The president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, earned 85 percent of the vote, winning the July 23rd election, which came as no surprise to anyone, whether the Kyrgyz population or any of the major powers. His opponent, SDP leader Almazbek Atambayev, ran a weak campaign that few expected to succeed.

It is hard to write this post because the conclusion was so incredibly foregone. I can’t express feelings of dissapointment, because I doubt that a change in leadership would do much. As I have expressed before, Kyrgyzstan lacks the requisite institutions to make democracy work, not a lack of leadership.

President Nursultan Nazarbaev recently signed a new law placing blogs, social media networks, and chatrooms under the rubric of “mass media”, effectively creating criminal liability for users of these internet communication platforms  and permitting the government to shut down and censor websites as it sees fit. The government denies this law as being any kind of tool for repression, framing the law as benefiting Kazakh citizens by granting protection from extremist literature, piracy, and 2009’s ultimate cliche excuse-pornography.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had urged Nazarbaev not to sign the law into effect. Miklos Haraszti, OSCE’s Representative on Freedom of the Media, criticized the legislation as contrary to both OSCE and international standards. Kazakhstan is set to chair OSCE in 2010-a decision that has been criticized by groups such as Human Rights Watch ever since the decision was made by OSCE’s council in 2007. Watchdog organizations have repeatedly questioned Kazakhstan’s ability to lead and uphold OSCE’s commitment to human and civic rights and the passing of this new internet law only reaffirms the apprehension.

Kazakhstan’s relationship with the internet is complex, with attempts to strengthen internet usage and boost the Kazakh telecommunications sector coexisting with efforts to monitor and suppress online content. Nazarbaev has been openly ambitious in regard to development of the Kazakh IT sector, which in the past decade has become the clear frontrunner and main internet service provider in Central Asia. That being said, online access is still accessible only to a minority, and Kazakh citizens living outside of major cities are well beyond the reach of the internet. Also, long before the enactment of the recent internet law plenty of legislation was already in place placing limitations on internet content (and aiding in the encouragement of self-censorship). More than 300 legislative acts exist that control information and telecommunications in Kazakhstan in one way or another. Although a few competitors do exist, Kazakhtelecom effectively holds a monopoly in the country and exerts an extraordinary amount of control. Traffic of all first-tier ISPs go through Kazakhtelecom’s channels, permitting an easy, centralized way to filter content. Furthermore, since Kazakhtelecom is the main provider of internet in countries like Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan it censors content for its Central Asian neighbors as well.

In 2008, livejournal.com was blocked, with Kazakhtelecom denying any role in the matter. Oddly enough, the Russian-language version of the site, livejournal.ru (which also happens to be the most popular blogsite in Russia), remained accessible. Speculation on behalf of media outlets such as The Moscow Times was that the block had to do with Nazarbaev’s former son-in-law, Rakhat Aliyev, who has openly criticized (and blogged about) the Nazarbaev government. Other websites such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty have been blocked since last year.

Dilip Hiro’s new book, Inside Central Asia, provides an up to date look at
Central Asia, Turkey, and Iran. Hiro is an expert on India and the Middle East and has written more than 30 books. Inside Central Asia is aimed at those needing a quick rundown (~400 pages) of the region, whether they are actually traveling there or safely in
armchairs with no plans to get up. There is an introduction of the region’s history, from the earliest known empires on through to the Soviet period, followed by a chapter each on Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Iran, and Turkey, focusing on the culture and politics of the last twenty or so years.

Hiro succeeds in presenting colorful anecdotes along with facts and how historical contingencies have created the present. Central Asia is simply one of the most fascinating places in the world, and even as an academic, I learned many little details that academic historians typically excise in order to appear more serious.

In general, I wish there was not such a stark divide between ‘popular’ and academic works of history and politics. My criticisms of Hiro’s work could extend to most other popular books, and frankly, Hiro does a better job than most others do. He does not give in to orientalizing or caricuturizing the people, making it seem like some sort of demented DisneyLand. He is sympathetic towards the region’s people, who have lost so much in the 20th century, and yet he paints a fair portrait of the gains as well.

Unfortunately, like many popular works, he does not integrate academic works as much as he could have. There have been a few truly remarkable works on the region in the last ten or so years, and he does not seem to have consulted them as much as he should have. He makes a few problematic word choices, such as describing nomads as “marauding”, when they actually had fixed patterns of movement or the region in pre-Soviet times as “feudal” when there was no ownership of peasant labor. He shouldn’t have called the Uzbek masses “Islamist”, but rather explained they want any alternative to the status quo of mass corruption and state perpetrated violence. His analysis of the Jadids is simplistic to the point of inaccuracy, which a cursory reading of Khalid’s The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform would have prevented. Hiro could have brought to light some of the academic debates on the region and not made it seem so cut and dry, as if no competing interpretations existed.

However, although the small chapter on the region’s history is fraught with
simplifications, the chapters devoted to current politics are strong. He is
detailed and deftly illustrates his points with his personal experiences.
Unfortunately, writing a book on the constantly changing region is difficult. He concludes his work by arguing that the closing of Manas for US troops shows that “Russia was back in the saddle as the Big Brother of Central Asia (414)”. Ooops, actually, it shows that Bakiyev is firmly in the saddle of Kyrgyzstan, playing two powers against each other for profit. Overall, I would recommend  Inside Central Asia to someone who needs to know what has been going on in Central Asia since the 1980’s. I would just suggest they read the news as well.

Much of the Western media has portrayed Kyrgyzstan’s decision  to permit US troops to use Manas Air Base as a surprise turnaround, painting Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek S. Bayikev as a crafty little leader, capable of pandering to both Russia and the United States as it suits him. Although I have no wish to demean President Bayikev’s new self-determining street rep, it is difficult to imagine Kyrgyzstan as really being that far outside of Russia’s “sphere of influence”, especially considering how eerily close this decision is to Obama’s upcoming visit to Russia. As recently noted, Russia has been sending political advisors to Kyrgyzstan to advise its government over the past year. Furthermore, although crucial to  efforts in Afghanistan, the Manas Air Base deal may not result in a windfall for the United States. Despite the enormous sum of money paid for permission to use the  air base, Manas can now only be used as a transit route for nonmilitary goods and the deal is only to last for one year.

Perhaps the question to be asked in this case is if the recent reversal is a symptom of pragmatic negotiating on behalf of President Obama or whether it is the Kremlin dangling a carrot in front of Washington.  I am inclined to choose the  latter as it is generally Russia that is ready to engage in realpolitik, willing to swap that which ranks lower on its agenda in order to preserve its greater interests. However, there are some signs that the Obama administration is engaging in some bottom line decisionmaking of its own when it comes to keeping a base open in Kyrgyzstan. Journalists have made light of the fact that in keeping Manas Air Base open, the U.S. is effectively engaging in dealmaking with an authoritarian government accused of human rights abuses.

Obama’s visit with Putin and Medvedev should help clarify the trajectory of US-Russia relations over the course of the next year. Whether or not both countries are really willing to play a little game of give-and-take with each other remains to be seen. Whether an event such as the recent one in Kyrgyzstan was a move by Washington or Moscow is not entirely clear. One thing is certain, however, and that is that a chess game is in play.