Afghanistan and Central Asia

Yesterday, I went to the Center for Strategic and International Studies to hear a talk from Steve LeVine, author of The Power and the Glory, about Caspian oil and pipelines–one of my favorite topics in the world, as I wrote my Master’s thesis on it.  Independently related, oil prices pushed to over USD 90 per barrel yesterday afternoon in late trading on the spot market.  

High oil prices
We Central Asia watchers know that Caspian oil –particularly at this moment, the problems in Kazakhstan with the Kashagan oil field–have been affected by high oil prices, upping the stakes in negotiations over oilfield control.  Not to mention the prices for our heating fuels, our gasoline, and the new push to develop alternate energy.  Further, much of the citizen dissatisfaction in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan is caused by higher energy prices affecting the affordability of basic foodstuffs like bread and cooking oil.  Energy issues count as one of the problems with which governments must contend over which they do not have a great control. 

Even Russia, which looks like it is running its own energy end-run with Europe and independent oil firms these past two years, could not create the conditions that allow them the power that they presently enjoy.  It behooves us all to understand energy distribution and its relation to foreign policy.

Indirectly, a policy prescription
Steve LeVine gave an interesting talk, which mostly focussed on the “diplomatic triumph” of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline–and it was a triumph, that continues to bring 1 million barrels per day of oil to the Mediterranean and thence to Europe.  As Mr. Levine said, it was a time when governments worked with oil companies–for example,  the Brits with BP and the US with Chevron, Exxon, etc –in order to come up with a comprehensive diplomatic plan.  This flies in the face of the conventional wisdom.

Second, the consensus in the room appeared to be that the U.S. is failing diplomatically in Central Asia.  Key to this mistake is the new emphasis on missile programs in Czechoslovakia, with de-emphasis on Russia’s Gazprom and its acquisition of energy grids in Eastern Europe (and Armenia) and its new pipeline plans in the North and South, which will increase its distributional capability.  If we spend out time re-building the Cold War, we will miss the real avenue of power.  Germany is especially vulnerable at this time to Russia’s power/energy politics.

Third, the consensus of the oil veterans in the room was that Turkmenistan does indeed have enough gas (especially combined with that of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) to make the construction of Trans-Caspian pipelines financially feasible.  With that consensus, one has to wonder: why has the U.S. not made more strides in Turkmenistan with Mr. Berdymuhammedov?  This question was not satisfactorily answered by anyone–and one could sense the frustration in the room.  Eventually, it seemed evident that we were expecting Central Asia’s presidents to step up to a plate and hit a home run for us, the way that Heidar Aliev did for the U.S. in Azerbaijan in the mid-1990’s.  Yet, all in the room agreed that the environment in Central Asia is very different ten years later.  As a policy, waiting on Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s Presidents won’t do the job for us, unless we take an active, supporting hand. 

However, as noted previously in this blog, the U.S. has essentially been pulling out of Central Asia for the past two years.

I recommend Mr. Levine’s book to all:  The Power and the Glory.  Available in a bookstore near you, and well worth the read.

This entry was posted on Thursday, October 25th, 2007 at 7:34 pm and is filed under Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Central Asia General, Economy, States & Regions. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.