Afghanistan and Central Asia

On May 2-4, Moscow will host a major International AIDS conference that will focus on the virus’s growth in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.  In an interview, Peter Piot, Executive Director of UNAIDS, stated that ‘HIV is increasing more rapidly in Central Asia than in any other part of the world.’  Piot blames widespread injecting-drug use and prostitution for the virus’s growing strength in the region.  The Moscow Conference will be attended by representatives from all the CA countries, and the issue HIV prevention, particularly regarding drug-use, will be ‘very high’ on the agenda.

Matthew Bryza, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, spoke out in support of Gazprom’s price hike for buying Central Asian gas and voiced his opposition to the creation of a Gas OPEC at a conference at Georgetown University.  Bryza stressed the importance of market forces in the supply of gas to Europe and argued that the extensive profits that Gazprom receives, has gone to ‘nefarious uses,’ such as organized crime and providing a ‘disincentive for reform, be it of the countries along the supply chain, or Gazprom itself.’  This last remark was a clear accusation that Russia’s control of the gas supply system has kept Central Asian states’ authoritarian and corrupt leaders in place and protected.  These are some of the first comments by a US government official I have seen concerning Russia’s recent increase in payments to CA gas producing states.

In connection to Monday’s discussion of the power dynamics between Russia’s Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and newly-elected President, Dmitry Medvedev, I want to now examine Medvedev’s liberal credentials. This of course will be discussed in the context that as President, Medvedev will most likely be playing a deferential role to Putin’s Prime Minister Office, but nonetheless he will have and most likely obtain greater power as his term proceeds. Medvedev’s views of governance, civil society, foreign policy, and Russia’s place in Europe, Eurasia, and in world politics, should shine a light on his future policies toward Central Asia. Future posts will go into specifics on Medvedev, Putin, and Russia’s policy toward the CA region under this new political alignment.

Though many scholars and journalist see a novel, and in some ways liberal, background in Dmitry Medvedev, most still predict that he will largely be just another Russian autocrat and/or Putin’s lapdog. The fact that Medvedev was never a Communist Party or KGB member, does not dissuade them from their beliefs. Nor the fact that in his time as Deputy Prime Minister, his initiatives included: an independent judiciary, an independent public television, and parliamentary oversight of the executive branch. It is widely viewed that Medvedev will continue Putin’s authoritative domestic path and aggressive foreign policy towards the West.

Journalist Pavel Felgenhauer argues that there will be little if any ‘liberalization’ or ‘thaw’ in Russian foreign or domestic policy during Medvedev’s new reign, as he believes Putin will amass all the nation’s power and money in his Prime Minister’s White House. Putin sent this message to the Russian and world public when he stated at a press conference with German Chancellor Merkel on March 8; “Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev is freed from the task of having to prove his liberal views, but I can tell you that he is just as much a Russian nationalist in the good sense as I am. I don’t think our partners will find him any easier to deal with.” Analyst Victor Yasmann, from Radio Free Europe, asserts that Medvedev will deceptively put on an exterior ‘face’ of liberalism to appease European and Western diplomats and businesses in order to promote Russian economic and political interests abroad. Both of these observers largely dismiss elements, his earlier mentioned initiatives and lack of security and Communist credentials, suggesting a more liberal, moderate Medvedev, and instead focus on his chairmanship of Gazprom over the last four years and his closeness to Putin.

Not all view Medvedev as a puppet of Putin or as the newest member in a long line of iron-fisted Russian leaders. Former US State Department special assistant for policy on the Soviet Union, Nicolai N. Petro, sees Medvedev as a ‘young, dynamic, liberal and patriotic leader’ who offers a ‘singular opportunity to re-engage with Russia.’ Petro catalogs Medvedev’s liberal policies; his work in judicial and legal reform, promotion of financially liberal policies, emphasis on a pragmatic foreign policy, and the importance he places in civil society and in NGOs ability to foster them. Petro, and he argues that Medvedev sees the situation similarly, sees the Yeltsin and Putin eras as a necessary period of consolidation, where the Russian government needed to re-establish central authority, shore up the domestic economy, and liberate politics and the media from the control of oligarchs who had been in place for decades during the Soviet reign. He argues that now that the situation has stabilized, Medvedev can ‘shift the focus’ from ‘consolidation to liberalization.’

Unfortunately, Yasmann and Felgenhauer’s analysis of the current and future state of Medvedev/Putin’s administration is the most likely scenario. History is hard to ignore when analyzing Russia’s present and in predicting its future, and liberalization does not appear strong in either. If one follows this belief, that Russia will continue to be more autocratic than a liberal society and government, its policies toward the Central Asian states should not change much in the near future. After all, Medvedev, as Chairman of Gazprom for the last four years, played an integral part in Russia’s energy, economic, and energy dealings in Eurasia and no one should predict any significant change in Russia’s policy. The authoritative leaders in Central Asia, specifically Karimov in Uzbekistan, Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan’s Berdymukhamedov, should expect a supportive and protective Russian government that will care more about stability in the region than in any type of political ‘openings.’

Is this assessment of Medvedev accurate? Or is he more liberal than most scholars and journalist give him credit for? If Medvedev is in fact more liberal, will he have the power to change Russian domestic and foreign policy? For that matter, what would a more liberal Russian stance toward Central Asia or the world look like?

Correction: It was brought to my attention that I misrepresented Freedom House Rankings on several earlier posts regarding each Central Asian nation. I mistakenly listed each nation’s score: Political Rights out of 10 and Civil Liberties out of 15. This was inaccurate, for each nation is given a score from 1-7, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least. The corrections have been made below and I apologize for any confusion.

For the first time in seven years, Ankara will host a Turkmen head of state, as President Berdymukhamedov visits the nation this March 24, 25. This diplomatic meeting quickly follows Turkey’s President Gul’s own visit to Ashgabat last December, as Turkey seems to be making an assertive effort to improve its relations with many Central Asian states, many of which hold populations with large Turk minorities. Turkmenistan’s Berdymukhamedov-led government is also showing a greater diplomatic effort to spread its interests beyond Russia, as Turkey opens the door to greater relations with the US and EU.

Economic and energy issues are expected to be the two main areas discussed at this conference. During Gul’s December visit, the two nations’ agreed to establish a joint economic cooperation council and last July Turkey signed a preliminary deal with Iran to carry natural gas from Iran and Turkmenistan to Europe. The Nabucco 3,300-kilometer gas pipeline which would send Turkmen, Middle Eastern, and Central Asian gas to the EU via Turkey, was also said be on the agenda. The US and EU strongly desire such a pipeline as it avoids Russia’s Gazprom’s reach, but Russia’s latest deal with Turkmenistan, which greatly raised Russia’s purchasing price for Central Asian gas, puts Nabucco in jeopardy. Whatever precise details or deals come from this meeting, it can be assumed that Turkey and Turkmenistan have created a closer relationship, which may yet bear fruit.

In a new article discussing Uzbekistan’s growing ‘thaw’ with the US and EU, Joana Lillis reports that Uzbek authorities have made a showing of promoting greater human rights in their state to try to relieve some of the sanctions and isolation brought to the state since the 2005 Andijan incident. The Uzbek government announced on March 13 that the International Committee of the Red Cross, which had been banned from performing its mission in the country for the past three years, would be allowed to investigate the nation’s prison/detainee system, which the US State Department just called ‘deplorable.’ Lillis warns that this and other recent Uzbek human rights promotion efforts may just be cosmetic and that sanctions brought against the country should not be taken away lightly.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, at a recent European Commission summit, warned that ‘the severe impact of climate change in Central Asia is causing water and food shortages that could lead to regional conflicts’ in the near future.

On a , here is a fascinating journal of an American who traveled to Beijing to watch the first MLB spring training game in China, the Dodgers vs. the Padres.

On March 2, 2008 Dmitry Medvedev won Russia’s presidential election with just over 70% of the vote. He is scheduled to take over the Presidency on May 7, with Russia’s current President, Vladimir Putin, taking over as Prime Minister. This new alignment for Russia’s government raises many important questions for Central Asia and for the world at large:

How powerful will Mr. Medvedev really be? How powerful will Mr. Putin remain? Will they each garner influence in different spheres, with Medvedev being in charge of domestic issues and Putin maintaining his hold in foreign policy and grand strategy? Will the new administration have a new outlook toward the world and its neighbors, or will it be just ‘more of the same?” Will this new administration’s policies toward Central Asia change/evolve? Will Central Asian states’ policies change toward Russia?

These are just some of the relevant questions that will be examined on this page. As of right now, I would just like to make a curt, overall assessment of Medvedev’s rise, Putin’s switch, and Russia’s current and future policy toward Central Asia and beyond.

It can safely be assumed that Putin will retain a great amount of power in Medvedev’s new government and it is important to note that Putin can regain the Presidency in 2012. Putin already plans to represent Russia at next month’s NATO summit in Romania and has laid out an ambitious economic and political program for the country for the next twelve years. Medvedev has even already stated that he hoped to work in an ‘effective tandem’ with Mr. Putin. However, BBC reporter Bridget Kendall correctly argues that Russia has never comfortably had two ‘tsars’ in charge at one time. Kendall also notes that during Putin’s first year in office he appeared rather modest and awkward, much like Medvedev seems presently, but quickly turned into the strong-willed and powerful leader we see today. It is extremely difficult to predict how the power will swing in the Kremlin under this new political alignment.

An analysis of Russia’s policies toward Central Asia by upcoming President Medvedev will be postponed for a couple days. Instead, I would like to discuss two interrelated stories occurring in China, but having ramifications in Central Asia and beyond:
1. China’s Xinjiang terrorist threat, specifically the March 7 plane incident
2. Chinese government suppression of Tibetan protesters and its affect on Central Asian stability issues.

Reporters Chris Buckley and Benjamin Kang Lim claim to have a source on the inside of the investigation into the March 7 plane incident who believes that the perpetrators may have come from Pakistan, not solely from China’s Uighur majority Xinjiang province. The two suspects, a man and a woman who made it on the plane, in custody were holding Pakistani passports. Another source stated that the female was in fact a Xinjiang-born Uighur, but had spent time recently in Pakistan being trained by a Pakistan-based militant group. There was also a still-at-large third suspect in this incident, a Pakistani, who is believed to be its mastermind.

When the incident first occurred, Xinjiang Province’s Communist Party chief, Wang Lequan, was quick to blame Uighur separatists. He stated at the time; “An investigation found that the attempt to cause an air disaster…was a grave act of sabotage instigated and conducted by Eastern Turkestan separatists from abroad.” So it appears that he was for the most part accurate, but this new source raises more questions about whether the Chinese government is raising the Uighur terrorist threat level, and specifically the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, in order to justify more repressive measures in the region.

Stephen Blank in Eurasianet.org, argues that China’s recent crackdown of its other main separatist group, Tibetans, can be a potentially precedent setting method for the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to handle similar secessionist attempts that may create instability in the Central Asian region. It is true that the SCO’s other members, specifically Russia, have voiced their approval of China’s policy against the Tibetan protesters and one can assume that China would share this support with Russia and its Central Asian neighbors if they came under similar separatist movements.

Blank asserts that the SCO charter includes a provision for each member to summon aid from the other member states in order to deal with a ‘security threat,’ as a separatist movement would most likely qualify. He suggests that China, but more likely Russia, would use this provision to intervene in Central Asia if an anti-government movement arose, and mentions Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan as ‘hotbeds of instability.’

There have been two major occurrences of unrest in Central Asia in the past few years that shine a light on exactly what the SCO’s two major powers, China and Russia, would do in such a situation. Uzbekistan’s Andijion incident in 2005 was a moment of unrest and anti-government protest, but Karimov was mostly able to handle the situation internally. The governments of Russia and China quickly applauded Karimov’s aggressive moves to suppress the demonstration and only a few months later, Russia and Uzbekistan agreed to a mutual protection pact and Russia opened up a new military base in the nation. Also in 2005, Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution occurred, creating great instability in the state. There was no request by the new or old Kyrgyzstan government for aid in bringing stability in the country and though China and Russia held an SCO meeting to discuss intervention, in the end they did very little.

How the Chinese government handles its separatist movements as the Beijing Olympics creep closer and closer will be intriguing and important to watch, but also as critical will be to see how Russia and their Central Asian neighbors react to their methods.

It appears that a deal is in the works between NATO and the Russian government for greater cooperation in Afghanistan. The deal would allow NATO troops the use of Russian land and airspace, the possible leasing of Russian planes and trains, and Russian training for Afghan helicopter pilots and counter-narcotics assistance at a center in Moscow. At a NATO meeting in Spain last year, then Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov asserted that the country’s stability was a ‘vital, visceral interest’ for Russia.

Discussing the potential alliance, NATO spokesman James Appathurai stated; ‘Discussions are under way. There is no deal done. We are working towards an agreement at the Bucharest Summit [April 2-4]”

The deal would also try to strengthen and solidify cooperation between the two regarding countering Afghan’s tremendous narcotics problem. NATO and Russia already work together training Afghan and Central Asian drug enforcement officials, but each side agrees that much more needs to be done.

This deal is not being made in a vacuum however, as the specter of Ukraine and Georgia’s possible ascension to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the US placement of a missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland are high on everyone’s agenda. Putin and Russia have not been shy in voicing their opposition with both of these measures (though there has been some progress concerning the missile defense system). Western diplomats have denied that Russian assistance in Afghanistan was in anyway a trade off to keep Ukraine and Georgia out of NATO, though it does not appear the two nations will be admitted to a MAP at the next NATO meeting in about a month.

Coming up: A discussion of Russia’s new President, Dmitry Medvedev, and how his new administration will affect Russia’s policy in Central Asia.

In the final segment of Freedom in the World Rankings; Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan received the highest scores (which means they are the least free) of all the Central Asian states.

Turkmenistan
Political Rights – 7/7

Civil Rights – 7/7

Status – Not Free

Freedom House’s report mainly concentrates on former President Niyazov’s ‘iron control’ over the Turkmeni people, institutions, and government, noting that ‘no substantive reforms’ have taken place under current President Berdymukhammedov (It must be remembered that much of the research for this report was done in 2006). FH paints a picture of a society ruled by an authoritarian megalomaniac who did what ever he could to stamp out any opposition to his rule. The report does not devote much time to Berdymukhammedov’s seizure of power besides acknowledging the criminal charges brought against Ovezgeldy Ataev, his main competitor for the presidency, and that he obtained the backing of the state’s Security Council, the country’s powerful security and intelligence services. The report acknowledges that Niyazov’s legacy of absolute presidential power will be difficult to overcome.

The report describes a nation lacking many political and civil rights. Freedom of speech and press were said to be ‘severely restricted,’ with dissenting political views banned from all media venues. The government is also very constraining on religious groups and NGOs, although they have recently made some superficial openings in regards to the latter. Lastly, FH spotlights the harsh treatment and the limited opportunities of the nation’s ethnic minorities, specifically its ethnic Uzbeks, who have at times been forced to relocate.

Uzbekistan
Political Rights – 7/7

Civil Rights – 7/7

Status – Not Free

Freedom House’s analysis of Uzbekistan’s political and civil rights record is barely better than neighbor to the south, Turkmenistan. Though Uzbek President Karimov has not built up quite the ‘cult of personality’ as President Niyazov, the report asserts he has continued to cement his authority in the state by imprisoning members of an already weakened political opposition, controlling the mass media, and expelling foreign-funded NGOs. FH does a fine job portraying how Karimov has used the 2005 government crackdown in Andijon to further rein in elements in the state that may challenge his rule; Islamists, journalists, opposition figures, etc.

Concerning specific political and civil rights, the report finds that religious and ethnic political parties are prohibited and that the only parties registered are pro-government. While the state’s constitution provides for guarantees of free speech, legislation has been passed that curtails political discussions about Karimov or the government. After the Andijon incident in 2005, foreign media representatives have found it very difficult to operate in the country and many of their local bureaus have been closed.

In regards to religion, the government does permit the existence of certain mainstream religions, including Islamic and Jewish communities, but there is strict control over Islamic worship as the state greatly fears Islamic radicalism. Many members of Islamic groups have been arrested and tortured for their religious views. Lastly, foreign NGOs, especially ones from the United States and Europe, have been targeted by the Uzbek government for temporary or permanent closure, including Freedom House, Eurasia Foundation, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, etc.

Gas, Gas, Gas: RadioFreeEurope reports on a new gas deal between Russia’s Gazprom and Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan that will likely increase prices for their European and Central Asian customers.

Continuing a 3-Part series on Freedom House’s Freedom of the World ratings for all five Central Asian states; Today are Kazakhstan and Tajikistan
Here is a link to how Freedom House scores each nation.

Kazakhstan
Political Rights – 6/7

Civil Rights – 5/7

Status – Not Free

Freedom House’s analysis of political and civil rights in Kazakhstan portrays a country headed in the wrong direction. The report highlights political violence in the country as being a growing issue with many opposition leaders, most notably Altynbek Sarsenbayev, facing assassination and intimidation attempts. The report blames much of this violence on clans competing to replace President Nazarbayev when he leaves office in 2012. State control over the media has increased with a new media minister and legislation. The state has a near monopoly over the control of the judiciary, rights of association and assembly, and NGOs. Corruption is said to be widespread in all levels of government and the trafficking of women for prostitution is a major problem.

Tajikistan
Political Rights – 6/7

Civil Rights – 5/7

Status – Not Free

Despite receiving the identical ‘freedom score’ as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan’s democratic outlook, though far from pristine, is not quite so dire according to FH. President Rakhmonov and his People’s Democratic Party continue to dominate the political landscape and will most likely maintain this for the foreseeable future (Rakhmonov can hold the presidency until 2020). Though Tajikistan is the only Central Asian state with a legal religion-based party, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), after the 2006 elections, FH sees opposition parties struggling to have any influence in government. Despite constitutional guarantees for the freedom of speech and press, independent journalists still face harassment and before the November 2006 presidential election, five websites critical of the government were temporarily shut down. Concerning NGOs, a number of them operate in the nation without interference, but international NGOs now must notify the Tajik government before any meetings with local politicians.

On an unrelated note, Ferghana.ru reporter Omar Sharifov has a piece about the recent thaw in Uzbekistan-US relations, centered on a joint Uzbek-American forum arranged by the US Embassy. The forum featured a speech by US Ambassador Richard Norland, who, although stated that ‘no significant’ changes have occurred concerning Uzbek human rights’ policies and actions, went on to emphasize that ‘marks of progress’ were ‘already clear.’

Freedom House (FH) recently came out with their 2007 Freedom in the World Rankings and I will individually go through their analysis of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, with Kyrgyzstan the focus today. Freedom House does a difficult and controversial job very well, and their work provides a great amount of insight into individual state’s measures of freedom and the level of freedom in the world as a whole. Freedom House concluded that the world is experiencing a period of ‘freedom stagnation’ at the moment, as the percentage of countries they label as ‘Free’ has remained flat for nearly a decade.

Before we get to the individual Central Asia state rankings, a quick note about how Freedom House scores levels of freedom. They have two main criteria, Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Each get a score based on specific questions about said subjects, 10 questions concerning Political Rights and 15 concerning Civil Liberties. Finally, after totaling up the Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores, they assign a final score from 1 to 7, with 1 being the most free and 7 being the least, Freedom House labels a nation as either ‘Free’, ‘Partly Free,’ or ‘Not Free.’ For quick reference, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were categorized as ‘Not Free’ and Kyrgyzstan was labeled as ‘Partly Free.’

Kyrgyzstan
Political Rights – 5/7

Civil Rights – 4/7

Status - Partly Free
Although Kyrgyzstan was the only Central Asian state to receive a ‘Partly Free’ ranking, Freedom House saddled it with a downward trending arrow, largely concerning setbacks in religious freedom. FH complemented the opening of Kyrgyzstan society and government in the aftermath of Akayev’s toppled government, but laments that much of this has started to slip away under President Bakiyev. The report notes that the latest constitution puts more power in the executive branch and they argue that this has ‘crushed hopes for constructive constitutional reform.’ The reports summary also acknowledges a retreat in media and civil society freedoms and the greater ‘interpenetration’ between government and organized crime. Kyrgyzstan is seen to ‘generally respect’ freedom of religion and association, but has had its share of problems in this regard as well. All religious organizations still must register with the Ministry of Justice and the government has used this to restrict and control Islamic groups that it regards as radical. Concerning freedom of assembly, the Kyrgyz government expelled two US diplomats in July 2006 for allegedly having ‘improper contact’ with NGOs. In addition, the report calls corruption and bribes ‘frequent’ occurrences in the state, and asserts that domestic violence and the trafficking of women are not crimes actively pursued by law enforcement.

Do you agree with Freedom House’s assessment of Kyrgyzstan’s level of freedom? What about their scoring system overall? Does it accurately portray if a nation is truly democratic or liberal? What purposes does this type of ‘freedom survey’ have anyway? Does it affect US foreign policy, or individual nation’s views of themselves and government?

Up next is Kazakhstan!

Joshua Kucera, in a diary published in Slate, describes a Xinjiang Province undergoing a great transition. He explored Kashgar, Korla, Urumqi, and Kanas Lake and in all these places he paints a vivid picture of an Uighur people and culture’s regional dominance being challenged by an influx of Han Chinese people, money, and government power. Kucera portrays a dynamic, yet schizophrenic region that at times seems like it is ‘the end of the world’ or stuck in the ‘middle ages,’ but also one showing rapid signs of modernization and high class culture. He does a wonderful job providing the reader both an Uighur and Han Chinese perspective on the region’s changes. The Chinese government is bringing much prosperity to the province, but Kucera accurately asserts that this newfound wealth and power is largely bypassing the local Uighurs, and in many ways in his reporting, they appear to be just background players in the Chinese vision for the region’s future. (Make sure you check out his Picture Slideshow)

Kucera also interviews Michael Manning, a 27 year old American from New Jersey, who lives in Korla and reports about the region in his blog, The Opposite End of China, which can be found at the bottom of this page under Blogroll. Manning also has written about Friday’s plane terrorist incident and last month’s Chinese Government Raid against ETIM, which have both brought the region much publicity in the past couple days.

In a related story, Joshua Kucera interviewed Uighur human rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize Nominee Rebiya Kadeer, about her home, the Xinjiang Province. In the interview, she calls the Chinese government’s policies an ‘existential threat’ to the Uighur people, dismisses the idea that radical Islamic elements are present in Xinjiang’s Uighur community (although she does say that ‘when people are pushed into a corner, and stripped naked without any kinds of rights, that kind of life may drive people to do crazy things’), and praises the US government for its continued support, but asks for more progress and international community participation.

(Picture by Joshua Kucera from Slate.com)