Drawing a Line: The West’s Difficult Choice in Georgia
On this page, we have constantly debated between realist and idealist foreign policies regarding the West and Central Asia. The West’s liberal/democratic rhetoric and policy of democracy promotion comes in stark contrast to Russia and China’s movements throughout the world, and this is easily seen in Central Asia. In this same regard, we have discussed the rise of the authoritarian model as a challenge to the West’s democratic/liberal world order. Russia’s incursion into Georgia is the latest incident in the battle between Authoritarian and Democratic/Liberal leadership and exemplifies the difficult choices of the US/EU in creating a policy that both protects their strategic interests yet also defends democracy in the world.
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has come out and bluntly stated that Russia’s war was the West’s challenge. He’s obviously a biased participant in the conflict, but let’s face it, he is a democratically-elected leader forming a state based on the rule of law and a market economy deep in a region beset by authoritarian states dominated by Russia. Saakashvili states, “If the international community allows Russia to crush our democratic, independent state, it will be giving carte blanche to authoritarian governments everywhere. Russia intends to destroy not just a country but an idea.” Saakashvili does not mince words, as he argues that if the West turns its back on his country, they are turning their back on democracy everywhere. Daniel Henniger of the WSJ joins this challenging call to the US/West, arguing against realpolitik. He states “Some argue that Georgia is not a primary American interest. They see Georgia as ultimately a place that transits oil and gas through pipelines from somewhere else to Turkey or onto Europe. Georgia is unlucky geography. This is false. When this crisis ends, Georgia will be either a model for a world that works or a world whose members do business with knives.” Presidential candidate John McCain agrees with this premise for action, though in a more measured way (i.e. he’s a politician) asserting, “This small democracy, far away from our shores, is an inspiration to all those who cherish our deepest ideals. As I told President Saakashvili on the day the cease-fire was declared, today we are all Georgians. We mustn’t forget it.”
The great fear is that Russia is emboldened by its uninterrupted assault on Georgian sovereignty and therefore could more critically and concretely threaten other former Soviet states who get to close to the West. The Eastern European Baltic States, Ukraine and Belarus have the most to fear, but the Central Asian states may also have to measure their encroachments with the West as well to make sure not to anger the Russian Bear who is now wide awake. So yes, this is a test for the West, and just like in the rough old days of 19th and early 20th century world politics there will be winners and losers. The US/West must make sure they are presenting to all former Soviet states, especially those making moves toward democracy and free markets, that they have a strong supporter who will defend their national sovereignty and ability to interact with all international actors.
There is a second aspect to the Russian-Georgia conflict that unequivocally enters into the world of realpolitik and that is the oil and gas pipelines that use Georgian and Azerbaijan territory to circumvent Russia and send those goods to the West. One could argue that the West should get involved in this incident and stop Russia based strictly on this issue. The invasion puts in doubt the secure transit of gas through the BTC pipeline and all future lines, such as the Nabucco, that would transverse Georgian territory. This corridor is the by far the best option for European states to avoid the Russian chokehold on CA gas and Moscow’s venture into Georgia may have severely affected its future prosperity. In other words, a successful Russian domination or Finlandization of Georgia would not only force CA states to back away from the West out of fear of Russian retaliation, but also may close one of their best options to diversify their gas and oil deliveries, putting them even deeper into Gazprom’s strong hands. Melik Kaylan describes the implications of this rather well.
So the US/EU/West has many reasons to confront (I’m not talking militarily) Russia in Georgia, with strong grounds in strategic interests and in promoting a secure world for democratic and liberal states in the world. I’ll leave with a few more words and a direct challenge from the Georgian President; “I have staked my country’s fate on the West’s rhetoric about democracy and liberty. As Georgians come under attack, we must ask: If the West is not with us, who is it with? If the line is not drawn now, when will it be drawn?” (Latest actions by the US/EU)
August 15th, 2008 at 5:03 pm
I applaud the author for recognizing the convergence of Western realist and idealist concerns for Georgia (namely the symbolic nature of the Georgian democracy and the necessity of finding an energy route that bypasses the Russian Federation). However the author is wrong on several counts. First and foremost I have trouble believing that Georgia is the true model of Western democracy that we want exported around the world. Yes, the Georgians have elections, but Saakaskvili did not hesitate to unleash riot police on relatively peaceful protesters this winter. This combined with the State of Emergency declared last winter brings the notion of an absolute liberal democracy in Georgia into doubt. However, I’m sure that the author of this article would agree with me in saying that this can be overlooked when compared with the alternative of a Russian dominated autocracy. My issue with this article is that the author seems to believe that the Russian Federation has gained influence in the region through the threat of the force it showed itself capable of displaying in Georgia. I could not disagree more. The aggressive Russian action in Georgia and it’s breakaway provinces will do more harm than good to the Russian state in the long run. First and foremost, it forced the West to acknowledge that Russia is no longer the weak ally of the nineties. Before the Georgian incident, Russia could get away with missile sales to the Iranians and related issues with a higher level of impunity than they will in the future. The second and related result of this conflict is that Europe recognizes the need to find energy sources independent of Russia. If Georgia emerges out of this conflict unscathed then perhaps European investment will pour forth to develop more energy routes, destroying Russia’s quasi-monopoly. The last and most important result of this conflict is that it in fact forces many of the former Soviet states to reconsider their relationship with Russia. The states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and the Ukraine all will move closer to NATO as a result of this conflict (Belarus was omitted because it created a “union” with Russia in the nineties and the two states have been moving closer together ever since). Let’s examine why. Azerbaijan is already on the road to NATO membership and possesses a formidable military. More importantly, they are already bitter for Russian support of Armenia in their recent conflict. Armenia will not move either way, they do have a Russian military base within their borders but will not move any closer without incurring Turkish wrath, which they do not under any conditions want to provoke. As for Ukraine, as long as a Pro-Western government remains in power it will stay in the Western sphere of influence for good. This is because Ukraine has a large army capable of cutting the teeth of the Russian army. Modavia will not shift to the Russian camp either as it is also on the road to NATO membership. I believe the long term results of this conflict can be summed up by the fact that Poland, rather than being deterred by Russian violence, sought American protection and allowed the missile defense system to be installed. This will be the long term trend as nations flock to the West for protection. Russia overplayed it’s hand
August 16th, 2008 at 10:46 am
This analysis makes reference to the 19th century’s Great Game geo-political struggle between Imperial Britian and Imperial Russia noting that there will be “winners and losers”. Seems to me we are two moves behind in Central Asia with little hope of countering the Shanghai Co-operative without addressing the failure of the unilateral actions of the US in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to bring stability to CA. Russia’s move into Georgia being simply a logical pattern of consolidation following our abandonment of the region in an ill-concieved, abortive effort to checkmate OPEC in Iraq.
Anyone familiar with the history of CA could have predicted the results without too much imagination. I must admit that reading much of the tone of this article reminds one of any series of articles in the mid 19th century London Times. The allusion to the “West” as if it were an effective consortium with choices here, seems weak given international considerations outside the region that include Russia as a partner. Further, given the active foreign policy of the current administration one might argue the definition of “autocratic” also.
As so often happens in the Great Game, Georgia was obviously making assumptions that backing would appear for its move and none is forthcoming, other than the bluster that is also historically part and parcel to these events. As for realpolitik, one could only welcome such a move whose first step might be restoration of the the US diplomatic corps after almost two decades of neglect.
August 29th, 2008 at 7:52 am
[…] So this morning, I expected to see Western editorials discussing Russia’s growing isolation in this conflict, but instead I found, once again, numerous pieces about a New World Order and the Return of the Cold War. But with the US remaining diplomatically strong, if in no other area, and the EU discussing sanctions, and the fact that only rogue regimes have voiced true support for Russian actions, one has to call into question the success of Georgian-Russia conflict for Moscow. I’m not trying to say that the move was not a strategic success in many fronts, it was and I have discussed this, but its long term effects and gains appear to be in question. […]