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	<title>Comments on: Drawing a Line: The West&#8217;s Difficult Choice in Georgia</title>
	<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/</link>
	<description>American Foreign Policy Analysis in Central Asia</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 08:43:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>by: Central Asia &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Russia Isolated in a 21st Century World?</title>
		<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/#comment-3805</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 29 Aug 2008 12:52:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/#comment-3805</guid>
					<description>[...] So this morning, I expected to see Western editorials discussing Russia&#8217;s growing isolation in this conflict, but instead I found, once again, numerous pieces about a New World Order and the Return of the Cold War.  But with the US remaining diplomatically strong, if in no other area, and the EU discussing sanctions, and the fact that only rogue regimes have voiced true support for Russian actions, one has to call into question the success of Georgian-Russia conflict for Moscow.  I&#8217;m not trying to say that the move was not a strategic success in many fronts, it was and I have discussed this, but its long term effects and gains appear to be in question. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] So this morning, I expected to see Western editorials discussing Russia&#8217;s growing isolation in this conflict, but instead I found, once again, numerous pieces about a New World Order and the Return of the Cold War.  But with the US remaining diplomatically strong, if in no other area, and the EU discussing sanctions, and the fact that only rogue regimes have voiced true support for Russian actions, one has to call into question the success of Georgian-Russia conflict for Moscow.  I&#8217;m not trying to say that the move was not a strategic success in many fronts, it was and I have discussed this, but its long term effects and gains appear to be in question. [&#8230;]
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		<title>by: Chester Morrison</title>
		<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/#comment-3607</link>
		<pubDate>Sat, 16 Aug 2008 15:46:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/#comment-3607</guid>
					<description>This analysis makes reference to the 19th century's Great Game geo-political struggle between Imperial Britian and Imperial Russia noting that there will be "winners and losers". Seems to me we are two moves behind in Central Asia with little hope of countering the Shanghai Co-operative without addressing the failure of the unilateral actions of the US in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to bring stability to CA. Russia's move into Georgia being simply a logical pattern of consolidation following our abandonment of the region in an ill-concieved, abortive effort to checkmate OPEC in Iraq. 

Anyone familiar with the history of CA could have predicted the results without too much imagination. I must admit that reading much of the tone of this article reminds one of any series of articles in the mid 19th century London Times.  The allusion to the "West" as if it were an effective consortium with choices here, seems weak given international considerations outside the region that include Russia as a partner. Further, given the active foreign policy of the current administration one might argue the definition of "autocratic" also.

As so often happens in the Great Game, Georgia was obviously making assumptions that backing would appear for its move and none is forthcoming, other than the bluster that is also historically part and parcel to these events. As for realpolitik, one could only welcome such a move whose first step might be restoration of the the US diplomatic corps after almost two decades of neglect.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This analysis makes reference to the 19th century&#8217;s Great Game geo-political struggle between Imperial Britian and Imperial Russia noting that there will be &#8220;winners and losers&#8221;. Seems to me we are two moves behind in Central Asia with little hope of countering the Shanghai Co-operative without addressing the failure of the unilateral actions of the US in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan to bring stability to CA. Russia&#8217;s move into Georgia being simply a logical pattern of consolidation following our abandonment of the region in an ill-concieved, abortive effort to checkmate OPEC in Iraq. </p>
<p>Anyone familiar with the history of CA could have predicted the results without too much imagination. I must admit that reading much of the tone of this article reminds one of any series of articles in the mid 19th century London Times.  The allusion to the &#8220;West&#8221; as if it were an effective consortium with choices here, seems weak given international considerations outside the region that include Russia as a partner. Further, given the active foreign policy of the current administration one might argue the definition of &#8220;autocratic&#8221; also.</p>
<p>As so often happens in the Great Game, Georgia was obviously making assumptions that backing would appear for its move and none is forthcoming, other than the bluster that is also historically part and parcel to these events. As for realpolitik, one could only welcome such a move whose first step might be restoration of the the US diplomatic corps after almost two decades of neglect.
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		<title>by: Grant Gibson</title>
		<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/#comment-3598</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 15 Aug 2008 22:03:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2008/08/15/drawing-a-line-the-wests-difficult-choice-in-georgia/#comment-3598</guid>
					<description>I applaud the author for recognizing the convergence of Western realist and idealist concerns for Georgia (namely the symbolic nature of the Georgian democracy and the necessity of finding an energy route that bypasses the Russian Federation). However the author is wrong on several counts. First and foremost I have trouble believing that Georgia is the true model of Western democracy that we want exported around the world. Yes, the Georgians have elections, but Saakaskvili did not hesitate to unleash riot police on relatively peaceful protesters this winter. This combined with the State of Emergency declared last winter brings the notion of an absolute liberal democracy in Georgia into doubt. However, I'm sure that the author of this article would agree with me in saying that this can be overlooked when compared with the alternative of a Russian dominated autocracy. My issue with this article is that the author seems to believe that the Russian Federation has gained influence in the region through the threat of the force it showed itself capable of displaying in Georgia. I could not disagree more. The aggressive Russian action in Georgia and it's breakaway provinces will do more harm than good to the Russian state in the long run. First and foremost, it forced the West to acknowledge that Russia is no longer the weak ally of the nineties. Before the Georgian incident, Russia could get away with missile sales to the Iranians and related issues with a higher level of impunity than they will in the future. The second and related result of this conflict is that Europe recognizes the need to find energy sources independent of Russia. If Georgia emerges out of this conflict unscathed then perhaps European investment will pour forth to develop more energy routes, destroying Russia's quasi-monopoly. The last and most important result of this conflict is that it in fact forces many of the former Soviet states to reconsider their relationship with Russia. The states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and the Ukraine all will move closer to NATO as a result of this conflict (Belarus was omitted because it created a "union" with Russia in the nineties and the two states have been moving closer together ever since). Let's examine why. Azerbaijan is already on the road to NATO membership and possesses a formidable military. More importantly, they are already bitter for Russian support of Armenia in their recent conflict. Armenia will not move either way, they do have a Russian military base within their borders but will not move any closer without incurring Turkish wrath, which they do not under any conditions want to provoke. As for Ukraine, as long as a Pro-Western government remains in power it will stay in the Western sphere of influence for good. This is because Ukraine has a large army capable of cutting the teeth of the Russian army. Modavia will not shift to the Russian camp either as it is also on the road to NATO membership. I believe the long term results of this conflict can be summed up by the fact that Poland, rather than being deterred by Russian violence, sought American protection and allowed the missile defense system to be installed. This will be the long term trend as nations flock to the West for protection. Russia overplayed it's hand</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I applaud the author for recognizing the convergence of Western realist and idealist concerns for Georgia (namely the symbolic nature of the Georgian democracy and the necessity of finding an energy route that bypasses the Russian Federation). However the author is wrong on several counts. First and foremost I have trouble believing that Georgia is the true model of Western democracy that we want exported around the world. Yes, the Georgians have elections, but Saakaskvili did not hesitate to unleash riot police on relatively peaceful protesters this winter. This combined with the State of Emergency declared last winter brings the notion of an absolute liberal democracy in Georgia into doubt. However, I&#8217;m sure that the author of this article would agree with me in saying that this can be overlooked when compared with the alternative of a Russian dominated autocracy. My issue with this article is that the author seems to believe that the Russian Federation has gained influence in the region through the threat of the force it showed itself capable of displaying in Georgia. I could not disagree more. The aggressive Russian action in Georgia and it&#8217;s breakaway provinces will do more harm than good to the Russian state in the long run. First and foremost, it forced the West to acknowledge that Russia is no longer the weak ally of the nineties. Before the Georgian incident, Russia could get away with missile sales to the Iranians and related issues with a higher level of impunity than they will in the future. The second and related result of this conflict is that Europe recognizes the need to find energy sources independent of Russia. If Georgia emerges out of this conflict unscathed then perhaps European investment will pour forth to develop more energy routes, destroying Russia&#8217;s quasi-monopoly. The last and most important result of this conflict is that it in fact forces many of the former Soviet states to reconsider their relationship with Russia. The states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldavia, and the Ukraine all will move closer to NATO as a result of this conflict (Belarus was omitted because it created a &#8220;union&#8221; with Russia in the nineties and the two states have been moving closer together ever since). Let&#8217;s examine why. Azerbaijan is already on the road to NATO membership and possesses a formidable military. More importantly, they are already bitter for Russian support of Armenia in their recent conflict. Armenia will not move either way, they do have a Russian military base within their borders but will not move any closer without incurring Turkish wrath, which they do not under any conditions want to provoke. As for Ukraine, as long as a Pro-Western government remains in power it will stay in the Western sphere of influence for good. This is because Ukraine has a large army capable of cutting the teeth of the Russian army. Modavia will not shift to the Russian camp either as it is also on the road to NATO membership. I believe the long term results of this conflict can be summed up by the fact that Poland, rather than being deterred by Russian violence, sought American protection and allowed the missile defense system to be installed. This will be the long term trend as nations flock to the West for protection. Russia overplayed it&#8217;s hand
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