Afghanistan and Central Asia

Bringing you news from the steppes and the mountains in one tidy package.  Almost everyone appears to be lying on their sofas with a cold compress after the heady weeks of SCO activities just past, so this’ll be brief. . . uh, more brief.

Kazakhstan:
–Another attempt to extradite Mr. Rakhat Aliev, according to Thursday’s RFE/RL Newsline.  In that same entry, Mr. Aliev’s “father Mukhtar, a prominent member of Kazakhstan’s Academy of Sciences, was prevented from boarding a flight from Astana to London on August 21 on the grounds that he was involved in an official investigation into possible weapons-related charges.”
–ENI is in trouble: further delays on the Kashagan field have made Kazakhstan weary, and they are now threatening closure on the project due to environmental considerations.  Okay, commentators, be fair: there are environmental considerations such as the seal deaths, and also, Kashagan is an enormously difficult project, more difficult than even ENI forecast.  Changes are due to be made, but ENI can still salvage this with a little proactive corporate diplomacy.
–Pre-SCO Summit,  Mongolia’s President Mr. Enkhbayar visits Kazakhstan with his retinue for talks.

Kyrgyzstan: 
–New arrests for spying in former defense and government officials.  The last two were charged with intrigue with China.  We’re still waiting to hear the details on these two.
–Torture deaths in Naryn, Northern Kyrgyzstan are being investigated by local and international human rights groups.  
–Iran sent a gracious message to Kyrygzstan on Kyrgyzstan’s National Day.
–Dateline, Cholpa-Ata: A meeting of EurAsEc Judicial Ministers in the Issyk-Kul Oblast.
–Russia plans to spend USD 2 billion in Kyrgyzstan’s economy, and beef up its military presence there.  The article talks about forward air base capacity, but I suspect counternarcotics are part of the plan. 
–Kyrgyz volunteers have paid USD 132 into a special fund to pay off USD 200 billion in external debt, because they trust their government that much.  So the government employees finally coughed up another 3632 bucks, I’m sure on their own initiative.

Mongolia:
–Chinalco has purchased controlling interest in Yunnan copper, which means China will be prospecting in Mongolia for the metal.  Canada’s Western Prospects has had site licenses revoked in the state for uranium.  Canada’s Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe are still working on legislative approval for a copper-and-gold deposit.
–Mongolian falcons go to Arabian countries, licensed, or, poached.  See also this longer article.

Tajikistan:
–Panj River Bridge set to open.  Vadim at NewEurasia and FPA Central Asia talked about this months ago, but this article discusses its state-of -the-art construction and the opportunities it presents for Aghanistan and Tajikistan.  Ribbon-cutting ceremony due on the 26th.
–A lot of religious regulations.  A lot of economic regulations. 

Turkmenistan:
–Amnesty for eleven, reported here yesterday.  Eurasianet is saying that this is accompanied by futher secret arrests of other top-level officials, also covered here.
–U.S. Congressional delegation and U.S. Commission on Religious Freedom to visit Ashgabat for increased bilateral ties.
–Austria to seek greater bilateral ties.
–Turkey and Iran to join in a joint venture for power plant in Turkmenistan.

Uzbekistan:
–Already reported here at FPA Central Asia: a new report from International Crisis Group on Uzbekistan’s virtually-unseen elections, now picked up by RFE/RL, Bloomberg, BBC. 
–Uzbekistan closed its border with Russia for four days because too much Uzbek produce was being exported to Russia (for higher sales price).  This drove local prices up, so an immediate intervention occurred, creating shortages in Russia’s Siberia and Urals regions.  You know, this is not the way to run an economy.  . . the dots stand for curse words . . .
–Iran sent gracious messages of fellowship to Uzbekistan for its National Day.
–Kazakhstan has extradited 56 Uzbeks in the last two years to Uzbekistan, mostly post-Andijan refugees associated with the Akramiya movement.

Xinjiang:
–Chinese Premier Mr. Wen Jiabao visited the XUAR for four days this week.  For those of you following the The Beat, you know that Xinjiang has had one natural disaster after another over the past year: floods, earthquakes, windstorms, and mudslides.  This week, more heavy rain and snow (in August).  Mr. Wen promised to provide earthquake-resistant housing and flood-control measures.  He also stressed the importance of bilingual education so that Uighur minorities could tap into the Chinese economic miracle.  A nice article from CCTV.

Photo: UMKC.edu; Mongolia Times

Have a great weekend, everyone!

News: Starting in September, Kyrgyzstan’s award-winning Shpilka vodka will be available in package stores in Florida, Missouri, Louisiana, and Oregon.  Shpilka means “stiletto heel”, and a marketing campaign has been envisioned that appeals to female purchasers: a bottle with flowing lines, no doubt a picture of high heels on the label, et cetera.

According to Nick Passmore at Forbes, “Vodka is not only the largest spirits category–one in every four spirits drinks consumed is vodka, according to Joanne Kletecka, Marketing Brand Director for Stolichnaya–but it’s also the fastest growing, up almost 20% over the last five years, as reported by the Distilled Spirits Council of the U.S. (DISCUS).”

I love this stuff:  not necessarily the vodka, I mean the globalization.  Skills learned in niche marketing here could radiate out to other great Kyrgyzstani exports. 

So if you enjoy vodka, try the Shpilka, enjoy it with moderate intake, and don’t drive or operate heavy machinery during or afterward.  Be nice to people.  Don’t step on their feet with your killer shoes.  And let us know how it was, all right?

Photo: National Gallery of Art, Australia; Zappo’s.com

Get Smart and Thanks Due:
First off, Afghanistanica has a great post on Afghanistan scholars to watch, read, and learn from.  Thank you, C. !
Another article on the mystery of not-enough translators for Afghanistan, also at Afghanistanica.  Read it and weep.  Then get mad.
Mr. Foust at Registan.net on basic flaws in reconstruction aid .  A good start on the issue, with links for more.

Diplomacy:
– After Mr. Karzai and Mr. Hu left the executive SCO summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, bilateral meetings were held between China’s VP Mr. Zheng and Aghanistan’ Foreign Minister Mr. Spanta in Beijing.
– Lower-key jirgas, as opposed to the Peace Jirga, appear to be bearing fruit across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
–The UN requests that a  Pakistan refugee camp for displaced Afghanistanis remain open.

Hostage, Inc.:
–In an article already linked above, the mayor of Gereshk, Mr. Dur Ali Shah, was abducted along with two of his sons and another man.  All but Mayor Shah were freed.
–A German hostage is freed and her kidnappers arrested.  Not all the German hostages are free yet.  In a recent video, Mr. Blechschmidt appears to be in some difficulty and explains that he is being held with five Afghanistani hostages.
–The Republic of Korea sees no progress in retrieving the remaining 19 South Korean hostages.

Military:
–The governor of Khost, Mr. Arsala Jamal, was attacked Wednesday while in convoy: three of his bodyguards were killed. Two more Afghanistani soldiers were killed, and eleven U.S. soldiers wounded, in Nuristan.
–Two Canadian soldiers have perished in Afghanistan this week.  An Afghanistani interpreter was also killed, and two Canadian journalists have been injured in the same roadside blast.
–The Polish military is reviewing actions of August 16 that resulted in civilian casualties.

Ordinance:
–Montenegro is sending surplus weapons to Afghanistan to help Afghanistan’s government arm its military against the Taliban:  1500 automatic rifles, 100 machine guns, and 250,000 bullets.
–British soldiers are getting new weapons that are, according to who talks about them, either thermobaric or not thermobaric.  Defence officials call it a “light anti-structure munition” and more accurate than an anti-tank munition.  A thermobaric weapon sort of sucks all the oxygen out of the air, or something like that, which would possibly cause more civilian casualties if used inappropriately.  Read more here at the Guardian and about Thermobaric Weapons at Wikipedia.
–New Zealand soldiers have destroyed 1200 pieces of weaponry in the last 4 months, mainly due to citizen information leading to their discovery.  This dangerous work helps ensure less injury to civilians and is dangerous work.
–Both Wired and The Conjecturor have been discussing EFPs–can’t keep up with the acronyms–Explosively Formed Penetrators–and their increased incidence in Afghanistan.  This would include IEDs–ah, Improvised Explosive Devices.

Terrorism:
–Turkey arrests two hijackers, one trained in Afghanistan terror camps, in a foiled plane hijacking to Tehran. 
–Afghanistan arrests the bomber who killed three German nationals last week: he is 15 years old.

The “Add a burden” department:
–Earlier this week, I posted upon Marked Increases of Opiate use in Afghanistan.  In related news: Yesterday, Relief Web posted an interview with Health Minister Mr. Fatemi, who announced a fourfold increase in AIDS incidence in Afghanistan.  He sounds very proactive, which is a good thing indeed.
–Rumours of killer telephone calls are making the rounds in Afghanistan.  Supposedly certain phone numbers, if answered, will emit a screech that causes brain hemorhages to the listener.  The rumor already caused trouble in Nigeria, Kuwait, India, and in Pakistan, where it was seen as by some religious leaders as a “sign of the wrath of God.”  Now the rumor is complicating life in a state with enough complications already.  Nothing to fear but fear itself . . .
–On the other side, Taliban insurgents are tapping into soldiers’ cell-phones and harrassing military families, according to the London Telegraph.

There’s more: Of course there is.  I wish everyone of all nationalities who has worked to rebuild Afghanistan’s civilization the most peaceful weekend possible. 

As we all know, Uzbekistan is supposed to have elections this December.  So far, not much in the way of election preparation has been noted.  Actually, Uzbekistan was supposed to have elections Last December.  Not much in the way of election preparation was noticed then, either.

Yesterday, the International Crisis Group, a group I respect to the utmost for their coverage of the Andijan Massacre (among other things),  released a new report on Uzbekistan.  The report warns against President Karimov’s lack of election mechanisms may well be leading to a forcible step-down in Uzbekistan.  The state’s increased repression and failing economy add pressures toward a possibly violent revolt and/or crackdown.  Since Uzbekistan is the central state in the five-state region, such upheaval would have a destabilizing effect upon all its neighbors, and would not, probably, create a new democracy.  What it would create I shudder to think.

Further Reading:
RFE/RL reports on the new ICG report
ICG Uzbekistan Page with links to the full report. 

Last week, President Berdymukhamedov signed an amnesty for eleven political prisoners sentenced under the Niyazov regime.  Of chief importance in the list was the former Chief Mufti of Turkmenistan, Nasrullah Ibn Ibdullah.  Another prisoner released was 70 years old.  All of the prisoners released were implicated in the assassination attempt on Turkmenbashi in November of 2002.  I can’t be sure about this, but I believe the Mufti was arrested to give credence to the charges of terrorism involved in the assassination attempt.  Since a “gang of international mercenaries of Caucasian origin was also blamed,” there’s no telling what Niyazov believed or didn’t believe.  We only know what happened: a little of what happened.

November 25, 2002:
On this day in Turkmenistan, President Niyazov’s motorcade was assaulted by machine gun fire from a Kamaz lorry near the Olympic stadium on Turkmenbashi Avenue in Ashgabat.  Mr. Niyazov escaped unscathed, but some of his bodyguards were wounded.  In the ensuing fracas, Mr. Niyazov denounced four former officials of his government, all expatriate at the time.  In the crackdown, forty-six people were eventually accused.  There are some who say that the assassination attempt was a staged piece of theatre; but Niyazov called it an act of terrorism. 

One of the prominent former officials of his government, Boris Shikhmuradov, had been a Foreign Minister for Turkmenistan and popular within diplomatic circles.  Upon the advent of accusations, Prima News Agency got in touch with Mr. Shikhmuradov for an interview on December 6th.  In that interview, Mr. Shikhmuradov was very forthcoming about the problems the Turkmenbashi was having with his rule:

repeated purges of the law enforcement agencies and the government, a disaster with the cotton harvest, Turkmen diplomacy failure at CIS summit in Kazakhstan and Caspian summit in Ashgabat, failure of negotiations with the Russian authoriteis about the supply of gas; dead-end situations with trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghan gas lines, and infamous failure of the negotiations with Uzbekistan about border disputes.  And on top of that also regular scandalous press, constant pressure from human rights organizations and OSCE . . .  also a story about the disappearance of USD 41.5 million from the country’s Centrobank. 

Later in the interview, he said Niyazov “invented enemies and is now mercilessly doing away with them.”  It was a drama to shift attention away from failures and to make the citizenry quiet.  Twenty days later, Mr. Shikhmuradov gave himself up to state security in order to stop the mass arrests in Turkmenistan.

After a trial where he was clearly tortured and medicated to incomprehensibility, Mr. Shikhmuradov was sentenced to life without parole in a closed, but videotaped trial.  By January 23, 2003, forty-six prisoners were tried and jailed.  Turkmenbashi had expelled the Uzbekistan Embassy from Turkmenistan, saying that President Karimov had some connections to the plot.  This created a reciprocal response, and Turkmenistan plunged into the isolationism already beginning to plague the state’s relations.  

I believe that this is the point where Turkmenbashi began to be run by his security services en toto, and through a final piece of blackmail.   In any case, it was a watershed event that changed the course of Turkmen relations for another four years and has left a lingering effect.

Of the at least 46 jailed over the plot, now eleven are freed.  Some are surely dead.  But we don’t know this for sure.   A better human rights regime in Turkmenistan would allow us to know more about prisoner treatment, and the status of the 35 extant prisoners of the assassination attempt that still remains such a mystery.  Over time, Central Asia-watchers and human-rights advocates can hope that increased transparency will be allowed in Turkmenistan.  With judicious diplomacy and some luck, Mr. Berdymukhamedov may continue to move in the direction of reform.  It seems that it is part of the orchestrated, incremental improvements and consolidations that he continues to make in Turkmenistan’s rule. 

Further reading:
Turaev, F. (2003, January 6).  Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: Central Asia’s new Cold War?  Transitions Online.  Available at Transitions online for a fee or at the CIAOnet database.
Olcott, M. (2003, November 21). at Eurasianet
Dr. Olcott’s most recent plea to free Mr. Shikhmuradov
Prima News Agency and BBC covered this case intensively, as did Eurasianet’s Turkmenistan Project. 

Photos: Chris Hodges for the truck; Prima.ru and BBC.

The Caspian sea is one home of the sturgeon, a large, unprepossessing fish that provides the world with one of its most tasty delicacies: caviar.  On August 11th, delegates met in Ashgabat in a regular meeting of the Commission on the Biological Resources of the Caspian Sea to discuss revising the quota system between the states for Caspian sturgeon fishing. 

Two big obstacles to fishing controls obtrude: first, there is significant poaching in Caspian waters, which makes quotas unenforceable.  Rampant poaching (estimated at 70% of the annual harvest) undermines the efforts to control overfishing which will decimate the species.  Second, pollution, particularly from oil spills, can severely decimate the sturgeon population.  Sturgeons are bottom-feeders, who nudge earth away from their shellfish dinners.  Therefore, pollution has the ability to kill not just fish, but their links on the food chain.

Politically, the Caspian Sea is still a realm of ambiguity in international law.  Parts of its jurisdiction are held in trust; other aspects of Caspian offshore ownership are owned by states.  The distinction as to whether the Caspian is a ‘Sea’ or a ‘Lake’ sets a precedent for either individual ownership or condominium rights.  Perhaps partly because this distinction has not been settled to Iran’s satisfaction, it is not a member of the Commission.  Without commission membership, Iran pretty much fishes as it will–over 50% of the catch estimated.  However, Iran is making calls for conservation and the use of aquaculture.  They were present at the Ashgabat meeting.

Primitive Fish in the Space Age: Satellite Tagging
In order to preserve the Genus of sturgeon that produce caviar, scientists in Kazakhstan have tagged some sturgeon to study their migratory habits via satellite.  The tagging occurred in May of 2006, shortly after a conference in Ramsar, Iran, of the World Sturgeon Conservation Society.  At that conference, the Ramsar Declaration on Global Sturgeon Conservation was proclaimed.  Iran’s waters are also known for their various sturgeon species, and they are estimated to fish about 50% of Caspian sturgeon each year.

As usual though, the problem is not space, but here on earth: the Ramsar Declaration is available in English and German: but not Russian, Farsi, Azeri, Turkmeni, or Kazakh.

Poaching, oil, lack of enforcement, lack of agreement, lack of translation:

Good luck fish.

Further Reading:
The World Sturgeon Conservation Society (WSCS) in Germany
Wikipedia on Sturgeon and Caviar Production  

Photo: Pew Ocean Science

Between the news agencies and the blog posts from Tajikistan’s residents, one can get a picture of Tajikistan that makes one wonder what people in Tajikistan are actually allowed to do:

1. Mosque leaders will be tested for religious capability by the state.

2. Unregistered mosques are being demolished.

3. A draft law that would regulate minority religious groups must petition in order to obtain legal recognition.

4. Madina over at NewEurasia.net writes about the new sumptuary laws that were passed earlier this year; and then goes on to detail the “recommended prices” for goods on the shelves, at the suggestion of President Rakhmonov.  Dear Mr. Rakhmonov, the U.S. had wage-price freezes in the early 1970’s, and they weren’t worth a hoot.  As Madina explains in her example, an artificial price will completely depress the supply of an item:

. . . according to Asia-Plus in the end of July, the city administration decided to establish the “recommended prices” to the essential goods, in the markets, including meat. As a result the “favorable” prices were set but the meat itself has disappeared from the counters: the merchants simply refused to sell their goods at the “recommended prices”. In their turn authorities responded by dismissing heads of the five main markets of Dushanbe. Similar situations took place in the past and still do when the Heads of Governmental Institutions are also dismissed for not having “fulfilled” their duties.

Madina goes on to explain the laws that constrain the media, with the new media draft law which holds journalists vulnerable for what they write. 

And then she notes that ‘the rule of rule’ will adversely affect human rights and media rights within the state.  This will in turn, she writes, have an adverse affect on perceptions of Tajikistan and, the amount of direct investment brought to the state. 

She’s right.

Photos: Eikongrafia.com; DBHS, Canada; and Sister Mary SmackDown from Jupiter Images

 New notes and data toward conclusions: but not conclusions.  Read on and form your own.

Over the weekend, I perused the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) World Drug Report 2007 that came out last month.  I’m going to start in Afghanistan and then follow various trade routes.  Since the opium market is a global market, this will eventually take us out of Central Asia and into the world at large.  

The map above is for 2006.  Here is the UNODC-2007 Map  in pdf.  (p. 61).

Afghanistan:
Doing the stats:
Price.
1. Farm-gate prices declined to USD 125 per kilo in December 2006 from USD 150 per kilo the previous year.  (p. 39).  This could be due to increased supply but also to a coordination of buyers into a cartel structure.  In general, however, I would assume that a buyer’s cartel would have driven the price far lower. Existence of such a cartel would indicate exponential trouble for counter-narcotics operations.

Processing.
2. Out of 8 countries who reported the destruction of  a total of 844 drug labs, Afghanistan destroyed 22% of them, or 186.  This seems to indicate that Afghanistan’s drug trade is sufficiently organized to have invested in “value-added” refinement on top of the agricultural trade.  (p. 39).
3. Afghanistan also reports increased seizure of the chemicals required to transform opium into morphine.

 Eradication.
4. Opium eradication occurred on 15, 300 hectares of Afghanistani fields.  (Table 2).
5. This left 165,000 hectares still in cultivation.  Doing the math: 15.3k/ 15.3 +165k = 0.0848, Which means that 8.5% of opium by area was eradicated. (p. 40).

Eurasian Traffic Patterns:
Route No. 1: Neighbors.
Iran: 53% of all Afghanistani opium traffics through Iran.  Iran also leads the world in opium seizures: 29% in 2005.  In part the nature of this large number of seizures are due to Iran’s large opiate consumption. (p. 47).
Pakistan: 33% of all Afghanistan’s opium traffics through Pakistan.  20% of all opiate seizures were made in Pakistan in 2005.   

Route No. 2:  South and outward. 
Since Afghanistan is a land-locked country, much of the traffic passes through Iran and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean.  One can see this, and also the role of maritime piracy/illegal sea trade by looking at the map of rising opiate abuse on page 61 of the report.  Afghanistan’s own use of opiates has risen markedly.  If one takes a ruler and angles it from Afghanistan to South Africa, the countries inbetween show either ‘marked rise’ of opiate use, or, some increase’ in opiate use.  Though Europe still has a higher opiate usage rate, this looks like far more than a foothold.

Route No. 3: West and then up.
Through Iran to Turkey and Bulgaria, and thence to Europe.  Increased interdiction efforts have shifted some of this traffic to travel through the Balkans, or the Ukraine, and thence to Europe. (p. 45).  Turkey seized 25% more this year than last, which suggests that this route remains of great importance. (p. 47).

Route No. 4: North and then West.
Through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and into Russia, other CIS states, the Baltics and Nordic states. (p. 45).  It is believed that traffic through Central Asia increased by 12% in 2006.  In 2005, Tajikistan accounted for 60% of all opiate captures in Central Asia.  But last year, their seizure rate declined 51%.   (p. 46). Since Tajikistan renewed its border patrol arrangements with Russia earlier this year, things could improve. 

Thanks to the UNODC and reporting states:
This is a nice piece of work, marred only by the failure of some countries to report (and for some countries, perhaps a little hedging on the information).  All of the states that reported deserve our appreciation and our admiration–and those that reported the worst news deserve our best regards for their honesty.  Since reporting sometimes has adverse effects on tourism and other kinds of direct investment, it is a sign of real political will to own up to the problems. 

It is also a step toward resolving the economic, security and public health problems inherent in opiate traffic. 
 

In the margins of the SCO conference, a bilateral agreement between China and Kazakhstan has furthered Kazakhstan’s trade relations and may potentially regularize Central Asia’s energy market.  Here’s the trade portion of the Central Asia NewsNet article, (somewhat edited here).  Note that higher energy prices increased the dollar volume:

A. In 2006 [China-Kazakhstani] bilateral trade volume hit USD 8.36 billion, up 22.8% as compared to 2005.
B. During the first half of 2007, the volume of trade turnover reached USD 5.97 billion, up 60.4 % as compared to the first half of 2006.
C. The volume of commodity trade turnover between Kazakhstan and China will reach USD 10 billion in 2007. According to previous plans, this figure was to be reached only by 2010.
D. In their Joint Communiqué, the two parties agreed to 1. cooperate to increase bilateral trade turnover by USD 15 billion by 2015, 2. strike a balance between bilateral export and import flows, and 3. diversify the structure of commodity trade.

A new development may be an SCO Energy Club, with a combination of investment opportunities through a bourse, and, hopefully, a more integrated and even redundant utility plan.  Right now, much energy commerce is complicated by Uzbekistan’s intransigence.  As Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan develop their hydropower and Kazakhstan concentrates on a Central Asian economic community, Uzbekistan may find that its stubbornness leaves them out of the decision-making process.

Photo: Energy bourse, Montreal, from ville.montreal.qc.ca

News? What news?
Kazakhstan had elections this Saturday after a short campaign season.  President Nazarbaev’s Nur-Otan party won over 80% of the legislative seats, and handily.  The OSCE sent observers, who again found the elections to be ‘not free and not fair’. 

The observers noted that ballot-boxes were allegedly stuffed; that the short election season put Kazakhstan’s minority party at a disadvantage, that votes were counted non-transparently; and that protests have to be within the law that Nur-Otan government will continue to set.

End of story?  Well, not exactly. 

Though OSCE observers describe an electoral reality, it focusses on domestic doings and omits a lot of international context.  In some ways, the tone–”business as usual”– is correct.  In other ways, it makes this pesky business sound like something that only happens in Kazakhstan to Kazakhstanis.  It allows other OSCE states to justify nixing Kazakhstan’s OSCE ambitions, which are very real and which look like burnt toast at the moment.  But as long as we take this as business as usual, we’re missing a point of view which the Kazakhstanis could justifiably hold.  And it may be past time for Kazakhstan to tell its own story in the sacred halls of the OSCE Secretariat.  But first, some background.

Election background:
Recent constitutional changes increased the number of seats and allowed for more minority representation.  The new constitution was supposed to help Kazakhstan conform more closely to OSCE democratization guidelines.

With every constitutional re-write, the opportunity for change cuts both ways.  The amendments for legislative reform were also accompanied by a less-democratic change, a one-person-only abrogation of term limits in the executive branch.  Though the term between elections remains the same (it has been extended constitutionally before), and Mr. Nazarbaev must run, the exception allows President Nazarbaev to run for office as many times as he feels necessary or desirable. 

Unfortunately, this term-unlimit left Kazakhstan in less conformity to OSCE democratization guidelines than before.  It also precipitated a fall-out within the Nazarbaev family which has become the Rakhat-gate scandal.  The scandal has focussed attention upon a. various non-transparent financial arrangements, particularly with banks, and media organizations; b. various kinds of criminal impunity for high-ranking members of Mr. Nazarbaev’s close-knit cadre, and c. (although few people are discussing this) the relationship of European non-transparency to Kazakhstani non-transparency.

Rakhat-gate:
As soon as Mr. Aliev made his disappointment public about the extension of Mr. Nazarbaev’s ability to run for office, it focussed attention upon the two men.  Though much is admirable about Mr. Nazarbaev, his son-in-law has never been portrayed as an admirable person in the media, with rumors of personal vendettas against others backed up by threats and violence, unfinished and/or unrealized power plays against Mr. Nazarbaev, and a distressing lack of subtlety in all of his dealings with the world.  But since he was kept on by Mr. Nazarbaev in various powerful positions, there was a suggestion of approval and impunity.  Eventually, this lack of finesse finally became too large to contain in context of the Nurbank scandal, where bank executives were killed and property transferred in a way which could not be hidden or excused.

In the fallout, the divorce between Nazarbaev and Aliev (much more important than the divorce between Darigha Nazarbaeva and Aliev), there were more non-transparent property transfers: first, at Nurbank, and second, of the Nazarbaeva-Aliev media empire.  The results were published, but they came so fast that no one understood how they were transferred and with what compensation. 

Certainly Nurbank’s property settlements had to be changed if force was used, for instance, in transferring the real property assets of the bank.  Maybe asset transfers should have taken place in the legal sphere.  Yet many of Nurbank’s ‘internal changes’ are no different than what occurs in Western enterprises who have ‘management shakeups.’  Likewise, some broadcasting outlets were closed for legitimate violations of broadcast permits, yet they had not been closed down earlier.   And when they re-opened, it was under new management: management shakeup or opaque deal?  Where does one draw the line?  For Kazakhstan, the family connections blur the distinction between the governmental and the private sector, the internal and the external.   Can we say this is untrue of other, more powerful or self-righteous OSCE states?  

European de facto collusion:
Transparency in all of the crimes associated with the Nurbank scandal and Rakhat-gate could have been furthered on the European end under two conditions: first, Austria could be more public about their own investigation of scandals allegedly associated with  Mr. Aliev, and second, Austrian courts could have extradited Mr. Aliev for trial.  They could have sought, as European Courts did in the U.S. with the Soering Case, that Aliev be not tried under sentence of death, but instead, life in prison.  But this did not occur: therefore Mr. Aliev will never have to testify or have his dealings revealed in a legitimate court.  If you were Kazakhstani, you could well argue that governmental/business transparency would have been achieved by trying Mr. Aliev–and which would also have put paid to the idea of family impunity.  Therefore, continued opacity and impunity have been guaranteed by Austria: not Kazakhstan.  Yet it is Kazakhstan whom we commonly view as non-transparent.

Summing it up: bad habits all around
In many ways, it’s difficult to blame Kazakhstan for their seamless backing of Mr. Nazarbaev as perpetually-running president of Kazakhstan.  His executive skills are masterly, and most of his policies have worked really well.  He’s done a great job in stimulating economic benefit within the country, and has managed to extend Kazakhstan’s bilateral relations past the Central Asian region.  His leadership creates stability within the country, and he has reached out past his borders to facilitate stability within the Central Asian region.  He is a diplomatic genius, who is able to remain flexible in a region where every great power wants absolute, uncompromising loyalty.  In most democratic countries, voters cast their ballots with the economy in mind, unless they are afraid of looming security threats.  Why should Kazakhstan be any different?

Yet on the other hand, if Kazakhstanis are so satisfied, there’s no need to have irregularities in elections.  Nur-Otan didn’t need 86% majority to form a credible, majority government. 

Yet I suspect there are some calculations in here that we have all missed because of a habitual stance of over-righteousness.  It’s good to remember that the aphorism that absolute power corrupts absolutely was not invented for post-Soviet states, but for all situations of power, from the family on up to international governance structures.  Some of the conflict over Kazakhstan’s leadership of the OSCE is self-serving, and it is this self-serving aspect which has escalated the conflict to come over Kazakhstan’s OSCE leadership bid.  And if the more-powerful states come across to Kazakhstan as judges and jury, I think they can expect to hit Kazakhstan in its identity and in its vanity, two really bad places to inflict injury.  In the occurence of electoral manipulation, leadership changes in large companies, and ‘heirs apparent’, such responses are not only injurious, but often somewhat hypocritical.  Yes, Kazakhstan should have free and fair elections.  They should have more transparency.  Their journalists should be able to write reasoned editorials from all sides of the spectrum.  Mr. Nazarbaev should loosen up the reins of power.  And the OSCE, and particularly the Western media that reports international community concerns should come up with a better public dialogue than habitual, unthinking pomposity – but I fear they won’t.

Further reading:
BBC on the OSCE — noting, as you will, that only Warsaw Pact and Former Soviet states are listed — uh-huh.  But you can’t blame all this on the BBC when we all do it, now can you?

You can read more on Rakhat-gate from previous posts.