Central Asia

Lots of news: this is just some of it.  Most of the news agencies seem to carry the domestic aspects for their own states of Afghanistan commitments–while most of the Afghanistan blogs seem to cover Afghanistan itself.  There may be something to think about in that picture.

Accurate reporting encouraged:
–A wonderfully sarcastic week at Afghanistanica, where the urban/international myth of Chechen fighters in Afghanistan is ruthlessly torn apart.  Then, a new example of this kind of misinformation concerning a non-Chechen “Chechen” cross-dressing incident is analyzed to underscore the point.  Hail, Afghanistanica!
–But not yet done: Afghanistanica then trounces the intellectual bombast and vanity that assails the ivory tower and prevents meaningful study. . . or change. . .
–Carl Robichaud is back at Afghanistan Watch, and reports on fighting at an Afghanistan drug lab, and questions whether fighting means Taliban or narcotraffickers or both.  We Afghanistan-watchers would like some background for the labels we’re given, yes?
–And in locations as well:  Peter Marton gives good reason to doubt reports by location, specifically in Tarin Kowt. 

It’s so interesting and maddening that these themes keep popping up.

Hostage, Incorporated:
–The last 19 South Korean hostages were freed over the past two days, in small groups at various collection points.  Of 23 hostages from the ROK kidnapped July 17th, two male hostages had been killed, and two previously released.  The South Korean goverment had to agree to withdraw their troops (as previously planned) by the end of the year.  They also had to agree to respect Taliban isolationism, including no missionaries (no surprise) but no visitors of any kind.  An undisclosed ransom has also likely been paid.
–Now that the hostages are freed, a backlash against the alleged reckless endangerment of missionaries by Church societies will begin.
–A Taliban spokesman has reportedly vowed that the Taliban will continue their kidnapping activities.
–And it seems so: the Taliban possibly captured as many as 100 Pakistani soldiers this week.
–And Mayor Shah is still missing from last week.  German hostages still missing.

Diplomacy:
–I missed this earlier, but that really good Civil-Military Relations blog touted this round-up as the best on Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.
–The Dutch would like their troops to leave Afghanistan, and Canada is saying this would cause trouble for their own efforts to do the same.  Therefore NATO leadership has to woo the Netherlands first, and Canada later.
–U.S. diplomacy in Pakistan, at Ramblin’ Gal.

Opium and more opium:
–Josh Foust of Registan.net and The Conjecturer writes an assessment for Global Voices Online about the new U.S. Counter-narcotics strategy (82 pages, pdf, big letters). 
–Mr. Marton looks at the UNODC report on Afghanistan for possible irregularities. 

Military:
–Suicide bombing at Kabul airport, reportedly aiming for German soldiers but wounding Afghanistan’s soldiers instead.

Public Health:
A new virulent epidemic southeast of Kabul has started with the death of five people on August 28th.  Twenty more are violently ill.
Covered this week in FPA Central Asia: a lot of stories on medical aid.

 Special thanks to those dedicated Afghanistan watchers out there, in academia, news agencies, and the blogs–I honor your work. 

Have a great weekend!

The world is an interesting place, and Central Asia among the most interesting regions of the world.  Now getting caught up for the week:

Central Asia General:
–In an interesting counterpoint to most discussion of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization written in English, Japan Times has editorialized that the SCO is of benefit to the world community.  

Kazakhstan:
–Son-in law troubles part I.D. 3. b. iii.: RFE/RL reports that charges are mounting in Kazakhstan against Mr. Rakhat Aliev.   It is alleged that the charges are supposed to dissuade Mr. Aliev from testifying in the Kazakhgate case, where illegal transfers of oil and cash paved the way for insider deals and opaque profit-taking.  Oh, and Mr. Aliev’s father, Mr. Mukhtar Aliev, has been charged with excess ordinance in the home.  Hmmm.   Like explosives in the dining room?  Was there going to be a coup?
–Son-in-law troubles part II: Dinara Nazarbaeva’s husband, Timur Kulibaev, was recently fired from his position at Samruk, Kazakhstan’s state holding corporation.  Mr. Kulibaev has served as an executive at both KazMunaiGas.  Mr. Kulibaev and Dinara Nazarbaeva made this year’s Forbes billionaire list, and are also part-owners of Halyk Bank (not Nurbank).
–Besides the trouble at Kashagan field, Kazakhstan’s KMG is doing pretty well: they bought 75% of Romania’s RomPetrol this week to expand their European business.
–Kazakhstan’s opposition is asking for a new election, since a. the election had some irregularities and b. because no opposition gained Parliamentary access, failing to garner at least 7% of seats in the legislature.  I say go for it.
–U.S. expatriate Mark Seidenfeld has been acquitted on first appeals in court on August 20th.  It looks like a few steps more in the process before the end–for instance, New Charges, reported at the Save Mark Seidenfeld site.

Kyrgyzstan:
–Go Alaska!; Go Kids!; Go Pay the Bills!!!!: If the U.S. pays its utility bills at Ganci AFB, it’ll be ahead of Russia on civil-military goodwill immediately.  Right now, the Russian military is using flashlights. . . while the USAF personnel are refurbishing a playspot in the area.   Alaska’s Air National Guard is sending 31 personnel to Kyrgyzstan from Fairbanks for six months, part of a new 150-person deployment to change things up at Ganci.
–When film piracy kills an industry, at Regnum.ru.
–Moving the capital of Kyrgyzstan?  Probably not, but it recalls the North-South divide in Kyrgyzstan’s politics.
–Kyrgyzstan’s government gets more say in the works and profits of its Kumtor mine, by acquiring more shares in a Canadian Mining enterprise.
 
Mongolia:
–Dateline, Ulaan Bataar: President Parvanov of Bulgaria is on a five-day visit ending September 1st to boost Bulgarian-Mongolian trade relations, in mining, tourism, and small enterprises.  
–Also, Mongolia will host talks between Japan and the DPRK September 5-6, in order to normalize diplomatic relations between its two guests.  This is a step the 6-Party Talks process where Mongolia has again been an invaluable aid to dialogue.
–China and Mongolia agree to protect a common cultural heritage: the long-song.  I loved this so much I wrote today’s Casual Friday post on the issue: check it out!

Tajikistan:
–Tajikistan’s new bilateral investment opportunities with Qatar, Afghanistan, and India  were covered earlier this week.  However, Tajikistan can set up all the free economic zones (FEZ) it likes, but needs basic infrastructure and reliable energy before they’ll turn around the economy.

Turkmenistan:
–Russia’s LUKoil sets its sights on Turkmenistani contracts.  In the meantime, the Turkmenistan pipeline to China is underway.
–Turkmenistan’s teachers must wear high-collared dresses with skirts that reach to the ankle.
–Turkmenistan’s farmers, the price of cotton, and unofficial/official rates of inflation inside the state at IWPR. 

Uzbekistan:
–Get in on the betting pool concerning Karimovian non-elections at Registan.net.   Every scenario–from the depressing to the action / adventure option is being discussed, but not really for money.
–Between the rock and the stone: Uzbekistan’s economic migrants face dangers and prejudices in Russia, as reported by Jamiyat at NewEurasia.net.
–Formerly-approved Presbyterian church becomes unapproved, at Forum 18.

Xinjiang:
–Two Xinjiang athletes, one a mountaineer, the other a ‘Dawaz’ acrobat, will carry the Olympic torch for Beijing 2008.
–Second pipeline route is mapped, from Central Asia to the Pearl and Yangtze Rivers.
Due to Xinjiang’s crazy weather this year, the cotton harvest is being delayed.

This week, China and Mongolia again agreed to work together to preserve an item of common cultural heritage, known as the long-song.  Songs and rituals are known as intangible cultural heritage–unlike an archeological site or preserved document, they rely upon performance or behavior (”expressive culture”) in order to survive.

The preservation effort:
UNESCO began documenting world heritage in about 1998.  In 2003, the UN passed the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, which came into force in April of 2006.  Part of the work of the Convention was to documenting folkways and arts of this nature and prove their value as part of world heritage.

In order to make its case internationally, China began to document its own list of precious cultural artifacts in earnest.  In March of 2006, Vice-Minister of Culture Zhou Heping said Chinese experts had chosen 501 examples from more than 1,300 contenders throughout the country, including crafts and festival rituals, to be entered into a State-level protection list.  Domestic protection does much to protect such heritage, but it does not allow the rest of the world to access this knowledge as readily.  China’s state support included investigation, but also social security for elders who knew these important traditions, encouraging artistic troupes, and making them part of school curriculums.  

China’s list of cultural (non-tangible) artifacts included China’s Kunqu Opera (included in 2002) and the art of guqin music (2003).  The Uighur Muqam, a genre of music from Xinjiang, was included in 2005.  The Twelve Muqam is a collection of 120 songs and interludes.  Here is a promotional video, with a little glitter added, but not too much, about 7 minutes (you need sound, but maybe a little low):

China and Mongolia also teamed up in 2005 to have Mongolian long-tune folk songs included on the list.  Mongolia and China succeeded in having the long-songs, or pastoral poems, of China and Mongolia included.   Here is a performance at the Art Institute of Chicago.  This particular performance, even by video, conveyed emotion and a sense of timelessness when I listened to it:

There is still a lot of work to be done to preserve this important heritage, suddenly made particularly ephemeral by cultural globalization.  For China and Mongolia, with a long history, a large territorial expanse, and numerous cultures, four traditions does not seem sufficient, does it?

Have a great weekend, enjoying your cultural rituals!   See you next week!

Some new resources from the FPA are now available on-line.  First of all, Abigail Mahoney has done a news round-up and fall update on Central Asia, particularly Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.  It’s a good, quick, fact-filled read.

Second, Marco Vincenzino has written a special two-part series on Afghanistan.  The first part covers the domestic and societal dynamics of violence, public diplomacy, and other critical factors that interfere with progress in achieving Afghanistan’s stability.  The second part discusses the world’s challenges in Afghanistan.  Mr. Vincenzino works with the Afghanistan World Foundation and other policy-making groups in New York and Washington DC. 

Check it out!

If only it were that simple: but a crop of news analysts and bloggers are seeing a rise in Realist theoretical constructs to explain what is happening in Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

What is Realism?
Contrary to its title, realism is not universally held to be the most “realistic” of theories.  It has many virtues however, in that it gives a tight theoretical explanation of most phenomena in politics–especially international politics. 

Realists presuppose a competitive environment, where power is the only political currency, and that winners take all and losers gain nothing.  A system of alliances keeps order and peace between nations, with weak states banding together to check the power of one powerful state.  Since these alliances are always based upon state-self-interest, they can be changed as conditions change.  One modification of Realism, structural realism, amended the alliance system to describe the bipolar relations during the Cold War, where superpowers checked each other and other states banded with one superpower or the other across the world.

These theories are vastly compelling, but they do not adequately explain what to do in a world full of non-state actors.  For Central Asia, two borderless, non-state affiliations challenge state security the most: international drug trade, and international terrorism.  These two things are related, and a more accurate depiction would call this in general, organized crime.  Other issues which do not suit a Realist mode would include climate change, energy commerce, and world financial networks–legal and illegal.

However, the nostalgia for realism seems to point to one “realistic” fact: we still depend upon the state system to solve non-state problems.  

Here’s where the discussion is currently taking place, so you can check it for yourself:

1. FPA’s own Robert Nolan on the Middle East–Global Views: A return to Realism?
2. Ben Paarman at Neweurasia.net with a great roundup of articles pertaining to Central Asia: “No-New-Zero-Sum-Great Game!”
3. An old post at FPA Central Asia on “The N.G.G. Metaphor“
4. The IR Theory Knowledge Base Web site

Illustration: Keene, NH Public Libraries

Providing for education is a big part of a sustained aid: providing teachers, doctors, and nurses, with the tools and means to bring knowledge and self-help to Afghanistan’s citizens and to the nation as a whole.  Frequently with aid we think of supplies.  Yet knowledge is something that cannot be taken away, from the mentoring of a surgeon in an Afghanistan city to counseling mothers in a small town. 

Salaries:
The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) will expend funds to pay teacher’s salaries as well as those of doctors and nurses in the state.  The total funding of 55 million pounds will be part of the UK’s already-stated 500 million pound commitment over three years.

Medical Assistance:
Captain Everdean reports via CENTCOM that a Provisional Reconstruction Team  delivered pediatric medical care in a remote province of Zabul, where they saw 200 people and mentored local nurses in health care.  A couple of weeks ago, another team took the donkey-track to a remote village in Panjshir Province, bringing food, toys and medicine.

The International Society of the Red Crescent/Red Cross (ICRC) has been working with Mirwais Hospital for the past eleven years.  In a recent interview, the head of the Afghanistan effort discusses why they have expanded their aid from surgical support to renewing hospital infrastructure.

Legal Assistance:
450 of Afghanistan’s judges are to receive copies of Afghan law books, and the first 37 judges received their copies on August 25th, in Parwan province.

Just an update.

Qatar & friendly trade:
This week, Qatar’s Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Economy and Commerce Mr. Yousuf Hussein Kamal visited Tajikistan.  While in Tajikistan, he and President Rakhmon arranged a cornucopia of economic agreements.  These include setting up a council of business leaders from the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in both states, to facilitate trade and idea exchanges.  Mr. Kamal also signed a document that allowed a Qatar-Tajikistan partnership between livestock companies, and Qatar also signed agreements concerning Dushanbe Real Estate. 

Uzbekistan’s virtual fence:
Uzbekistan has closed the border to Tajikistan before the September 1-2 Independence Day celebrations, citing possible security breaches.  

Just contemplate the preceding sentence for a minute.  Then think about border trade cut-offs.  It’s not the easiest thing, to be a neighbor of an isolationist state. 

Russia’s old project:
All that friendly feeling did not extend to Russia’s RusAl, (or, Russian Aluminum), who had planned, with Russia’s Mr. Putin’s support, to build the proposed Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan.   Rogun hydropower plant was supposed to have a capacity of 13 billion kW/h on the highland Vakhsh River, but negotiations broke down as to the quality of the dam that would have been required.  President Rakhmon announced that Tajikistan would build it or seek other backers this past June; and has formally abrogated their RusAl contract as of today.

So, who might be courting for Rogun?  Looks like India, or maybe China or Pakistan. 

Afghanistan:
The Panj River Bridge between Afghanistan and Tajikistan is open, to mixed reviews.  It’s a beautiful bridge that is going to bring new opportunities for legal and illegal trade.  Check out this post by Vadim for a full, educated discussion on the situation.

A newer article by Vadim covered the opening ceremonies, where Mr. Rakhmon talked about the illegal trade and Mr. Karzai talked about the legal trade, which is probably an indicator of the challenges foremost in each leader’s mind. 

In the end, he gives us a fascinating tableau of Sinatra, Afghan singing, and Tajik television that is the essence of the bright moments of globalization.  And it looks like Tajikistan will continue to try to get more of those bright moments.

It’s official: Kashagan oil extraction work has been shut down pending new negotiations with the consortium led by independent oil company ENI.  This is not affecting anyone’s current oil supply, but it will be of interest to world stockbrokers, oil-market analysts, and Central Asia watchers.  I love this stuff, myself, so Let’s Go: this is a long post, but painless and (hopefully) entertaining.  You will be fully informed by the end.

Some history:
The Kashagan field was discovered in 2000 and represents a large, “lifetime find” of oil reserves.  These have been estimated at 750,000 mmboe, or 750,000 million barrels of oil equivalent: ah, 7.5 x (10 to the 11th power) of barrels of oil equivalent.  There is often an element of testyria involved in early reserve numbers, more from the political side than the oil company side: engineers looking somewhat askance at the politicians, you understand.  And at Kashagan with its multiple extraction problems, the engineers have been right to have that look: 

1. In 2001, the CEO of ENI forecast production to begin in 2005.  Last month, ENI reported that delays on the field will push back production two more years, to 2010.

2. Last year, Forbes/AFX reported a more recent reserve estimate that put Kashagan reserves at 45 billion barrels, of which  10-13 billion are considered recoverable.  That’s still a lot: and with that recovery rate, it also implies an irregular geology and hence a lot of technical problems.  The initial investment cost for oil extraction was estimated at USD 29 billion, or USD 2.9 x (10 to the 10th power).  In 2005, this estimate was revised upward 17%, or  USD 4.93 billion more. 

By the numbers:
1. Kazakhstan owns all of the oil.  Period, zero.

2. A consortium of independent and national oil companies have contracted with the state to bring that oil up in a kind of partnership agreement by shares.  Oil companies provide investment and technology in return for a percentage of the oil extracted, which they turn around and sell.  This is known as a PSA or profit-sharing agreement.  At Kashagan, the percentage going to the companies totalled 90%, with Kazakhstan keeping 10% of the title of extracted oil.  They are now negotiating for 40% for the state’s share, which means that the consortium would revise its yields downward, but not in its percentage of the PSA.  (see numbers below).

The consortium is led by a majority-interest oil company who operates the oil well–hence, that lead company is called the ”operator”.  At Kashagan, that company is Italy’s ENI, which is a subsidiary or majority-owned or whatever of Italy’s Agip (AgipKCO).  The stockholders in extraction include:

ENI  (Italy) 18.52%
ExxonMobil (US) 18.52%
Total  (France) 18.52%
Shell  (EU) 18.52%
ConocoPhillips (U.S.) 9.26%
KazMunaiGas (Kazakhstan) 8.33%
Inpex (Japan) 8.33%

One should note that Kazakhstan receives 8.33% of the corporate portion of production via KMG, plus all of the state portion of production.  By entering the PSA, Kazakhstan (through nationally-owned KMG) increases its own investment in its principal producer of state revenue.  It puts money into extraction, gains technical knowledge, and further participation in the project’s profit.

Kazakhstan’s side:
1. Paying out and paying out again.
This means also that project cost overruns and project delays hit Kazakhstan twice: first, in oil recovery, and second, in investment.  All the investment in an oil well is front-loaded: it’s on spec.  You have to put in billions before you see a dime.  That is why oil companies have (and should have) large budgets. 

This is also why states, particularly developing states, cannot deal as easily with cost overruns and delays.  They have a state to run, with social security payments and farm subsidies and national health programs, and people who are old or indigent or facing crop failure now cannot wait for their state to pay out those funds.  You can lay off workers, but you can’t lay off citizens.  The 2005 cost reassessment meant that KMG and Inpex (8.33%) had to come up with USD 410,669,000–411 million each–while ENI and other major (18.52%) shareholders would have to come up with nearly another billion apiece. 

2. Petro-politics and petro-promises:
Furthermore, Kazakhstan has engaged to supply multiple customers, most of them powerful, and some of them contiguous neighbors.  Along with recent pipelines to China being built in carefully-crafted stages, Kazakhstan has  agreed to ship oil via the BTC pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. 

About the time that Azerbaijan’s oilfields begin to slow production, Kashagan oil was going to fill the BTC to capacity and extend the life and usefulness of that USD 4 billion project.  Oil to the West via BTC was one major guarantor of good Kazakhstan-EU/US relations–not the only one, but a good one. 

Not having this oil supply come through hurts Kazakhstan’s westward ambitions.  And there is also the inevitable punishment that comes from losing utility.  The EU/US will not treat Kazakhstan the same without this production coming through, whether it’s a no-fault situation or not.  It’s a matter of who’s necessary to whom: the old quid pro quo.  It’s not fair, of course, but that makes no difference.

3. Externalities:
One undesirable aspect of oil for oil supplier states is that it depresses other kinds of investment in other sectors of the economy.  While Kazakhstan does rely mainly upon its oil for revenue, it is working upon building up other income streams, in agriculture, light industry including electronics, and banking.   The inflationary pressures on an oil-supplier state remain a challenge to non-oil related domestic enterprise.

Oil spills and other environmental problems reduce fish stocks and other wetlands-based businesses.  Many of these are small businesses, employing the vast majority of Kazakhstan’s labor force.  This year’s seal deaths have been treated as a warning about oil depredations in the Caspian.  All environmental problems have an adverse effect on the economy and on public health. 

Independent oil’s side:
That is not to say that the oil companies are thrilled by the production delays, cost overruns, and environmental hazards, because they couldn’t be: 

1. Honesty hurts
Technical limits are a proof of honesty that nobody likes.  The PSA partners can’t be happy that only 13 billion barrels out of 45 billion is recoverable, because it cuts into their returns on investment.  But it does prove that they are using a good technical understanding: not trying to extract past their technical capability and thereby ruining what is left by using faulty, short-sighted extraction methods.

Furthermore, as an interested outside observer, it looks as if Kashagan has been nothing but unpleasant surprises in succession as soon as it was attempted.  (more…)

I found this while looking for news for the Central Asia Beat of last week, but it was well worth returning to:  accounts of torture in Naryn by the police.  The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights works to raise awareness of human rights violations in Central Asia, improve local human rights defenders personal security and their access to policy-making, and interact between local and international communities.  And indeed August 13th looks like a day of decision: two police officers were acquitted of torture, perhaps wrongly.  One new investigation was formally started on torture charges.  And one more prisoner died.

According to the International Helsinki Federation and the Kyrgyzstani human rights center Kylym Shamy, several arrests by Naryn’s GOVD (a department of the Ministry of Interior) have ended in prisoner deaths.  This is pretty much verbatim from the IHF/Kylym Shamy Press Release:

Alykbek Sakeev, a 48 year old man, was arrested by two officers of GOVD, Chyngyz Kerimkulov and Taalajbek Chypaev, on suspicion of cattle theft on 20 November 2006. After several hours, he was delivered to the emergency room of the casualty hospital in Naryn where he died without regaining consciousness.

According to Sakeev’s relatives and doctors he had five broken ribs on each side, skull trauma, a bruise on the head, and many other traumas. . . .  the GOVD officers that Sakeev simply fell down from the bench several times.

On 25 November 2006, a criminal case was initiated against the two law enforcement officers for torture under articles 305 and 305-1, but in three days they were released after signing a statement that they would not leave the state. In February 2007, Sakeev’s relatives withdrew their appeal after receiving 200,000 Soms from the GOVD officers, and the Naryn city prosecutor’s office tried to close the case.

Under pressure from human rights defenders, the case was reinitiated. On 13 August 2007, the two police officers were acquitted.

It certainly looks as if justice fell off the bench several times, and it also looks like human rights defenders are at some risk:

Several days before the court decision, human rights defender Aziza Abdurasulova, who monitored the trial, was attacked in the court hall by unknown women.

The investigation of Bektemir Akunov’s death began August 13: 

Also on 13 August, the court started the trial to determine the cause of death of Bektemir Akunov, who reportedly hanged himself by his own shirt in the pre-detention cell in GOVD department of the Naryn city on 14 April 2007. The unsettled circumstances surrounding his death have attracted public attention in Kyrgyzstan after an independent commission headed by Aziza Abdurasulova had concluded that Akunov did not commit suicide.

 And another prisoner died.

On the same day of 13 August 2007, Kurmanbek Kalmatov, a 55-year old man, died after he was beaten by the senior investigator of the Naryn city.

Ms. Abdurasulova also reports seeing 14-and 15 year old youths with slash marks on their hands who reported also being kicked while wearing gas masks–in order to get them to confess to a crime they did not commit.

The Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights is also keeping track of these cases, but it looks like the Kyrgyzstan national government will have to get involved in order to make sure that justice is done and that a policy of torture is no longer pursued in Naryn, or indeed, anywhere else in Kyrgyzstan. 

Short little entry:

I’m always thrilled when Central Asia hits the big-time.  This time, The New York Times:  and this time, it’s a five-piece slide show by photographer Carolyn Drake called “A Land at a Crossroads”.  And let me tell you that I hope it’s true.  A crossroads should mean trade, and trade is needed.