Afghanistan and Central Asia

Yesterday morning, I attended a lecture and discussion led by Tatyana Zhukova titled ‘From Nomads to Central Asian Tigers’ about her home country of Kazakhstan at the World Affairs Council - San Diego. Zhukova, an ethnic Russian, worked for several years as an economic specialist for the US embassy in Kazakhstan and recently moved to the San Diego area. Her expertise was tracking trends in the Kazakh oil and gas industries.

In her talk, she went over much about Kazakh’s history, culture, Soviet past, rising economy, and relations with Russia, China, and the US. She began her presentation by discussing what her home country ‘was not’, basically what the Borat movie portrayed, and what it ‘was’, growing, modern, and diverse. She described for us what life was like before and during the Soviet collapse, describing both the positive and negative elements which occurred.

In describing the rising economic power that Kazakhstan has become, she visually showed us pictures of its capital of Astana’s modern architecture and told us that real estate was there was just as experience as here in the US. She discussed the tremendous oil reserves of the state with the most impressive stat being that the nation held the 9th greatest oil reserves in the world.

This part of the lecture quickly transitioned to Kazakh relations with Russia, EU, China, and the US, as all of these states desire the country’s energy reserves. Zhukova called Kazakhstan’s foreign outlook the ‘multi-vector policy’ which attempts to balance, balance, and balance some more all of those great powers which desire influence. She described Russian-Kazakh relations as of ‘always closer’ than the others as history, ethnicity, economic and political ties were so strong between the two. In terms of China, she argued that though relations were vastly growing, there was a fear of too much Beijing influence in the country. Zhukova did an excellent job outlining US major diplomatic visits to Astana for the dual purposes of promoting openness and democracy and for securing favorable energy deals for US companies.

In terms of Kazakh domestic politics, Zhukova talked about President Nazarbayev’s unlimited presidency in a very nonchalant manner. Though she herself made some criticisms of his rule, corruption and lack of individual rights being two large complaints, she made it very clear that the country was stable and growing (though the monthly income of a Kazakh was around $525) and that Nazarbayev should be given credit for this. Some member of the audience asked her about political rights in the country, as in ‘could people protest, criticize the leadership or policies?’  Zhukova also told the story that when she was in DC, there was this women in front of the White House holding signs and shouting that Bush was a terrorist. She turned to her American husband and said ‘aren’t they going to arrest her or take her away.’

It was an enlightening talk and I look forward to more by the World Affairs Council - San Diego, which is scheduled to have upcoming talks about the geopolitics of Central Asia, Afghanistan, and I am scheduled to speak about the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in February.
(Here is Tatyana’s professional email address if you have further questions, tatyana.zhukova@yahoo.com)

The rising political tensions between India and Pakistan are having a direct impact on Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia. The two regional powers have traded influence in Afghanistan to try and outmaneuver the other and it is Pakistan’s security apparatus’s greatest fear right now that India currently has the upper-hand with US-backed Karzai government.

We all know the tremendous linkages between the Afghan and Pakistani people, cultural, society, and state, but India’s connections have been ever growing since the fall of the Taliban. Since 2001, India has provided over $750 million in reconstruction aid and pledged another $450. At this moment, New Delphi has around 4,000 workers and security personnel in the troubled country, not to mention an airbase in bordering Tajikistan. This presence greatly troubles Pakistan as their security officials fear they are being encircled by their rival to the south. This fear may have led the ISI to try and intimidate New Delphi by orchestrating the terrorist attack on India’s embassy in Kabul.

The Mumbai Massacre will have concrete effects on the stability of Afghanistan as it has rejuvenated a game of power politics throughout the region. As India was ratcheting up strong rhetoric and demanding a list of 20 suspected militants from Pakistan’s government, Islamabad’s military stated that they would move most of the 100,000 troops on their border with Afghanistan, who obstensively are battling the Taliban, to the state’s southern border with India. A similar event occurred in 2001 when India moved thousands of troops to the Kashmir border after their parliament was attacked.

If this troop movement were to occur, the greatest beneficiaries would be the Taliban as all of a sudden they have no need to worry about their south-eastern flank and their sanctuary becomes even more cozy. For the US/NATO and Afghan government this would make their counterinsurgency efforts just that much harder and that is why Condi Rice was in India yesterday trying to calm things down between the two long-time rivals.

Just as Rubin and Rashid argued in their Foreign Affairs piece, this is a regional situation and it will require a regional diplomatic solution. A diplomatically strategic solution that helps solve the security dilemma for the Afghan, Pakistani, and Indian states. It is true that one cannot look at Afghan-India and Afghan-Pakistan relations without first examining India-Pakistan relations. As both India and Pakistan look at Afghan influence as a zero-sum game. This is a very serious dilemma because if Pakistan believes that the Karzai, NATO backed government, is more pro-Indian than pro-Pakistan, than its security officials would most likely work for an alternative, aka the Taliban.

Today, I want to go over recent cooperative measures and conferences in our beloved Central Asian region. With Obama soon to be in the White House and multilateralism all the rage, I thought it was about time. In all seriousness, these cooperative efforts regarding such important transnational issues as terrorism, trade, drug trades, and disease control can bring concrete gains for the region’s states and citizens.

Terrorism - The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) brought together international, regional, and local public and private representatives in Bishkek to “explore the forms and methods of partnerships, the role of the banking sector and NGOs in the struggle against terrorism, the role of religious organizations, educational awareness raising, and the role of media in combating extremism.” The conference was hosted by the Western-based OSCE, but involved the UN, CIS, CSTO, and the SCO. I wonder how the latter’s representatives felt about this comment from OSCE ambassador Andrew Tesoriere; “Human rights and rule of law are central to counter-terrorism strategy. To undermine them is to play into hands of the terrorists. A successful counter-terrorist strategy supports dialogue, diversity and tolerance within society. It does not block them.” This conference, which occurred in early November, obviously has taken on greater significance since the Mumbai massacre last week.

Border Management & Drug Control - The government of Tajikistan co-hosted with the EU this conference for participating Central Asian states and international delegations to present their priorities in regards to border patrol and the narcotics trade. The Conference concluded with the official delegations’ agreement to a Partnership Declaration, which emphasized ‘the importance of strengthening cross-border co-operation and developing and implementing national border management and national drug control strategies.’ Rather broad, but I hope some pragmatic progress was achieved as well.

Disease Control - This article highlights the work of NGO’s, particularly Management Sciences for Health, efforts to curb the spread of infectious diseases within Afghanistan and across its borders into Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. The piece discusses the work of NGO’s to help coordinate the aforementioned government’s ability to stop such contagious diseases, such as HIV, tuberculosis, cholera, malaria, polio, and the avian influenza.

I’ll end this post with a quote from Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi about his hopes for greater cooperation between South and Central Asia;

“It is our firm belief that increased economic, political and human interaction will further the geo-economic potential of South Asia and Central Asia. Challenges are enormous but so are the opportunities, let us focus on the latter.”

I just finished Barnett R. Rubin and Ahmed Rashid’s Foreign Affairs piece on US/NATO Afghan and Pakistani policy, titled ‘From Great Game to Grand Bargain: Ending Chaos in Afghanistan and Pakistan.‘ Rubin, who has a blog and a forthcoming book, and Rashid are two giants in the field and I was looking forward at what they had to say about the current situation, especially with a new US administration coming in. Here are some of the articles major topics and policy recommendations:

Afghan Troop Surge

The authors frame a likely troop surge begun by Bush and almost definitely followed through by Barack Obama, as a policy that without a major overhaul of regional security issues will almost definitely fail. They posit that greater troop levels could protect local Afghan populations, giving police and administrative institutions a greater chance at growth and progress, and enable US/NATO forces to have to revert less to air attacks, which have resulted in civilian deaths, but they emphasize other policy prescriptions as having a greater chance at success. Another aspect they fail to mention regarding an Afghan troop surge is the possible coming to the negotiation table of certain groups who see the surge as a sign of US/NATO commitment and decide that they should strike a deal, aka the Sunni Awakening in Iraq. Rubin and Rashid are saying nothing new in that the situation on the ground will take more than just more feet on the ground, but their emphasis on the tenuous geopolitical situation of the region, especially Pakistan’s, is worth discussing further.

Pakistani Geopolitics

The best aspect of the whole article is Rubin and Rashid’s analysis of Pakistan’s, or at least their internal perceived, tenuous and insecure geopolitical situation. The authors layout the fears of the Pakistani military and intelligence agency regarding the current Afghan government, specifically regarding the possible long-term presence of US troops and its perceived and real alignment with Pakistan’s archrival, India. To them, Pakistan is a state surrounded by existential enemies, India, an Afghanistan allied with India, and the US, a state that though partnered with the country in the War on Terror, is also a major ally of India, which includes the recent signing of the India-US Nuclear Cooperation Treaty. In Rashid and Rubin’s eyes, these external enemies have led the Pakistani military and government see the Kashmir rebels and Pakistani Taliban as partners at times, willing to help to assist the state’s geopolitical objectives of undermining the Indian and Indian-allied Afghan government. Though I think the authors have gone a bit overboard in describing Pakistan’s external ‘existential’ problems, especially regarding the India-US nuke deal,as the US also works closely, just not publicly, with the Pakistani military on this issue, and I believe they overemphasize the Afghan-India alliance and under-emphasize the historical animosity between Afghan-Pakistan’s Durand Line and FATA situation.

Major Diplomatic Initiative

The main policy prescription given by the two experts is for an international diplomatic compact, which is able to relieve at least most of the region’s geopolitical insecurities. Most of the Initiative has to do with reliving Pakistani fears, which they argue would allow them to be a more productive partner in stabilizing Afghanistan and cooling tensions on the Kashmir issue. Here is a lengthy excerpt which describes some of the give and take between the international and regional participants:

A first step could be the establishment of a contact group on the region authorized by the UN Security Council. This contact group, including the five permanent members and perhaps others (NATO, Saudi Arabia), could promote dialogue between India and Pakistan about their respective interests in Afghanistan and about finding a solution to the Kashmir dispute; seek a long-term political vision for the future of the FATA from the Pakistani government, perhaps one involving integrating the FATA into Pakistan’s provinces, as proposed by several Pakistani political parties; move Afghanistan and Pakistan toward discussions on the Durand Line and other frontier issues; involve Moscow in the region’s stabilization so that Afghanistan does not become a test of wills between the United States and Russia, as Georgia has become; provide guarantees to Tehran that the U.S.-NATO commitment to Afghanistan is not a threat to Iran; and ensure that China’s interests and role are brought to bear in international discussions on Afghanistan. Such a dialogue would have to be backed by the pledge of a multiyear international development aid package for regional economic integration, including aid to the most affected regions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, particularly the border regions. (At present, the United States is proposing to provide $750 million in aid to the FATA but without having any political framework to deliver the aid.)

A central purpose of the contact group would be to assure Pakistan that the international community is committed to its territorial integrity — and to help resolve the Afghan and Kashmir border issues so as to better define Pakistan’s territory. The international community would have to provide transparent reassurances and aid to Pakistan, pledge that no state is interested in its dismemberment, and guarantee open borders between Pakistan and both Afghanistan and India. The United States and the European Union would have to open up their markets to Pakistan’s critical exports, especially textiles, and to Afghan products. And the United States would need to offer a road map to Pakistan to achieving the same kind of nuclear deal that was reached with India, once Pakistan has transparent and internationally monitored guarantees about the nonproliferation of its nuclear weapons technology.

Reassurances by the contact group that addressed Pakistan’s security concerns might encourage Pakistan to promote, rather than hinder, an internationally and nationally acceptable political settlement in Afghanistan. Backing up the contact group’s influence and clout must be the threat that any breaking of agreements or support for terrorism originating in the FATA would be taken to the UN Security Council. Pakistan, the largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, sees itself as a legitimate international power, rather than a spoiler; confronted with the potential loss of that status, it would compromise.

To the authors credit, they also go into ways US/NATO could assure China, India, Russia, and Iran that their presence is not to endanger their respected interests or security, but only to provide a stable, prosperous region. What the US expects is for the states and main players in the region, specifically the Afghan and Pakistani governments, to commit to combating international terrorism in their territory.

What do you think? What did you think about the article? What did I miss? What did Rubin and Rashid miss?

Last Tuesday and Wednesday, with the latter in a joint news conference with the secretary general of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Afghan President Karzai voiced his displeasure with international NATO presence in his country and called for a timetable of withdrawal. In front of Scheffer, he used more careful language, calling for a ‘timetable for success’, not withdrawal, but the point was made. Karzai went on to say:

“How long will this war go? Afghanistan can’t continue to suffer a war without end.”

These are valid questions anyone involved in this conflict should ask, but why is Karzai now starting to publicly criticize and be so demanding with US/NATO and all the international backing that helped put and keep him in charge? Is it because the Taliban seems stronger than at any point in the past seven years? Is it because he is speaking the voice of most Afghanis who are tired with the lack of progress and international footsteps all over their land? Or is it because Karzai is up for reelection in a matter of months and is using the international troops and presence as a political punching bag to make him appear more powerful and in touch with his citizenry?

All of these in some way probably true. Though the US/NATO/NGOS have made tremendous sacrifices for Afghan democracy and stability, progress in many areas has been minimal and violence is sadly still too much of an everyday occurrence for many Afghani’s, especially in the south. Karzai himself, is an embattled leader trying to show his people that he, not the foreigners, is in charge. It is for this reason why you won’t hear much backtalk from NATO or US officers or government officials (Condi Rice and Scheffer have already sidestepped the issue). The US/NATO want Karzai to appear and be strong to and for his people as they obviously want the Afghanis to take on more of the governing and letting Karzai voice his displeasure with NATO from time to time is part of this deal.

And it is not like there aren’t issues for Karzai and the Afghan people to complain about. The Taliban are still creating havoc in much of their lives and making it very difficult for many to lead normal lives. Civilian casualties literally hit the homefront in many ways, as Karzai has rightly protested against military mishaps that have led to many unfortunate, tragic deaths. The ArmyTimes has pointed out how local Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), though have done some great and valiant work, in many ways undermine the local and federal Afghan government in their respected locations.

What do you think is behind Karzai’s public denouncements and calls for a ‘timetable’? How would you react if you were the international presence he was talking about? What would Karzai say if the US/NATO did decide that this was not an effort worth fighting for and then announce a withdrawal date? Can there really be something like a ‘timetable for success’?

The legal and cultural battle of whether or not Muslims should be able to wear a headscarf, hijab, in educational or other government facilities has been a well-publicized, contentious debate in such places as Turkey and France, both either straddling or inside the West, but this issue is also starting to boil in parts of Central Asia.  Abdumomun Mamaraimov and Saodat Asanova performed a thorough analysis of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s own present controversy over the wearing of the hijab by school students.

It appears that in the last few years, the Tajik and Kyrg governments have moved in the direction of disallowing the wearing of hijabs in their government-run schools.  Tajikistan’s government has formally banned the practice and Kyrgyzstan’s has done so more as a forced ‘recommendation.’  In any case, there are many citizens of the each state that feels this is a violation of their religious and individual rights.  It appears that a few, though not an incredible amount, of female students have either chosen, along with their families in most cases, to stop attending school or have been suspended or expelled.

While certain citizens are against this formal or informal ban, the government and education ministers claim it is a necessary measure against religious separation and extremism in a public sphere that the government desires to be secular.  Tajik Education Minister Abdujabor Rahmonov equates the hijab with conducting ‘propaganda for religious ideas in a secular society.’  Both the Kyrg and Tajik government are most in fear of the Islamic group Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a group that advocates the non-violent removal of the region’s secular governments with an Islamic state, but that has at times been connected to terrorist attacks.  The leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan do indeed have reason to fear radical Islamists as they have caused problems in the past for each state.

But this brings us to the central part of the hijab argument.  It is obvious that most hijab wearers are just devout Muslims who mean no harm, but one cannot ignore that extremists do exist.  So is the hijab ban slowing or strengthening extremism?  Is the ban worth the loss of some religious and individual rights?  The end of the Mamaraimov and Asaova piece attempts to answer these difficult questions.  They rightly argue that the hijab cannot just be equated with Islamic extremism.  If I wear a cowboy hat it does not mean I just got back from a rodeo.  The two authors advocate a more nuanced approach to the conflict, though they don’t offer any specific recommendations, except for those who feel they are being prosecuted because of their hijab wearing to be patient.  The governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan need to communicate their reasoning for the ban.  Their citizens need to know their voices are heard.  At times, governments do need to make a law that punishes/restricts the many because of the wrongs of a few, but it is also the job of the government to clearly explain why such a law was passed.  Unfortunately, the accountability I am discussing probably goes beyond what can be expected from these two governments.  I also hold out hope that a compromise could be made, as in certain places in the school were the hijab is allowed or maybe just one day a week.  Either way these two societies need to do whatever they can not to alienate or disenfranchise a portion of their populace as this policy is meant to discourage, not encourage extremism.

Good news that hopefully just keeps getting better. The Afghan government, not US/NATO troops, has arrested 10 suspects in the Nov. 12 female student and teacher acid attack. It looks like it was a combination of local Kandahar and federal police and law officials who performed the investigation, arrests, and has reportedly garnered confessions from the suspects. The Afghan officials accused a high-ranking Taliban member of instigating the attack by offering 100,000 Pakistani rupees for any violence against Afghan schools and female students. Now this is almost definitely not a watershed moment showcasing Afghan government strength and law enforcement, but it is a positive development nonetheless, one that can hopefully lead to a greater sense of citizen faith in the government’s ability to protect and serve them.

Afghan Refugees
The Afghan government is portraying its growing strength in another area, its refugee and returnee situation. The International Conference on the Return and Reintegration of Afghan Refugees, co-hosted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which ‘expressed its intent to take overall responsibility for planning and implementing its national development strategy.’ The US state department has programmed $500 million dollars to aid the refugees and returnees, a large majority of funds needed, but the Afghan government has another opportunity to show its people what it is capable of.

U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council
US Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky just got back from a trip to Afghanistan where she met with President Karzai, Foreign Minister Spanta, and Women’s Affairs Minister Ghazanfar concerning the transition of the U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to its permanent home at Georgetown University. Here is some real quick background on the Council:

The Council, which meets in Washington, DC and Kabul every year, was created by President Bush and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in 2002. Its mission is to help empower Afghan women to play a critical role in the reconstruction of their nation. The Council promotes public/private partnerships between U.S. and Afghan institutions and mobilizes private resources to help Afghan women gain the skills and education they need to improve their status and economic well-being. It also seeks to improve women’s access to health care and reduce the adult illiteracy that impedes Afghan women’s progress.

Lastly, Joshua at Registan.net gives a fascinating overview of homosexual life in Afghanistan since the Taliban’s overthrow in 2001. Alas, like most things in life there have been positives closely aligned with dramatic negatives.

The New York Times, which has done a more than decent job covering the people, culture, and political situation of the Uighurs in China’s Xinjiang Province, has a well-researched piece examining the impact of several mummified Xinjiang ancestors’ genetic background.

A museum in the province’s capital of Urumqi holds several well-preserved mummified humans found in the Tarim Basin. Some of these mummies are more than 4,000 years old and their genetic make-up is widely seen as an accurate way to answer the ‘who was there first’ question being fought over by the Han Chinese and Uighur Muslims. Forget, the Cold War, this is the true East vs. West battle.

Each group has their claims to regional legitimacy and both have obvious important ramifications to who rightly has claim to the region and its rule. It is for this reason that the Chinese government, fearing the genetic evidence from these mummies would verify the Uighur’s long-time presence, has been loath to let biological testing take place that they could not control. Nonetheless, foreign scholars have slipped away some tissue, which though still far from conclusive, has shown strong western roots in the region’s people. The mummies have been found to have Central Asian, Iranian, and even European traits.

However, it is near impossible to pin down exactly how long a specific group has ruled/inhabited an area, as can be sadly seen in the Caucasus and Balkan regions where each group has ancient stories and anthropological evidence to defend their claims. And even more important is what a group can do with the knowledge. The Uighurs of Xinjiang can uncover a book written by Mao proclaiming their rightful place and rule of the region and the Chinese government would find a way to discredit or ignore it.

This is truly a case where science meets politics. Only time will tell who wins….Politics.

(Source: New York Times)

It appears that the Taliban’s leader Mullah Omar may yet still have his day in the hot Afghan sun as President Karzai has publicly invited him to negotiations to end the violent conflict that has plagued the state since 2001. Karzai has promised the Taliban leader, who was ousted from power by the US in 2001, full protection from all sides. Karzai is taking a hardline on the issue, basically telling the international community, which holds a large stake in the country, to back off, at least regarding discussions with high Taliban officials. Karzai stated:

“If I say I want protection for Mullah Omar, the international community has two choices: remove me, or leave if they disagree.”

Karzai is no doubt trying to distance himself from the NATO international forces to strengthen his domestic appeal and legitimacy with his presidency up for election early next year. However, Karzai did stop by the UK late last week and reportedly briefed PM Gordon Brown on the possible negotiations. The US government has not vocally gone against the proposal, but cautioned that Omar, nor any other major Taliban figure, has never shown a ‘willingness to negotiate.’ In fact, Mullah Omar has not responded in any known way to Karzai’s rapprochement.

Negotiations with insurgents is already ongoing and will be necessary if Afghanistan and Pakistan are to find long-lasting piece, and this will include dealings with people with blood on their hands, but is effective and moral policy to hold free and fair talks with a person who led a brutal regime, which provided explicit shelter to the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks? Mullah Omar still has a $10 million dollar US bounty on his head! This policy does not sound right to me. However, this conflict is one of immense challenges and duration and if making a deal with Omar or others his type, could bring peace and stability to the region, it may be worth it. But what would that peace look like? Would it require putting Omar and other Taliban leaders back in the government, but just at lesser positions? Too dangerous for me. Will it mean giving the FATA and southern Afghan provinces near total autonomy? That is not acceptable either, too much of a security risk.

What would negotiations between Karzai and Omar look like? What would be the best case scenario? What would each side have to give up? What would you do if you were the US? What would you do if you were Karzai? Mullah Omar?

I haven’t done much book reviewing on this blog besides Ahmed Rashid’s ‘Descent into Chaos‘, and that’s really not going to change, but I would like to list a group of recent publications concerning Afghanistan and Central Asia that you may find interesting and worth looking into.

Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World - by Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, Ghani is a former Afghan government finance minister and much of the centers around Afghanistan.

Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics - Bobo Lo, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is covered.

Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond - Abdulkader H. Sinno, a study using organization theory to examine the participating conflicting groups in Afghanistan.

Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia - Marshall I. Goldman, the title says it all.

National Identity and Globalization: Youth, State, and Society in Post-Soviet Eurasia - by Douglas W. Blum, the author examines the fashioning of national identifies after the Cold War in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan - Edited by Robert D. Crews and Amin Tarzi, an extensive of history and examination of the US role throughout it.

After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan - by James F. Dobbins, the former American ambassador pontificates the good and the bad of the US’s role in the country.

All of these books were published within the last two years and should not be hard to find. Any comments about any specific book would be welcomed.