Afghanistan: Obama, troops, and poppies
I’m a couple days late, actually with the saturated media coverage it seems much longer, but Presidential candidate Barack Obama visited Afghanistan, meeting with US troops and the Afghan leadership. Reports stated that he made the trip to highlight the nation as the main front as the war on terror, more so than Iraq. I was pleased to hear that Obama visited, or at least flew over, the Pakistan-Afghan border where the insurgency is the strongest and where most NATO/US soldiers are dying. As I wrote last week this strategic area is of vital importance to US, regional, and international security and has been widely misunderstood by US officials and the media at large, so hopefully Obama was able to provide himself a clearer picture of the conflict by his visit (which I must say is about time, why did it take him this long to checkout the war-torn/vital nation? Well I’m at in this parantheses opinion piece, I have been also less than thrilled with Presidential candidate John McCain’s emphasis on Afghanistan, the public needs to know what the US/NATO/Afghan government is up against.) In positive news, Obama is reportedly going to ask Europe to ’shoulder more of the burden to help deal with global security threats’ in his upcoming Berlin speech. The global security threats definitely include Afghanistan and hopefully a fresh dialogue of NATO’s role can be opened.
In a reversal from the past few years, Afghanistan has taken over Iraq as the top international news story in the US. We can only hope this leads to more educated and effective policy prescriptions by politicians, backed by a knowledgeable populace. Here are a few worthwhile stories about the Afghan situation. I will not call this a link dump, there is just too much to cover for me to comment on them all, so let’s call it a ‘link gentle lay down’ instead.
Iraqi Ambassador Samir Sumaida’ie asserted that Al Qaeda was for the most part leaving Iraq and that many of its members were heading to Afghanistan. The Ambassador stated, ‘’We have heard reports recently that many of the foreign fighters that were in Iraq have left, either back to their homeland or going to fight in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is now seeming to be more suitable for al-Qaida fighters.'’ Good news for Iraq, bad news for Afghanistan. That seems to be the trend lately.
Top Pentagon officials have recommended hundreds of more troops for the Afghan effort, but the official recommendation hasn’t been approved by Joint Chief of Staff Adm. Mullen or Defense Secretary Gates. Obama, McCain, and top commanders in Afghanistan have recommended about 10,000 more troops for the war.
Nancy Hatch Dupree, director of the Afghanistan Center at Kabul University, advocates greater support for education and literacy development in Afghanistan in her New York Times Op-Ed ‘Rebuilding Afghanistan, One Book at a Time‘. The Taliban have made schools, specifically ones that teach girls, a central target in their insurgency against the Afghan government.
Lastly, the New York Times Magazine has a major article about Afghanistan’s drug trade, titled ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?’ I have not had a chance to read the whole article, but here is a shorter preview about a former US official who apparently was the main source for the article. I will try to summarize and analyze the article at a later date.
(Photo Source: New York Times)
July 24th, 2008 at 1:42 pm
Senator Obama is turning out to be a real disappointment and a very dangerous man. Moving the war on terror to Pakistan could have disastrous consequences on both the political stability in the region, and in the broader balance of power. Scholars such as Richard Betts accurately point out that beyond Iran or North Korea, “Pakistan may harbor the greatest potential danger of all.” With the current instability in Pakistan, Betts points to the danger that a pro-Taliban government would pose in a nuclear Pakistan. This is no minor point to be made. While the Shi’a in Iran are highly unlikely to proliferate WMD to their Sunni enemies, the Pakistanis harbor no such enmity toward Sunni terrorist organizations. Should a pro-Taliban or other similar type of government come to power in Pakistan, Al-Qaeda’s chances of gaining access to nuclear weapons would dramatically increase overnight.
There are, of course, two sides to every argument; and this argument is no exception. On the one hand, some insist that American forces are needed in order to maintain political stability and to prevent such a government from rising to power. On the other hand, there are those who believe that a deliberate attack against Pakistan’s state sovereignty will only further enrage its radical population, and serve to radicalize its moderates. I offer the following in support of this latter argument:
Pakistan has approximately 160 million people; better than half of the population of the entire Arab world. Pakistan also has some of the deepest underlying ethnic fissures in the region, which could lead to long-term disintegration of the state if exacerbated. Even with an impressive growth in GDP (second only to China in all of Asia), it could be decades before wide-spread poverty is alleviated and a stable middle class is established in Pakistan.
Furthermore, the absence of a deeply embedded democratic system in Pakistan presents perhaps the greatest danger to stability. In this country, upon which the facade of democracy has been thrust by outside forces and the current regime came to power by coup, the army fulfills the role of “referee within the political boxing ring.” However, this referee demonstrates a “strong personal interest in the outcome of many of the fights and a strong tendency to make up the rules as he goes along.” The Pakistani army “also has a long record of either joining in the fight on one side or the other, or clubbing both boxers to the ground and taking the prize himself” (Lieven, 2006:43).
Pakistan’s army is also unusually large. Thathiah Ravi (2006:119, 121) observes that the army has “outgrown its watchdog role to become the master of this nation state.” Ravi attributes America’s less than dependable alliance with Pakistan to the nature of its army. “Occasionally, it perceives the Pakistan Army as an inescapable ally and at other times as a threat to regional peace and [a] non-proliferation regime.” According to Ravi, India and Afghanistan blame the conflict in Kashmir and the Durand line on the Pakistan Army, accusing it of “inciting, abetting and encouraging terrorism from its soil.” Ravi also blames the “flagrant violations in nuclear proliferation by Pakistan, both as an originator and as a conduit for China and North Korea” on the Pakistan Army, because of its support for terrorists.
The point to be made is that the stability of Pakistan depends upon maintaining the delicate balance of power both within the state of Pakistan, and in the broader region. Pakistan is not an island, it has alliances and enemies. Moving American troops into Pakistan will no doubt not only serve to radicalize its population and fuel the popular call for Jihad, it could also spark a proxy war with China that could have long-lasting economic repercussions. Focusing on the more immediate impact American troops would have on the Pakistani population; let’s consider a few past encounters:
On January 13, 2006, the United States launched a missile strike on the village of Damadola, Pakistan. Rather than kill the targeted Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, the strike instead slaughtered 17 locals. This only served to further weaken the Musharraf government and further destabilize the entire area. In a nuclear state like Pakistan, this was not only unfortunate, it was outright stupid.
On October 30, 2006, the Pakistani military, under pressure from the US, attacked a madrassah in the Northwest Frontier province in Pakistan. Immediately following the attack, local residents, convinced that the US military was behind the attack, burned American flags and effigies of President Bush, and shouted “Death to America!” Outraged over an attack on school children, the local residents viewed the attack as an assault against Islam.
On November 7, 2006, a suicide bomber retaliated. Further outrage ensued when President Bush extended his condolences to the families of the victims of the suicide attack, and President Musharraf did the same, adding that terrorism will be eliminated “with an iron hand.” The point to be driven home is that the attack on the madrassah was kept as quiet as possible, while the suicide bombing was publicized as a tragedy, and one more reason to maintain the war on terror.
Last year trouble escalated when the Pakistani government laid siege to the Red Mosque and more than 100 people were killed. “Even before his soldiers had overrun the Lal Masjid … the retaliations began.” Suicide attacks originating from both Afghan Taliban and Pakistani tribal militants targeted military convoys and a police recruiting center. Guerrilla attacks that demonstrated a shocking degree of organization and speed-not to mention strategic cunning revealed that they were orchestrated by none other than al-Qaeda’s number two man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri; a fact confirmed by Pakistani and Taliban officials. One such attack occurred on July 15, 2007, when a suicide bomber killed 24 Pakistani troops and injured some 30 others in the village of Daznaray (20 miles to the north of Miran Shah, in North Waziristan). Musharraf ordered thousands of troops into the region to attempt to restore order. But radical groups swore to retaliate against the government for its siege of the mosque and its cooperation with the United States.
A July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concludes that “al Qaeda is resurgent in Pakistan- and more centrally organized than it has been at any time since 9/11.” The NIE reports that al-Qaeda now enjoys sanctuary in Bajaur and North Waziristan, from which they operate “a complex command, control, training and recruitment base” with an “intact hierarchy of top leadership and operational lieutenants.”
In September 2006 Musharraf signed a peace deal with Pashtun tribal elders in North Waziristan. The deal gave pro-Taliban militants full control of security in the area. Al Qaeda provides funding, training and ideological inspiration, while Afghan Taliban and Pakistani Tribal leaders supply the manpower. These forces are so strong that last year Musharraf sent well over 100,000 trained Pakistani soldiers against them, but they were not able to prevail against them.
The question remains, what does America do when Pakistan no longer has a Musharraf to bridge the gap? While Musharraf claims that President Bush has assured him of Pakistan’s sovereignty, Senator Obama obviously has no intention of honoring such an assurance. As it is, the Pakistanis do just enough to avoid jeopardizing U.S. support. Musharraf, who is caught between Pakistan’s dependence on American aid and loyalty to the Pakistani people, denies being George Bush’s hand-puppet. Musharraf insists that he is “200 percent certain” that the United States will not unilaterally decide to attack terrorists on Pakistani soil. What happens when we begin to do just that?
August 5th, 2008 at 8:29 am
[…] With the Taliban showcasing great ‘tenacity‘ and ability to recruit new members from around the region to replace those lost, one must conclude that the Afghan government and its International supporters are in a fight for their lives. Hard decisions will have to made for them to win, including the eradication of the nation’s poppy crops and growers. Last week, I quickly mentioned this article, ‘Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?,’ by Thomas Schweich, a top US drug official in Afghanistan for several years. […]
December 9th, 2008 at 9:19 pm
[…] Back to Afghanistan, the conflict has grown since the year began, and is widely now seen in a more regional light, especially in regards to Pakistan, where most of the insurgents find safety. A disturbing trend in the conflict involves the increasing deluge of militants from other CA states, providing evermore recruits for the Taliban’s cause. President Karzai has been under increasing pressure to bring progress to the country and is keeping one, two, probably three eyes on the upcoming presidential election early next year. Though the Afghan situation has had its brighter moments, it starting to be seen as possibly a task too large for the US and NATO, but this has not stopped American commitment as both this years presidential advocates advocated bringing in more troops to the conflict, not bringing them home. Though, I found the presidential debates mostly devoid of a serious discussion of the war’s problems and whether or not more troops was a ‘good idea’ or not, President-elect Barack Obama did seem to have a worthwhile diplomatic visit to the troubled country, meeting with Karzai and US military leaders. […]