide an immediate challenge for the newly elected Prime Minister Asif Ali Zardari.  About Zardari, here is an editorial welcoming him and here is one labeling him ‘mad and bad.’  In any case, he’ll have some busy first days at the office.

4. With VP Dick Cheney calling Russia’s actions in Georgia ‘troublesome and unhelpful actions’ and warning that if Moscow has its ways with S. Ossetia and Abkhazia; “We know that if one country is allowed to unilaterally redraw the borders of another, it will happen and it will happen again,” there is new heat between the these old cold war foes and Central Asia may find itself squeezed between the two (with a solid pinch from China).  For a perspective on what that would be like, James Traub wrote an interesting article about how the ramping up of rhetoric, animosity, and actual geopolitical gains and loses might have on all of us.  He discusses that Russia truly may have entered a 19th century world where on its borders it only sees ‘enemies or vassals.’  If this is true, and of course nothing is ever that simple, than the Central Asian states are stuck between two very sharp and unfriendly choices when it comes to relations with Mother Russia.

Tidbits: Martha Brill Olcott and Johannes Linn wrote a concise piece analyzing Central Asia’s current difficulties.   And in what is being billed as a visible sign of Kazakhstan’s economic prosperity, the first British private school, Haileybury Almaty, has opened in the nation’s capital.

Hope you find these of interest.  Comments and questions are always welcome and will be posted on the site.

So with one billion dollars in aid combined with a diplomatic visit by Vice President Dick Cheney, featuring many strong rebukes to Russia and a statement arguing for the nation’s inclusion in NATO, the US appears to have anted up or at least called Moscow’s hand in the Georgia-Russia conflict. Here are couple Cheney quotes while in Tbilisi: first referring to Russia’s invasion, calling it “an illegitimate, unilateral attempt to change your country’s borders by force that has been universally condemned by the free world”, and going on “Russia’s actions have cast grave doubt on Russia’s intentions and on its reliability as an international partner, not just in Georgia but across this region and indeed throughout the international system.” What do these strong statements and strong actions, the billion in aid, in defense of Georgia and their territorial integrity and democratic government mean for other former Soviet states, especially in Central Asia?

I want to examine that question in two sectors, both strategic, but different animals none the less: 1. After being shown as holding a weak hand in this conflict deep Russia’s ’sphere of influence’ the US appears to showing diplomatic and material gumption and providing breathing space for Georgia’s government to regain legitimacy and stability. Could the states of Central Asia expect similar treatment if Moscow deepened to an unacceptable degree their already latent involvement in these nations? Now I am not saying Russia will invade any of the CA states, that plain and simple will not be happening any time soon, but Moscow could continue to deepen their relations and influence with states like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in ways that threaten their ability to have normal relations with the US/West/and even China. So does this move by the Bush administration provide some sense of security or Moscow push back for these CA states? I think to a relative degree it does. The Russian presence in these CA states is so omnipresent, not no move by the US/West/China, could push them completely out, and these CA states would not want that in any case, but this Cheney visit is sending a powerful symbol that the US sees interests in the Caucasus and beyond and will make moves to protect them and keep Russia from any form of domination. This US strategic move helps the CA leaders know that they have some breathing space when dealing with Russia and China for that matter, and the next section will showcase this.

2. Energy Supplies and the Georgia Conflict - Soon after Russia was seen as successful invading and defeating the Georgian army there was great fear that Moscow would secure the removal of President Saakashvili and then the BTC pipeline, giving it a de facto veto over its supplies to Europe. Future pipelines that like BTC would circumvent Russian territory on their way to Europe, such as Nabucco or the Trans-Caspian, were also in danger. Does Cheney’s visit, US aide and assurance, and the fact that Russia has been left rather isolated internationally since the invasion, specifically referring to its lack of support from China and the CA states during the SCO meeting, though there are contradictory accounts, portend not as drastic a future for oil/gas supplies from Central Asia and the Caucasus and Central Asia to Europe? Well, yes and no. Even with US aide and diplomatic support, Russia is still only miles from the BTC pipeline making EU investors and customers nervous to say the least. And only a day or so after the SCO summit, Putin was in Uzbekistan securing a new pipeline that would directly challenge the planned Nabucco line and also Putin stated that military cooperation between the two states was to be widened. (After the SCO summit, China didn’t miss out on any deal making in the region either, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) However, before VP Cheney stopped in Tbilisi he paid a visit to its neighbor Azerbaijan. This stopover was no doubt an attempt to shore up Azerbaijan as an ally of the West and as a energy transit nation for the BTC, and hopefully other future projects. The Russians know what Cheney is all about, US interests and oil/gas power and contacts. John Hannah, a US national security advisor, stated “The overriding priority, especially in Baku, Tbilisi and Kiev, will be the same: a clear and simple message that the United States has a deep and abiding interest in the well-being and security of this part of the world.” Well it is true that the Russian disturbance in Georgia has caused EU oil/gas investors to quiver and show reluctance in backing future deals, the US is not going down without a fight, though this is definitely an uphill battle. To provide a real counterweight to Moscow’s monopoly on oil/gas from the CA region, the EU must organize a more coherent and ambitious effort in Central Asia. The West needs to show the CA states that they will provide the money, materials, security, and the breathing space needed, otherwise they will move further into Gazprom’s and Russia’s hands.

These are complicated issues and no doubt I have left holes all over the place, so please fill me and my readers in!