Central Asia

Yesterday, we quickly went over the planned new alignment of the CSTO, which would consist of a deployment of 10,000 more troops and a missile shield, in what the organization’s Secretary General called “a powerful military grouping of five countries in Central Asia.” Eurasia Daily today provided more details of the new force structure, its internal complications, and ramifications in light of the Georgian conflict and rising Russia/Western tensions. The group’s Sec Gen Bordyuzha stated that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan would all participate and “anticipated that the force will consist of regular troop units, brigades, regiments, or divisions. Currently, the CSTO’s military component consists of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces, estimated to include ten battalions (4,000); it is planned that this structure will be subsumed into the new force structure.”

Now, the CSTO has many similar force structures in Central Asia and tried to create one similar to this in 2005 which never came into actual existence, so what are this deployment’s prospects and why is Russia leading this military charge at this moment? One of you made this witty and mostly on-point comment regarding yesterday’s post:

“The missile shield is obviously a counterbalance to the US shield in Eastern Europe. It’s more kindergarten foreign policy from Russian; You have a missile shield? Fine, we’ll get our own. See how you like that! Next, they’ll probably let it slip that the coordinates for the NATO bases in Poland are preprogrammed in.”

Regarding this new deployment’s talk of a missile shield, I largely agree with the above quote, but there is more to this deployment and Central Asian military grouping by Russia than just tit-for-tat against the United States and Europe. CSTO Sec Gen Bordyuzha mentioned that the new force was to help ‘control the tensions in Afghanistan’ and I, and others, believe that Russia genuinely fears the growing conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and most importantly its growth or spread into Central Asia where Russia holds its gas dominance. Russia depends on stable and safe gas imports from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan and any destabilization in the region could cause havoc on its energy import-export led economy. Russia and the Central Asian states are also not strangers to the nefarious powers of Islamic terrorist attacks and groups which may increasingly spread out from Afghanistan, or come back to, the Central Asian or Russian territories.

Russia and the Central Asian state leaders do not desire a return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, as the group is a major destabilizing force, spreading its Islamist ideology, helping narco-traffickers move throughout the region, and making pipelines and other transit routes impossible to traverse through the Afghan and also Pakistan territory. Putin and most CA state leaders showed their backing for the removal of the Taliban in 2001, by providing bases and logistical support to US/NATO forces and this continues largely today. Even with the Russian-West brewhaha over Georgia, Moscow still allows NATO forces utilized a Russian controlled corridor to transit goods, though Moscow has recently warned the Western alliance that they could close it anytime, and Medvedev just last week offered Afghan President Karzai 225 Russian police officers to help train the Afghan National Police.

Now Russia has commenced this new CSTO deployment in part to politically slap the West, but it also helps them deepen their strategic connections in the region and provide a ready-made force to combat the spread of Afghanistan’s growing instability. For the CSTO Central Asian states, Russia and this new grouping are also seen as a protective shield against the rising chaos and danger of the Talibanization of Afghanistan. Russia/Medvedev/Putin may indeed have grand strategic plans in Central Asia, and this troop deployment may be just one spoke in the wheel, but it also provides a solid support system in what all those involved consider a real threat to regional stability and integrity.

(Photo Source: Eurasia Daily - CSTO General Secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha)

On March 2, 2008 Dmitry Medvedev won Russia’s presidential election with just over 70% of the vote. He is scheduled to take over the Presidency on May 7, with Russia’s current President, Vladimir Putin, taking over as Prime Minister. This new alignment for Russia’s government raises many important questions for Central Asia and for the world at large:

How powerful will Mr. Medvedev really be? How powerful will Mr. Putin remain? Will they each garner influence in different spheres, with Medvedev being in charge of domestic issues and Putin maintaining his hold in foreign policy and grand strategy? Will the new administration have a new outlook toward the world and its neighbors, or will it be just ‘more of the same?” Will this new administration’s policies toward Central Asia change/evolve? Will Central Asian states’ policies change toward Russia?

These are just some of the relevant questions that will be examined on this page. As of right now, I would just like to make a curt, overall assessment of Medvedev’s rise, Putin’s switch, and Russia’s current and future policy toward Central Asia and beyond.

It can safely be assumed that Putin will retain a great amount of power in Medvedev’s new government and it is important to note that Putin can regain the Presidency in 2012. Putin already plans to represent Russia at next month’s NATO summit in Romania and has laid out an ambitious economic and political program for the country for the next twelve years. Medvedev has even already stated that he hoped to work in an ‘effective tandem’ with Mr. Putin. However, BBC reporter Bridget Kendall correctly argues that Russia has never comfortably had two ‘tsars’ in charge at one time. Kendall also notes that during Putin’s first year in office he appeared rather modest and awkward, much like Medvedev seems presently, but quickly turned into the strong-willed and powerful leader we see today. It is extremely difficult to predict how the power will swing in the Kremlin under this new political alignment.

Last week, I posted critical thinking from the blogosphere on the metaphors commonly used when discussing Afghanistan. Now I want to contribute my own two cents on a common metaphor used in Central Asia: The New Great Game.   The N.G.G. is a term that now stands for more than one aspect of Central Asian affairs, which has confused the set of facts it represents.  Furthermore, I’m pretty sure the term N.G.G. has been inaccurate for some time now.

History
The original “Great Game” was “played” between Tsarist Russia and the British Empire, as each country attempted to increase their sphere of influence from centers in Moscow and India, respectively.   The area of contention was little-mapped and poorly-known by its contenders, encompassing a region from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan.  The term was first used in an 1829 letter by Arthur Connolly, a British intelligence officer associated with the Bengal Light Lancers and the British East Asia Company, and it was used in the sense of cultural superiority.  The term became more publicly used after being part of the emotional and physical landscape in Rudyard Kipling’s novel Kim (1901).   Anglo-Russian treaties of 1907, which supposedly settled the regional “contest”, were nullified in 1917 with the Bolshevik Revolution.  In the next phase of geopolitical struggle, The Soviets subdued the Central Asian region surrounding Bukhara, and Great Britain went on to treat with Afghanistan, until the end of Second World War. 

The first “New Great Game” occurred when the US became a world superpower, and it was an adjunct to Cold War geopolitics.  N.G.G.-1 culminated in the Soviet-Afghanistan war, where the U.S. armed the mujahedin and then retired to the locker room.  The term became further muddied as the Soviet Union disintegrated, and the US and Europe began to take more interest in the Westernization of Central Asia. 

Contemporary Use
In current parlance, the term is used for the political economy of Caspian oil, competing collective security arrangements and bilateral diplomacy rivalries in the Central Asian region, and (less often) the presence of ISAF in Afghanistan. 

Many great Central Asian thinkers have used this trope, and their works remain important to understanding Central Asia’s history of cross-cultural dialogue, and well worth reading.  (Most spectacular example: Mr. Hopkirk’s The Great Game.)  But the use of the term in a current article should be a sign that the analysis has been narrowed to a very minimal list of international actors.  Therefore, the author has given him/herself  an already tightly-edited list of possible outcomes:  “In this Great Power X failed, and Great Power Y triumphed.”   The N.G.G. forgets that the object of their sentence (s/he who is to be acted upon–i.e., Central Asia) also has the power to reciprocate (s/he can also act).  Most specifically, using “Great Game” metaphors essentially ignores the sovereign wishes of Central Asia’s Republics and action they take in their own interest.  Therefore, we need to read invocations of the N.G.G. with a healthy skepticism. 

Limits
The New Great Game could not predict the Tulip Revolution or the Andijan Massacre.  It can’t account for the diplomatic facility of the President of Kazakhstan or the bizarre isolationism  of the late President of Turkmenistan.  It does reveal, however, a latent parochialism.  Under N.G.G. parameters, Central Asia is a grand b-ball court for Titanic Teams, and the court owners cower under the thud of gigantic, well-shod feet. Recourse to the N.G.G. metaphor, whether for its strategies or against them,  reveals more about the writer’s view of Central Asia than what its states want to do or how its people react.  And as these states develop multiple diplomatic efforts with an expanding number of states, intergovernmental organizations, private businesses, and markets, they fit this paradigm less and less.

In short, the N.G.G. is not all that New; changing attitudes about what accomplishes Greatness have made old, single-minded powerplays obsolescent; and, for those who must meet with the obnoxious people who insist upon bouncing on in, it cannot be enough fun to be called a Game.

References:
Wikipedia, “The Great Game”
A timeline of the “Great Game“–a little messy in format, but taken from Hopkirk’s important book 
Update: Registan.net has a review of Hopkirk’s book made today

Photos: customersarealways.com; Answers.com; The Kirk Report

Strictly speaking, Mr.Repin’s work does not belong in a Central Asia blog.  Ilya Repin was an ethnic Russian who grew up in the Ukraine and eventually settled in Belarus.  Yet Mr. Repin painted a series of four works that described the conflict between Tsarist secret police and Russian revolutionaries that still resonates today. 

For our time, this series shows so much about rents in social fabric: in particular, the psychology of people of conscience who rebel against autocratic regimes, whether punctilious or searching or outraged; powerlessness against, and defiance of, authority.  The last painting shows the cost to both prisoner and those who must somehow get by in their absence. 

The Revolutionary Meeting (1883)

Arrest of a Propagandist (1880-1892)

Refusal to Confess (1879-1885)

They Did Not Expect Him (1884)

For those of us who have not endured this kind of conflict, this is one of the ways we learn to understand: through the enduring power of art.

Three internet Biographies of Ilya Repin (I liked Wikipedia just fine): 24 digital, Olga’s Gallery, Wikipedia

Photos: First four, Olga’s Gallery; Last one, Auburn University