Afghanistan and Central Asia

Yesterday, I offhandedly stated my disappointment about the lack of a discussion of China’s growing influence during Friday’s presidential debate.  It was amazing to me that the United States could have a ‘Foreign Policy’ presidential debate and only mention the word China once.  The leaders, government, businesses, and citizens of Central Asia know how important China’s rise to power has and will continue to be.  As its power and economy have grown, China has increased its investments, relations, and strategic influence in the region and shows no signs of slowing up.  Even the NATO ‘controlled’ state of Afghanistan, China is making major economic and strategic inroads.  Here are some examples of China’s growing influence in the Central Asian states:

-A 960-kilometer oil pipeline from Western Kazakhstan to Western China has partially started operations and should be carrying 20 millions tons of the black gold annually in only a few years time.  For this project, Beijing ponied up $700 million and diligently met the expected time table of completion. 

-The planned Turkmenistan-Chinese gas pipeline, which will traverse Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will stretch over 7,000-kilometers all the way to Shanghai.  This deal also included a production-sharing-agreement (PSA) allowing Beijing to develop the gas fields feeding the pipeline, making it the only nation to have a on-shore PSA with Turkmenistan.

-China won a $3.5 billion contract to develop Afghanistan’s Aynak copper field earlier this summer.  The price and challenging task of working this unstable and possibly violent area showcase Beijing’s ability to take risks that private companies and most nations are unwilling to do.  Though China will face many trials, building up the infrastructure, railways, environmental concerns, displacing villagers, and possible sabotage, in getting this project off the ground, if successful it will be solidify the state’s presence in the nation and further it as a whole in the region.  Afghanistan’s government and people also have much to be gained if the Aynak field can be successfully mined with greater job opportunities and a positive sign to show other foreign investors.   

-In Tajikistan, China’s Export-Import Bank provided a $300 million loan to help finance the construction of the Zeravshan hydropower station.  Also in Tajikistan, a Chinese mining group invested approximately $100 million in a gold-mining operation.

-China is also involved in the construction of a railway stretching from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan. 

Now these are just some of the projects and investments made by China into the CA region, but one can see their influence is growing tremendously in the past ten years or so and I would imagine that this will only increase with time and a growing Chinese economy.  China also has long-term interests and investments in Iran and Pakistan and this only magnifies the importance of the Central Asian states.  China’s government and businesses have deep pockets, ask no questions about human rights, and are able to provide infrastructure and capital to CA states and leaders lacking in both. 

Back to the presidential debate, it is important to know that China has begun to have similar levels of investments and growing influence in many regions of the world, so may be we should be discussing Beijing’s role and rise a little bit more.

Good morning. I just want to provide some real quick reaction and analysis to Friday’s presidential debate between Barack Obama and John McCain. Here is the transcript (which I also put on the bottom of this post) and video, and here is video of the five minutes or so they spent on Afghanistan/Pakistan.

As the United States current president was reviewing and possibly writing a new strategy for the conflict in Afghan/Pakistan (yes it should be called both now) each presidential candidate stated their views on the issue to the American and world audience. Though my overall thoughts on the debate were positive, (except for the complete lack of a discussion on the rise of China), and each had constructive and strong statements regarding their preferred polices to help bring stability to the Afghan/Pakistan situation, much was left wanting. Each advocated more troops, which I fundamentally agree with, but there continues to be nearly no debate in this country about how difficult this task is and what it is worth.

In the next few weeks I plan on delving deeper and deeper into both McCain’s and Obama’s views and likely policy regarding Afghanistan/Pakistan and the Central Asian region and Friday’s debate is a solid place to start off. Obama and McCain each advocated an increase in troops, basically the 2-3 brigades that have already been set by President Bush, but differed in many other elements. McCain stressed the creation of a new military strategy, Petraeus’s one in Iraq we can presume but he does not elaborate, and Obama focuses on Al Qaeda and the fact that the US presence in Iraq is having a detrimental effect on Afghan/Al Qaeda progress. Obama described the Afghan/Pak situation as ‘getting worse, not better’ and argued that the US needs to 1. Get Karzai to provide for his people 2. Control the narco trafficking and growing 3. Get Pakistan to go after Al Qaeda or the US should do it itself. McCain ceased on this last point to try and paint Obama as naive, arguing that ‘you can’t just do that’ in regard to saying out loud what you would do militarily in Pakistani territory, but Obama stood strong by this argument throughout the debate. McCain to his credit tried to put some historical background to the conflict and even mentioned Waziristan!, stating that he’d been there and that the area hadn’t been ruled since Alexander the Great, which is atleast telling the American people just how hard this task we are confronting is. McCain then stressed that the US must be careful with the newly appointed Zadari government, mentioning the recent Marriot terrorist attack, but alas you don’t come away knowing exactly what he would do to get the nation to be a constructive and useful ally in this conflict. Concerning the entire debate, basically McCain talked too much about Iraq and too little about Afghan/Pakistan, China, grand strategy and Obama undervalued the importance of Iraq and the value of getting it right and concentrated too much on Al Qaeda.
All right, that was quick, but I promise more. Here’s more! For the best unpartisan, analytical work on the two presidential canidate’s views on the Afghan/Pakistan and the world, I recommend George Freidman’s Stratfor articles, which are centered around this debate:

1. The New President and the Global Landscape - This is a debate preview of each canidate’s positions and gives straight talk about the difficult road ahead in Afghanistan for either canidate and NATO.

2. Obama’s Foreign Policy Stance

3. McCain’s Foreign Policy Stance

I will post more about these canidate’s views and possible strategies concerning Afghanistan and Central Asia in the very near future. What did you think of the debate? Did both candidates sound informed on the Afghan conflict? It’s history? Did they each layout a strategy that can be implemented? Did they say anything different than what the Bush administration is saying or doing? What question would you have asked them if you were the moderator?

Transcript:LEHRER: Afghanistan, lead — a new — a new lead question. Now, having resolved Iraq, we’ll move to Afghanistan.

And it goes to you, Senator Obama, and it’s a — it picks up on a point that’s already been made. Do you think more troops — more U.S. troops should be sent to Afghanistan, how many, and when?

OBAMA: Yes, I think we need more troops. I’ve been saying that for over a year now.

And I think that we have to do it as quickly as possible, because it’s been acknowledged by the commanders on the ground the situation is getting worse, not better.

We had the highest fatalities among U.S. troops this past year than at any time since 2002. And we are seeing a major offensive taking place — al Qaeda and Taliban crossing the border and attacking our troops in a brazen fashion. They are feeling emboldened.

And we cannot separate Afghanistan from Iraq, because what our commanders have said is we don’t have the troops right now to deal with Afghanistan.

So I would send two to three additional brigades to Afghanistan. Now, keep in mind that we have four times the number of troops in Iraq, where nobody had anything to do with 9/11 before we went in, where, in fact, there was no al Qaeda before we went in, but we have four times more troops there than we do in Afghanistan.

And that is a strategic mistake, because every intelligence agency will acknowledge that al Qaeda is the greatest threat against the United States and that Secretary of Defense Gates acknowledged the central front — that the place where we have to deal with these folks is going to be in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.

So here’s what we have to do comprehensively, though. It’s not just more troops.

We have to press the Afghan government to make certain that they are actually working for their people. And I’ve said this to President Karzai.

No. 2, we’ve got to deal with a growing poppy trade that has exploded over the last several years.

No. 3, we’ve got to deal with Pakistan, because al Qaeda and the Taliban have safe havens in Pakistan, across the border in the northwest regions, and although, you know, under George Bush, with the support of Senator McCain, we’ve been giving them $10 billion over the last seven years, they have not done what needs to be done to get rid of those safe havens.

And until we do, Americans here at home are not going to be safe.

LEHRER: Afghanistan, Senator McCain?

MCCAIN: First of all, I won’t repeat the mistake that I regret enormously, and that is, after we were able to help the Afghan freedom fighters and drive the Russians out of Afghanistan, we basically washed our hands of the region.

And the result over time was the Taliban, al Qaeda, and a lot of the difficulties we are facing today. So we can’t ignore those lessons of history.

Now, on this issue of aiding Pakistan, if you’re going to aim a gun at somebody, George Shultz, our great secretary of state, told me once, you’d better be prepared to pull the trigger.

I’m not prepared at this time to cut off aid to Pakistan. So I’m not prepared to threaten it, as Senator Obama apparently wants to do, as he has said that he would announce military strikes into Pakistan.

We’ve got to get the support of the people of — of Pakistan. He said that he would launch military strikes into Pakistan.

Now, you don’t do that. You don’t say that out loud. If you have to do things, you have to do things, and you work with the Pakistani government.

Now, the new president of Pakistan, Kardari (sic), has got his hands full. And this area on the border has not been governed since the days of Alexander the Great.

I’ve been to Waziristan. I can see how tough that terrain is. It’s ruled by a handful of tribes.

And, yes, Senator Obama calls for more troops, but what he doesn’t understand, it’s got to be a new strategy, the same strategy that he condemned in Iraq. It’s going to have to be employed in Afghanistan.

And we’re going to have to help the Pakistanis go into these areas and obtain the allegiance of the people. And it’s going to be tough. They’ve intermarried with al Qaeda and the Taliban. And it’s going to be tough. But we have to get the cooperation of the people in those areas.

And the Pakistanis are going to have to understand that that bombing in the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was a signal from the terrorists that they don’t want that government to cooperate with us in combating the Taliban and jihadist elements.

So we’ve got a lot of work to do in Afghanistan. But I’m confident, now that General Petraeus is in the new position of command, that we will employ a strategy which not only means additional troops — and, by the way, there have been 20,000 additional troops, from 32,000 to 53,000, and there needs to be more.

So it’s not just the addition of troops that matters. It’s a strategy that will succeed. And Pakistan is a very important element in this. And I know how to work with him. And I guarantee you I would not publicly state that I’m going to attack them.

OBAMA: Nobody talked about attacking Pakistan. Here’s what I said.

And if John wants to disagree with this, he can let me know, that, if the United States has al Qaeda, bin Laden, top-level lieutenants in our sights, and Pakistan is unable or unwilling to act, then we should take them out.

Now, I think that’s the right strategy; I think that’s the right policy.

And, John, I — you’re absolutely right that presidents have to be prudent in what they say. But, you know, coming from you, who, you know, in the past has threatened extinction for North Korea and, you know, sung songs about bombing Iran, I don’t know, you know, how credible that is. I think this is the right strategy.

Now, Senator McCain is also right that it’s difficult. This is not an easy situation. You’ve got cross-border attacks against U.S. troops.

And we’ve got a choice. We could allow our troops to just be on the defensive and absorb those blows again and again and again, if Pakistan is unwilling to cooperate, or we have to start making some decisions.

And the problem, John, with the strategy that’s been pursued was that, for 10 years, we coddled Musharraf, we alienated the Pakistani population, because we were anti-democratic. We had a 20th-century mindset that basically said, “Well, you know, he may be a dictator, but he’s our dictator.”

And as a consequence, we lost legitimacy in Pakistan. We spent $10 billion. And in the meantime, they weren’t going after al Qaeda, and they are more powerful now than at any time since we began the war in Afghanistan.

That’s going to change when I’m president of the United States.

MCCAIN: I — I don’t think that Senator Obama understands that there was a failed state in Pakistan when Musharraf came to power. Everybody who was around then, and had been there, and knew about it knew that it was a failed state.

But let me tell you, you know, this business about bombing Iran and all that, let me tell you my record.

Back in 1983, when I was a brand-new United States congressman, the one — the person I admired the most and still admire the most, Ronald Reagan, wanted to send Marines into Lebanon.

And I saw that, and I saw the situation, and I stood up, and I voted against that, because I was afraid that they couldn’t make peace in a place where 300 or 400 or several hundred Marines would make a difference. Tragically, I was right: Nearly 300 Marines lost their lives in the bombing of the barracks.

And then we had Somalia — then we had the first Gulf War. I supported — I supported that.

I supported us going into Bosnia, when a number of my own party and colleagues was against that operation in Bosnia. That was the right thing to do, to stop genocide and to preserve what was necessary inside of Europe.

I supported what we did in Kosovo. I supported it because ethnic cleansing and genocide was taking place there.

And I have a record — and Somalia, I opposed that we should turn — turn the force in Somalia from a peacekeeping force into a peacemaking force, which they were not capable of.

So I have a record. I have a record of being involved in these national security issues, which involve the highest responsibility and the toughest decisions that any president can make, and that is to send our young men and women into harm’s way.

And I’ll tell you, I had a town hall meeting in Wolfeboro, New Hampshire, and a woman stood up and she said, “Senator McCain, I want you to do me the honor of wearing a bracelet with my son’s name on it.”

He was 22 years old and he was killed in combat outside of Baghdad, Matthew Stanley, before Christmas last year. This was last August, a year ago. And I said, “I will — I will wear his bracelet with honor.”

And this was August, a year ago. And then she said, “But, Senator McCain, I want you to do everything — promise me one thing, that you’ll do everything in your power to make sure that my son’s death was not in vain.”

That means that that mission succeeds, just like those young people who re-enlisted in Baghdad, just like the mother I met at the airport the other day whose son was killed. And they all say to me that we don’t want defeat.

MCCAIN: A war that I was in, where we had an Army, that it wasn’t through any fault of their own, but they were defeated. And I know how hard it is for that — for an Army and a military to recover from that. And it did and we will win this one and we won’t come home in defeat and dishonor and probably have to go back if we fail.

OBAMA: Jim, let me just make a point. I’ve got a bracelet, too, from Sergeant - from the mother of Sergeant Ryan David Jopeck, sure another mother is not going through what I’m going through.

No U.S. soldier ever dies in vain because they’re carrying out the missions of their commander in chief. And we honor all the service that they’ve provided. Our troops have performed brilliantly. The question is for the next president, are we making good judgments about how to keep America safe precisely because sending our military into battle is such an enormous step.

And the point that I originally made is that we took our eye off Afghanistan, we took our eye off the folks who perpetrated 9/11, they are still sending out videotapes and Senator McCain, nobody is talking about defeat in Iraq, but I have to say we are having enormous problems in Afghanistan because of that decision.

And it is not true you have consistently been concerned about what happened in Afghanistan. At one point, while you were focused on Iraq, you said well, we can “muddle through” Afghanistan. You don’t muddle through the central front on terror and you don’t muddle through going after bin Laden. You don’t muddle through stamping out the Taliban.

I think that is something we have to take seriously. And when I’m president, I will.

LEHRER: New …

MCCAIN: You might think that with that kind of concern that Senator Obama would have gone to Afghanistan, particularly given his responsibilities as a subcommittee chairman. By the way, when I’m subcommittee chairman, we take up the issues under my subcommittee. But the important thing is — the important thing is I visited Afghanistan and I traveled to Waziristan and I traveled to these places and I know what our security requirements are. I know what our needs are. So the point is that we will prevail in Afghanistan, but we need the new strategy and we need it to succeed.

But the important thing is, if we suffer defeat in Iraq, which General Petraeus predicts we will, if we adopted Senator Obama’s set date for withdrawal, then that will have a calamitous effect in Afghanistan and American national security interests in the region. Senator Obama doesn’t seem to understand there is a connected between the two.

I was lucky enough to attend the Foreign Policy Association sponsored 2008 World Leadership Forum yesterday in New York City and here is a short summary/analysis of what I saw and heard from some of the world’s leading experts and leaders of various foreign policy issues, including our beloved Central Asian region.

During yesterday’s session I attended two panel discussions about the global economic outlook and energy security and heard speeches from the President’s of Spain, Poland, and Turkey. The two parts of the Forum that contained issues most central to the CA region were the panel on Energy Security, featuring EU Commissioner for External Relations and Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who has been mentioned much on this page and just recently concluded a forum on security in Paris with Central Asian state leaders, and Turkey’s President Abdullah Gul, who not only gave a solid speech but took questions from the audience for nearly a half an hour.  But I would first like to go over a few more general observations.

First off, it was intriguing and enlightening to hear from some of Wall Street’s biggest investment firms’ representatives, including Lehman Brothers and Goldman Sachs, and other finance sector experts and what they had to say about the current economic crisis and the US government’s bailout proposal.  Unsurprisingly, they all seemed to support the bailout.  They talked about the crisis from a mainly US perspective, but also discussed how foreign markets, especially China, were effected.  They also touched on what the future might hold for the US and world economy, and there also seemed to be a consensus that the US and world’s was in for an economic slowdown, but nothing too dramatically destabilizing.

Secondly, listening to the back-to-back speeches by Spain President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero and Polish President Lech Kaczynski was like seeing two different world’s collide, at least concerning world outlooks.  Zapatero discussed terrorism a decent amount, but otherwise his speech was about ‘cooperation,’ ‘equality,’ and world social and economic development.  Kaczynski’s speech was much more combatative and largely concerned Poland’s fears of a rising and dangerous Russia.  Though both Poland and Spain are members of NATO and the EU, they seemed to live in two different worlds.  Spain in Kant’s land of perpetual peace and Poland in Hobbes’ land of perpetual fear and pain.  It was realism vs. international liberalism going at it in front of my very eyes.  Interesting stuff to say the least for an international relations guy such as myself.  The FPA may post the transcripts from the speeches and I will make sure to link to them when they do.

Alright, I apologize for the detour. I’ve been covering energy supplies, security, politics in Central Asia for awhile now and in doing this I came across the work of Benita Ferrero-Waldner’s work for the EU on several occasions so it was great to see and hear from her in person.  She mainly spoke in generalities, like a diplomat normally does, but she did have some telling quotes about EU’s relationship with Russia and the Central Asian states concerning energy supplies.  She called bilateral deals in Central Asia the ‘top political priority’ for the EU, especially in light of what she called the ’situation’ in Georgia.  She mentioned the recent Memorandum of Understandings signed with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and about her hopes for the Nabucco pipeline becoming a reality.  She stated that the EU desired a ‘level playing field’ with Russia and that energy was a ‘fundamental part of foreign policy’ today, not just of the EU, but nearly all nation’s foreign relations.  However, she did not discuss the difficulty in making deals with the Central Asian state’s leaders who have well-known human rights violations, and unfortunately I did have time to bring this up during the Q and A.  Turkish President Gul was very accomodating and answered many questions about a range of issues, including energy supplies.  Though he tip-toed around commenting on the Georgian conflict he voiced his strong support for Turkey’s rights to transit oil and gas from the Caucasus and Central Asia.  He basically provided the audience with a rundown of all the pipelines and transit routes that traverse Turkish territory on their way to Europe, mainly of course the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which he stated also emphasized included resources from Kazakhstan.  Concerning the Nabucco pipeline project from Central Asia through Turkey to Austria, he called it a ’strategic project’ and strongly disagreed with those who called it a ‘dream’, saying; ‘No, that’s what they said about the BTC.’

Questions? Comments? Anybody else that attended?

A few various items today:

A. Yesterday, and the day before, we discussed the meaning of a new CSTO deployment in Central Asia, with myself coming out on the side that it was both a political and strategic move for Russia and for the Central Asian states involved.  Basically, Russia wants the CA states looking towards it for security and the CA states want assurances against the growing instability in Afghanistan, in other words, a security partnership.  But Russia and the CSTO are not the only game in town, especially when one is talking about Afghan security and halting the Taliban advance.  The NATO alliance holds many strategic and political cards, as was quickly pointed out yesterday, they or the US have bases in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and as we can see in this meeting between NATO Depty Sec Gen Claudio Bisogniero and Kazak Defense Minister Danial Akhmetov and its following press conference, Kazakhstan relys on and is a ‘key partner’ in this Western alliance as well.  At the meeting the two sides exchanged pleasentries and discussed their upcoming Kazak-NATO in Brussels where they will work on the framework of Kazak’s individual plan of partnership.  The NATO Gen Sec stated Kazak was a ‘key partner’ and that achieved ‘good results’ in their cooperation with the nation.  Kazak minister Akhmetov made this very positive overture to its alliance with the military alliance along with the EU and US:

“I with pleasure note a positive dynamics and rather intensive reinforcement of relations between Kazakhstan and NATO,” stated in his turn D. Akhmetov. “I want to stress that expanding of constructive interactions with the alliance, European state, with the USA is a priority direction of the external political course of Kazakhstan.”

It appears the CSTO has quite the challenger for regional primacy, but Moscow knew that already.

B. Speaking of Afghanistan, and who isn’t nowadays, Eurasianet.org published an interesting interview with former US intelligence analyst and current global scholar at CSIS regarding the current situations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the effect General Petraeus might have on the Afghan conflict now that he is in charge of the whole region of Central Command.  Though the interview focuses on Iraq, Cordesman has some blunt assessments about the current Afghan stabilization campaign and what will need to be done to achieve the desired result of a stable, free Afghanistan.  He stated that for the entire course of the Afghan war, ‘we’ve underestimated the threat, we’ve reacted far too slowly, we’ve never had the forces or resources to take the initiative.’  He discusses the discrepancy in the requested 12-15 thousand troop requests by commanders in country and the promise by Bush, Gates, and Chairman Mullen for only 8,000.

Cordesman also lamented the lack of aid and business sector workers available to help rebuild the country, but argues that we either do not have the resources or that the military does not want inexperienced people coming into to this conflict zone.  With the fear that more aid workers will be targeted for violence by the Taliban as were three last month.  The military’s job in Afghanistan is amazing complicated as they must be soldiers, diplomats, engineers, teachers, etc.  General Petraeus probably understands this more than anyone else in the military, but as Cordesman points out, we should not expect immediate miracles from him as he takes over Central Command.

C. To conclude today’s post, I want to highlight an important piece lambasting the Uzbekistan government over its various violations of individual and group rights.  Tanzilya Salimdjanova and Mandeep Tiwana from Civicus: World Alliance for Citizen Participation attempt to shed light on several instances of Uzbek government repression of its citizens and do this in light of celebrations of the nation’s Independence from the Soviet Union 17 years ago.  The two discuss the imprisonments of activists Mutabar tojiboeva and Yusuf Juma, the restrictive Rules of Holding Mass Events legislation which strongly denies Uzbeki’s rights of assembly and protest (in planning a public event one must put aside a minimum of 10 seats in each section for security personnel, ‘how inviting!’), and the struggle for organized groups in civil society to gather and be recognized, including NGOs, faith-based groups, and professional organizations.  Too often we in the West think only of the Afghan people’s freedoms or lack there of and miss what is happening across the border.  We can thank this work by Salimdjanova and Tiwana for this vital piece and all others who keep a light shining on oppression of human rights everywhere.

Yesterday, we quickly went over the planned new alignment of the CSTO, which would consist of a deployment of 10,000 more troops and a missile shield, in what the organization’s Secretary General called “a powerful military grouping of five countries in Central Asia.” Eurasia Daily today provided more details of the new force structure, its internal complications, and ramifications in light of the Georgian conflict and rising Russia/Western tensions. The group’s Sec Gen Bordyuzha stated that Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan would all participate and “anticipated that the force will consist of regular troop units, brigades, regiments, or divisions. Currently, the CSTO’s military component consists of Collective Rapid Deployment Forces, estimated to include ten battalions (4,000); it is planned that this structure will be subsumed into the new force structure.”

Now, the CSTO has many similar force structures in Central Asia and tried to create one similar to this in 2005 which never came into actual existence, so what are this deployment’s prospects and why is Russia leading this military charge at this moment? One of you made this witty and mostly on-point comment regarding yesterday’s post:

“The missile shield is obviously a counterbalance to the US shield in Eastern Europe. It’s more kindergarten foreign policy from Russian; You have a missile shield? Fine, we’ll get our own. See how you like that! Next, they’ll probably let it slip that the coordinates for the NATO bases in Poland are preprogrammed in.”

Regarding this new deployment’s talk of a missile shield, I largely agree with the above quote, but there is more to this deployment and Central Asian military grouping by Russia than just tit-for-tat against the United States and Europe. CSTO Sec Gen Bordyuzha mentioned that the new force was to help ‘control the tensions in Afghanistan’ and I, and others, believe that Russia genuinely fears the growing conflict in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and most importantly its growth or spread into Central Asia where Russia holds its gas dominance. Russia depends on stable and safe gas imports from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan and any destabilization in the region could cause havoc on its energy import-export led economy. Russia and the Central Asian states are also not strangers to the nefarious powers of Islamic terrorist attacks and groups which may increasingly spread out from Afghanistan, or come back to, the Central Asian or Russian territories.

 

Russia and the Central Asian state leaders do not desire a return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, as the group is a major destabilizing force, spreading its Islamist ideology, helping narco-traffickers move throughout the region, and making pipelines and other transit routes impossible to traverse through the Afghan and also Pakistan territory. Putin and most CA state leaders showed their backing for the removal of the Taliban in 2001, by providing bases and logistical support to US/NATO forces and this continues largely today. Even with the Russian-West brewhaha over Georgia, Moscow still allows NATO forces utilized a Russian controlled corridor to transit goods, though Moscow has recently warned the Western alliance that they could close it anytime, and Medvedev just last week offered Afghan President Karzai 225 Russian police officers to help train the Afghan National Police.

Now Russia has commenced this new CSTO deployment in part to politically slap the West, but it also helps them deepen their strategic connections in the region and provide a ready-made force to combat the spread of Afghanistan’s growing instability. For the CSTO Central Asian states, Russia and this new grouping are also seen as a protective shield against the rising chaos and danger of the Talibanization of Afghanistan. Russia/Medvedev/Putin may indeed have grand strategic plans in Central Asia, and this troop deployment may be just one spoke in the wheel, but it also provides a solid support system in what all those involved consider a real threat to regional stability and integrity.

(Photo Source: Eurasia Daily - CSTO General Secretary Nikolay Bordyuzha)

 

Today we will discuss two recent developments: An expansion of the Russia-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO and the first EU/Central Asian Forum on Security Issues held this past week.  What do these two developments individually tell us about Russia and the EU’s role/position in Central Asia?  Which cooperation discussions and pronouncements have or will have the most teeth?  Are the Central Asia states successfully playing one group off the other for their own strategic benefit or are they being pushed around?

Last Friday, CSTO members Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia agreed to deploy troops and a missile defense shield in Central Asia to control the situation over ‘tensions in Afghanistan.’  CSTO Sec Gen Nikolay Bordyuzha stated that the deployment will consist of 10 battalions and made the following statements regarding the new alignment’s look and purpose:

“All CSTO members are concerned with fact of military objects appearance around them or such serious structures as anti-rocket shield founded. Such actions stipulate necessity of creation on the CSTO borders of a new military infrastructure, restoration of some its elements of the Soviet Union period.”

“Under ensuring collective security a role of Collective forces of the quick deployment is increased in Central Asia.  Constant attention will be paid to its advancement of fighting preparedness and modernization.”

We discussed this rising development a little over a week ago and as was said then, the move clearly reference’s the US missile defense system in Czech and Poland. Concerning the first quote, I’m not sure the smaller CSTO states are as worried about the Europe/US  missile shield as one specific member, Moscow.  The line about the arrangement having elements from the Soviet Union was also a little surprising, especially with the all the talk about a new Cold War lately, though largely dismissed.  In any form, this is definitely a concrete move by Moscow to increase its military/strategic pull with these smaller states in what it sees as its sphere of influence.

On Sept. 17-18 there were held both the EU-Central Asia Ministerial Troika and the first ever EU-Central Asia Security Forum in Paris.  Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke to gathering about three crucial areas of interest between the two groups: Terrorism, Narco Trafficking/Border Patrol, and energy and environmental issues.  In an interesting choice, Ferrero-Waldner opened up the forum by mentioning Francis Fukuyama’s End of History statement and then quickly acknowledging that the recent events, aka Georgia, have showed us that ‘were not quite there yet.’  Ferrero-Waldner also did not beat around the bush about energy issues as she assertively stated Europe’s and CA’s priority must be to diversify, diversify, diversify!  Here are her poinant words:

“Strengthening our energy partnership with Central Asia is a top political priority for the European Union. The region is central to our strategy of diversification of energy supplies and supply routes, a policy that is all the more pertinent after the events of this summer. The events in the Caucasus have given both Central Asia and Europe food for thought. The security dimension of our energy policies has been thrown into sharp relief. And, while we in the EU are intensifying efforts with regard to the security of our supplies, Central Asia also has a strong interest in diversifying its export routes.

We intend to redouble our efforts to develop energy links between the EU and Central Asia through diversified energy transportation routes and new energy infrastructure, including Nabucco. Making a reality of the long-discussed “southern corridor” must be the focus of our work together in the coming months, and I hope that at our next Baku ministerial in late November we can give new impetus to the creation of a Trans-Caspian energy corridor.”

There was no doubt what the central aspect of this Parisan meeting was all about, energy.  More importantly it was about the EU obtaining closer relations with these states in the middle of a crucial period where Russia is attempting to cement their dominant role in the region after the Georgia conflict.  As many no doubt noted, human rights issues were mainly but under the table during the forum with Ferrero-Waldner mentioning them once in passing.

Back to the questions I raised at the top: what do you think?  Russia? EU? Central Asian States?

Apparently a ‘clash’ occurred in Turkmenistan’s capital of Ashgabat last Friday and Saturday in which heavy fire was exchanged, tanks and armored vehicles were used, and 20 or so Turkmen police officers were killed, who the clash involved besides Turkmen officers and what it was about is still open to debate. Turkmenistan’s state media made no statements about the incident, but their foreign ministry, possibly trying to head off any claims that this was Andijon II, put out this statement: “Special units of Turkmenistan’s law enforcement agencies carried out an operation to seize (the group), as a result of which the above mentioned criminal group was neutralized.” The Turk government went on to describe the incident as one perpetrated by organized criminal drug traffickers. On the other hand, independent websites not controlled by the Turkmen government and the opposition group Turkmenistan’ Popular Democratic Movement, led by Boris Shikhmuradov, claimed that the incident was a government battle against ‘a religious group, possibly radical Islamists.’ In 2005, the Turkmenistan government reportedly brutally suppressed an uprising, which they claimed was an Islamic insurrection, while others claim it was just by poor citizens peacefully protesting against government policies. Hopefully a full and accurate portrayal of the incident arises before too long, though I will not be holding my breath.

(Photo Source: The Associated Press: Turkmen policemen stand guard on a street in Ashgabat)

I did a quick summary of most of the major outcomes of the SCO’s Dushanbe Summit on Monday, but I want to get a bit more into the affect of Russia’s conflict in Georgia and all that has happened since diplomatically and strategically.  As we have read, the SCO’s Dushanbe Declaration came out with a rather neutral sounding statement regarding the conflict, neither supporting Russia nor condemning them.  Russia was no doubt displeased with this, and though they spun the Declaration into a sign of support from China and their Central Asian neighbors, they had to start to question their level of isolation and the usefulness of the SCO in promoting their foreign policy and in confronting what they see as Western encroachments.

Mark N. Katz at Eurasianet and John J. Tkacik, Jr. at the Heritage Foundation each wrote analytical pieces discussing diplomatic and strategic moves after the Georgian conflict and its aftermath, mainly Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia independence, Katz of Russia and the Central Asian states and Tkacik Jr., China.  Katz argues that Russia came into a rather unfriendly environment at the last SCO summit, facing deteriorating relationships with many Central Asian states and recalcitrant China, eager to have the CA states look to it for leadership.  Though this takes too harsh a view of Russia’s relations and influence in Central Asia, (as there was/is indeed great pressure on the CA states to move toward Russia’s side in this conflict and Russia seemed to have successful visits to Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan immediately after the summit), Katz’s analysis rings true that China will use the SCO to move closer to the CA and have its states depend more on its resources, such as for infrastucture investments, and that Russia will start, though in many ways it already does, to lean more toward the Moscow dominated CSTO for regional cooperation.

There are a myriad of reasons why China never came right out and stated its support for Russia in the conflict, but John Tkacik does an excellent job shedding some light on their internal process by detailing their changing diplomatic positions from well before the conflict to today.  The main reason China would be wary about explicitly supporting such actions would protecting their secessionist’s claims themselves, on Tibet, Taiwan, Xinjiang Province, and several Islands and waters of its coasts.  It would also go against China’s ‘quiet rise’ where they let others talk the hits from the West.  Tkacik states two central motivations for what he sees in the end is China’s implicit support of Russia’s move into Georgia: 1. China considers American and NATO moves to bring Georgia into the network of Western security pacts as a threat to a close Chinese partner, Russia  2. China may want to preserve its own options for taking similar action beyond its own borders.  Now Tkacik is not implying China would use this method in Central Asia, but in the aforementioned regions.

So of course, how China and Russia handle and view this Georgian conflict has strong ramifications for the Central Asia states, who must always remain wary.  Do you think the Georgian conflict has strengthened Russia’s hand in Central Asia?  Or do you think that they may have overplayed their hand and now their current isolation is pushing CA states toward the coffers of China?  Or are the CA authoritative leaders simply just relieved to see the Georgian Rose Revolution leaders punished and checked?  What did the Dushanbe Declaration’s about the conflict signify about the group’s future?  Chinese dominated?

Whose side is Pakistan on in the NATO-led conflict in Afghanistan?  Does the Pakistani government and army want to stop and defeat the Taliban?  Can it?  As a US decision maker, should you be extremely worried about Pakistan’s answers to all of these questions?  Unfortunately, the last question is the only one that should be answered with an authoritative Yes.  With US/NATO drones flying in and out of Pakistan/Afghan’s border region, the Taliban ramping up their activity throughout Afghanistan and Pakistan, including in the cities of Kabul and Peshawar, and with a new, untested government in place in Pakistan, we seek answers to these very important questions.

Dexter Filkins has written an excellent report full of first-hand stories, interviews, and analysis from the Afghan/Pak border region and he tries to answer these questions. Filkins, who just finished a book about his experience in Iraq (‘The Forever War’), sees a border situation much like most observers nowadays, academic and in the press, violent, out of control, and maybe most disturbing, they all see a Pakistani government and army either unable to curtail the Taliban-led insurgents and Al Qaeda operatives in any meaningful way or even worse, actually providing support for the insurgency. Through interviews of Taliban members, tribal leaders around the border, militants, and Pak government officials Filkins paints a frightening, but all too real picture of a do-nothing Pak government, taking all the aid the US will throw at them while tacitly and at times implicitly supporting the Taliban’s efforts to destabilize Afghanistan’s government.

Filkins goes over the deals made between the Pak army and the Taliban (he argues that these are the only pacts that can be made as the government is too impotent to be considered a real partner) and comes to the conclusion that they basically have come down to this: you (the border insurgents) don’t attack Pakistan’s mainland and cities, and we (the Pak army) will let you continue your attacks on NATO and Afghan forces across the border.  Now the Pakistan government and army have denied this claim for years now, but as US/NATO increase its missions near the border and drone attacks keep hitting targets inside Pakistan, one has to believe that the US has started to take this as the truth and unilaterally respond as seen necessary.  These aggressive attacks inside of Pakistani territory have caused a diplomatic riff that will hopefully just stay that way and not escalate.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen flew to Pakistan today to meet with Pak civilian and military leadership.  This is Mullen’s fifth trip already to the nation since being named Chairman.  The meeting will no doubt discuss US troop deployment into Pak territory on Sept. 3 and Pakistan’s army chief Kayani response asserting their right to protect their homeland with force.

It appears that both the US and Pakistan are playing a Double Game: Pakistan is taking US money and promising to reign in the Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other extremist forces that are causing instability in Afghanistan while at the same time in many ways willfully allowing the Taliban to control large swaths of territory and perform raids into Afghan territory.  The US double game is more out in the open and its objectives are easier to discern:  The US government continues to call the Pakistan government a partner in the War on Terror and provide it aid (such as these F-16’s), while at the same time acknowledging that ISI helped orchestrate the Kabul Indian Embassy bombing and that large regions in and around the FATA were breeding and staging grounds for the Taliban, and in the last few weeks start to launch military missions inside of Pak territory without complete Pak government or military approval.

This is a very complicated issue and region of the world, and I know this piece, just like Filkins’ article, raised more questions than answers.  Before you can win a war you have to know who your enemy is.  We know a lot about the Taliban, they are the ones who burn girls’ schools, banish women from the street, blow up stores selling modern goods, and ‘thrash children for flying kites,’ but what are the forces behind them?  Who exactly are we fighting over there?  Who are our friends?  These are simple questions with complicated, troubling, and in many ways unknown, answers.

(Map Source: New York Times)

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 8th annual summit in Dushanbe two weeks ago covered many issues and issued several decrees.  We already discussed how the grouping did not give Russia the diplomatic support regarding the Georgian conflict as they hoped, but the conference also set up joint military manuevers, moved along the process of an Afghan Contact Group-SCO summit, and made progress on the acceptance of new members, or at least putting the group’s observer members on more sure footing within the organization.  The SCO’s official website and the Summit’s Dushanbe Declaration both gave the official line of what was accomplished and agreed upon at meeting.  From inching closer to Iran, India, and Pakistan membership to stopping ‘pscyhotropic substances’, they seemed to cover it all.

1. Joint Anti-Terrorism Exercises - The group agreed and actually already opened on September 3-4, joint anti-terrorism drills in Volgograd, Russia. These drills consisted of practicing ’search and investigative operations to prevent the activity of terrorist groups.’  Though I do not know much about these drills, it appears that they are not quite as large as previous SCO military maneuvers, specifically the two Peace Missions.

2. Economic Cooperation - A memorandum on partnership betwen the SCO’s Interbank Association and the Eurasian Development Bank was signed,  and the members worked toward creating ‘favorable trade and investment conditions,’ development of transportation routes and transit potential, modern information and telecommunication technologies, and hoped to further the usefulness of the SCO Business Council.

3. Observer Status - Work with the SCO’s observer states, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Mongolia, was said to be put on a ‘qualitively new level’ and the SCO’s Head of States approved the Regulations on the Status of Dialogue Partner of the SCO.  An expert group was to assemble to consider a whole range of issues relating to the expansion of the group and to hopefully tell me what  a ‘dialogue partner’ is.  A report stated that Russian President Medvedev said that as  a ‘dialogue partner’ the observers could participate in the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS).  Through the years, geopolitics, the real fears by China, Russia, and all four CA states, and organizational roadblocks have kept the group from expanding further, but this Dialogue Partner may be an important step in changing this.  Iran wants to be a member super bad, so does Pakistan, Mongolia and India are a little wary, with the proof being that while Iran’s President Ahmadinejad attended the summit in person, representing India was their Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas.  Which brings us to the next topic.

4. Energy Club- When one looks at the SCO’s official website about the Summit and its Declaration, nary a word can be found about energy supplies.  An odd thing, being that all these nations deal greatly in this area and it defines a large part of their relations with each other. But also not that surprising as Russia and China have and will continue to butt heads in the region fighting for energy resources, and the CA states themselves have tried to make deals with as many partner as possible, even in the west, in order to diversify their portfolio.  However, I was able to find an interesting statement by Kazak President Nazarbayev about what he hopes to the SCO can accomplish in the energy cooperation realm:

‘Projects to set up a single energy market and a common transport corridor of the SCO could be an example of the global appraoch to defining forms and mechanisms of cooperation…..links Russia, China, and the Central Asian countries is already a serioius basis for setting upa single energy space of the SCO.  It is absolutely necessary to draw upa common energy strategy as soon as possible.  There are all components for setting up an energy community in the SCO, within whose framework the interests of producers, shippers, and consumers of energy resources can be harmonized.’

So Nazarbayev is clearly for an SCO energy club, but what about the rest?  I’ll get back to this another time.

5. Afghanistan Contact Group - The group appeared to give much attention to the narcotics trafficking problem in the region, and made steps to increasing cooperation with Afghanistan in this regard.  According to the declaration the SCO leaders decided to ‘intensify the work of the SCO-Afghanistan contact group and launch preparations on the ground for holding a conference on Afghanistan under the aegis of the SCO to discuss joint action against terrorism, illegal drug trafficking and organized crime.’  This is an area where the US/NATO could use some support as the opium situation in Afghanistan is growing out of control and the Taliban are receiving more and more recruits from the CA nations.

6. Georgia Conflict - I have already discussed here how the weak statement put out regarding the Georgia-Russian conflict by the SCO undermined Russia’s stance on this issue even more and caused it to be even more isolated, but here is a Russian source who strongly disagrees.  In the same Dushanbe Declaration he takes a different meaning and claims that behind closed doors Moscow received full backing in its efforts in the conflict.  It seems to me that Russia did not get exactly what it wanted, but it is also true that they were more than welcomed into the bosom that is the SCO.