Afghanistan and Central Asia

Just like agricultural crops, seminars seem to be popping up everywhere this summer.  One of the latest was is Hujand, Tajikistan: on regional cooperation.  Feghana.ru interviewed a Russian academic at the conference, and the interview gives a different perspective to Central Asia’s politics.

For one thing, Professor Plastun talked about terrorism measures in Central Asia, saying that:

Terrorism did not originate in Asia.  It was brought here from without.  And those who claimed to be fighting terrorism showed up there too.  In fact, this war on terrorism will drag for years, in the hope to isolate Central Asia from Russia. What for? There are three motives involved here. It will weaken Russia (1), it will prevent integration of Central Asian countries (2), and it will gain access to the resources that are being rapidly depleted in other regions of the world (3).

Half-truths:
It’s pretty important to read this statement as a motivator and a background, which I will get to at the end.  Before that, we need to examine this position’s accuracy, at about 50%: true in accurately cataloguing the interest of foreign states, false in leaving the Russian Federation out of this catalogue.  Most Russian interest in Central Asia also has to do with resource competition and terrorism control.  If not, then the heavily state-sponsored Gazprom would be more interested in developing production sharing agreements with other firms, and state-owned Transneft would be encouraging more efforts such as the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line from Kazakhstan to Novorossiysk, Russia.  Instead, Gazprom has been squeezing gas from Turkmenistan for years at a discounted price, and Russia has been using cheap gas as a hammer against Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, et cetera.

It’s also wrong of Professor Plastun to intimate that the fight against terrorism or the global war on terror/Islamic extremism/whatever one would like to call it  under whatever terms is solely a product of far-off powers.  If that were so, then the Tajik Civil War might have ended differently, with a less Russian-favored and Uzbekistan-favored President Rakhmon in place.  The IMU would not have bombed anywhere in Tashkent; Kyrgyzstan would not have foiled an embassy bombing in Bishkek; and the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (and for that matter, the China-led SCO) would concentrate far more on border guard education and less on military exercises against terrorism.   So this set of disingenuous sentences (or, uh, readily-shoveled farm by-product) are misleading.  What they do represent though, is a context for Russia’s view of the conduct of other states in the area–and also, a view that might be shared, to some degree, by Central Asian states.  It is certainly a view being put forward–today in public–and probably consistently in private.

Central Asian interest from abroad, in the context of this article, excludes the interest of both China and Russia, and as contiguous states to the Central Asian region, they have the most to lose by regional instability.  Under those terms, their interest might be considered more legitimate than that of the “foreign states” of the EU and North America.  In many ways, it is far more immediate.  However, as Professor Plastun notes in a different context, terror can be exported, or migrate, rather than be solely a local affair.  Leaving terror aside, the road to Europe for narcotics and human trafficking runs also through Central Asia.  Even in the most Realist terms, (setting aside humanitarian considerations) narcotics traffic weakens a state internally; human trafficking measures misery and instability and can be considered a measure of disaffection in and a challenge to organized civic life.  As such, the EU and the U.S. have as legitimate an interest in the conduct of Central Asia’s governments as do its neighbors.

The other aspect of global trade is considered legitimate trade: for Central Asia, in general, this means energy trade.   Here too, except for proximity, it’s hard to see where Russia’s desire to control energy flow out of Central Asia is anything more innately virtuous than the desire of the EU and the US (or for that matter, China) to partake in Central Asia’s energy boom.  The diversity of customers is giving some Central Asian states (particularly Kazakhstan, and hopefully Turkmenistan) a chance to diversify its customer base and achieve a more market-rational price for their resources. 

Against this bidding war, however, there is the spectre of increased demand and production that shortens Central Asia’s “revenue window” for oil and gas income.  That however, is a function of price: does anyone really think that Central Asia’s petroleum would be pumped more slowly if it had a single, monopoly customer?  To follow through on Professor Plastun’s comments, the U.S. and Europe would have to diminish demand so that price would go down and interest in oil and gas would be less.  That’s not a bad idea (in fact, it’s a great one, as the U.S. is the “big pig” in oil consumption), but it does not address the likelihood that Russia’s largesse and attention in the area would also be lessened in the absence of competition. 

Underlying truths:
While statements such as Professor Plastun’s need to be dismissed on the count of truth, they should not be dismissed in terms of sentiment.  In reality, statements such as these show the way the wind can blow in prevailing public opinion, and that is the underlying truth that must be addressed:

1. All of Central Asia has to engage in self-help to move beyond the loss of energy resources, and the best friends to Central Asia will make this a priority in their diplomatic efforts and spending.

2. All of Central Asia has to engage its youth and its poor in legitimate economic activity, or else they will have no choice but illegitimate economic activity, and the best friends to Central Asia will make this a priority, not just in talk, but in deeds.

3. The reason that the SCO is making such a success in Central Asia is that they are approaching these two goals in a concerted effort, on bilateral, multilateral and assisted terms (such as using the Asian Development Bank’s CAREC plan as part of their blueprint).  They are also paying attention to protocol matters while they do this, saving reputations, buying from everyone, and playing hardball only in private.  Unlike China and Russia, proximity cannot be cited as a reason for diplomatic and economic efforts in Central Asia.  Unlike Russia, previous practice and relationships cannot be used: sixteen years of independence versus institutions and infrastructure geared toward Moscow–.  Unless the EU and the US take this into account, they will continue to be stuck with the reputation as wasters of energy resources and complainers about governance–and not as friends to Central Asia, however good their intentions.  But even then, we should probably expect Russian academics, especially those with specious logic, to complain.

This entry was posted on Friday, July 6th, 2007 at 7:38 am and is filed under Central Asia General, Collective Security Organizations. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a response, or trackback from your own site.