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	<title>Comments on: SCO: Epilogue 2007</title>
	<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/</link>
	<description>American Foreign Policy Analysis in Central Asia</description>
	<pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2008 09:26:51 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>by: A Second Hand Conjecture &#187; News Brief, Pizazz We're Gonna Give It To You* Edition</title>
		<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/#comment-1195</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2007 22:25:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/#comment-1195</guid>
					<description>[...] These two takes on the SCO exercises (covered in sometimes much greater depth here, at Registan.net, and Bonnie Boyd&#8217;s Central Asia blog) have some interesting tidbits: the PLA has never performed a distance deployment before, and it&#8217;s a lot of hoopla over nothing, since they didn&#8217;t mean much and didn&#8217;t accomplish much by our standards. Our standards. Our standards are pretty high—a decade ago we were air-dropping battalions from Missouri to Shymkent non-stop—and not matching such incredible capability doesn&#8217;t matter very much. The real purpose of this exercise was coordination, and a sort of show-of-force: proving other countries can organize outside of NATO and the UNSC. That being said, the irrational hostility toward the Chinese is beyond tiresome at this point. China has no real expeditionary capability to speak of, and could never sustain any sort of foreign deployment without significant foreign support (the Chinese troops in Lebanon and Darfur are supported by UN logistics, for example). What&#8217;s more, not since invading Vietnam in 1979 have they deployed troops beyond their borders without UN sanction—a milestone we have yet to match. China is also hypersensitive to world opinion and its foreign relations in a way I wish we could be, which gives them a great deal of gravitas (if you will) when dealing with collective security issues. So I chalk the SCO exercises up to a big-time win for China&#8230; and a medium win for Russia, and all the other SCO countries. And of course, a big smack on the nose to the U.S.—perhaps not coincidentally just as Ms. Boyd did. These sorts of wargames are never (I should say rarely) about war itself or the militaries involved, they about the politics of the individual nations, and the nations at which they are directed. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[&#8230;] These two takes on the SCO exercises (covered in sometimes much greater depth here, at Registan.net, and Bonnie Boyd&#8217;s Central Asia blog) have some interesting tidbits: the PLA has never performed a distance deployment before, and it&#8217;s a lot of hoopla over nothing, since they didn&#8217;t mean much and didn&#8217;t accomplish much by our standards. Our standards. Our standards are pretty high—a decade ago we were air-dropping battalions from Missouri to Shymkent non-stop—and not matching such incredible capability doesn&#8217;t matter very much. The real purpose of this exercise was coordination, and a sort of show-of-force: proving other countries can organize outside of NATO and the UNSC. That being said, the irrational hostility toward the Chinese is beyond tiresome at this point. China has no real expeditionary capability to speak of, and could never sustain any sort of foreign deployment without significant foreign support (the Chinese troops in Lebanon and Darfur are supported by UN logistics, for example). What&#8217;s more, not since invading Vietnam in 1979 have they deployed troops beyond their borders without UN sanction—a milestone we have yet to match. China is also hypersensitive to world opinion and its foreign relations in a way I wish we could be, which gives them a great deal of gravitas (if you will) when dealing with collective security issues. So I chalk the SCO exercises up to a big-time win for China&#8230; and a medium win for Russia, and all the other SCO countries. And of course, a big smack on the nose to the U.S.—perhaps not coincidentally just as Ms. Boyd did. These sorts of wargames are never (I should say rarely) about war itself or the militaries involved, they about the politics of the individual nations, and the nations at which they are directed. [&#8230;]
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		<title>by: bboyd</title>
		<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/#comment-1188</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2007 16:30:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/#comment-1188</guid>
					<description>Dear Josh,
I wonder how it compares with SCO coverage in China and Russia.  One thing I have wondered: was Kyrgyzstan too worried about a mis-step to allow something that Russia, at least, would have been more ready for?

If that is part of it, then we can probably expect Tajikistan next year to go the same way.  

Anyway, I'm very grateful for your posts on the conference.  I don't mind telling you, I laughed myself silly at the absurdity.  In the absence of real news, all that's left is for people to make outsized conspiracy claims . . . and I am glad you are not one of that number.

Come visit anytime,

Bonnie</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dear Josh,<br />
I wonder how it compares with SCO coverage in China and Russia.  One thing I have wondered: was Kyrgyzstan too worried about a mis-step to allow something that Russia, at least, would have been more ready for?</p>
<p>If that is part of it, then we can probably expect Tajikistan next year to go the same way.  </p>
<p>Anyway, I&#8217;m very grateful for your posts on the conference.  I don&#8217;t mind telling you, I laughed myself silly at the absurdity.  In the absence of real news, all that&#8217;s left is for people to make outsized conspiracy claims . . . and I am glad you are not one of that number.</p>
<p>Come visit anytime,</p>
<p>Bonnie
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		<title>by: Josh</title>
		<link>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/#comment-1177</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Aug 2007 04:04:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://centralasia.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2007/08/20/sco-epilogue-2007/#comment-1177</guid>
					<description>Yes, you're right that it wasn't that different from large event coverage everywhere. And though I haven't covered a lot of large events, while maybe they're 90 percent dog-and-pony show, there are tiny opportunities to get people in the halls, talk to outliers on the meetings who will brief you on details, and so on. This was striking because there was absolutely nothing.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yes, you&#8217;re right that it wasn&#8217;t that different from large event coverage everywhere. And though I haven&#8217;t covered a lot of large events, while maybe they&#8217;re 90 percent dog-and-pony show, there are tiny opportunities to get people in the halls, talk to outliers on the meetings who will brief you on details, and so on. This was striking because there was absolutely nothing.
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