President Nursultan Nazarbaev recently signed a new law placing blogs, social media networks, and chatrooms under the rubric of “mass media”, effectively creating criminal liability for users of these internet communication platforms  and permitting the government to shut down and censor websites as it sees fit. The government denies this law as being any kind of tool for repression, framing the law as benefiting Kazakh citizens by granting protection from extremist literature, piracy, and 2009’s ultimate cliche excuse-pornography.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had urged Nazarbaev not to sign the law into effect. Miklos Haraszti, OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media, criticized the legislation as contrary to both OSCE and international standards. Kazakhstan is set to chair OSCE in 2010-a decision that has been criticized by groups such as Human Rights Watch ever since the decision was made by OSCE’s council in 2007. Watchdog organizations have repeatedly questioned Kazakhstan’s ability to lead and uphold OSCE’s commitment to human and civic rights and the passing of this new internet law only reaffirms the apprehension.

Kazakhstan’s relationship with the internet is complex, with attempts to strengthen internet usage and boost the Kazakh telecommunications sector coexisting with efforts to monitor and suppress online content. Nazarbaev has been openly ambitious in regard to development of the Kazakh IT sector, which in the past decade has become the clear frontrunner and main internet service provider in Central Asia. That being said, online access is still accessible only to a minority, and Kazakh citizens living outside of major cities are well beyond the reach of the internet. Also, long before the enactment of the recent internet law plenty of legislation was already in place placing limitations on internet content (and aiding in the encouragement of self-censorship). More than 300 legislative acts exist that control information and telecommunications in Kazakhstan in one way or another. Although a few competitors do exist, Kazakhtelecom effectively holds a monopoly in the country and exerts an extraordinary amount of control. Traffic of all first-tier ISPs go through Kazakhtelecom’s channels, permitting an easy, centralized way to filter content. Furthermore, since Kazakhtelecom is the main provider of internet in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan it censors content for its Central Asian neighbors as well.

In 2008, livejournal.com was blocked, with Kazakhtelecom denying any role in the matter. Oddly enough, the Russian-language version of the site, livejournal.ru (which also happens to be the most popular blogsite in Russia), remained accessible. Speculation on behalf of media outlets such as The Moscow Times was that the block had to do with Nazarbaev’s former son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev, who has openly criticized (and blogged about) the Nazarbaev government. Other websites such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have been blocked since last year.

Rakhat Aliev, President Nazarbayev’s son-in-law, has been living in Vienna, Austria since 2007 after a public split with Nazarbayev. Ever since, he has been denigrating the Kazakh leadership. He has finally put it all in a book, published in German and Russian, called The Godfather-in-Law. It is available in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

The book details how President Nazarbayev has been extorting billions of dollars from state coffers and apparently, “enslaved his country”. The picture on the cover only resembles Nazarbayev. Aliev has been tried, convicted and sentenced in absentia. He was given 40 years for extortion, kidnapping, and murder.

The battle for power, and political influence which begets it, is as old as human civilization.  Societies and States are not usually left wanting for people who want to be ‘in charge’ or 'take power.’  However, how this is done, as in the process of acquiring and maintaining political power, depends greatly from one location to another and from one political system to another.  For instance, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, John McCain, Mitt Romney, Mike Huckabee, and many others very much desired to be the next President of the United States and they competed for this position within the American electoral system, which for all its ills and discrepancies, is rather democratic and fair.

On the contrary, the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan all have a political process that is far from fair and is constantly manipulated by the powers that be.  A few weeks ago I discussed Tajik's political/governmental problems and this included the mysterious disappearance of Hasan Sadulloev, President Rahmon's brother-in-law and powerful businessman.  It appears Sadulloev had presidential ambitions and this led to his strange vanishing.

According to a report by Eurasianet's Farangis Najibullah, the Sadulloev incident is far from abnormal in Central Asian domestic politics.  Najibullah discusses the similar case of Rakhat Aliev in Kazakhstan, a former son-in-law to President Nazarbayev, who was charged with kidnapping, murder, and conspiracy to overthrow the government.  Aliev is now out of the country and faces a long prison sentence if he ever returns home.

Exile, prison, or death await those who threaten the political power of Central Asian leaders.  One should not be surprised by this unfortunately, as these governments are only accountable to themselves and their hold on power.  Even longstanding liberal democracies have their flaws, but they offer their citizens a chance to vet and have a voice in their next leader, something sadly most Central Asian citizens do not.

Najibullah ends her article on a hopeful note, stating that such corrupt stories as Sadulloev and Aliev's, may continue to frustrate a population which is hungry, unemployed, and dissatisfied with its government and that this may one day lead to change.  He quotes a university professor in Osh, Kyrgyzstan; “It was presidential family members’ greed that brought Askar Akaev's {former Kyrg President} demise, and it's not impossible that the same scenario can be repeated in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere in Central Asia any day.”

Summary:
Central Asia preserved its stability, if nothing else: no cataclysms, massacres, or color revolutions interfered with the business at hand.  This means that in 2007, the work was in details and indicators rather than watershed events.  As a region, the Central Asian Republics made limited progress in the world community.  Each state continued to make half-steps towards globalizing their economies, trying out new techniques and new alliances, but essentially remaining in the same place.  Stagnant, however, is not the same thing as unchanged: as institutions and infrastructure crumble, poor water regimes, high energy prices, and a lack of coordinated effort toward solving issues in common continues to point to political failure in the broadest sense.  Scandals over HIV infections in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan; the continued over-reliance on poor agricultural practice; election shenanigans in almost every state; and the continuing repression of free media in Central Asia points to the consolidation of post-Soviet fiefdoms rather than modern states.

Progress was also stalled by the waning interest or resources invested by NATO states and by the continuing war in Afghanistan and instability in Pakistan, which diverted funds and focus from Central Asia as a region–and failed to stem increased opportunities for drug trade in Central Asia's southernmost geographical areas, making the realities of organized crime much more compelling than the closely-related but somehow distinct Global War on Tactics.   Economic progress continues to be challenged by Central Asia's geographic inaccessibility, remnants of command economy infrastructure, poor media access, and corruption.

Most Critical (and Unexpected) Events:
The year started out with a prime opportunity: the death of Turkmenistan's president, Sapurmurat Niyazov, Turkmenbashi the Great.  The hand-over of power was seamless, creating numerous diplomatic opportunities which have overall been missed west of the Mediterranean.   Nevertheless, Turkmenistan has made moves toward reducing its isolationism in the person of its new, improved leader Mr. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov.  So far, progress has appeared to move glacially in terms of human rights, media rights, and democratization.  Economic agreements however, have formed the basis for new discourse between Turkmenistan and its neighboring Central Asian states, Russia, China, the EU, Iran, and various firms.

The second critical event, Kazakhstan's Nurbank scandal, has had repercussions which are still being played out.  President Nazarbaev's son-in-law Rakhat Aliev committed a crime which could not be swept under the rug.  The resulting scandal has been hushed up in Kazakhstan's media but also, curiously, in the West, involving Austrian financiers, the fall of the Aliev media empire, and subsequent re-consolidation as a state-run enterprise, the re-organization of Kazakhstan's politics, the fall of Timur Kulibaev as head of Kazakhstan's state oil company, and an extradition battle for Rakhat Aliev  that spilled the emotions of dysfunctional family relations into international diplomacy.   However, ugly in public, however, the repercussions of the "Rakhat-gate" scandal are, at a guess, even more cut-throat in private.   There's a lot of financial monkey-business here that hasn't reached public scrutiny‚ what I would allege to be a 24/7 money Laundromat‚ not to mention the dead bodies of two Nurbank officials.  For more, check Rakhat Aliev entries from this year.

Most Influential Persons:
No. 1: The Smooth Operator
Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev.
Without a doubt, only a person as subtle and competent as Mr. Nazarbaev could have turned Rakhat-gate into a governmental reorganization which left him more securely in power and his country as OSCE chair for 2009.  But Mr. Nazarbaev also was able to use high oil prices to develop development plans for Central Asian neighbors such as Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, including the new Eurasian Development Bank (EADB).  As the state partner in Kashagan oil field, Kazakhstan was also able to bring ENI to an accounting for problems with producing the field: a negotiation which is continuing. 

No. 2: The Stone in the Shoe
Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov.
In contrast to Mr. Nazarbaev, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan made his influence felt in a different way: by contributing to the continued inertia in Central Asian development.  Because Uzbekistan occupies the central area of the region, major building blocks of Central Asian development, such as roads, utility grids, water conservation, border protections, immigration, tourism, and who knows what else have been put on semi-permanent hold.  A look at the Asian Development Bank's CAREC plan shows how planners for Central Asia have not been able to obviate Uzbekistan's spoiler role in Central Asia.  It may be past time to re-draw plans so that they reflect less reliance on Uzbekistan's centrality‚ the cold shoulder can be a two-way street.  However, that look at the ADB's CAREC plan also shows how difficult (but not impossible) such a project would be.

Most Influential Company:
Gazprom is the clear winner for Most Influential Company.  First, the wily and judicious mix of Russian state diplomacy and corporate economic transactions make the firm a hard one to fight on either a corporate or state level.  Second, the infrastructure pretty much runs to Russia before it goes anywhere else.   Central Asia is kind of trapped: and what is more, Gazprom's success is driving a lot of Europe's diplomacy toward Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and with Russia as well.  They're just good at what they do.  Other companies to watch: RozAtomprom, Russia's nuclear group, with similar relationships as Gazprom to the Russian government; and KazAtomprom, Kazakhstan's uranium company. 

Most Influential Organizations:
The annual meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization this year was conducted with apparent bonhomie and no mouthing off about the U.S.  Nevertheless, China has choreographed its SCO, the Asian Development Bank, state oil companies, and state-to-state diplomacy in a seamless ballet of permeating, long-term influence in the region.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization stepped in (read: Russia) on security matters, particularly for Tajikistan, moving into the power vacuum created by increased drug trade from Afghanistan accompanied by the de-commissioning of the UN's Tajikistan mission, UNTOP, after 10 years of post-Tajikistani Civil War monitoring. 

The Taliban/drug lords of Afghanistan are also a potent and influential organization in Central Asia, particularly as more drug trade has increased addiction rates, crime, and HIV transmission in Central Asia.

Most Unexpected Development:
The critical events above‚ Rakhat-gate scandal and the death of Turkmenbashi‚ were unexpected.   But it's well worth highlighting again that Kazakhstan will be leading the OSCE very soon. 

The most heartbreaking development has been the number of children in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan infected by HIV through poor medical practice and corrupt medical procurement.

Best Reporting:
For a region that gets little attention, Central Asia has without a doubt the best group of handmaidens and footmen to the truth in its a coterie of nagging but loving commentators.  The blogroll at right should be considered an honor roll, and there is no one listed there to whom I am not indebted. 

Great blogs such as Registan.net have paved the way for educating the English-speaking from beginner to advanced;  NewEurasia.net, part of Transitions Online, and Global Voices Online have brought Central Asia's local voices to the world community. 

A lot of fine reporting comes out of Central Asia, through the newly-resurrected IWPR and the courageous Ferghana.ru; International Crisis Group writes fantastic reports; and British Broadcasting Corporation consistently shares Central Asia's news with the world.  Indispensable in my view, and currently underfunded,  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty writes the most consistent quality reportage on Central Asia. 

Best Book:
Of all the books I've read this year in order to understand Central Asia more fully, the one that sticks out the most in terms of Central Asia was not written this year: it's Alena Ledeneva's How Russia Works.  The Oil and the Glory by Steve LeVine is a great offering for those of us who wish to understand transition economies and the Caspian oil phenomenon: it covers Eurasia and Kazakhstan. 

Predictions for 2008:
It's a rash person who makes predictions, but I don't see any earth-shattering event for next year, just more of the same advance and retreat as Central Asian states cope with increasing limits and increasing opportunities:

1. Kazakhstan: The EU and US will fail to make the most of Kazakhstan's OSCE chair, by pressing on a variety of globally-accepted issues in public and undercutting this by worrying about oil and gas in private.  The best opportunity is to pick one issue of the social issues– I would choose legal reform, since it ultimately covers everything anyway–and then present a united front on this plus the energy issues‚ including uranium as well as gas.

2. Uzbekistan: Most likely scenario: the January presidential race in Uzbekistan will leave Islam Karimov in power, with the Uzbekistani people continuing to accept the dismal state of affairs there, or, if possible, voting with their feet to go elsewhere and swelling the already growth industry of poorly paid labor in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation. 

3. Uzbekistan Alternate Scenario: The alternate scenario is that Mr. Karimov passes to his post-life reward a la Niyazov, causing an interesting power-play between regionally-entrenched elites within the state, punctuated by isolated demonstrations by people in the Ferghana region, and thus exporting strife to Turkmenistan but especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and adding painful incidents to an already abysmal human rights record.

4. Tajikistan: Continued pressure from the United States on Iran without corresponding spending on Tajikistan's drug trafficking problems will create increasing Islamization of the state. 

5. Kyrgyzstan: The Tulip Revolution will further regionalize, presenting new opportunities for destabilizing elements.  Bakiev in response will continue to tighten down on security, and democratic gains will be lost.  The best hope here is Kazakhstan's interest in economic development of its neighbor and the transfer of diplomatic skills to Kyrgyz leadership–a more long-range position for democratization.

6. Turkmenistan: President Berdymukhamedov will continue to look for economic opportunities and will create relations with those who give him the most programs for the least trouble.  The state will remain isolated.  The Trans-Caspian pipeline will mire down in bureaucracy, as Western states will focus upon a variety of issues rather than economic realities.  Russia will continue to have the right-hand place at Turkmenistan's table, with Kazakhstan as a sometime broker or mediator for various deals. 

After writing on the untimely death–no, criminal assassination–of Mr. Alisher Saipov, I’m noticing the Return of a Theme: the continuing loss of a precariously-positioned free press in Central Asia.  Here goes the round-up:

Central Asia in General:
One of the best English-language sources on Central Asia, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) , is now no longer promulgating stories.  Formerly funded by the U.S. Department of States’ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, it is now a static web site.  What the heck happened?  The site says they have “completed one phase of their mission” and are “looking for more funding.”  This is not a good sign, especially given what is below this paragraph.

Kazakhstan:
1. Opposition Web sites in Kazakhstan were shut down this week when Rakhat Aliev stepped up to the microphone.  Mr. Aliev accused Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev of ordering the death of his last credible opponent in the 2005 elections, Mr. Sarsenbaev.  Opposition parties published these accusations on the Web–and hence, good-bye, electrons. 

2. IFEX also reports the loss of independent news agencies in Kazakhstan as well as opposition party sites:

The International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech “Adil Soz” expresses its deep concern over the recent mass repression against independent media in Kazakhstan. Websites http://www.zonakz.net, http://www.geo.kz, http://www.kompromat.kz and internet radio station http://www.inkar.info remain blocked since 23 October 2007. The website http://www.kub.kz was removed from the Kazakh segment of the internet without justification (see IFEX alert of 30 October 2007).

3. If you have any time at all, go read the article (linked above) at the IFEX site.  Because as of Yesterday, October 30th, Kazakhstan is now inspecting Newspapers as well.  Only the intervention of human rights defenders saved a computer with Subscriber's Information on it.

Kyrgyzstan: 
1. The smear is on: Mr. Alisher Saipov, recently murdered, is now the target of a mudslinging campaign.  After the Kyrgyz police investigated and said that there was no evidence that Uzbekistan had anything to do with his murder.  Until they catch the actual murderer, that may well be true.  After a search of Mr. Saipov's residence for Hizb-ut-Tahrir flyers, (none were found), police remain certain that Mr. Saipov was connected to extremist groups.  Fellow journalists are saying that of course he had contacts with HuT for the purposes of interviews–he had also interviewed Kyrgyzstan's President Bakiev.  Does this mean that Mr. Saipov was connected to the president??  It's a good point.

Since Mr. Saipov was employed frequently at Ferghana.ru, they are covering this story very carefully.  This article gives a timeline of the investigation so far, the accusations, and the defense.  Tell you what: it's a murder.  It should get a complete and proper investigation regardless.

2. Ferghana.ru also has an article about the tight control by the government on Kyrgyzstani journalists.

Uzbekistan:
1. Referring to the last article at IWPR–a swan-song perhaps– “Uzbekistan officials tight-lipped about elections” posted September 26th.  If we don't support a free press in Central Asia, who is going to do it?  If nothing else, the continual harrassment and death of journalists in the region show that they cannot do it alone.

2. Whether Uzbekistani government officials killed Mr. Saipov or not, the television program that marked him certainly set up a precondition. 

Further reading:
European Union Presidency on the death of Mr. Alisher Saipov, citing his work

Photo: thank you, gazdi.dox.hu for the perfect photograph

The world is an interesting place, and Central Asia among the most interesting regions of the world.  Now getting caught up for the week:

Central Asia General:
–In an interesting counterpoint to most discussion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization written in English, Japan Times has editorialized that the SCO is of benefit to the world community.  

Kazakhstan:
–Son-in law troubles part I.D. 3. b. iii.: RFE/RL reports that charges are mounting in Kazakhstan against Mr. Rakhat Aliev.   It is alleged that the charges are supposed to dissuade Mr. Aliev from testifying in the Kazakhgate case, where illegal transfers of oil and cash paved the way for insider deals and opaque profit-taking.  Oh, and Mr. Aliev's father, Mr. Mukhtar Aliev, has been charged with excess ordinance in the home.  Hmmm.   Like explosives in the dining room?  Was there going to be a coup?
–Son-in-law troubles part II: Dinara Nazarbaeva's husband, Timur Kulibaev, was recently fired from his position at Samruk, Kazakhstan's state holding corporation.  Mr. Kulibaev has served as an executive at both KazMunaiGas.  Mr. Kulibaev and Dinara Nazarbaeva made this year's Forbes billionaire list, and are also part-owners of Halyk Bank (not Nurbank).
–Besides the trouble at Kashagan field, Kazakhstan's KMG is doing pretty well: they bought 75% of Romania's RomPetrol this week to expand their European business.
–Kazakhstan's opposition is asking for a new election, since a. the election had some irregularities and b. because no opposition gained Parliamentary access, failing to garner at least 7% of seats in the legislature.  I say go for it.
–U.S. expatriate Mark Seidenfeld has been acquitted on first appeals in court on August 20th.  It looks like a few steps more in the process before the end–for instance, New Charges, reported at the Save Mark Seidenfeld site.

Kyrgyzstan:
–Go Alaska!; Go Kids!; Go Pay the Bills!!!!: If the U.S. pays its utility bills at Ganci AFB, it’ll be ahead of Russia on civil-military goodwill immediately.  Right now, the Russian military is using flashlights. . . while the USAF personnel are refurbishing a playspot in the area.   Alaska's Air National Guard is sending 31 personnel to Kyrgyzstan from Fairbanks for six months, part of a new 150-person deployment to change things up at Ganci.
–When film piracy kills an industry, at Regnum.ru.
–Moving the capital of Kyrgyzstan?  Probably not, but it recalls the North-South divide in Kyrgyzstan's politics.
–Kyrgyzstan's government gets more say in the works and profits of its Kumtor mine, by acquiring more shares in a Canadian Mining enterprise.
 
Mongolia:
–Dateline, Ulaan Bataar: President Parvanov of Bulgaria is on a five-day visit ending September 1st to boost Bulgarian-Mongolian trade relations, in mining, tourism, and small enterprises.  
–Also, Mongolia will host talks between Japan and the DPRK September 5-6, in order to normalize diplomatic relations between its two guests.  This is a step the 6-Party Talks process where Mongolia has again been an invaluable aid to dialogue.
–China and Mongolia agree to protect a common cultural heritage: the long-song.  I loved this so much I wrote today's Casual Friday post on the issue: check it out!

Tajikistan:
–Tajikistan's new bilateral investment opportunities with Qatar, Afghanistan, and India  were covered earlier this week.  However, Tajikistan can set up all the free economic zones (FEZ) it likes, but needs basic infrastructure and reliable energy before they’ll turn around the economy.

Turkmenistan:
–Russia's LUKoil sets its sights on Turkmenistani contracts.  In the meantime, the Turkmenistan pipeline to China is underway.
–Turkmenistan's teachers must wear high-collared dresses with skirts that reach to the ankle.
–Turkmenistan's farmers, the price of cotton, and unofficial/official rates of inflation inside the state at IWPR. 

Uzbekistan:
–Get in on the betting pool concerning Karimovian non-elections at Registan.net.   Every scenario–from the depressing to the action / adventure option is being discussed, but not really for money.
–Between the rock and the stone: Uzbekistan's economic migrants face dangers and prejudices in Russia, as reported by Jamiyat at NewEurasia.net.
–Formerly-approved Presbyterian church becomes unapproved, at Forum 18.

Xinjiang:
–Two Xinjiang athletes, one a mountaineer, the other a ‘Dawaz’ acrobat, will carry the Olympic torch for Beijing 2008.
–Second pipeline route is mapped, from Central Asia to the Pearl and Yangtze Rivers.
Due to Xinjiang's crazy weather this year, the cotton harvest is being delayed.

Bringing you news from the steppes and the mountains in one tidy package.  Almost everyone appears to be lying on their sofas with a cold compress after the heady weeks of SCO activities just past, so this’ll be brief. . . uh, more brief.

Kazakhstan:
–Another attempt to extradite Mr. Rakhat Aliev, according to Thursday's RFE/RL Newsline.  In that same entry, Mr. Aliev's “father Mukhtar, a prominent member of Kazakhstan's Academy of Sciences, was prevented from boarding a flight from Astana to London on August 21 on the grounds that he was involved in an official investigation into possible weapons-related charges.”
–ENI is in trouble: further delays on the Kashagan field have made Kazakhstan weary, and they are now threatening closure on the project due to environmental considerations.  Okay, commentators, be fair: there are environmental considerations such as the seal deaths, and also, Kashagan is an enormously difficult project, more difficult than even ENI forecast.  Changes are due to be made, but ENI can still salvage this with a little proactive corporate diplomacy.
–Pre-SCO Summit,  Mongolia's President Mr. Enkhbayar visits Kazakhstan with his retinue for talks.

Kyrgyzstan: 
–New arrests for spying in former defense and government officials.  The last two were charged with intrigue with China.  We’re still waiting to hear the details on these two.
–Torture deaths in Naryn, Northern Kyrgyzstan are being investigated by local and international human rights groups.  
–Iran sent a gracious message to Kyrygzstan on Kyrgyzstan's National Day.
–Dateline, Cholpa-Ata: A meeting of EurAsEc Judicial Ministers in the Issyk-Kul Oblast.
–Russia plans to spend USD 2 billion in Kyrgyzstan's economy, and beef up its military presence there.  The article talks about forward air base capacity, but I suspect counternarcotics are part of the plan. 
–Kyrgyz volunteers have paid USD 132 into a special fund to pay off USD 200 billion in external debt, because they trust their government that much.  So the government employees finally coughed up another 3632 bucks, I’m sure on their own initiative.

Mongolia:
–Chinalco has purchased controlling interest in Yunnan copper, which means China will be prospecting in Mongolia for the metal.  Canada's Western Prospects has had site licenses revoked in the state for uranium.  Canada's Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe are still working on legislative approval for a copper-and-gold deposit.
–Mongolian falcons go to Arabian countries, licensed, or, poached.  See also this longer article.

Tajikistan:
–Panj River Bridge set to open.  Vadim at NewEurasia and FPA Central Asia talked about this months ago, but this article discusses its state-of -the-art construction and the opportunities it presents for Aghanistan and Tajikistan.  Ribbon-cutting ceremony due on the 26th.
–A lot of religious regulations.  A lot of economic regulations. 

Turkmenistan:
–Amnesty for eleven, reported here yesterday.  Eurasianet is saying that this is accompanied by futher secret arrests of other top-level officials, also covered here.
–U.S. Congressional delegation and U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom to visit Ashgabat for increased bilateral ties.
–Austria to seek greater bilateral ties.
–Turkey and Iran to join in a joint venture for power plant in Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan:
–Already reported here at FPA Central Asia: a new report from International Crisis Group on Uzbekistan's virtually-unseen elections, now picked up by RFE/RL, Bloomberg, BBC. 
–Uzbekistan closed its border with Russia for four days because too much Uzbek produce was being exported to Russia (for higher sales price).  This drove local prices up, so an immediate intervention occurred, creating shortages in Russia's Siberia and Urals regions.  You know, this is not the way to run an economy.  . . the dots stand for curse words . . .
–Iran sent gracious messages of fellowship to Uzbekistan for its National Day.
–Kazakhstan has extradited 56 Uzbeks in the last two years to Uzbekistan, mostly post-Andijan refugees associated with the Akramiya movement.

Xinjiang:
–Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao visited the XUAR for four days this week.  For those of you following the The Beat, you know that Xinjiang has had one natural disaster after another over the past year: floods, earthquakes, windstorms, and mudslides.  This week, more heavy rain and snow (in August).  Mr. Wen promised to provide earthquake-resistant housing and flood-control measures.  He also stressed the importance of bilingual education so that Uighur minorities could tap into the Chinese economic miracle.  A nice article from CCTV.

Photo: UMKC.edu; Mongolia Times

Have a great weekend, everyone!

News? What news?
Kazakhstan had elections this Saturday after a short campaign season.  President Nazarbaev's Nur-Otan party won over 80% of the legislative seats, and handily.  The OSCE sent observers, who again found the elections to be ‘not free and not fair’. 

The observers noted that ballot-boxes were allegedly stuffed; that the short election season put Kazakhstan's minority party at a disadvantage, that votes were counted non-transparently; and that protests have to be within the law that Nur-Otan government will continue to set.

End of story?  Well, not exactly. 

Though OSCE observers describe an electoral reality, it focusses on domestic doings and omits a lot of international context.  In some ways, the tone–”business as usual”– is correct.  In other ways, it makes this pesky business sound like something that only happens in Kazakhstan to Kazakhstanis.  It allows other OSCE states to justify nixing Kazakhstan's OSCE ambitions, which are very real and which look like burnt toast at the moment.  But as long as we take this as business as usual, we’re missing a point of view which the Kazakhstanis could justifiably hold.  And it may be past time for Kazakhstan to tell its own story in the sacred halls of the OSCE Secretariat.  But first, some background.

Election background:
Recent constitutional changes increased the number of seats and allowed for more minority representation.  The new constitution was supposed to help Kazakhstan conform more closely to OSCE democratization guidelines.

With every constitutional re-write, the opportunity for change cuts both ways.  The amendments for legislative reform were also accompanied by a less-democratic change, a one-person-only abrogation of term limits in the executive branch.  Though the term between elections remains the same (it has been extended constitutionally before), and Mr. Nazarbaev must run, the exception allows President Nazarbaev to run for office as many times as he feels necessary or desirable. 

Unfortunately, this term-unlimit left Kazakhstan in less conformity to OSCE democratization guidelines than before.  It also precipitated a fall-out within the Nazarbaev family which has become the Rakhat-gate scandal.  The scandal has focussed attention upon a. various non-transparent financial arrangements, particularly with banks, and media organizations; b. various kinds of criminal impunity for high-ranking members of Mr. Nazarbaev's close-knit cadre, and c. (although few people are discussing this) the relationship of European non-transparency to Kazakhstani non-transparency.

Rakhat-gate:
As soon as Mr. Aliev made his disappointment public about the extension of Mr. Nazarbaev's ability to run for office, it focussed attention upon the two men.  Though much is admirable about Mr. Nazarbaev, his son-in-law has never been portrayed as an admirable person in the media, with rumors of personal vendettas against others backed up by threats and violence, unfinished and/or unrealized power plays against Mr. Nazarbaev, and a distressing lack of subtlety in all of his dealings with the world.  But since he was kept on by Mr. Nazarbaev in various powerful positions, there was a suggestion of approval and impunity.  Eventually, this lack of finesse finally became too large to contain in context of the Nurbank scandal, where bank executives were killed and property transferred in a way which could not be hidden or excused.

In the fallout, the divorce between Nazarbaev and Aliev (much more important than the divorce between Darigha Nazarbaeva and Aliev), there were more non-transparent property transfers: first, at Nurbank, and second, of the Nazarbaeva-Aliev media empire.  The results were published, but they came so fast that no one understood how they were transferred and with what compensation. 

Certainly Nurbank's property settlements had to be changed if force was used, for instance, in transferring the real property assets of the bank.  Maybe asset transfers should have taken place in the legal sphere.  Yet many of Nurbank's ‘internal changes’ are no different than what occurs in Western enterprises who have ‘management shakeups.’  Likewise, some broadcasting outlets were closed for legitimate violations of broadcast permits, yet they had not been closed down earlier.   And when they re-opened, it was under new management: management shakeup or opaque deal?  Where does one draw the line?  For Kazakhstan, the family connections blur the distinction between the governmental and the private sector, the internal and the external.   Can we say this is untrue of other, more powerful or self-righteous OSCE states?  

European de facto collusion:
Transparency in all of the crimes associated with the Nurbank scandal and Rakhat-gate could have been furthered on the European end under two conditions: first, Austria could be more public about their own investigation of scandals allegedly associated with  Mr. Aliev, and second, Austrian courts could have extradited Mr. Aliev for trial.  They could have sought, as European Courts did in the U.S. with the Soering Case, that Aliev be not tried under sentence of death, but instead, life in prison.  But this did not occur: therefore Mr. Aliev will never have to testify or have his dealings revealed in a legitimate court.  If you were Kazakhstani, you could well argue that governmental/business transparency would have been achieved by trying Mr. Aliev–and which would also have put paid to the idea of family impunity.  Therefore, continued opacity and impunity have been guaranteed by Austria: not Kazakhstan.  Yet it is Kazakhstan whom we commonly view as non-transparent.

Summing it up: bad habits all around
In many ways, it's difficult to blame Kazakhstan for their seamless backing of Mr. Nazarbaev as perpetually-running president of Kazakhstan.  His executive skills are masterly, and most of his policies have worked really well.  He's done a great job in stimulating economic benefit within the country, and has managed to extend Kazakhstan's bilateral relations past the Central Asian region.  His leadership creates stability within the country, and he has reached out past his borders to facilitate stability within the Central Asian region.  He is a diplomatic genius, who is able to remain flexible in a region where every great power wants absolute, uncompromising loyalty.  In most democratic countries, voters cast their ballots with the economy in mind, unless they are afraid of looming security threats.  Why should Kazakhstan be any different?

Yet on the other hand, if Kazakhstanis are so satisfied, there's no need to have irregularities in elections.  Nur-Otan didn't need 86% majority to form a credible, majority government. 

Yet I suspect there are some calculations in here that we have all missed because of a habitual stance of over-righteousness.  It's good to remember that the aphorism that absolute power corrupts absolutely was not invented for post-Soviet states, but for all situations of power, from the family on up to international governance structures.  Some of the conflict over Kazakhstan's leadership of the OSCE is self-serving, and it is this self-serving aspect which has escalated the conflict to come over Kazakhstan's OSCE leadership bid.  And if the more-powerful states come across to Kazakhstan as judges and jury, I think they can expect to hit Kazakhstan in its identity and in its vanity, two really bad places to inflict injury.  In the occurence of electoral manipulation, leadership changes in large companies, and ‘heirs apparent’, such responses are not only injurious, but often somewhat hypocritical.  Yes, Kazakhstan should have free and fair elections.  They should have more transparency.  Their journalists should be able to write reasoned editorials from all sides of the spectrum.  Mr. Nazarbaev should loosen up the reins of power.  And the OSCE, and particularly the Western media that reports international community concerns should come up with a better public dialogue than habitual, unthinking pomposity – but I fear they won't.

Further reading:
BBC on the OSCE — noting, as you will, that only Warsaw Pact and Former Soviet states are listed — uh-huh.  But you can't blame all this on the BBC when we all do it, now can you?

You can read more on Rakhat-gate from previous posts.

Since almost all the news revolves and resolves around the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, I’m going to try to hit most of the non-SCO news here in the Central Asia Beat this week.

Next week, I’ll try to wrap up SCO developments. . .

Kazakhstan:
–From RFE/RL Newsline, August 16: The Kazakhstan Today news agency, formerly a Rakhat-n-Darigha production, has re-opened after a two-month clampdown.  Now under new management in the wake of Rakhat-gate.
–Terrorist activity stopped in April during Mr. Nazarbaev's visit to Shymkent.
–Another activity in Chelyabinsk: On August 16th, Kazakhstan's national railway, Temir Joly, went to Russia in order to learn from Russian Railways more skills for handling passenger traffic.
–The work of election preparation continues: RFE/RL reports that opposition members are recommending voters use paper ballots instead of electronic voting machines; elections are This Saturday, August 18th.  OSCE observers arrived Thursday and were welcomed by Mr. Togaev, Chairman of the Senate of the Parliament.  Must read: Adam Kesher's roundup at Global Voices Online on the elections.

Kyrgyzstan:
It's all about SCO: but no.  There's more.
–Kyrgyzstan plans to upgrade its requirements for its diplomatic service.
–Water shortages may affect Kyrgyzstan's hydropower output and wreck their ability to export electricity in the region.  This is such bad news.
Kyrgyzstan accesses that global imperative: for public relations to attract investment. 

Mongolia:
–China's Shenhua Energy may build a coal rail link in Mongolia, at IHT.
–Mongolia and China agree to new meteorological cooperation to help avert the effects and disasters from sandstorms.  No, of course they can't decide the weather: just what to do about it.
–A look at Japanese sumo wrestling and one of its participants from Mongolia, who is currently in trouble.

Tajikistan:
–Grisly execution video shows up last Sunday on Russian nationalist Web sites.  The video consists of alleged Russian nationalists killing a Tajikistani immigrant and a Daghestani citizen underneath a Nazi flag.  The person who posted it has turned himself in, his computer is confiscated, but no one knows who committed the crimes yet: or who are the “National Socialists of Rus”.  Well, we already know what they are.  Vadim gives the Tajikistan perspective over at neweurasia.net .  And I would like to offer condolences to the Tajikistani and Daghestani people over their loss.
–After talks between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Tajikistan, nine cooperation agreements are signed, and Azerbaijan's Mr. Ihlam Aliev announces plans to invest in Tajikistan.
–The International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank helps develop new health and sanitation manuals for Tajikistan's inspectors. 
–Serious charges against the EBRD in Tajikistan are levelled by John Helmer at Asia Times and also discussed by Joshua over at Registan.net on his way to larger trends in the region.

Turkmenistan:
–CNPC, one of China's heavy-hitting oil companies, initiates two projects in Turkmenistan this week.
–US Assistant Secretary for Economic, Energy and Business Affairs Daniel Sullivan arrived in Ashgabat as the head of the US delegation August 14th to discuss energy cooperation and to urge Turkmenistan to diversify its economy/pipeline destinations and become more transparent.  If anyone would like to call me, I have a lot of ideas about these diversified economy arrangements. 

Uzbekistan:
–Islamic Summit in Tashkent on August 15th by IESCO: the Islamic, Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (based in Rabat, Morocco).  The summit extolled Uzbekistan's contributions to Islamic culture, and then made a sojourn to Samarkand, to look at the past glory of the Silk Road.
–The OSCE met to train human rights observers in Uzbekistan on August 14th.
–Cotton Expo in Tashkent, next month: September 10-12.
–Trade turnover between Russia and Uzbekistan is up 300% in the last two years. . . whoa.  And, Mr. Sidikov at RFE/RL explains why U.S.-Uzbek trade is not more significant.

Xinjiang Province:
–Major nickel deposit discovered, which is a component of stainless steel, and, well, nickels.
–Supreme People's Court of China promises to send assistance to Xinjiang's overburdened criminal court system.
–New Xinjiang analysis at Jane's.  Unfortunately, only the preview is available, but it explains why, perhaps, the Xinjiang court system is so overburdened . . .

What a dynamic region!  Have a great weekend, everyone, in Central Asia and beyond . . .

It's Friday: must be time for the CAB.  And what a week: there's no keeping up with this hot zone of geopolitical interest . . . although some states have more news than others.

Central Asia General: 
–All SCO this week, every day.  First, the beginning of a Collective Security Timeline, on a separate page in this blog, for reference.  Stray and random bits of info are welcome: leave a comment and a reference and I’ll put it into the list.
–Nathan Hamm over at Registan.net discusses and gives great references to the study of nomadism as a theory for explaining Central Asian politics, etc–and more importantly, the limits of its use.

Kazakhstan: 
Not a great week for one of my favorite places:
–Rakhat-gate moves to Austria, discussed here yesterday. What a mess.
–With the Kashagan oil field in delayed production, Kazakhstan will not be able to meet new commitments for oil distribution.  This is a problem for Poland, the Ukraine, and the West, since Nazarbaev cannot commit to the Trans-caspian line without the crude to fill it.  News analysts continue to see these things as all-politics.  No, no, no!  It's a production constraint with political and economic repercussions.  Ihlam Aliev President of Azerbaijan can plead, but if the oil ain't distributable, it ain't.  In the meantime, Italy's ENI, the operator of the field, is facing dismissal by Kazakhstan's authorities–or at the least–less favorable contract terms.
–Kazakhstan and Jordan strengthen bilateral cooperation, particularly in the realm of agricultural commerce, transportation agreements, and paving the way toward more intimate free trade relationships.  This article also references Egypt-Kazakh relations. 

Kyrgyzstan:
–China's Hu Jin-tao will visit Kyrgyzstan for the first time ever on August 14th, for SCO summit but also bilateral talks; and thence to Kazakhstan & Russia.
–Global Voices Online rounds up the Kyrgyzstani preparations for the SCO summit, which include beautification and security measures.  It's not all fun, getting ready for a party.  Mirsulzhan has more on the primping and preening of Bishkek, and other aspects for the locals.
–In the same post, Mirsulzhan details the reactions of Kyrgyzstani bloggers toward Feliks Kulov's idea of a Kyrgyz-Russia reunification.  It makes one wonder if Mr. Kulov's has taken a look at Belarus’ plight at the moment.
–Bermet Akaeva is charged again, with a possible 2-year sentence if convicted.  This time, she's being charged for trying to influence the outcome of the last charge. 
–Bread prices are up, and citizen confidence is down.
–Kyrgyzstan's farmers are better off than Uzbekistan's and Turkmenistan's: not only do they know that the world cotton market has turned to lint, they are refusing to plant the crop.  That is called a rational supplier response to market price–in the U.S. cotton growers are doing the same.  Yet the adjustment for Kyrgyzstan is catastrophic, with 60% of its work force involved in agriculture.

Mongolia:
–An Indian news agency explains Khaan Quest 2007, a military exercise reported in the CAB last week, as a bid for India and the U.S. to keep tabs on China's space program and other strategic observations.  A Mongolia-India war game immediately follows Khaan Quest 2007: this one is named “Nomadic Elephant.”  Considering previous ties and balance of power theory, one should next expect that Pakistan's observer status in the SCO might be ramped up to a full membership.  Don't know that though . . . Pakistan is complicated . . .
–Mongolia's President Enkhbayar to attend SCO meetings as an observer.

Tajikistan:
–A sign of increasing bilateral regard: The former Iranian Foreign Minister and the first Iranian ambassador to Dushanbe are awarded with Tajikistan's Peace Prize, for work undertaken during the Tajik Civil War.
–Two former Guantanamo detainees are on trial in Tajikistan for illegal border crossings and “mercenary activity” in Afghanistan.
–In Dushanbe, unlicensed mosques are being razed;

Turkmenistan:
–IWPR discusses grain harvest shortfalls in Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan:
–Erk opposition party website has been hacked: or censored: or both. . .
–A look at the importance of Iran to Uzbekistani commerce.

Xinjiang:
–Again, yesterday, here: SCO Military exercises began in Xinjiang, and then move this weekend or so to Chelyabinsk.  Chelyabinsk was verboten to foreigners for 30 years–now Chinese troops are lobbing fake bombs and driving tanks in the area.  Amazing.  And–significant.