Kazakhstan v. OSCE v. elections: The rig is in?
News? What news?
Kazakhstan had elections this Saturday after a short campaign season. President Nazarbaev’s Nur-Otan party won over 80% of the legislative seats, and handily. The OSCE sent observers, who again found the elections to be ‘not free and not fair’.
The observers noted that ballot-boxes were allegedly stuffed; that the short election season put Kazakhstan’s minority party at a disadvantage, that votes were counted non-transparently; and that protests have to be within the law that Nur-Otan government will continue to set.
End of story? Well, not exactly.
Though OSCE observers describe an electoral reality, it focusses on domestic doings and omits a lot of international context. In some ways, the tone–”business as usual”– is correct. In other ways, it makes this pesky business sound like something that only happens in Kazakhstan to Kazakhstanis. It allows other OSCE states to justify nixing Kazakhstan’s OSCE ambitions, which are very real and which look like burnt toast at the moment. But as long as we take this as business as usual, we’re missing a point of view which the Kazakhstanis could justifiably hold. And it may be past time for Kazakhstan to tell its own story in the sacred halls of the OSCE Secretariat. But first, some background.
Election background:
Recent constitutional changes increased the number of seats and allowed for more minority representation. The new constitution was supposed to help Kazakhstan conform more closely to OSCE democratization guidelines.
With every constitutional re-write, the opportunity for change cuts both ways. The amendments for legislative reform were also accompanied by a less-democratic change, a one-person-only abrogation of term limits in the executive branch. Though the term between elections remains the same (it has been extended constitutionally before), and Mr. Nazarbaev must run, the exception allows President Nazarbaev to run for office as many times as he feels necessary or desirable.
Unfortunately, this term-unlimit left Kazakhstan in less conformity to OSCE democratization guidelines than before. It also precipitated a fall-out within the Nazarbaev family which has become the Rakhat-gate scandal. The scandal has focussed attention upon a. various non-transparent financial arrangements, particularly with banks, and media organizations; b. various kinds of criminal impunity for high-ranking members of Mr. Nazarbaev’s close-knit cadre, and c. (although few people are discussing this) the relationship of European non-transparency to Kazakhstani non-transparency.
Rakhat-gate:
As soon as Mr. Aliev made his disappointment public about the extension of Mr. Nazarbaev’s ability to run for office, it focussed attention upon the two men. Though much is admirable about Mr. Nazarbaev, his son-in-law has never been portrayed as an admirable person in the media, with rumors of personal vendettas against others backed up by threats and violence, unfinished and/or unrealized power plays against Mr. Nazarbaev, and a distressing lack of subtlety in all of his dealings with the world. But since he was kept on by Mr. Nazarbaev in various powerful positions, there was a suggestion of approval and impunity. Eventually, this lack of finesse finally became too large to contain in context of the Nurbank scandal, where bank executives were killed and property transferred in a way which could not be hidden or excused.
In the fallout, the divorce between Nazarbaev and Aliev (much more important than the divorce between Darigha Nazarbaeva and Aliev), there were more non-transparent property transfers: first, at Nurbank, and second, of the Nazarbaeva-Aliev media empire. The results were published, but they came so fast that no one understood how they were transferred and with what compensation.
Certainly Nurbank’s property settlements had to be changed if force was used, for instance, in transferring the real property assets of the bank. Maybe asset transfers should have taken place in the legal sphere. Yet many of Nurbank’s ‘internal changes’ are no different than what occurs in Western enterprises who have ‘management shakeups.’ Likewise, some broadcasting outlets were closed for legitimate violations of broadcast permits, yet they had not been closed down earlier. And when they re-opened, it was under new management: management shakeup or opaque deal? Where does one draw the line? For Kazakhstan, the family connections blur the distinction between the governmental and the private sector, the internal and the external. Can we say this is untrue of other, more powerful or self-righteous OSCE states?
European de facto collusion:
Transparency in all of the crimes associated with the Nurbank scandal and Rakhat-gate could have been furthered on the European end under two conditions: first, Austria could be more public about their own investigation of scandals allegedly associated with Mr. Aliev, and second, Austrian courts could have extradited Mr. Aliev for trial. They could have sought, as European Courts did in the U.S. with the Soering Case, that Aliev be not tried under sentence of death, but instead, life in prison. But this did not occur: therefore Mr. Aliev will never have to testify or have his dealings revealed in a legitimate court. If you were Kazakhstani, you could well argue that governmental/business transparency would have been achieved by trying Mr. Aliev–and which would also have put paid to the idea of family impunity. Therefore, continued opacity and impunity have been guaranteed by Austria: not Kazakhstan. Yet it is Kazakhstan whom we commonly view as non-transparent.
Summing it up: bad habits all around
In many ways, it’s difficult to blame Kazakhstan for their seamless backing of Mr. Nazarbaev as perpetually-running president of Kazakhstan. His executive skills are masterly, and most of his policies have worked really well. He’s done a great job in stimulating economic benefit within the country, and has managed to extend Kazakhstan’s bilateral relations past the Central Asian region. His leadership creates stability within the country, and he has reached out past his borders to facilitate stability within the Central Asian region. He is a diplomatic genius, who is able to remain flexible in a region where every great power wants absolute, uncompromising loyalty. In most democratic countries, voters cast their ballots with the economy in mind, unless they are afraid of looming security threats. Why should Kazakhstan be any different?
Yet on the other hand, if Kazakhstanis are so satisfied, there’s no need to have irregularities in elections. Nur-Otan didn’t need 86% majority to form a credible, majority government.
Yet I suspect there are some calculations in here that we have all missed because of a habitual stance of over-righteousness. It’s good to remember that the aphorism that absolute power corrupts absolutely was not invented for post-Soviet states, but for all situations of power, from the family on up to international governance structures. Some of the conflict over Kazakhstan’s leadership of the OSCE is self-serving, and it is this self-serving aspect which has escalated the conflict to come over Kazakhstan’s OSCE leadership bid. And if the more-powerful states come across to Kazakhstan as judges and jury, I think they can expect to hit Kazakhstan in its identity and in its vanity, two really bad places to inflict injury. In the occurence of electoral manipulation, leadership changes in large companies, and ‘heirs apparent’, such responses are not only injurious, but often somewhat hypocritical. Yes, Kazakhstan should have free and fair elections. They should have more transparency. Their journalists should be able to write reasoned editorials from all sides of the spectrum. Mr. Nazarbaev should loosen up the reins of power. And the OSCE, and particularly the Western media that reports international community concerns should come up with a better public dialogue than habitual, unthinking pomposity – but I fear they won’t.
Further reading:
BBC on the OSCE — noting, as you will, that only Warsaw Pact and Former Soviet states are listed — uh-huh. But you can’t blame all this on the BBC when we all do it, now can you?
You can read more on Rakhat-gate from previous posts.
August 21st, 2007 at 7:04 am
[…] Arthur concludes that Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections which took place this weekend were seriously flawed, both because of irregularities on voting day itself and, equally important, because of skewed media coverage of the poll’s contestants. Plus: Bonnie Boyd writes a great backgrounder on the elections. Share This […]
August 21st, 2007 at 10:04 am
You made a major error in your posting - Nazarbaev’s Nur Otan party didn’t win 88% of the seats.. they won ALL of the seats. There is a 7% threshold that a party must reach to gain any seats, and none of the other parties reached it. So the whole parliament will be Nur Otan party people - welcome to an official single-party state. (To be fair, there were no opposition parties in the previous parliament either, so maybe more a continuation of a single party state - especially since the new electoral rules prohibit independent candidates.)
The larger point that Nazarbaev has been successful is relatively moot. The strongest years of growth have come since 2001 when world energy prices have been high. It would be fairly staggering if any government of an energy exporting state failed to post strong growth. This wealth is also conducive to buying off and suppressing alternative power structures (even in his own family), ensuring relative stability.
He has acted well on the international stage, balancing well among the US-China-Russia nexus of interest in the region, but domestic problems - health, poverty, environmental degradation, and lack of freedoms loom large under the exterior of “economic success.” From what I’ve read, he has done little to lead a transformation and modernization of the Kazakh economy. The oil sector alone accounts for more than 30% of the economy, not counting natural gas and the other natural resources that Kazakhstan exports.
In my opinion, the fate of the Nazarbaev family will be that of the world economy. If growth stays strong around the world, especially in China, he can rely on strong prices to continue to provide the rents needed to maintain control. If the global economy stalls and there is a significant drop in the price of oil, natural gas, or other resources, he will be left with a angry population wondering where all that oil money went and a divided elite hungry for continued rents.
Anyway, that’s my $0.02.
August 21st, 2007 at 11:21 am
Dear Dan,
Your two-cents is worth a lot more than you’re advertising . . . That is right and I stand corrected: Nur Otan did win all the seats due to the 7-percent rule. I didn’t convey that properly and will put it in the post above.
Second, you are also not wrong about the need to diversify Kazakhstan’s economy–and that oil provides benefits that are so soon squandered. I try to track as many of these as I can find, and there are many. The other problem besides petroleum price, of course, is that eventually Kazakhstan will be out of oilsupply. These decades are their prime opportunity to bring the state up into an independent vibrant economy, with a strong middle class. Therefore transparency issues are crucial. Human rights issues are also crucial and a media provides a way to gauge all of these things. No question!
However, this post was also about the two-theme diplomacy of the OSCE. The desire to create non-Russian avenues of energy distribution in Kazakhstan creates one kind of single-minded diplomacy while the international governance crowd has another kind of single-minded diplomacy. I think the Kazakhstanis sometimes must feel as if they are talking to a person with two heads, both of which are yakking away at once, when they listen to the OSCE/West. So much of the discourse is repetitive and habitual. Attempts to reconcile the two voices, equally insistent, are seldom made.
Furthermore, seldom does public discourse reconcile Western aspirations with Kazakhstan’s reality. International governance people expect a state 16 years old to have the same ability to provide transparency or rule of law or income opportunity as a state like Austria or the United States, both of whom have problems with these issues at present: (or pick any state, but, for instance, the GINI coefficient in Kazakhstan shows better income-sharing than does the GINI for the U.S.̵
It might be better for us to share our problems with Kazakhstan than to lecture their government.
Likewise, the petroleum diplomats (or more accurately maybe, media pundits) sometimes fail to understand that Kazakhstan cannot afford to have only Western customers when they have many hungry neighbors.
I see Kazakhstan as making many significant steps toward a diverse economy. I see Rakhat-gate as a painful opportunity for more transparency in Kazakhstan, coupled with an opportunity for more secrecy. Austria’s court ruling has not tipped the balance toward transparency.
Please write in again, in response or any time. Your comments are much appreciated.
Bonnie
August 21st, 2007 at 1:45 pm
Thanks for the quick reply:
I agree, I like your commentary on the broader OSCE politics which are influencing the interaction between the West and Kazakhstan. The definitely are tensions sometimes, even within the same institution, about the end goals. A larger effort needs to be made by the OSCE to reconcile the dual messages, but (and this is maybe the fault of the OSCE) the issues of economic development and democracy/human rights shouldn’t be joined [naive, I know].
Second, I think that your point about how transparency could have been promoted if Austria just extradited Aliev also doesn’t really stand up. Everyone, even the Kazakh public, probably realizes that he would not have had a trial in a “legitimate” court. Is there a “legitimate court” in KZ? Sending him back for a show trial wouldn’t really do much, except maybe provide Nazarbaev with a ready-made demonstration of what he would do to the Kazakh elites who even question his rule.
Now, whether he should be extradited is a different question entirely, one that I am not decided on. On one hand, I think that Aliev is / was obviously involved in some very ruthless activities by just being part off Nazarbaev’s inner circle. Anything he gets he probably has coming to him by just playing the ruthless game. However, there may be some benefit to not extraditing him. Keeping him free from Nazarbaev’s grasps may provide him the shelter / opportunity to really spout off about the levels of corruption and depravity that go on in the KZ government. Not that he would be pursuing it out of any altruistic drive, but his knowledge (and perhaps those of others who have confidence to come forward later) could facilitate fractures in the elite circles.
Third, why should countries have different standards of transparency just because one a new nation? Obviously it takes time to develop and build capacity, but by setting or excusing countries on account of the recentness of their independence creates a “bigotry of low expectations” scenario. Futhermore, there are a number of other countries that received independence from the Sov Union at the same time and are able to meet or nearly meet the international standards of transparency. Now there may be different factors which contribute to this (ie - allure of EU membership, nature domination by USSR, etc), but that should prevent international orgs from pressuring them to meet standards.
Besides, it is a bit different when there is a new, poor country with a government that is at least trying to meet the standards and there is a new, poor country where the government is obviously not trying to meet international standards, but doing the least amount necessary to maintain complete control but still win approval.
Last, let’s not get started about the comparative Gini scores of the US & West v. Kazakhstan. a) there are major issues about how you calculate it in terms of what are the size of percentiles, b) it only measures relative income equality, but not necessarily wealth disparity c) different Lorenz curves can give equal scores but mean extremely different things on the ground, d) it doesn’t take into account over all social development - even if Kazakhstan has a better Gini score, you’d be hard pressed to argue that someone from lowest x-percentile in Kazakhstan would be better off than the lowest x-percentile in the US e) the Gini coefficient is only as good as the data provided / available on a country
Why not just compare something like the human development index scores?
Anyway.. my brief rebuttal. I don’t know how coherent it is given I just spat it out while multitasking at work. I enjoy the blog. I was going to apply for this position myself, but I didn’t end up getting to it. I’m glad you got it, it’s been interesting to read. Keep it up.
August 21st, 2007 at 4:34 pm
Dear Dan,
I’ll go for a lot of what you say, or in other places get where you’re going, except: there’s a lot of alternatives between sending Aliev to Kazakhstan and setting him loose to party down in London or whatever he’s up to. In any case, Aliev’s trial would have been closely watched by international media, provided it was an open trial. Which Austria could have bargained for: a. an open trial and b. no death sentence. What a strike for the rule of law it could have been.
Thanks for writing back,
Bonnie
August 22nd, 2007 at 9:59 am
Dear Bonnie and Dan,
I read your posts with much interest. I myself are just in the process of writing a commentary on the recent elections in KAZ and I have to admit that two “souls” want to take advantage of my opinion
First thing the election itself: it is fact that these elections (on the voting day) were more free and transparent than the ones before. I could talk with some OSCE observers from Western Europe and US and all of them told me that there was no obvious manipulation, pressure on voters, etc. Probably we all have to admit that the Kazakh society has much trust in NN and his politics. Everybody in KAZ knows that the key-players from other parties were part of the ruling system. In their opinion they ask themselves: Why should we change the running horse?
Second the preps for election: The opp’s had more chances to be presented in the media, although it is more than obvious that they did not have the equal chance, compared with Nur Otan. Of course the election came too early for parties like ANSPK, which just recently united with True Ak Zhol. There was no pressure, persecution on their leaders during the campaign (compared with the KAZ elections in the 90’s and the ones in 2004 and 2005).
Third the results: This is a thing I really do not understand (also a comment on the previous Presidential Elections): NN and his party would have also won when having the most democratic elections in the world. Why 91 % in 2005, why all Parliament seats in 2007? Obviously this was a sign for the people in KAZ, not for the OSCE guys/countries. We all have to admit that mentality in Central Asia is different. When going to small town and cities in KAz (not Almaty), NN is the big Daddy and people there never heard of Tuyakby, Abilov or Kozhakhmetov. All major opposition parties are only present in the financial capital, not in the hole country.
The OSCE: I am working closely with OSCE for several years now and I really do not know what their strategy is on the 2009 issue. All Western countries welcomed KAZ bid in 2003, when it came to the discussion. It was a problem of OSCE that the organization did not define benchmarks for KAZ, how to achieve this goal, they fell asleep until December 2006, when they had to decide in Brussels. On the one hand they wanted the hydrocarbons, a functioning OSCE with the support of Russia and they hoped that a smile toward KAZ would bring the country and the hole region closer to Europ. Then they were surprised that it didnt work, when meeting in Brusseld at the OSCE’s Ministerial Council. Especially most of the EU members (on front Germany, France and even Netherlands) supported openly the KAZ bid. How will they react now, after election day in KAZ? I dont know. Germany e.g. became a little bit more cautious after the Aliyev trouble.
I think the main problem is the perspective from where you try to analyze the situation: For a Kazakh, it might sound arrogant what Western observers say and do: The German Chancellor can run as many times as he likes to rule the country; we all know that corruption is not a speciality of KAZ; the West wants to have our gas and oil, but they want to give us advice on how we should build-up our society.On the contrary we in the West look to KAZ and can only quote that the politics and the administration is corrupt, anti-democratic and totalitarian.
E.g. and interview with me was published in a KAZ newspaper (not one from the opposition, “close-to-the-government” one, although the KAZ government/official journalists know that I support democratic change in KAZ. This did not happen in UZB or TRKM, where my name is on the black list. So I have to underline the fact that some changes in KAZ are obvious.
On the other hand we all have to decide, which facts should be the point for giving the OSCE chairmanship to KAZ: In my view they have to fulfill all organization’s commitments. That’s what the OSCE stands for. But beside KAZ we also have to criticize the Western member states, not the organization itself: they want a system in KAZ that is even not realized in Western countries (e.g. US Presidential elections, Berlusconi politics in Italy, etc.
Maybe my comment is a little bit confused, I will try to be more structured in my commentary
Michael
August 22nd, 2007 at 9:59 am
Dear Bonnie and Dan,
I read your posts with much interest. I myself are just in the process of writing a commentary on the recent elections in KAZ and I have to admit that two “souls” want to take advantage of my opinion
First thing the election itself: it is fact that these elections (on the voting day) were more free and transparent than the ones before. I could talk with some OSCE observers from Western Europe and US and all of them told me that there was no obvious manipulation, pressure on voters, etc. Probably we all have to admit that the Kazakh society has much trust in NN and his politics. Everybody in KAZ knows that the key-players from other parties were part of the ruling system. In their opinion they ask themselves: Why should we change the running horse?
Second the preps for election: The opp’s had more chances to be presented in the media, although it is more than obvious that they did not have the equal chance, compared with Nur Otan. Of course the election came too early for parties like ANSPK, which just recently united with True Ak Zhol. There was no pressure, persecution on their leaders during the campaign (compared with the KAZ elections in the 90’s and the ones in 2004 and 2005).
Third the results: This is a thing I really do not understand (also a comment on the previous Presidential Elections): NN and his party would have also won when having the most democratic elections in the world. Why 91 % in 2005, why all Parliament seats in 2007? Obviously this was a sign for the people in KAZ, not for the OSCE guys/countries. We all have to admit that mentality in Central Asia is different. When going to small town and cities in KAz (not Almaty), NN is the big Daddy and people there never heard of Tuyakby, Abilov or Kozhakhmetov. All major opposition parties are only present in the financial capital, not in the hole country.
The OSCE: I am working closely with OSCE for several years now and I really do not know what their strategy is on the 2009 issue. All Western countries welcomed KAZ bid in 2003, when it came to the discussion. It was a problem of OSCE that the organization did not define benchmarks for KAZ, how to achieve this goal, they fell asleep until December 2006, when they had to decide in Brussels. On the one hand they wanted the hydrocarbons, a functioning OSCE with the support of Russia and they hoped that a smile toward KAZ would bring the country and the hole region closer to Europ. Then they were surprised that it didnt work, when meeting in Brusseld at the OSCE’s Ministerial Council. Especially most of the EU members (on front Germany, France and even Netherlands) supported openly the KAZ bid. How will they react now, after election day in KAZ? I dont know. Germany e.g. became a little bit more cautious after the Aliyev trouble.
I think the main problem is the perspective from where you try to analyze the situation: For a Kazakh, it might sound arrogant what Western observers say and do: The German Chancellor can run as many times as he likes to rule the country; we all know that corruption is not a speciality of KAZ; the West wants to have our gas and oil, but they want to give us advice on how we should build-up our society.On the contrary we in the West look to KAZ and can only quote that the politics and the administration is corrupt, anti-democratic and totalitarian.
E.g. and interview with me was published in a KAZ newspaper (not one from the opposition, “close-to-the-government” one, although the KAZ government/official journalists know that I support democratic change in KAZ. This did not happen in UZB or TRKM, where my name is on the black list. So I have to underline the fact that some changes in KAZ are obvious.
On the other hand we all have to decide, which facts should be the point for giving the OSCE chairmanship to KAZ: In my view they have to fulfill all organization’s commitments. That’s what the OSCE stands for. But beside KAZ we also have to criticize the Western member states, not the organization itself: they want a system in KAZ that is even not realized in Western countries (e.g. US Presidential elections, Berlusconi politics in Italy, etc.
Maybe my comment is a little bit confused, I will try to be more structured in my article for ETG
Michael
August 22nd, 2007 at 10:00 am
sorry for the double one
August 22nd, 2007 at 10:17 am
Dear Michael,
As usual, your comments are always worthwhile. Thanks for writing in. I will definitely link to your article when you have it up. and may poach big parts of it as well as the comments here for another post. Because:
This has been a great thread of comments and I am so proud to have such cogent, thoughtful readers.
Bonnie
December 6th, 2007 at 1:25 pm
[…] Gee, I hate when I’m wrong. I was rooting for Kazakhstan and OSCE chairmanship, but I didn’t think they’d get the chance after Rakhat-gate blew into the stratosphere. But they have it, which, as I said, and against most of the reactions, I think is a good thing. […]
December 9th, 2007 at 12:28 pm
Hi Bonnie, this is a great blog. I am ashamed to say I only just found it through a link on Registan.net. Much needed.
Regarding this particular post — I find the exchange a bit of over-thinking.
It’s pretty simple: run a fair election and you can be chairman. That’s a non-negotiable qualification, in my opinion. Otherwise you lack the moral authority over the other members.
By making oil part of the OSCE equation, you corrupt the issue — and the organization — instantly. Having oil is not a qualification for membership or chairmanship, the last time I checked.
What is a qualification is honoring the precepts of the OSCE, which is the respect of the voice of the electorate. Kazakhstan has never done that. I lived and worked in Kazakhstan for eight years, and there was nothing free about any of its elections. No true rival candidate or party has been permitted to compete fairly.
Neither is this an issue of being pristine (there is no pristine country). It’s a matter of not equivocating on your main reasons for existence, and in the case of the OSCE one of them is holding free and fair elections.
The choice of Kazakhstan makes a mockery of the OSCE charter.
Steve LeVine, author
The Oil and the Glory: The Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian Sea (Random House)
http://www.oilandglory.com