Afghanistan and Central Asia

UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon has designated 2008 as the Year of Water Sanitation, a worthy effort which dovetails into public health and climate change issues–and which Central Asian states could use to their benefit.

According to the UN, investing $10 billion a year could halve the proportion of people without basic toilet facilities by 2015.  This grimy state of affairs affects 2.6 billion people worldwide, and not just aesthetically.

Public Health vs. Polio:
In Pakistan and Afghanistan, polio, spread by fecal-oral contact, continues to be a public health problem.  Afghanistan has had an immunization program over the past year at enormous effort; Pakistan needs one desperately.  Dr. Chan at the UN’s World Health Organization has stated that the last pockets of polio incidence are also the most expensive and difficult to reach–Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, and Nigeria.  Cultural differences, difficulty in understanding the vaccine regime, and security and transportation problems  frequently hinder efforts.  Hardline preachers in the Pakistani tribal areas have forbidden health workers to immunize children, as late as August of this year.

Rotary International, a long-run enemy to polio virus, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, are jump-starting the continued effort with a grant to WHO of USD 2 million.

“An estimated 42,000 people die every week from diseases related to low water quality and an absence of adequate sanitation,” U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon said in a statement announcing 2008 as the Year of Sanitation.   Water-borne diseases such as botulism, cholera, and typhoid mostly affect children.

Climate change:
Add to the fact that climate change hits poor countries the hardest–and water quality in poor countries is the worst.  What this means is that water sources themselves become exploited in a heightened fashion, because water itself is not taken care of downriver.  The effects of climate change in Central Asia’s aquifers and in Xinjiang make it more important than ever to safeguard and safely treat/sanitize the water that is available.  It’s a great program for 2008.  I hope Central Asia officials are busy writing their grants for water sanitation projects–Today–at the very latest., for their major rivers and their dead lakes, their sewage infrastructure, and whatever else that they can think of that will bring water quality up for human use–and for human industry–and human health.

Further Reading: Wikipedia on Poliomyelitus, a disease spread by poor sanitation

Photo: BBC

Before NATO, there was Afghanistan’s Taliban movement (you can’t call it a government, because it offered no protection and no services to its people).  And the new Taliban, neo-Taliban, or whatever we call them have the same, tawdry, consistent practice of gratuitous cruelty in this regard–

Here’s the whole story from AFP wire, as printed by the Pakistan Daily Times:

WANA: Local Taliban militants seized and burned thousands of kilogrammes of food destined for pregnant women from a hospital in South Waziristan, officials said on Sunday.

The food, mainly lentils and cooking oil, had been supplied by the aid charity Save the Children to feed pregnant women suffering from malnutrition.

A Taliban activist said they were destroyed because “foreign NGOs want to harm our future generations.” An administration official, Tariq Salim, said the Health Ministry officials had not consulted him before distributing food directly to the women. Meanwhile, in North Waziristan, three people were killed and five wounded when troops conducted “retaliatory” strikes on suspected militant hideouts in Mir Ali, local officials said. Several houses were destroyed in the strikes that came after militants hit a checkpost with a missile barrage. One soldier was wounded in the rocket attack late Saturday, they said.

Well, if you could’ve seen me, I’d hopped right onto my local soapbox.  And then I stepped right back off again, to think instead of react. 

1. NGOs
It’s past time to honor the NGOs such as Save the Children whose work is dangerous and difficult.  Those who deliver aid on-site face numerous disappointments and trials, but they are there, putting human concerns first.  As of October 29th, the United Nations has documented the death of 34 aid workers in this troubled state for 2007.  They are soldiers too–we need to look at it just like that.

2. Donors
It’s also past time to honor those who donate funds to worthy NGOs working in Afghanistan.  Stories like this often make people wonder if their charitable impulses do any good–and this leads to what is often called “donor fatigue”.  But worthy, well-run programs do make a difference.  Not everything we do has the immediate effect we want it to, even with people we know.  But in the long term, the expression and relationship makes a difference.  In Afghanistan, where malnutrition, poverty, and childbed mortality are large problems, donations make a big difference.

3. In Unrelated News? Or, related News?
You can miss it if you read fast, but what is the relationship between the Waziristan official’s gripes about food distribution and the story of Taliban destruction of the warehouse?  These are two separate issues, related only by being in the same story. But it brings some questions to mind:

What is the relationship between warehouse protection by regional officials and Taliban incursions? What is the relationship between NGO/government for coordinating aid efforts?  What is the obstruction to aid efforts that are posed by regional officials?  Questions like this can make you mad, but they should also remind one of the difficulties in getting an aid effort moving and its mission to the target recipients. 

4. Evening out the competition
It’s strategically intelligent of the Taliban to bomb aid–because they don’t offer any.  By decimating our ability to help Afghanistan’s people, the contrast between “them and us” becomes one only of who’s the meanest person around–a life full of fear and no benefit.  We can’t give up on aid, or else Afghanistan’s people will have no horizon for the future.  The fact that babies are involved only underscores the need for aid today.

I am angry–I am thinking about those expectant mothers who will not eat this week.  But I am also humbled by the consistent heroism of those who are making aid happen in a world where “serving the people” seems to be a huge risk.  I am thankful for those who have served so consistently, by deed and by donation, in Afghanistan. 

Today the World Bank announced the approval of a new loan to Kazakhstan for developing better customs procedures.  The total project cost is USD 62 million, with Kazakhstan committing 43.5 million and the World Bank 18.5 million to the effort.  This is a fantastic step for the state, and it dovetails with many of the other efforts Kazakhstan is making to develop trade in the Central Asian region.

According to the stats in the press release (emphasis added):

The Government of Kazakhstan’s focus on customs reform over the last several years has led to strengthening of the legislative base, increases in revenue collection, and the simplification of customs procedures. As a result, the average customs tariff in Kazakhstan is less than 10 percent, the country has eliminated almost all export taxes, and there has been a recent reduction in tariffs for food and other products.

This is the kind of  good news that is going to keep Kazakhstan from having bread riots; it will stimulate home business and international trade.  Furthermore, it cuts down on corrupt practices.  And how is that?  I’m sure I don’t know all the ways one can take a bite out of enterprise, but let’s list a few:

1. Simplified customs procedures are by their nature more transparent–everyone can figure out what the rules are and if they are getting the runaround.

2. Legislative support means that the law is not adjudicated on the local level, with transactions at the point of entry or exit subject to additional fees, “legal interpretation”, fines, favors, tips, or bribes.

3.  Lowering tariffs means more revenue collection, because the cost differential between official fees and unofficial bribes becomes negligible.  As a result, the cost of business is better served by exporting and importing within the law.  The fees go into the government’s bank account and not into the grey or black market, personal, Swiss, or Cayman Island bank accounts out of the state.

There’s still plenty to do, and Kazakhstan and the World Bank are giving it a go:

However, the customs development agenda remains large. According to the latest World Bank report “Connecting to Compete” which measures effectiveness of trade logistics in various countries, Kazakhstan is on the 139th** place out of 150 countries in the area of customs effectiveness.

But the World Bank’s point in their report is not that trade logistics addresses only negatives.  There is a marked correlation between easy trade and state prosperity.  On page 17 of the report, they note that -the competitive advantage of states erodes in the face of unpredictable trading regimes - and later in the report, they note that reliability and predictability in customs regimes matter even more than cost in establishing commerce.  I think that could be called eradicating the “What Now??!!” syndrome for the business world.  . . and for food consumers. . . in Kazakhstan.

Just out of curiosity, I looked up the other states in Central Asia in “Connecting to Compete“:
In the report (not the press release)
Pakistan’s score was 2.62, for 68 out of 150;
Iran’s score was 2.51, for 78 out of 150;
Kyrgyzstan’s score was 2.35, for 103 out of 150;
Uzbekistan’s score was 2.16, for 129 out of 150;
Kazakhstan’s score was 2.12, for 133 out of 150**; (a discrepancy from press release?)
Mongolia’s score was 2.08, for 136 out of 150;
Tajikistan’s score was 1.21 our of 5, for 146 out of 150; and
Afghanistan’s score was , for 150 out of 150. 
Turkmenistan was not scored.

Photo: Kazakhstan’s Embassy in Austria

Thirty or more pages out of eighty-five in a new report from swisspeace discusses private security contracting in Afghanistan.  The report lists its methodologies, which is at least five steps up from the normal analysis. (links below).  Due to its extensiveness and care, the report gives some bona-fide examination of the issues in regard to Afghanistan. 

Paramount to all the contracting arguments currently taking place  is the problem of security versus state capacity–that is true in Iraq as well as Afghanistan.  And not all of the information in this report casts slurs upon private contractors: some of it, in fact, falls under the category of accurate information, which can be used to come to different conclusions.  Other parts of the report give nuance to what Afghanistan watchers have been saying all along–and support our understanding of the primary dilemmas in Afghanistan and the importance of security and the need for a legal economy.

No big surprise
That security contractors are carrying out functions in Afghanistan is an open secret.  All of the aid missions need security; all aid convoys; all of the embassies.  We all know that NATO hasn’t sent enough troops, either occupied with other wars or the horrors of confronting the voters back home.  Private security is presumably filling the gap, allowing, for instance, aid workers to do their job with less probability of being kidnapped by the Taliban.  Some of this private security presence is for capacity-building, such as police training or military training of home troops.  But then there are problems–of course there are.

Categories and economics
The report lists three different kinds of security contracting firms: international firms from visiting states such as NATO countries; third-party national companies or groups; and Afghanistan-owned and operated firms.  There’s some talk about “colonial-model pay scales”, where NATO-state-based contractors pull in more money than locals, but this is to some degree nonsense.  Different prices reflect different market prices for labor in these states as well as the differential in opportunity cost.  The real problem is that Afghanistan doesn’t have any industry that would present a viable alternative to security contracting.  Only a viable economy with varieties of jobs are going to drive local security prices up.  On the other hand, a dangerous job that doesn’t pay enough to cover basic economic needs (and higher security risks) only leads to corruption. 

Weak national government.
By definition, the state is the arbiter of security within its territory. Afghanistan’s displacement of state authority began before the Taliban, who rushed into a vacuum.  The Taliban ruled, with a kind of draconian, particularized justice system and security apparatus.  But they did not govern the region–they dispensed with the economy and included no social services for its people.  Nor did these rulers have regular congress with other state governments, ignoring diplomatic and consular immunity, et cetera. 

After the entrance of U.S. forces, a government was set up.  However, steps to restore government by ousting the Taliban are somewhat stuck, as US/NATO becomes one authority while national, provincial and local authority become another.  Afghanistan’s government is not strong enough to stand alone, but by providing security, occupying forces tend to displace governmental authority.  This dilemma also plays out in the realm of security services in at least three ways:

1. Ultimate authority. 
Afghanistan has not been able to sufficiently regulate the activities of private contractors, through the issuance of licenses, background checks, and bonds for good behavior deposited in the Afghanistan National Bank.  However, background checks are hard to get, especially for Afghanistan nationals.  Third-party firms and international firms have also not been quite forthcoming. (pp. 22-24).  Weapons should be registered as well, in order to track their loss or use, but this has not occurred–and in the weapon-trafficking environment of Afghanistan, this is nothing but a reasonable requirement. 

Afghanistan has not been able to pass a law with sufficient regulations through their jirga.  After several bank robberies (thought to be inside jobs), new impetus was given to pass a meaningful law, with ISAF, UN, and Afghanistan input into its draft.  The draft of February 2007 has yet to be passed.

2. Weapons, transparency. 
Weapons used by security staff are frequently bought on the illegal arms market, particularly by companies which do not have recourse to more modern armaments from their home states.  Likewise, at the dissolution of a company, these arms make it back into the illegal arms market via theft, or, Ministry of the Interior corruption.  Transparency of both firm and government continue to be a problem.

3. Lots of groups with guns and attitude.
According to this report, there is an unspecified number of private security contractors, but somewhere around seventy in number.  For the average, security-less Afghan citizen, it’s hard to keep track of who did what or who has what.  A number of firms do not wear uniforms–but of course have firearms–an average of over three per security contractor, and of varied make, model, and vintage. 

The result is that security contractors, drug-runners, Taliban, other armed groups, all look somewhat the same.  If you are being accosted by someone with a large weapon, on what side are they?  It’s got to be frightening in the extreme. 

On the other hand, it’s the small, local company that (reading between the lines of this report) is the one that’s the most trouble for locals, registration efforts, weapons procurement, and corruption.  So is this a barrier to entry for local firms, or a problem of professionalization?  According to this report, many of the foreign security firms are making efforts to professionalize the Afghan industry.  (Would that also be the colonializing mentality?  Or would it be capacity building?  At least this report notes the effort.)

In the meantime, the dilemmas continue to spin out between state power and state incapacity, the need for security in the short term versus the long term, the role of weapons in the drug wars, and all of the others. 

This report gives a lot of information, but I’m not with them concerning all of their conclusions.  I find it reliable, though, in terms of its painstaking approach.  I encourage everyone to read through it.

Here is the swisspeace report.
Here is the article that leads to the swisspeace report, reporting the conclusions but not the data– the best part.

A few months ago, I regretfully removed a Xinjiang news and analysis blog from the blogroll here at FPA Central Asia, as its site had disappeared.  I’m happy to note that there is another new news blog for Xinjiang–we’ll be back up to two.  The name of the blog is New Dominion, and it’s looking good.

Sometimes it’s difficult to get strictly Xinjiang information from the wealth of news about China in general.  And there’s a lot going on there: with new extractive industry activity, the rising need for transit between China’s larger economic centers and other Central Asian states, its role in water conservation and its importance to watching climate change. The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is also ethnically and religiously divided from other parts of China.  It is also quite poor, but again, it’s difficult to get stats for one region as opposed to China as a whole (at least, in English it is difficult).

The other Xinjiang blog featured at FPA Central Asia has this perfectly spelled out in its name: The Opposite End of China.  Check both of these blogs out and support this great work!

The moral high ground
Today, the International Crisis Group has sent out a bunch of useful information on Central Asia, and I can’t wait to read all of the in-depth work they’ve done on Pakistan.  On Turkmenistan, ICG’s Mr. Schutte at has also written a new op-ed, featured in the EU Observer, about clarifying the goals, aims, and quid pro quo between European states and Turkmenistan in diplomatic relations.  This “European clarification” resonates deeply in the United States and the international community in general, including myself.  But not today: I’m getting a little ill from hanging out with the prudes.

Being correct isn’t everything
As previously reported, Mr. Berdymukhamedov visited the EU on November 5th.  Despite this being a watershed occurence, or, a potential beginning for all kinds of discussions, here’s the principled, one-note, pro forma prescription, all over Central Asia without differentiation:

Beyond the smiles and formal statements, one hopes they took the opportunity to remind the Turkmen leader that the EU’s friendship has a price.

One year ago, [under the late President Niyazov] the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee made that price clear, . . . [they] would only give its approval to an Interim Trade Agreement “if concrete progress on the human rights situation is achieved”.

Well, there’s complete clarity here.  But it leaves out one very important intangible.

Loyalty to friends:  
You don’t want a friend that is watching you for every sign of a screw-up.  Even more, afraid of your screw-up, so much so that they can broadcast your failings to the world and disavow meaningful association with you at the first sign of trouble.   Guess what: Turkmenistan doesn’t either.  Also, democracies change their policies under each leader: it’s difficult for states such as Turkmenistan to seriously commit to a long-term relationship with a United States whose international policies change drastically every eight years. 

Second of all, let’s talk economic development: okay, let’s talk natural gas.  By itself, it’s not hypocritical for the EU or anyone else to be interested in natural resources.  The problem is that resource purchases are also straight quid pro quo–money for energy–and that set of transactions also does not lead to political loyalty in the end.

A style problem:
It’s a style problem for the EU, the humanitarians, and the policy prescriptors.  You can’t fault the analysis, only the delivery.  Mr. Schotte details the small promise of one Internet cafe with tight security, as opposed to full-out media transparency.  The new arrests of some officials and the new amnesties for others are bewildering:

Others point to the end-of-Ramadan release of 9000 prisoners as a sign of softening attitude towards the opposition, but the move was so sudden and random, it seems to have been almost a whim. And none of those set free is known to have been a political prisoner. Some former victims of political repression were allowed to flee the country, but that seems more an attempt to silence opposition within the country than a signal of any new freedom to travel abroad.

First of all, I wouldn’t count on the fact that what looks random from the outside, such as the unannounced release of prisoners, is actually random.   

But what’s wrong with asking for information rather than demanding it?  Asking to put in some internet cafes rather than dissing the one that’s there?  Arranging to have broadband capacity installed with cell phones rather than being contemptuous that it’s not already available?  Behind the scenes, diplomats are doing just that–and are frequently put off because we’re so busy talking about the target state’s deficiencies and stripping their pride.

And sometimes pride is the pivot. Turkmenistan has been a failed state in all but name.  Mr. Berdymukhamedov seems to understand that Mr. Niyazov perverted or killed every institution in Turkmenistan.  He’s been out in the world, trying to develop relationships.  I don’t consider that “grasping at straws” but evidence of real opportunity.

The style factor– and the substance
This state failure makes it imperative to include many of the reforms that the ICG editorial has noted.  But we’re not going to get there unless we promise to stick with our new friend, Turkmenistan.  We have to assume that from an international community point of view that Turkmenistan will continue to misstep, go too slow, refuse or balk at new reforms.   

And friends ask each other for favors: but they don’t present a list of demands at the moment of introduction.  At the least, they ask how you’re doing first.  They compliment you.  They listen to your dreams, plans, and problems.  They follow up and they follow through.  They catch your back.  Sometimes, they tell you off: but most of the time–not.  That’s the part of the quid pro quo that we seem to be missing.

For those of you and myself, who think I’m getting too much news from Ferghana.ru lately?  Well, IWPR is gone now, as well as Mr. Saipov, what else can I do?  Little by little, our eyes and ears are closed–the voices of Uzbekistan are silenced. 

In an earlier post, I said there wasn’t much news on Uzbekistan’s elections.  Here’s what there is, that I can find:

On October 10, opposition candidates were nominated:

All five officially registered political parties nominated their candidates for president of Uzbekistan. Dilorom Tashmuhamedova will run for presidency from the Adolat party, Ahtam Tursunov from Fidokorlar, Hoshid Dosmuhamedov from Milli Tiklanish, and Asliddin Rustamov from the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. The Uzbek Liberal Democratic Party in its turn nominated Islam Karimov.

November 7th, Mr. Karimov made his campaign promises: he promises to run for election for an unconstitutional third term.  No need to change the constitution though: this will only be Mr. Karimov’s second seven-year term, so he still qualifies.  But all sophistry aside:

Pills and Weddings:
If you want medical attention or a marriage license, you have to support Mr. Karimov’s third term. 

What information Ferghana.Ru has compiled indicates that the Tashkent narcological dispensary denies health certificates to whoever applies for it (without it, registries refuse to register marriages) without the applicant’s signature on the petition for Karimov’s third term of office. Collectors even walk door-to-door, even though this method is recognized as more difficult. The law “On election of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan” demands signatures of at least 5% of all voters.

If only that level of effort and ingenuity was being used for building infrastructure and relationships, training doctors and farmers and schoolchildren . . . .

Recently there has been some new talk of energy cooperation out there in the international discourse: three energy groups, and one forgotten energy group.   Stick with me, here: it’s all good, and useful stuff for those of us contemplating small loaves of bread, higher gasoline and heating oil prices.

International Energy Forum:
Yesterday I attended a presentation of the International Energy Forum (IEF) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  Ambassador Arne Walther of Norway, the IEFs’ Secretary General, gave the presentation. 

The IEF holds low-key but high-ranking organization conferences. According to its S-G Mr. Walther, the IEF posits no particular goals except two: fostering dialogue, and obtaining statistics that help member countries make plans for the future.  The dialogue is low-key because the talks are not targeted toward specific outcomes, such as, deciding who should get what oil.  However, its high rank is due to the fact that the conferences are conducted at the Ministerial level, and allow a lot of peripheral activity, the exchange of names and cards, jokes and concerns, creating contacts that allow for international cooperation.  This kind of unfocused agenda/ focused activity is essential: it is networking, and it creates intangible avenues for other kinds of discourse and future consensus. 

The other goal, the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI) is a self-reporting aggregation of data, much like the UN, where members compile their own data to report.  This is another one of those glacial diplomatic progressions, necessary but achieved incrementally.  Everyone wants to know what everybody else has but no one wants to tell what they have in the way of reserves, developed, undeveloped, or strategic.  They are now working on getting a database on natural gas–well, that should tell you how incremental this procedure must be.  I was surprised to see that Ambassador Walther still had all of his hair, because I would have torn mine out long ago. 

However, other issues besides “who-has-what” come up in these sessions.  There are also discussions, including reconciling economics and politics, energy poverty, and climate change in re: fossil fuels.  Mr. Walther emphasized that the dialogue has shifted to Asia: that would be, China, India, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf–a set of realities that non-Asia needs to take into account.

Last of all, in the question-and-answer period, Mr. Walther noted that things get done in all sorts of groupings: bilateral and multilateral, regional, and international.  Many times, common concerns are addressed more quickly in local or regional dialogue, which brings me to the next set of acronyms:

Shanghai Cooperation Organization:
According to Sergei Blagov, Russia has come to the conclusion that a regional “Energy Club” would be in the best interests of Russia as well as China in the SCO.  As we know, China has used its SCO connections with Central Asia to launch aid initiatives and energy deals–a kind of economic collective security.  At another talk this week, held at the Wilson Center,  Mr. Nikolai Zlobin of the World Security Initiative noted that Russia had been viewing the SCO as a primarily military collective security–and China, economic.  This looks set to change.

Uranium:
About a year and a half ago, Mr. Blagov also wrote about Russia’s interest in Kazakh uranium, another up-and-coming energy source that would foster Russia’s protected Rozatomprom (the nuclear equivalent of Gazprom, ya’all) and this is also an energy concern for the world at large.  Earlier this week, Registan.net covered Russia’s newest efforts at consolidating uranium commerce.  We usually think of uranium in terms of traditional security, but down the road (actually, now)  it’ll be important for energy security as well.

GECF:
Last of all, where is the Gas-Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) and what are they doing?  This Saudi Arabian-Russian initiative last popped up in the news in April, when Mr. Berdymuhamedov went to Riyadh in order to open relations with the Saudi Arabian government.

Further reading:
Josh Foust over at The Registan was also at the event: hey, that is one intelligent (or do I mean irreverent? yes, both) man in a grey suit.  Get his take here.
CSIS event proceedings will be up at http://www.csis.org/ in a few weeks: look under the events or energy categories to discover it.

Photo: heavytees.com

At least three aspects of life intertwine when discussing recent Uzbekistani news: these would be: a. elections, which are scheduled but we aren’t hearing anything new; b. a lack of human rights, media freedoms, and whether or not the West’s sanction regime is working; and c. life for Uzbekistanis, which right now seems to be caught up in bread availability.

Bread First
According to Ferghana.ru, a loaf of bread in Tashkent is still the usual size, but in Nukus or Karakalpakstan in general, its height, width are larger than but comparable to that of a matchbox.  I’m talking a small, 34-wooden match matchbox in the US, with the slice a little larger–somewhat like those holiday “gift loaves” one might make for a holiday tea table for people you don’t know very well.  Other pictures accompanying this article show bakeries and bread stores devoid of merchandise.   

Distributing the dough
The article itself discusses the distribution of flour and dough.  If dough is being shipped rather than flour, this points to a standard recipe which has a similar quality throughout the distribution area (and is not a good sign for quality, actually).  It reflects a command economy.  It means that regional centers are able, non-transparently, to change the quality of the flour or introduce other binders and fillers.  In the U.S. before the advent of the 1880’s muckraking journalists, this was quite common also.  Plaster, for instance, was used to extend flour and create profits: the bread of the pioneers. 

Transparency means quality–and so does competition.  If dough is arriving pre-mixed at each bakery, then no one can compete in terms of flavor, nutrition, or price.  The elements of production are the same.  The profit also never comes to the locality, but stays in the regional center where the allocations are decided.  But that’s a dough of a different color.

This distribution describes the state of politics as well
The fact that Karakalpakstan gets a smaller loaf than Tashkent is a reflection of a couple of things:   a. the cost of transport in a high-price energy environment.  However, Uzbekistan is just not that big.  b. where potential social unrest is a larger problem.  Big-city Tashkent has more people, closer together–a bread riot in a village is far more easily contained or ignored.  c. elections upcoming, however much of a circus they may be, for the same reasons: unrest and voter activity.

Elections in the midst of starvation aren’t usually a good idea in nominally democratic countries: they tend to create upset, upheaval, revolutions.  Ruling parties generally try to provide at least basic welfare at the advent of the electoral moment.  Uh, that isn’t happening, at least in the provinces.  President Karimov has introduced a system of food coupons, but if a bread ration is so much smaller, its value is only partial.  Which leads one to suspect that the election is in the bag, and that the attitude of leader impunity has reached a new altitude. 

We have to wait and see, but this is not a situation that argues for a stable Central Asia. 

Further reading:
Cooking oil disappears in Tashkent
Uzbek bread is great–back when you could get it, at neweurasia.net
Closed supermarkets in Tashkent–two months ago, at neweurasia.net

Photo: bread.com

Yesterday and today, President of Turkmenistan Mr. Berdymukhamedov is in the home of the European Union, receiving what RFE/RL calls a “cautiously upbeat welcome“. 

Due to the uh, recently traditional privacy attendant to Turkmenistani activities, there will be no press conference afterward.  This actually works out for the EU as well, since they are still waiting for that coup de foudre in Central Asia at large: instant Westernization.  As ever, the EU can’t make up its mind whether to go for the natural gas or the human rights principles.  If only it would just all work out on its own, without anyone getting their hands soiled.

According to RFERL, drug traffic will also be discussed:

During his visit, the Turkmen leader is also scheduled to meet with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and EU foreign-policy chief Javier Solana. Berdymukhammedov’s talks with both men are likely to touch on the drug trade emanating from Afghanistan, which borders southeastern Turkmenistan.

Yes, that’s a really good idea–and, someone needs to think about the burden on Turkmenistan that Afghanistan’s upheaval has been.  But as usual, the West (in this case, the EU) attaches a lot of strings to developing new friendships–a “conditionality” that never seems to be satisfied.

EU officials say the “conditionality” spelled out today to Berdymukhammedov will mostly affect whether Turkmenistan can upgrade the Soviet-era trade agreement it has with the EU. An enhancement to a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would mean closer political contacts and more aid money. The EU has earmarked 30 million euros ($43 million) for the period through 2010.  But that sum is dwarfed by the potential windfall that Turkmenistan could reap from direct energy trade with the EU.

Well, USD 43 million would be great for Turkmenistan.  Good luck, Mr. Berdymukhamedov.  Keep trying: we Central Asia watchers want you in the club, and not just over oil and gas.

 Further reading:
New investment climate in Turkmenistan
Mr. B visits the United States

Photo: Asianews.it