Afghanistan and Central Asia

In March of this year, Republican Presidential candidate John McCain made a major foreign policy speech at the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles. (Video and Text) In this speech, McCain proposes isolating Russia, specifically from the G-8:

“We should start by ensuring that the G-8, the group of eight highly industrialized states, becomes again a club of leading market democracies: it should include Brazil and India but exclude Russia. Rather than tolerate Russia’s nuclear blackmail or cyber attacks, Western nations should make clear that the solidarity of NATO, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is indivisible and that the organization’s doors remain open to all democracies committed to the defense of freedom.”

If the US stops ‘tolerating’ Russia’s undemocratic and aggressive behavior, what would be the effects? More specifically, if the US tried to isolate Russia, how would this affect the US/West’s approach and relations with most of the Central Asian states, whom Russia is a nation they could never even think of ‘ignoring’?

Under new President Medvedev, Russia’s presence in CA has been strong of late. Medvedev has visited Kazakhstan multiple times and just finished conducting a three stop tour through the region trying to secure gas rights, and curtail the West’s attempts to do the same. Radio Free Europe’s reporter Farangis Najibullah has discussed Moscow’s growing military expansion in the region, mainly regarding Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The article also quotes Uzbek President Karimov as advocating the merger of the Russian controlled CSTO and Eurasec to create a ‘powerful union capable of becoming a counterbalance to NATO and the EU.” Najibullah asserts that the US/West have made some strides in increasing their presence in the region, mainly due to the Afghanistan war, but argues that aid given on conditions of human rights and democracy promotion and just plain old simple geography and its historical links, favor closer CA state relations with Russia. However, an article by Eurasia Daily’s Roger McDermott argues that he sees ’subtle’ changes in Tajikistan’s foreign policy, indicating a trend toward a more independent security and defense posture. But cautions that this does not necessary mean the nation will turn toward the West, more likely close neighbors Afghanistan and Iran (India?).

Lastly, Eurasianet.org wrote a piece arguing that the US/West were making great gains in the CA region, specifically regarding irking Gazprom and increasingly the likelihood of gas pipelines circumventing Russia on their way to Europe (Trans-Caspian and Nabucco), and that this was putting Russia on the ‘defensive.’ The article does not posit too strong of an arguement backing this claim, but the EU/US push for gas supplies, aid, and the NATO presence in Afghanistan and in some CA states, has unquestionably made Russia recalibrate its interests and influence in the region, and Medvedev’s recent visits should be seen in this regard. Russia would not be doubling the price of CA gas imports if this were not the case.

So the US/West has made some progress in the region, and Russia has also proven to be able to fight back, but what would happen if McCain’s proposed alienation of Russia come to fruition? How would it affect the US and Russian posture in Central Asia? I do not believe McCain is advocating a complete reduction in Russian engagement, but mainly in international organizations, such as the G-8. Russia and the US have too much shared interests in the region to completely back away from working together, as was pointed out in an Op-Ed by former Sec of State Albright and Defense Sec William J. Perry. The US and Russia share interests regarding counterterrorism, preventing Iran building nuclear weapons, securing nuclear materials, maintaining/creating stability in Afghanistan and in Central Asia as a whole. The US needs Russia to help keep the region stable, curb China’s encroachments, and fight terrorism. Russia needs the US presence in the region for nearly the same things, stability of Afghanistan and beyond and to block Chinese advancements. Now when McCain bashes Russia it mainly has to do with their autocratic internal ways and how these are pushed out into the wider world, for example their use of cyber-warfare and freezing gas supplies to their ‘uncooperative’ neighbors. And it is true that Russia will not lift a finger to help liberalize, democratize, or create greater transparency in CA state governments, and the US/EU will inevitably try to promote this, so there will be inevitable clashes. McCain is right to call Russia’s on its unproductive and aggressive behavior, but the nation surely cannot be just pushed out of important organizations, especially in Central Asia.

What do you think?

Johannes F. Linn, a former World Bank vice president for Europe and Central Asia and current Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, recently made an extended visit to the region and has written a series of assessments on key issues facing the region. Today, I would like to discuss two pieces in this series in which Linn tackles CA’s water issues in great detail.

‘The Impending Water Crisis in Central Asia: An Immediate Threat‘: In this piece Linn layouts the region’s modern water history and current and coming water ‘crisis.’ On this site we have already discussed how the harsh winter combined with the current drought has cost the region’s energy and water sectors to be under great strain and how this has a dramatic impact on the region’s population, especially its poor. Linn argues that the region is in for a difficult year ahead, comparing its last major drought in 2000-2001, and that situation could quickly deteriorate into a ‘major humanitarian, economic and political crisis.’ This piece concentrates on Tajikistan’s dire situation, with Linn concerned that the upcoming winter may see seven million Tajik citizens with little or no electricity.

Linn highlights the complicated dance between the region’s countries, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan upstream and therefore controlling nations and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan as downstream nations depending on Kyrg and Tajik for water flows from the Amu Darya, Syr Darya, and Kambarata rivers and waterways. He reports that cross-border disputes along Tajik-Kyrg and Kyrg-Uzbek borders had flared up between March and May. The region’s states also failed to come to an agreement over water management during a June 27-28 conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, where Uzbekistan refused to accept Kyrg’s water discharge offer for the coming year.

The situation is very complicated and if you want to get a full picture of the region’s potential coming ‘crisis’ I suggest you read both of Linn’s pieces. So what should the region’s governments and international community do to stop or at least moderate these water/energy issues? Linn offers four steps for regional governments and the international community:

1. Conduct an ‘expert assessment’ of the Central Asian water adn energy shortage and its impact immediately. In other words, find out what the heck is going on.

2. Based on the above assessment, regional governments and international agencies should ‘plan emergency responses.’

3. The UN, international financial institutions, EU, China, Russia, and the US should use diplomatic mechanisms to make sure that the region’s water and energy problems do not develop into ‘open conflict.’ This is crucial.

4. An assessment of the region’s long-term prospects of water and energy balances, with an emphasis on the effect of climate change.

‘Water-Energy Links in Central Asia: A Long-Term Opportunity and Challenge‘: Linn’s second piece goes into more details about region’s dam and irrigation systems, specifically Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam.  Linn posits three options concerning the allocation of region’s transnational water resources:

A. Downstream countries (Uzbek, Kazak, Turkmen) could pay upstream countries (Kyrgf and Tajik) for the summer release of water stored in the winter, as was practiced in the Soviet-ruled days.

B.  Downstream countries could build dams and reservoirs on their territories to catch the waters released by the upstream countries during the winters for summer use.  Linn discusses how this has already been tried and has its setbacks.

C. (Linn’s optimal choice) Build dams and reservoirs along the same river or river system in sequence or as ‘cascades.’  Linn argues this would ‘allow the release of water from the higher reservoir for electricity generation in winter, but catching and storing the water in the subsequent reservoir for summer release.’

I am no expert on this subject, but Linn’s recommendations do seem to make sense, especially because he acknowledges the importance of creating a mechanism for the region’s states to work out these policies together, for if they cannot work together none of his recommendations would come to fruition.  In this regard, Linn suggests the creation of a ‘consortium of partners,’ which include all directly affected countries, regional powers (China and Russia), and international financial partners to help with funding the dams and power plants.

I will keep an eye on Linn and the Brookings Institution’s future pieces about important issues facing Central Asia.

In an incident that looks like it could be linked to two stories recently discussed on this blog, Russia’s energy policy in Central Asia and Islamic militant groups based in the region, a 20-mile section of a natural gas pipeline, which travels from western Kazakhstan into Russian territory, was shut down late yesterday after an explosion damaged the line.  There were no reported casualties or injuries and Russia nor Gazprom has commented on the incident just yet.  There is no word about what caused the blast and no one has claimed responsibility.  Terrorist and militant groups have attacked pipelines in nearby Pakistan and Nigeria on a regular basis.  It is pure speculation that I linked the region’s Islamic groups to this incident and I will keep tabs on any further developments.

Freedom House put two new reports out in June of interest: Nations in Transit 2008 Annual Report and Supporting Freedom’s Advocates?: An Analysis of the Bush Administration FY2008 Budget Request for Democracy and Human Rights (Follow the link down the page and download the pdf under ‘Past Reports’) These reports are linked in an unfortunate way, the decreasingly open and democratic nature of Central Asia’s regime is key to both of them.

The Nations in Transit report ‘measures progress and setbacks in democratization in 29 countries and administrative areas from Central Europe to the Eurasian region of the Former Soviet Union.’ In its overall analysis of the former Soviet States, specifically in Central Asia, the report stated; ‘In distinct contrast to the trajectories of the other regions, the former Soviet Union has moved toward a more deeply anchored authoritarian, democratic accountability is an ever-scarcer commodity.’ Dierdre Tynan of Eurasianet.org gives an overview and analysis of the report’s findings here.

The Transit report grades each country from 1-7, with 1 being the most free, on 8 different categories and then assigns a overall score. The categories are: 1. Electoral Process 2. Civil Society 3. Independent Media 4. Governance 5. National Democratic Governance 6. Local Democratic Governance 7. Judicial Framework and Independence 8. Corruption. In a sadly similar formula to last year’s Freedom of the World rankings for Central Asia, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan’s scores could hardly get lower, ranking near the bottom of the world, 6.93 and 6.86 disrespectfully. Kyrgyzstan received the best score in the region, 5.93, with Freedom House calling its 2005 upheaval now a time of ‘lost promise.’ Tajikistan’s score worsened from 5.96 to 6.07, with Freedom House stating that ‘justice is bought and sold’ in the nation.

Concerning the analysis of the Bush Administration’s FY2009 Budget Request for Democracy and Human Rights, Deirdre Tynan also wrote up another overview and critique (I haven’t had time yet to read FH whole report). Tynan reports that FH is disappointed in the President’s proposed budget for two critical reasons; 1. A lack of transparency as to where exactly the money where go, for instance to help civil society, rule of law? 2. Though the budget request increased overall, funds for most Central Asian states fell. The report argues that the US government needs to put more funds in developing the civil society of the region, particularly Kazakhstan, and has harsh words for Russia’s presence in the region, calling it a ‘negative influence over its former Soviet neighbors’ and as sliding evermore ‘towards increased autocracy.’ Freedom House leaves out hope that Congress will put the money back in when they have an opportunity to appropriate funds.

I couldn’t agree more with Freedom House about greater transparency in the appropriation of these funds, we should know where and to whom they are going. And I am more than sympathetic to their promotion of greater aid to support Central Asia’s civil society, independent media, and promotion of the rule of law and free and fair elections, but there are indeed strategic elements to consider, such as energy supplies and the fact that we need to work with these authoritative leaders at time on issues such as Afghanistan’s security. To leaders like, Islam Karimov, Berdymukhamedov, and Nazarbayev this money is aimed at their removal from power and that can’t sit too well, not to mention that China and Russia both see it as an affront to their regional interests and influence.

However, in the end, these are two informative, important, and brave reports by Freedom House.

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has made his second visit to Central Asia, this time stopping by Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan for the second time. Gas was apparently the only thing on the diplomatic menu. Medvedev and his Gazprom officials are wary of European and Chinese influence and engagement in the region’s energy resources, a sphere Russia has dominated for years, and this trip’s purpose appears to keep that monopoly intact.

Medvedev first went to Baku, Azerbaijan and reportedly told the nation that it was willing to buy up all of its Caspian Sea and land gas to keep it from heading to Europe via the BTC pipeline already functioning, or the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines in discussions right now. This would be a tall order for Medvedev to accomplish, as Azerbaijan has been courted by the West and strategically faced that way for some years now.

Immediately after this visit the Russian president visited Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan before heading off to the G-8 summit. Russia/Gazprom already dominate gas flow from these two states, but it faces growing competition from Europe and China and therefore wants to solidify its position. Last December, Russia and these two states agreed to build a new pipeline a while later Russia agreed to up its price for their energy resources, both moves to hurt Europe/China’s chances of getting in ‘on the game.’ The purpose of this recent visit also appears to be for Russia to buy up as much of the two nation’s gas as possible in order to stifle any deals the states would make with the EU/China and India for that matter. Russia’s energy policy is not one of just paranoia, as China has just announced the start of construction of a huge, 30 billion cubic meter natural gas pipeline transversing from Turkmenistan, through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, and ending in its own Xinjiang Province and EU representatives are in serious talks with Turkmen officials about the Trans-Caspian and Nabucco pipelines.

(Photo: Medvedev with Azerbaijan President Aliyev: Source Asianews.it)

How bout some early Monday morning polygamy talk? Radio Free Europe reports that the Kazak parliament has been debating a new draft law that would allow any man who is able to meet his second and third wife’s financial needs and obtain their consent can have multiple marriages. The parliament has debated this issue before without passing and implementing a law and from the looks of it there is a fair amount of opposition to the legislation to keep it from passing, but the practice of polygamy does exist and their are some demographic and rational reasons for it be formalized in the law.

All of the Central Asian states have experienced polygamy throughout their history, as it allowed in the Islamic religion and culture, and after the fall of the Soviet Empire it reportedly enjoyed a resurgence. Kazakhstan decriminalized the practice in 1998, but all of the other CA states still treat it as a crime, though one rarely prosecuted. Women’s groups in Kazakhstan do not support ‘polygamy’ per se, but they do desire that these 2nd and 3rd wives have protection under the law, which they have none of as of right now. Polygamy does provide one answer the demographic challenges facing most of the CA nations as it allows financially stable men to take on more than one poor, destitute women and provide for them and their children. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, where a large amount of the male population travels abroad for employment and has many men who may never come back, some people say that the ability for a man of wealth to take more than one wife ‘benefits’ wives and children. We’ll have to see how far the Kazak parliament goes in formalizing this type of marriage.

Here are some other pertinent religious and cultural pieces from Forum 18, a great watchdog publication for the region’s human and religious rights;

1. “Why can’t all religious communities have places of worship?” - examines Turkmenistan’s government’s refusal to let non-Islamic religions have a place to worship.

2. “Kazakhstan: Alarm at state-backed planned new Religion Law” - discusses a planned law restricting ‘freedom of thought’ and penalizing ‘unapproved’ religious activities.

3. “Kazakhstan: A law on Non-Freedom of Conscience” - discusses the same law as above, but in greater detail. And here’s the latest update on the law’s possible passing with some modifications.

(Photo: Radio Free Europe)

Still staying on the issue of Russia, Mark Dillen, head of an international public affairs consultancy and blog writer for FPA’s 2008 Presidential Election and Public Diplomacy blogs, attended and discussed the World Affairs Council of Northern California’s annual conference which featured a ‘Reading Russia’ series. Dillen discusses that most of the scholars present were pessimistic about Russia and its new President’s future, calling the nation and the leader ‘more authoritarian.’

However, Dillen found a Russian analyst who had a more nuanced view of the great power and its new leader, Dimitri Trenin, Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Trenin sought to highlight the fact that though the Russian’s change over of power was anything close to a free and fair a election, it more likely resembled the choice of one really, really Super Delegate, it was still a peaceful, organized step-down and ascension of power in nation without a history of such an occurrence. Trenin also argues that it is in Putin’s interest to secure a ‘mature’ and strong President Medvedev. Trenin states ‘I think the West would be right to read this as a case of regency whose purpose would not be to give Mr. Putin a formal pretext for returning to power but rather to guarantee that Medvedev succeeds.’

We have talked about Robert Kagan’s new book arguing that Russia and China offer the world’s states another model for modernization, one based on authoritative government. And we have also discussed how the Medvedev/Putin changeover would affect Russia’s foreign relations, especially in Central Asia. Will Russia’s peaceful transition of power have any impact on the government and leaders of Central Asia? Most of the CA states have leaders for life or have consistently augmented their constitutions to secure their continued rule. Who do you agree with more, the majority of Russian scholars who are pessimistic about the great power’s authoritative nature and future or with Trenin, who sees some progress in the state’s recent governmental changeover?

About a month ago we discussed the implications for new Russian presidency of Dmitry Medvedev for Central Asia, Russian domestic politics, and the world in general. Would Medvedev be Putin’s puppet? Would he be a liberalizer? What could we expect from him regarding relations between Russia and the Central Asian states? We are about to find out.

Medvedev is scheduled to make his first foreign diplomatic visit to Astana, Kazakhstan on May 22-23 and President Nazarbayev (Here’s a little background analysis) has already made a few phone calls to the new leader to open up discussions on ‘bilateral relations and international issues.’ (a little vague) However, Sergei Blagov has reported that the Kazak defense department has already signed numerous lucrative contracts with Russian arms powerhouse Rosoboronexport and other Kazak officials reiterated the two nations ’strategic’ alliance. Blagov highlighted growing trade between the two states in recent years featuring double digit increases.

But things are not getting too cozy; as the issue of oil contracts, prices, and pipelines looks to be a clashing point between the two resource-rich states and this could be a harbinger for Uzbek and Turkmenistan-Russian relations in the Medvedev term as well. Blagov reports that Russia desperately desires to increase output from the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which would continue to orientate Kazak resources towards Russia, but it appears that Nazarbayev has not given in. Medvedev was a long time member of Gazprom’s board, including its chairman, and it appears likely that he will want to ‘tighten the knot’ on the region’s energy resources. Russia is clearly concerned that Kazak and CA other resource-rich states will start moving more and more of the oil and gas towards Europe directly through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, already functioning, and the Trans-Caspian, not yet a reality, pipelines.

Analyst Sergei Blagov seems to think that Medvedev and Russia can have some success in this energy politics, but as we have discussed before, Stephen Blank argues that Russia’s position in this regard is growing weaker and weaker, while China and the CA states gain still greater leverage. We will have to wait and see how Medvedev’s visit to Astana, and his following trip to gas-rich Turkmenistan, work out. Medvedev will not let Russia’s resource monopoly fall without a fight.

I would like to quickly draw attention to New York University’s Political Science MA Program’s online Journal of Political Inquiry, which features an article on US/Pakistan relations, Iran/US relations and the policy of containment, Albania’s process of democratization, and a short book review of Paul Berman’s Terror and Liberalism, by yours truly.

To offer some sweet relief for your Monday blues, here’s some Central Asian geopolitical analytical madness! A couple of weeks ago we discussed the EU’s attempts at diversifying CA gas exports to circumvent Russian territory and influence, mainly in Turkmenistan. In addition, on this blog we have talked about China and India’s growing role in the region, once again usually centered on natural resources. The geopolitics surrounding CA’s ‘Great Game’ have been analyzed for decades, but I must admit the stories and actors involved remain vibrant and the debate about who’s winning and losing rages on.

Professor Stephen Blank, from the US Army War College, has written an excellent piece analyzing Russia’s March 11 deal with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to buy their gas at world prices. He argues that this move signifies a weakening Russian position in the region (and possibly in Europe) and rising regional cooperation between the Central Asian gas and oil producing states. Blank sees the region opening up for natural resource competition with an aggressive China with a voracious oil/gas appetite and the EU showing greater policy cohesion in regional resource negotiations. He asserts that this competition is forcing Russia into compromising positions (the price hike) and heightening the importance and negotiating posture of the CA states.

If one has been following the news lately, this analysis appears to be more right than wrong. Although, I believe Blank is overstating Russia’s weakness (though not as much as this piece), he is right that the CA strategic resource holding states have gained an increasing amount of leverage with suitors from China, EU, US, and India joining Russia. Whether the CA states can use this an opportunity to heighten their regional cooperation, which has never been strong unless you count Soviet domination in the 20th century, is another story.

Blank argues that Russia desperately desires to keep China’s actions in the region in line by chaining them down in an energy club based in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, where they can work together to separate and exploit the CA states and keep the US/EU out of the loop at the same time. This is good policy for Russia in that it needs to be careful not to allow a CA with unchecked natural resource competition, but the SCO has not proven itself to be a strong enough group to hold its cohesiveness (aka Russia-China partnership) when it comes to such a vital national interest as oil/gas procurement. The SCO also receives weak marks in curtailing EU/US influence in the region. The US has its largest presence in the region (mainly due to the Afghanistan war) ever and as this article showcases, the EU is making progress in its energy dealings in the region.

Is Russia’s hold on Central Asia, specifically regarding natural resources, ebbing or is its faltering influence highly exaggerated? Does the March 11 agreement portend rising regional cooperation between Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan? Is more open competition for resources involving India, Russia, China, EU, and the US good or bad for the CA states? Do you think it was tough for Professor Stephen to grow up with the last name ‘Blank’?

In an earlier post, I discussed a burgeoning Russia/NATO partnership concerning Afghanistan. This agreement, which is being negotiated as we speak at the Bucharest NATO Summit, however, may not come to fruition. Only a day or so ago, Konstantin Kosachev, head of Russia’s State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs, stated that the agreement was ‘premature’ and articulated further that ‘increasing Russia’s involvement is not expedient today because…this operation is being carried out in the format of a NATO operation.’

No doubt Russia’s new stance on NATO’s Afghanistan mission is a reaction to President Bush’s support of Ukraine and Georgia’s ascension to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) program, which is an important step to full NATO membership. However, because of Germany and France’s opposing stances, it appears unlikely that Ukraine and Georgia will actually be received into NATO’s MAP system. It will be intriguing to see how this all plays out during the rest of the Summit which concludes on Friday.

The Bucharest Summit has two important Central Asian guests as well, Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov and Turkmenistan’s leader, President Berdymukhammedov. This is Karimov’s second NATO summit and Turkmenistan’s first appearance. Both of these nations are members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace and journalist Bruce Pannier does a fine job discussing their objectives for the Summit.

Both of these nations border Afghanistan and its stability is vital to their own, so joining NATO’s discourse on the subject should hopefully breed further cooperation. However, as was discussed above, these two nations will have some of their policy toward NATO’s Afghanistan mission dictated by Russia’s own dealings with the multilateral-security pact. For instance, the Russian-NATO partnership would constitute a land route for supplies into Afghanistan that would go through not only Russian territory, but also Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. If Russia and NATO/US come to diplomatic blows or a dead-end during the Summit over NATO expansion, parts of NATO’s dealings with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan could be affected.

Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are hoping this Summit will provide them greater access to Western influence, especially regarding gas pipelines and security cooperation. Pannier’s article points out that US Predator drones have hit Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Uzbekistan government’s main enemy, targets inside of Pakistan and the Karimov government has let the US use their Termez base on a ‘case-by-case basis.’ Ashgabat is definitely utilizing the Summit as an opportunity to grow out of its isolationist past and as Pannier suggests, Berdymukhammedov may be having some side conversations concerning alternative gas export routes circumventing Russia with several European leaders.

(Picture Source: AFP, Radio Free Europe)