Afghanistan and Central Asia

Somehow the confluence of my pleasure reading seems to bear directly on events that we explore repeatedly in international politics.  Recently, I have read two books that portray Western attitudes about corruption, lack of transparency, election abuses, and the relationships between politicians and their consituencies.  I am not going to do a full book review here–just a few quotes from two Fictional Works.   One great aspect of fiction, or course, is that it attaches to no one in particular and allows us to explore issues on a personal level without making accusations.  Another aspect of looking at fiction: it deals with universals, or at least, what we Westerners culturally assume is universal.

One of the books: All the King’s Men (1946) by Robert Penn Warren.  This is a fairly standard text in the U.S. educational canon, and I think it sums up many of the cultural assumptions we have about corruption in government.  Though Warren continued to deny it, this novel had many parallels to the lives of the populist and corrupt Huey and Russell Long of Louisiana.  The second is Henry Fielding’s Jonathan Wild (1743), about the “Thief-taker General of Great Britain and Ireland” and was actually a roman-a-clef about Walpole’s government from 1721-1742.  A brief biography of Walpole notes that he served six months for corruption in government and then resumed his government service as  First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Stuff like that, uh, never happens now.

All the King’s Men:
Warren wrote that the politician he wished to portray in an early (dramatic) version of All the King’s Men would be a man::

whose personal motivation had been, in one sense, idealistic, who in many ways was to serve the cause of social betterment, but who was corrupted by power, even by power exercised against corruption.  That is, his means defile his ends.  But more than that, he was to be a man whose power was based on the fact that somehow he could vicariously fulfill some secret needs of the people about him.”   . . . . 

According to Warren’s conception, the fulfillment of these secret needs ultimately cause the dehumanization and alienation of that leader from the people and from himself as well.   In short, he was planning to write about a Greek tragic hero of a 20th century type and link it to some of the problems with democratization itself: that leaders who tap into that secret need can be popularly elected and maintain power, even when it is not in the best interest of the electorate to do so.  In the last chapter (Chapter 10), the protagonist Willie Stark has been assassinated, and his wife, who presumably should know him without the political aura, gives an epitaph of sorts:  “He was a great man . . . . . I have to believe that.”

Jonathan Wild
In Jonathan Wild, Fielding the idea of a leader’s greatness is the subject of pitiless probe.  First, the use of a master criminal as a stand-in for a Prime Minister takes one right to the bottom line.  Wild’s historical racket was to engage thieves to steal, and then go to the victims of the theft to secure a reward for the return of property–or to blackmail the victims further if he managed to obtain compromising material.  Likewise, his thieves had to jump to his tune–he would be quite ready to turn them into the magistrates if they took too large a cut of the ill-gotten gains.  This ability to work the system from all angles Fielding called Greatness:

. . . it is necessary that all great and surprising events, the designs of which are laid, conducted and brought to perfection by the utmost force of hman invention and art, should be produced by great and eminent men. . .  
. . . .we often find such a mixture of good and evil in the same character that it may require a very accurate judgement and a very elaborate enquiry to determine on which side the balance turns. . .  the greater number are of the mixt kind . . . their greatest virtues being obscured and allayed by their vices, and those again softened and coloured over by their virtues.

Later in Book One, Wild elucidates his idea, which sounds not too different than forming a political party or coalition: 

What then have I to do in the pursuit of greatness but to procure a gang and make the use of this gang centre in myself?

So, what do they say about Western norms?
These two different works, one supposedly non-political and one heavy satire, say a lot about a conception of democracy and governance.  In Fielding’s time, government did not supply many social services; income equality would have been a laughable concept; government served the needs of a few.  Slightly over 100 years after Walpole’s government, Sir Robert Peel argued for criminal consolidation so that punishment would be in proportion to the crime committed, and rule of law could be developed more fully.  One agent of this change, directly relates to Fielding’s work: a free press.   Fielding could write about crime and government as similar enterprises without fear of charges or reprisals from great men.

Second, distrust of government and of its leaders does not always lead to reform.  For some reason, this always shocks us when looking at the “other”, but we frequently fail to note instances of it in our own histories.  Warren had originally chosen to make the leader the tragic hero, but in a sense, the collective electorate also has an equally fatal flaw, in that they support a leader who has lost the compulsion to serve them well. 

In democracies, people believe in spin. we want to have our age defined and what Warren terms “secret needs” fulfilled.  Therefore, democratization does not always produce the best choice; democracy also gives an opportunity to make a poor choice.  An electorate may let stated issues lie because unstated ones are more powerful. 

As voters and yes, as leaders, we have to surmount our own prejudices and complacencies in order to get the best government available.  At the same time, we should not find it incomprehensible that states beside our own have problematic leaders, even when these leaders evince competence or even greatness.  I sometimes think we have to concentrate more upon those mediums of oversight that eventually bring corrupt governments down, rather than specific leaders: election protocols, media freedoms, and rule of law.  That way, when any electorate is ready to insist upon better governance, they will have the tools to achieve it.

 1. On Saturday, a bomb exploded close to Tajikistan’s highest court in Dushanbe.  No person was hurt, and the bomb only damaged windows.  It could have been so much worse.  The city’s chief prosecutor, Kurbanali Mukhammetov, said that the motive for the bombing was not clear, but he suspects IMU activity.  However, it might also have to do with the increased organized crime from Afghanistan’s drug trade.  It might also be an anniversary: last year, on June 16, three explosions rocked Dushanbe.

2. In 2002, the UNDP made a  conservative estimate that 100 tonnes of heroin per year transited Tajikistan.  The internal drug market was estimated to be worth USD 120-200 million annually.   In 2003, Russian forces pulled away from Tajikistan’s borders.  A ten-year agreement between Russia and Tajikistan, started in 1993, ended and were not renewed.  Heroin labs were set up in Northern Afghanistan, and transit routes included the Moscovy and Panj river sites, as well as Badakshan mountain crossings during the summer months.   Last week, Vadim over at neweurasianet reported that the Panj river bridge has been rehabilitated, which increases the likelihood of drug traffick through this area just as it does for any other Afghanistan-Tajik trade.  Unfortunately for the most part, that Is the trade available, and it brings new reasons for crime, conflict, and social despair–especially in the absence of good border control.

Last year, CSM reported that Afghanistan’s drug trade, already ubiquitous, was becoming far more organized in its approaches, which included routes through Tajikistan.

3.  Last of all, BBC has an article of the large number of cluster bombs still extant from the 1992-1996 Tajik war.  Like mines, these explosives are still dangerous a decade after war has stopped.  Unlike mines, however, the sub-bomblets scatter upon impact, making it far harder to ascertain where they may be found.  As long as they are extant, however, children and agricultural workers will continue to be injured when they come in contact with these devices.

What conclusion can one derive from these reports of volatile substances in Tajikistan?  First, the key to Tajikistan’s stability is inextricably tied to Afghanistan’s drug trade being better controlled.  Better border control can be a barrier, but both countries need a more varied economy in order to bring the opium trade down.  Once these economies pick up, then funding de-mining and de-cluster bomb initiatives will become part of social services.

However, Tajikistan can’t wait as long as would be convenient for the rest of us.  It’s time for friendly states and international organizations to provide Tajikistan with some help.

Further Reading:
Tajikistan bust on June 14: 100 kilos of heroin 

Hasten his musters and conduct his powers:
I must change arms at home, and give the distaff
Into my husband’s hands.    –King Lear, (IV, ii) 

The personal, the private, the political, the public, and the press issues are nearly inseparable in the Aliev-Nazarbaev contretemps.  I feel we are at once watching for gossip, witnessing a future tragedy, analyzing politics, and investigating business.  Part of the problem is that the contention is so personal, and has at least on Mr. Aliev’s side, been made public.  The other part of the problem is that much of the misdeeds alleged and committed are still in the dark; the relationships and jurisdictions of competing Kazakhstani law enforcement agencies is not quite clear; and the ownership of Kazakhstan’s press and its government is a strange mix of public and private.  Nepotism creates perceived extra-official communication and relations in even the most neutral situations, and the shaky situation between President Nazarbaev, his daughter, Dariga, and her husband, Rakhat Aliev, appears to be growing rapidly more Byzantine. 

The areas of concern: Kazakhstan’s financial community; its political destiny; the status of its domestic media; the status of its justice department; and the whereabouts of missing persons.

For those of you that might be new to this conflict, I posted on Kazakhstan’s Family Dynamic on May 28;  Rakhat Aliev’s Extradition on June 4; and related Bank Business on June 6.  These posts are referenced, and best of all, the comments are informative.  The rest can just push on:

Divorce 
Rakhat Aliev has announced that he received divorce papers via fax with his forged signature on them: and that he has never consented to a divorce.   I spent a good part of yesterday looking for Kazakhstan’s divorce law on the Web and had no luck–to see if the speed of this development was contrary to conventional law, for instance.  Nevertheless, a divorce with this much property involved usually takes far longer than this.

Changing Nurbank interest
RFE/RL Newsline reported  that Dariga Nazarbaeva has been allowed to purchase interest in Nurbank.  Here is the newsline entry:

Kazakhstan’s Financial Oversight Agency issued a resolution on June
12 allowing Darigha Nazarbaeva, daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbaev, to acquire a large stake in Nurbank, “Kazakhstan Today” reported the next day. Nurbank stands at the center of a complex scandal involving Nazarbaeva’s former husband, Rakhat Aliev, whom she recently divorced (see “RFE/RL Newsline,” June 13, 2007). Aliev, a former Kazakh ambassador to Austria, faces extradition from that country to Kazakhstan on abduction charges in connection with an alleged attempt to pressure Nurbank managers. DK

Second, Nurali Aliev, Darigha’s son, had been elected to the Nurbank board in January.  According to Joanna Willis at Eurasianet: When Mr. Wala joined the Nurbank board, his name disappeared from the roster.  Recently, his name has resurfaced within the bank’s hierarchy.

Media mandates
After KTK-TV closed some of its operations, it reopened with a new executive in charge.  Furthermore, local media had been told not to discuss the issues attendant with Aliev, Nurbank, and related issues.  I don’t know if this ban remains.

Political consolidation
President Nazarbaev’s Nur-Otan party had merged with Dariga Nazarbaeva’s Asar party; it has recently incorporated some other smaller parties.  Now Kazakhstan’s two major opposition parties have merged, and it looks as if Parliamentary elections are imminent.  New constitutional mandates for Parliamentary representation also make new elections likely to occur soon.  Then, according to Parliamentary process, the government is remade.

So what are the recurring threads in this yarn?
A. Austria:  Austria is the home of the investment group that managed Aliev/Nazarbaeva family investments outside of Kazakhstan; Austria is the home of Mr. Wala of Nurbank; two Austrian banks want to purchase Nurbank; and Mr. Aliev resides, is on bail, and might be extradited from Austria.

B. Changing ownership and control strategies: Nurbank ownership has shifted, with Dariga Nazarbaeva’s buy-in.  It might be easy to assume that the new percentages of ownership come from Aliev’s portion, but they may also come from other unnamed previous stakeholders, such as Mr. Aliev’s father.  Nurbank has also undergone some semi-transparent/not transparent managerial changes.  The Karavan/KTK/etc media empire has had managerial changes.  With new elections, the government will have new managerial changes.

C. Speed: A quick divorce; an expedited buy-in, previous to the buyout; several seamless management changes; expected quick upcoming elections.

D. Opacity: President Nazarbaev has promised that Mr. Aliev will be prosecuted without favoritism or prejudice, using the standard of the rule-of-law.  Nevertheless, one common thread in the commentary about Mr. Aliev’s trial is that limiting the scope of investigations is going to be difficult.

Both Ms. Lillis’ article and this one by Marina Kozlova cite Aliev’s business associates and regional political commentators as unfavorable to Aliev.  One said: “as one of the harshest members of Nazarbaev’s family, Mr. Aliev has more enemies than anyone in Kazakhstan.”   This statement can be backed up by going through media records–this didn’t just start with Nurbank.   But the problem is that the previous impunity under which Aliev operated taints many other associates.  Mr. Aliev may or may not have committed crimes on behalf of Mr. Nazarbaev, and if so, with or without Mr. Nazarbaev’s knowledge; but the failure to respond to previous needs for investigation tends to taint Mr. Nazarbaev’s reputation.  Furthermore, Mr. Aliev has already signalled with volume that he is prepared to tell it all if he must. 

One possible conclusion: Mr. Aliev retains custody to the Austrian bank accounts while Ms. Nazarbaeva takes all of the Kazakhstan banking and media business; the Nurbank sale goes through very quickly; Mr. Aliev’s trial is a. closed to the public, or b. takes place after Parliamentary elections, or c. never takes place.  I’m betting on b.

Further reading:
Yesterday, RFE/RL posted an article that focuses upon the family component to Central Asia’s business environment in several Central Asian states.

P.S. A discouraging day: after finding nothing on Kazakhstan and divorce, I lost my best draft of this post yesterday when the server went down.  I think I remembered everything, though.  Anyone who knows something about Kazakhstan’s family law, or whether Kazakhstan’s domestic media is discussing Nurbank:  Please Write In. 

Special thanks: To Michael Lausch, for sending me the RFE/RL newsline article.

Here is a short, 1.5 minute video, produced by UNICEF, that illustrates the conduct of polio immunization in Afghanistan.  I alluded to this immunization drive in a previous post.   

The details such as the chalk markers are very interesting procedural points that you rarely get in news articles or scholarly papers–the details, right?

The second 3-minute video starts out with a bit of heart-warming introduction, and then also gives the details.  It also underscores the limits and opportunities to deliver public health as a partnership between Afghanistan’s capable citizens and those of the U.S. military personnel involved–and consider themselves stakeholders as well.

Now these are just great: and they don’t stop us from seeing the need for more of the same.  Hope you enjoy.

In part 1 of this series, I described the extremely desirable and/or risk-reducing incentives that make Afghanistan’s opium production persistent.  Changing opium production requires a different landscape of economic incentives and disincentives, which is what Afghanistan’s agricultural aid programs aim to provide on many levels.

Chief among the disincentives include poppy eradication and other law enforcement measures; these have had little or no negative effect on poppy production.  (See last week’s video entry.)  Creating alternative economies have also had limited success in a region where poverty is rampant and GDP per capita is USD 800 per year.  Each of the efforts listed below have significant merit and represent hours of strategic thinking.  In the long-term, they may well meet with the success of a more varied, self-sustaining agricultural base.  At the same time, each one is suffering from short to medium term problems–for reasons also discussed below.

Resurrecting a varied agriculture from the ground on up
Large infrastructure projects: 
This has included the re-vamping of irrigation systems, which allows farmers to plant more water-reliant crops with greater success; road construction, which allows for farm-to-market distribution; and land terracing, reforestation, and re-building exhausted crop soil.  However, many of these very necessary forms of agricultural infrastructure also facilitate poppy growth and most of all, distribution.  For example, Vadim over at neweurasia.net wrote extensively upon a new bridge over the Panj river that will unite Tajikistan and Afghanistan–and may be used for increased drug traffic.  From the comments on this article, it seems that fear is just, and creates burdens as well as opportunities for Afghanistan’s neighbors.  In the end, these projects are value-neutral in changing the conditions for opium cultivation.  Non-opium agriculture and commerce will not survive without them, but they also facilitate the growth and transport of opium as well.

Crop specific infrastructure:
Another approach has been facilitates the quality and marketability of specific non-opium crops.  Once roads are built that trucks can traverse without jouncing produce around and smashing it flat, the need for other kinds of distribution and middle-man infrastructure show up.  These include cold storage and warehousing for produce, so that it can be packed appropriately.  According to one report, even a lack of crates can stop produce production: failing to harvest fruit, or packing it so poorly that it is too damaged to use, much less sell, after shipping.  Other provided technology/appliances include generators, raisin dryers, and veterinary clinics and services. 

The report I read on apple distribution was meticulously written and comprehensive, and therefore I want to use it as a best example.  A portion of the report discussed packing materials, including boxes and inserts to pack apples appropriately.  It is true that paying for boxes would cut down on crops left unpacked and damage control.  From what I have been reading lately, most enterprising Afghanistani businessmen are perfectly capable of maintaining a standard (sometimes at the top of their lungs, of course, just like anywhere).  But this also assumes a ready distribution of these boxes in perpetuity, in order to change the agricultural habits of centuries. 

Therefore, one has to have a box factory: one has to have a source of pulp and cardboard; and the inserts, which in the U.S. are made often of foam or plastic, remain an imported good.  As long as packing materials are imports, they are either too dear or the output of a program, which will have limited and temporary distribution.  So let’s put it like this: just as every cold storage facility needs a generator, every agricultural region needs a package-maker/distributor.  And most of all, it needs to be part of the innate calculus for costing in farm sales, which takes public relations and education.  This particular report, crafted so carefully, written to initiate, justify, and prompt this active aid, are less useful to Afghanistan’s farmers and consumers than they are to grant-makers or foreign spectator-scholars like me, who has a life habit and expectation of buying well-packed produce.   I am convinced this project is worthy: but then I am not the owner of an orchard in Afghanistan.

Alternate crops:
By far, the effort to bring different crops to Afghanistan is the one that will continue to suffer the most initial failure.  The reason for this failure is that nothing is going to fetch the price that opium does, and we should expect this effort to meet both initial interest and ultimate resistance.  It’s the educative aspect of this that will bear fruit in the long run: it gives these farmers something to think about: a choice when the incentive landscape changes. 

It’s so interesting to me, though, that many of the ideas for crop substitution seems to hinge upon a flower-to-flower substitution: Afghanistan’s floral fantasy.  First, sunflowers were suggested, for seed and oil; then crocus plants, for saffron, which would at least be an expensive, cash-commodity crop.  Even noted Afghanistan scholar Barnett Rubin seemed to be seduced by the flower aspect: he wrote one paper on the possibilities of perfume production.   This floral substitution project idea also adds a nice value-added component: manufacture of essences. 

The perfume project actually came into being, and has met significant institutional and infrastructure barriers: see this 6-page report at Aga Khan Foundation site.

Nevertheless, the consistent floral topnote here suggest to me a brainstorm on the part of outsiders rather than an effort that initiates out of a popular need in Afghanistan.  And all of these are good ideas, but one runs into the same problem as with packing materials: as long as these ideas are imports, they will not capture the popular imagination.  It requires time, repetition, and a kind of suggestiveness to turn an idea into part of an innate set of choices.

The second effort has been to introduce better seed varieties of traditional crops: for example, drought-resistant wheat seed.  This will probably work in the long run with greater success than say, crocus: but not when the seed is dropped at the front door along with a threat to use it instead of poppy seed for this year’s crop. 

Aspirational projects:
On a more aspirational level, USAID-backed Chemonics inaugurated an agricultural fair where laser technology for land terracing was modelled.  The fair brought together numbers of farmers as well as some agribusiness leaders.  For instance, Dole is opening an 83-acre experimental farm.  The highlight of the fair, according to the press release, was the announcement of scholarships for students of agriculture.

Efforts like agricultural fairs are opportunities for more than the show-off of laser technology.  They have the quality of relief, as they also incorporate ideas of community and celebration, spectacle and progress.  Items like experimental farms bring hope for a future sustainable agriculture.  They bring technology transfer, as Dole will look at appropriate seed types and cultivation methods, and work with actual Afghan soil.  But focusing upon these efforts in their publicity gives a somewhat skewed picture of the kind of aid that Chemonics delivers (sometimes at loss to life) in Afghanistan on a more daily basis.

While each of these projects is very important to Afghanistan’s overall health, it appears to many observers that projects are un-coordinated with each other and have patchwork type of development.   It’s not hard to see why: to bring up produce production, you need cardboard; to initiate better market distribution, you have to facilitate it for every crop, desirable and undesirable; and to re-terrace land, you have to explain lasers to people who currently have few elementary schools.  

In essence, every project in Afghanistan right now is aspirational: they are based on hope and its counterpart, despair: despair on the ground, and despair of making a positive difference in opium eradication.  As much as we need to tweak our delivery of these alternatives, we need to hold on tight to the ideas from which these alternatives spring.  The patchwork problem is mosty a funding problem: not enough money to tie together the efforts already being made.

Further reading: So much that you could write several texts, so this is selected:
US Department of State Country Background Notes-Afghanistan–updated May 2007
Numbers: USAID Afghanistan budget page, updated June 2, 2007. USAID is the top reconstruction contributor in Afghanistan
ReliefWeb: Who’s Working in Afghanistan
When Afghanistan’s reconstruction was left out of US budget- BBC, 2003 - which, though rectified, is an indicator in itself

Photos: BBC; Linvilla.com; Magnar Aspaker; Pure-Incense.com; FAO

Kyrgyzstan’s schools will now teach the Epic of Manas as a required component of the curriculum.   IWPR did not say whether this was to go to grade school, secondary school, or university (or all of the above). 

Like Homer’s epics, the Epic of Manas is part of an oral tradition; unlike Homer, his work is still sung today and various artists sing its excerpts in various form.  It has some similarities to the Mongol histories; and it is also claimed by Uighur historians in Xinjiang.

In 2005, the Turkish scholar Elmira Köçümkulkïzï translated large excerpts of the Epic of Manas to English.  On the Epic of Manas Web site, an article by this scholar is featured, as well as links to excerpts of the poem–and–links to performances of it.

This work is copyrighted, but here is an excerpt (lines 6550 - 6599) from an excerpt of the epic:  (lines 6378 - 7276).  To set the scene: boorish, ambitious warrior Kochku starts boasting before he raids the horses of the noble Kyrgyz: 

Among those horses
Stallions and chargers were mixed.
Kochku and Tagïlïk,
Leading their seven hundred warriors
Raided the horses all together,
They cut off the tether ropes, made an uproar,
Thus testing the forty families,
They carried out their khan’s order
By devastating Bay Jakïp.
Suffering from the Kalmyks,
 
Women and children were distraught,
“We really face captivity,” said
Noble Baltay and bay Jakïp:
Losing hope for their noble souls, they said,
“We suffered from Kochku.
If we resist them,
Not one of us will be spared,” they said,
“Let the Kïtay take our livestock,
And add them to their treasure,” they said.
Only Allah is just,
 
May our noble souls survive!” they said.
The wicked Kochku began the killing,
He didn’t spare any souls
Of the forty Kyrgyz families, the noble people.
From the palace of Esenkhan
He had come on a special mission
To the Kyrgyz,
To inflict great trouble
On Jakïp,
And take away his countless livestock
 
By plundering them quickly.
They destroyed their yurts,
Made their young women and girls weep,
And plundering, stampeded
All the grazing mares.
While that was going on,
The twelve-years-old brave Manas,
Riding his horse Toruchaar
Donning his weapons and everything,
Wearing an unsheathed sword at his waist,
 
Like a dark rain-cloud,
His wrath showing on his face,
Without a moment’s pause,
And risking his life and limb,
Without a second glance,
With no thought for his soul, he said:
“While I still have my strong head,
How can I give up my stallions?
These Kalmyks have gone too far,
I will exchange blows with them.

Thus the first noble deed of Manas–he kills Kolchuk. 

We’re indebted to Elmira Köçümkulkïzï for a wonderful translation and an excellent introduction.  I look forward to seeing this work in English–one of those Penguin classics editions, or similar!  However, I’m glad I don’t have to take the test.

Check also the UNESCO site for downloads.

Photos: Freenet.biskhkek.su; Dick McCray, 1998 

Something new and significant: a possible two-party state?  Recently Nur-Otan, President Nazarbaev’s party, has consolidated with some smaller opposition parties.  Now the opposition takes steps: Kazakhstan’s opposition parties, Ak Zhol and the National Social Democrats, have merged.  The new opposition party hopes to make a difference in the next Parliamentary elections.

While we’re all waiting for the next act of King Lear only with full faculties, starring Mr. Aliev as the Duke of Cornwall, the new opposition as the Duke of Gloucester, and Mr. Kulibaev as the silently loyal Cordelia, it’s time to post just a few updates:

1. According to the Save Mark Seidenfeld site, Mr. Seidenfeld’s trial was put off again from its June 4 date, and again rescheduled for the 15th of June.  Since this is a Friday, I suppose that really means it is rescheduled for the 18th of June, but we’ll see. 

2. There is still no news on journalist Oralgaisha Omarshanova, who disappeared on March 30, 2007 in the middle of an investigation of the root causes of some ethnic riots.  This blog posted on her disappearance on April 19–I am still keeping track–but there’s nothing to track.  No news is not good news.

3. Joshua Foust at Registan.net talks about the new Caspian-Black Sea Pipeline that President Nazarbaev has proposed, and which is probably impossible under every constraint known to politicians, engineers, and real estate agents.  It does show, however, that oil transport is still an area for big ideas and large gestures in Central Asia.

Last week, Secretary of Defense Gates measured the costs of Ganci AFB in Manas against the costs of other bases maintained by foreign powers in Kyrgyzstan.  This whirlwind trip-with-comparative analysis, designed to keep Ganci open, was followed by today’s visit from a high-ranking U.S. official, Undersecretary of State Boucher. 

Mr. Boucher made the U.S. position quite clear in regard to the interference of regional collective security organizations in the continued use of Manas International Airport: the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is to mind its own business.  Kyrgyzstan and the U.S. have a bilateral arrangement in regard to Ganci AFB, with which outside parties should not interfere.  Though Russia was not mentioned, the implication for the Russia-led CSTO is equally obvious.  Nonpon has reported on some CSTO maneuvers concerning Ganci. 

Erika Marat analyzed Kyrgyzstan’s reaction to Secretary Gates’ presentation, finding that Kyrgyzstan still felt more sympathy with  Russia on the issue of U.S. presence within its borders.  Therefore, to sweeten the deal, and/or perhaps, to acknowledge some responsibility for the traffic problems at Manas Airport, the U.S. will pay for the crashed Kyrgyz Airliner from a September, 2006 incident involving an Air Force tanker plane.  Reported damages are USD 1.5 million.

I don’t know if tough talk and a check is going to satisfy parties for long.

Through twenty-six years of war and repression, Afghanistan has lost its ability to meet its public health needs.  The efforts to rebuild health care systems continues, with mixed results.  

This was illustrated for me yesterday, when I read Asne Seierstad’s The Bookseller of Kabul. Though Seierstad’s book focused upon family relations, disease just kept cropping up over and over again as a barrier to progress, a root cause of desperate acts–in short, a contributor to a poor environment for reconstruction.   One story in particular in Seierstad’s work had a father who stole from his employer in order to feed his family: two daughters had polio, and medical treatment was out of the question.  He ended up in prison, which is a great place to pick up tuberculosis, and an impossible place to try to feed your already starving family.

In industrialized societies, we frequently get our immunizations and vitamins as a matter of course; we don’t have to know these diseases in the way that Afghanistan’s citizens do.  Therefore, I’ll discuss the diseases and eradication efforts  in alphabetical order:  

Leishmaniasis:
Cutaneous leishmaniasis reached epidemic proportions in Afghanistan and was targeted by the UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) in 2004.  In 2004, and estimated 200,000 people were infected, 67,500 of whom resided in Kabul.  A protozoan infection [Thanks, Ms. Clark: see comments below] from Phlebotomus sergenti, a sandfly, infest the skin, making ”active lesions”, primarily on the face and hands.  Later, the scars remain, and can be as much as one inch wide.  The flies are active from April to October, which gives them plenty of opportunities to cause this parasitic disease.

As in malaria, the insect vector itself is not strong; it has increased its habitat by living in the cracks of walls.  Therefore, it is most likely to affect those who are house-bound in regions with poor or decaying construction–this would include women, children, and the aged all over Northern Afghanistan.  A Belgian grant of Euro 200,000 in 2004 enabled a program to combine drug treatment and the purchase of anti-insect bed nets.  This was to be the beginning of a national eradication programme.  So far I have not found any information after 2004 on this programme.  Since the disease is not life-threatening, it does not have the priority of other public health efforts.  However, the disease does affect the quality of life, particularly for women, as there is a social stigma attached to the scars.

Polio
Polio has been endemic in Afghanistan, and programs to eradicate it started in 2002.  The disease is caused by the poliomyelitis virus and first enters the body by mouth, multiplies in the intestine, and causes paralysis, sometimes total paralysis in five hours.  The conditions favorable to it are primarily poor sanitation.   Vaccination efforts continued, and in 2005, only 9 new cases were reported.

In 2006, however, 29 additional cases were reported.  The disease especially affects the Southern regions of Afghanistan, where fighting had been most concentrated; which also hampered health care efforts.  The combined 2006 efforts of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Health, the WHO and UNICEF planned to immunize 5 to 7 million children in 3 days, in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan.  Previous to that effort, immunization was estimated at a 66%.  It was thought that this new effort would halt indigenous polio transmission in Afghanistan.  The three-day push was repeated five times in 2006.  The effort was funded by the World Bank, USAID, Rotary International, the State of Japan, and the UK’s DFID.  The children were also given Vitamin A, which is considered a major aid in battling children’s diseases.  This year, Taliban activity and edicts against accessing medical aid has halted polio immunizations in Uruzgan province.

Rickets
Vitamin D is essential to bone growth, the movement of Calcium and other minerals through the bloodstream.  Children born with vitamin D deficiencies are prone to “soft bones” and bone deformation from rickets.  One primary way humans manufacture Vitamin D is through exposure to sunlight.  Therefore, most of Afghanistan’s women, enjoined to stay indoors or go outside clad in a burka are especially at risk.  This becomes more acute in homes that do not have walled backyards, so that the women may get no exposure to sunlight at all, and their infants are especially prone to the disease.

Tetanus
Tetanus is an extremely painful bacterial disease: its painsful symptoms are caused by a nerve poison produced by the bacteria Clostridium tetani.  Its onset usually comes from untreated wounds of all sorts, but particularly puncture wounds.  Last month, 300,000 mothers and children were immunized against tetanus and measles in Kabul, along with efforts in other parts of Afghanistan.  Not all of those eligible for vaccination chose to accept the invitation for treatement, but anywhere from 50% to 70% of mothers were treated in all regions, and 55% to 70% of children were vaccinated.   Measles is a highly contagious viral disease, causing very high fever, cough, and conjunctivitis.  It’s high contagion makes epidemic fast able to outstrip hospital resources in states all over the world. 

Tuberculosis
In 2003, IRIN news reported that Afghanistan had one of the highest TB rates in the world: and estimated 70,000 cases annually–of which only 15% were treated.   Of TB-related deaths, 65% were women.  The symptoms of TB usually include cough, fever, and wasting away, but it is a very complex disease.  The culprit is primarily poverty and malnutrition. 

There are a lot of subtexts here, including the present and future conditions of Afghanistan’s women and children; the urgent need for reconstruction and the rebuilding of education systems; the future social costs of  today’s disease; and the ability of Afghanistan’s people to move forward economically.  For the moment, I want to focus on another aspect: many are interested in reviving public health systems in Afghanistan–and to their great number, many more need to be added.

A real friend is one who takes his hand in a time of distress and helplessness.     –Afghanistan proverb

 Further Reading:
The Bookseller of Kabul by Asne Seierstad is available (See Worth Reading page-Afghanistan).  A portion of book proceeds go to Afghanistan’s reconstruction.

See also the WHO Web site for Topic Information and Country Information; UNICEF Country Information portal page
Rotary International’s Polio Plus Program worldwide

Photos: Doctors without Borders; IRIN

This week I received a flock of new State Department fact sheets on H5N1 Avian influenza.  The leader of these flying missives was : U.S. Government Support to Combat Avian and Pandemic Influenza — An Update , which reminds us of the potential seriousness of any viral mutation in creating a human flu pandemic.  In the meantime, this H5N1 scourge is affecting the economy and livelihood of million of people all over the world who depend on birds for protein and income.

According to this lead Fact Sheet, since 2005 the US has allocated more than USD 6 billion in emergency funding to address the threat of avian and potential human pandemic influenza domestically and internationally.  (On an analytical note, the word allocated is not the same as spent, and domestic and international funds are not broken out).  USD 434 million has been pledged to support further efforts.

The second relevant fact sheet divides efforts by State Department Bureau, and South and Central Asia are in the same bureau.  Within this region, a total of USD 10.5 million is being spent, with 9.4 million going to states, and 1.1 million for regional efforts in eleven states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Here is one portion of the Central Asia efforts for each of the three pillars:
1. Preparedness and Communication: Support for the development of preparedness plans in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

2. Surveillance and Detection: Developing / conducting training programs / workshops for rapid response and laboratory testing in India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

3. Response and Containment: Strengthening human response capacity for avian and pandemic influenza in Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

Further reading:
Department of State portal page for H5N1 Fact Sheets
Department of State portal page for H5N1 other Official Sources

Map: Thank you again, BBC.  Photo: Bird Flu Information.org