Afghanistan and Central Asia

Now that Turkmenbashi is gone, I feel constrained to preserve the memory and teachings of his most amazing book, The Ruhnama.  In my experience, there is no other book quite like it for range of subject matter, and reading it expresses a dedication to Central Asian affairs that is well worth remarking upon.  Those of you who have read it should have no trouble with the following questions:

1.  According to the Ruhnama, a virtuous wife should receive precious gems from her husband.  This gem would be:

a. diamonds, because they are a girl’s best friend;
b. rubies, because a virtuous wife’s worth is well beyond their cost;
c. emeralds, because they light up the face;
d. lapis lazuli, because it recalls the blue of tiles in Khiva’s sacred buildings.

2. ”Since creation, human beings have considered themselves the only thinking, constructing creating beings, and the only intelligent rulers of the earth.”

a. Turkmenbashi believed this, because he was the most intelligent ruler;
b. Turkmenbashi believed this, because Oguz Han, the father of Turkmen, instilled his sons with great wisdom;
c. Turkmenbashi refuted this, because it left out the divine;
d. Turkmenbashi refuted this, because all living things and animals are able to perform mental processes and communicate, including plants.

3. The consolation of the South (Turkmenistan as opposed to Russia) for poisonous desert fauna is:

a. sweet melons that do not need sugar;
b. the golden century;
c. oil and gas reserves;
d. less bronchitis than they have in Siberia.

4. According to Turkmenbashi, Turkmen in history were defeated by:

a. external forces moving against them, who considered the Turkmen bandits;
b. internal forces rooted in individual egotism, disagreement, and taking things that were religiously unlawful;
c. four centuries of Turkmen diaspora;
d. both a. and b.

5. According to the Ruhnama, today’s Turkmenistan does not have:

a. political prisoners;
b. disagreement;
c. slanderous comments;
d. all of the above.

If you click on the title to this entry, it will include comments.  The first comment has the answer key.
For those who want to review before taking the quiz, the Ruhnama is available in English translation here.  You can also order an official Ruhnama mug or t-shirt from this site.  And if you pass this quiz, you might want to take the official U.S. Ruhnama quiz.

Photo: ValtionMetalli.com

It’s sometimes difficult to get good information about the Xinjiang Autonomous Uighur Region of China, but these two blogs do an excellent job:

On the serious side:
Xinjiang Watch has a great article up now that should help us all read news about Xinjiang a little more intelligently: Xinjiang Man Throws Flaming Projectile at Picture of Mao .

For those of you who have been avidly reading about dangerous Chinese toothpaste cut with anti-freeze ingredients, and melamine-fortified Chinese dog food, this post from The Opposite End of China just fits right in.  I think it’s glue, but if you’re sure, please write and tell him how to fix it, will you?  It’s not pretty.

Photos: KitchenGardeners.com; Thundercats.VPGA.com

Targeting Xinjiang:
According to the People’s Daily online, the Chinese government is implementing a USD 2.6 million program to halt iodine deficiency in the Xinjiang area.  30 of Xinjiang’s prefectures have significant populations suffering from iodine-deficiency diseases.  The program will provide 5 yuan per person to equalize the costs between iodized salt and black market salt. 

Iodine deficiency most famously causes goiter, a swelling of the throat, because iodine is necessary for thyroid gland function.  Under a lack of iodine, the thyroid gland enlarges to compensate for inefficient function.

Iodine deficiency also causes miscarriages during pregnancy.  Mothers who suffer lack proper iodine nutrition and who carry a baby to term produce infants with iodine deficiency.  Iodine deficiency has also been linked to intelligence, with iodine-deprived people scoring 10 to 12 points lower on IQ tests.  According to UNICEF, iodine-deficiency is the leading cause of preventable mental retardation and inadequate child motor skills.  UNICEF’s 1990 goal was to create universal salt iodization by 2005.  In the early 1990’s, only 20% of the world’s households consumed iodized salt; by 2004, 69% of world households were consuming iodine.  Deficiencies are most marked in Former Soviet states and Eastern Europe, at about 47%.

However, many people unfamiliar with the need for iodine are distrustful of its addition to their food.  It only costs USD 1.15 per ton of salt to add sufficient potassium iodide, but the public relations effort to combat this distrust takes far more effort.

Kazakhstan’s Success:
In Kazakhstan, a successful program to bring iodine nutritional awareness was detailed in a delightful article in the New York Times earlier this year.   In 1999, only 29% of Kazakhstan’s households were  consuming iodized salt; that number has jumped to 94%.  

This article is well worth a read–it presents not just a challenge, but how it is being met by many thoughtful people.

Photos: FAQ.com

President Berdymukhammedov plans to open a new economic free zone along the Caspian Sea that would welcome tourists to his country.  The zone would center around the town of Turkmenbashi and be called “Avaza”.   

Previously, Turkmenistan’s tourism efforts were hampered by its stringent security.  The new tourism zone would cut down on the constant curbside inspection of visas and passports, making the travel experience more friendly.

The initiative was proposed by Mr. Berdymuhammedov on May 11 in Kazakhstan and enjoys both Russian and Kazakhstani support.  The economic free zone would apply to materials for bringing infrastructure and development into the area in order to make Avaza more destination-worthy.

However, local travel agencies in Turkmenistan have declined in recent years, and the lack of changes in the security system and transparency of government relations to business have created significant perceived barriers to entry in this business, IWPR reports.

My two cents: While many tourists would appreciate five-star hotel service envisioned in the official Travel and Tourism notes  (from the Embassy of Turkmenistan to the US), the real niche for tourism in the state, in my opinion, would require greater openness to eco-touring and the experience of cultural and geographical diversity.  This is usually obtained by staying in smaller hotels without a resort atmosphere, and allowing people to explore more on their own.  Tourists of this type are more likely to brave the longer journey to Turkmenistan.

Which, against a recent backdrop of increased security, seems less likely.  Border control regimes, including passport inspections, have increased in intensity this month.

Photos: BBC; Hotels Shopper; France, Diplomatie

Uzbekistan’s labor force has increasingly turned to migration in order to bring money home to families.  Now it looks as if immigration is going to be a new revenue-builder for the state. 

According to a new resolution, immigrants must now register before going abroad.  Not only that, but regional governors of Karapalkstan are also recalling their 200,000 estimated immigrants from abroad.  This means that these citizens will have to give up work in order to return home, and then pay for a “Work Abroad Permit” — an exit visa–in order to return to a job, or most likely, look for a new one.  Karapalkstan is the poorest district of Uzbekistan–the furthest downstream from all water sources, and the closest to the Aral Sea, where environmental degradation continues to affect the agriculture and health of Karakalpakstan.  Its citizens need the remittance economy that labor migration provides perhaps more critically than any other region of Uzbekistan.

In 2006, Russia estimated that there were 1.5 million illegal Uzbekistani immigrants alongside a 102,658 legal immigrants.  The new provisions of the resolution are being implemented by the Prosecutor General’s office, the National Security Service, and the Ministry of Interior.  NSS involvement could imply the use of non-transparent pressures on an already tough situation for Uzbekistan’s residents. 

OJSC (Open joint stock company) Nurbank is the seventh largest of Kazakhstan’s banks, opening for business in 1992.  According to its Web site, it is owned by the largest oil, food, publishing and foreign trade firms operating in Kazakhstan, and also currently lends to oil, food, foreign trade, and publishing & information firms.  Already part of many loan syndication networks (where banks get together to finance large loans), JSC Nurbank has recently positioned itself to improve its access to the global finance community by adding an Export-Import banking division.   This good positioning is now in jeopardy as further scandal rocks the bank’s reputation.

Mr. Rakhat Aliyev’s father, Mukhtar Aliyev, owns 6.73% of Nurbank, but he remains the only shareholder with a published stake.  Most commonly, it is felt that the most important and visible shareholders are Rakhat Aliev and his wife, Dariga Nazarbaeva.  Mr. Rakhat Aliyev’s son, 22-year-old Nurali Aliyev,  assumed a position on the board on January 15, 2007.

Those were not the only changes at Nurbank last January.  A competition of tales concerning kidnappings, hostages, police efforts, and media wars began in January 31, 2007, when five armed personnel stormed the Nurbank building, only to be stopped by bank security guards.  As it turned out, the five armed attackers were security forces, bent on releasing hostages held inside the bank.  The alleged hostage-holder was Mr. Rakhat Aliyev, supposedly holding Mr. Abilmazhen Gilimov, the chairman of the bank, and Mr. Zholdas Timraliev, vice president of the bank.  Both have subsequently resigned.  The allegations against Mr. Aliyev include that he called both officials for a meeting, and held them for 24 hours in order to compel them to sell interest in a building in Almaty–in fact, the Nurbank building itself.  Mr. Timraliev’s wife, Amangul Qapasheva, has subsequently said that her husband was beaten during that period.  He disappeared again on January 23, 2007, after a summons from the Tax police. According to news reports of February 21, 2007, he had still not yet reappeared.  and the Almaty building has changed ownership at an under-market price.

When Mr. Gilimov’s and Mr. Timraliev’s wives could not find him, Ms. Qapasheva went public with her husband’s story; Mr. Gilimov’s wife, Ms. Nazira Bazarbaeva, has not commented publicly based upon advice from her lawyer. 

By the first part of February, Dariga Nazarbaeva was indicating that subsequent financial investigations were due to changes in management.  The criminal charges she referred to appeared to be of a financial nature, “although politics was involved.”  It seems from these statements, that previous management was to blame for financial indiscretions.  Indeed, Kazakh authorities arrested Mr. Gilimov and have said that Mr. Timraliev is “in hiding“, ostensibly to avoid charges of financial misdeeds.  One charge concerns an illegal USD 6.5 million bank transfer. 

In mid-February, Mr. Aliev sued the two wives for defamation of character.   He has been demoted from First Deputy Foreign Minister of Kazakhstan to the Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Austria.  This was widely believed to be an attempt to defuse the public scandal.    

Yesterday, news broke that Ambassador Rakhat Aliev is being investigated for disturbances at Nurbank earlier this year. 

Sean Roberts has a great backgrounder as of February 16th on Mr. Aliev here. 
Leila at neweurasia.net has a current post that gives a local perspective.

I’ve posted a couple of isolated reports on the CSTO recently.  It now seems that these are part of some new, more comprehensive Central Asian security initiatives. 

The Secretary-General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Nikolai Bordyuzha, was in Kyrgyzstan to attend a working meeting.  He inspected Kyrgyz Defense and Interior special forces exercises.  Mr. Bordyuzha also spoke at Kyrgyzstan’s first Media Conference, on “The role of mass media in counteracting challenges and threats of the 21st Century”.  Much of what he said has implications for future diplomacy, security and domestic initiatives:

Afghanistan, NATO, & Border Control
First, KazInform reports that Mr. Bordyuzha said that NATO efforts in Afghanistan were inefficient in terms of eradicating terrorist groups and criminal gangs, and that the Taliban represented Central Asia’s greatest threat.  Not only religious extremism, but rapidly-increasing drug trade through Central Asia is destabilizing the region.  The Kyrgyz Secretary of State agreed, saying that the destabilization of one state was a loss to the world community. 

Yesterday I posted that Kyrgyzstan has asked for additional Russian assistance in border control and control of migration.  This also means an increased Russian force presence in Kyrgyzstan, something that may have implications for future US-Kyrgyzstan negotiations for Ganci Air Force Base in Manas.

This is especially true since Mr. Bordyuzha also outlined NATO’s nefarious plots to expand into Central Asia.  Interfax quoted him as saying that:

In fact, NATO has been pursuing a policy of projecting and consolidating its military-political presence in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.”  . . . .
But there are also other external challenges and risks that undermine stability in the post-Soviet space, primarily the growing activities of extra-regional structures, primarily NATO, the European Union and third countries.”
In addition to this, a concept to build the so-called “Greater Central Asia” is being pushed forth, which is an attempt to drive a geopolitical wedge between regional states on the one hand and Russia and the CSTO on the other. This is an attempt to re-orient the Central Asian states towards cooperation with the United States in a new format, encompassing, besides the Central Asian states, Afghanistan and Pakistan and, in the future, India.”

For me, this looks like an attempt to use fear of drug traffic and extremism to kill any multilateral economic ties and NGO activity from India, Pakistan, the EU and the US.  Due to this “multilateral plot”, Mr Bordyuzha is calling for a new CSTO counterterrorist community.  This appears to be a new military force, despite the fact that the CSTO already has a rapid anti-terror deployment force. 

A new call for increased CSTO military had already gone out last week.

Afghanistan & the Media War:
In a separate article, Mr. Bordyzha noted that the war against extremist elements in Central Asia was being carried out less by force and more by persuasion, in media outlets.  His stated that more information security was needed.  He also wants to counteract extremist views in the media.  This may well affect the content of Central Asia’s media over the short and medium term.

Three main points:
This new CSTO rumbling seems to point to three different Russian ambitions:
1. Keeping a core-periphery relationship with Russia: Notwithstanding the arguments against NATO expansion in Central Asia, it is really non-NATO entities that bother the Russian Federation.  The recent appeals to the CSTO/Russia for greater security provision reflect that NATO or any of its constitutent states has been given (and perhaps has not asked for) much of a role in Central Asia’s security.  Thus, the fear of the “expansion of NATO” has more to do with a fear of multilateral economic ties, recently accelerating between South Asia and Central Asia, as well as between the EU, US, and some of Central Asia’s Republics, and the global governance advocates.

2. Providing security: On balance, none of these new initiatives are unprecedented.  Their main significance is the following: however much ISAF forces in Afghanistan say they are making gains, Central Asia is not feeling any relief from either organized crime or extremism emanating from that region.  The US Department of State renewed its warning of terrorism in Central Asia on April 24th, which might seem to tacitly agreement to that feeling of insecurity. 

3. Meeting failures of ISAF: The US focus continues to be on Afghanistan as a state.  Failing to look at Afghanistan as a regional problem to the north as well as East and West (Pakistan & Iran) has created problems for Central Asian states. 

In addition, much of the support that Central Asia would need to combat organized crime or provide alternate economic opportunities has now been diverted to the immediate war effort.  This security and economic gap is particularly acute in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which are the least economically developed and the states which comprise the narcotrafficking routes. 

Conclusion:
By failing to view this larger picture, the US policy of minimal aid to these states has allowed Russia, through the medium of the CSTO, to fill a security vacuum that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan cannot fill by themselves.  As we all know, security is first.  Long-range, these CSTO efforts will only delay the initiatives toward a free press and economic independence–but then again, so do crime and terrorism.

Photos: Jamestown Foundation; Charlestown AFB; US Army

Mark Seidenfeld is still in prison in Kazakhstan, after an April trial delay that pushes back legal presentations until probably June.  In the meantime, according to the Save Mark Seidenfeld blog, both Russian and Kazakhstani press are publishing articles that make Mr. Seidenfeld look guilty, or that he is a spy.  If you get a chance, check that link above for a media summary.  It doesn’t look good for Mr. Seidenfeld. 

Also over at the Save Mark Seidenfeld site, Derek Bloom is translating English documents into Russian as fast as he can in order to fight these mistaken impressions and cheryni piar.  Cheryni piar is a phenomenon discussed in Alena Ledeneva’s book, How Russia Really Works (see Worth Reading page).  In the book, Ledeneva describes the way that p.r. agencies and ostensibly impartial journalism can be bought in order to smear others.  While I have no information on any alleged cheryni piar (black p.r.) pay-offs on Mr. Seidenfeld’s situation, it seems that the fact-checking in Russian and Kazakhstan’s press might leave something to be desired.  And there is no corresponding advocacy, even of a positive neutrality, that the U.S. has been able to give in return. 

Just as with my post on the PwC audit showing the evidence that clears Mark Seidenfeld of charges in Kazakhstan, I have primary documents that show a mostly gesture-laden efforts by U.S. Consular staff of the Embassy of the U.S. to Kazakhstan toward Mr. Seidenfeld’s plight.  These include:

(more…)

Today’s RFE/RL has an article on Kyrgyzstan’s problems with border control.  The Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Marat Sultanov,  has sought Russian help via the CIS collective security arrangements now undertaken through the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Recently, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan implemented a short-term arrangement of greater access between the two countries, only to have it backfire through ambiguous provisions.  Today Kyrgyzstan has openly said that it seeks to close borders between the two countries more fully.  No specific security reasons are noted, although conflicts between border guards in these states, or border guards and citizens is a fairly frequent occurrence.

The CSTO military training exercises include cooperation on anti-terror measures and also border control.

Last week, Nathan Hamm at Registan.net posted twice on new constitutional reforms in Kazakhstan.  In the first, he discussed how new constitutional changes would answer objections that many member states have toward Kazakhstan’s OSCE leadership bid.  In the second post, Nathan wrote that his earlier post might have been too optimistic, as some of the implications of the new rules are not quite as democratic as they look.  Like Nathan, I’ve been looking at the news articles, and I agree that it looks like a mixed accomplishment from Western standards.  Two things: The law hasn’t been signed yet.  (**) We’re not getting enough information yet. 

Executive branch
Kazakhstan’s parliament voted presidential term lengths down from a previously-inflated seven years to five years, beginning in 2012, when Mr. Nazarbaev’s current term ends.  The lowered term limits would be favorable to the OSCE.  Starting in 2012 is neutral and stable, meaning that it “grandfathers in” the current arrangement.  

The grand exception, and the one that is capturing attention, is that Mr. Nazarbaev will be exempt from term limits, able to run indefinitely for office after 2012 under five year terms.  This is being called in the media as “President for Life” and Mr. Nazarbaev is being called “Kazakhbashi” already. 

Two assumptions underlie the objections, both borne out in the past.  The first is that Kazakhstan’s elections have not yet been free and fair.  Most notably, the last election was scarred by the murder of a popular and viable opposition candidate, Altynbek Sarsenbayev.  The murderers were ostensibly found, tried, and sentenced, but the accusations against the Nazarbaev family or its close allies still hang in the air.

Second, the analysts assume that Kazakhstan’s electorate will continue to accept or be apathetic to any presidential abuses of power.  One reason popularly cited is a sort of post-Soviet inattention, but there is perhaps a more substantial reason for this “apathy.” 

As a Ria Novosti article mentions, Kazakhstan’s economic growth rate has been substantial under Mr. Nazarbaev’s direction.  The acceptance or apathy of the voting public needs to be linked to that growth.  All over the world, most voters choose by their wallet.  However, Kazakhstan’s current growth and income distribution argues that further economic success is likely in the future.  This means that continued voter acceptance of Mr. Nazarbaev also seems likely, without trotting in any Soviet-legacy malaise.

At any rate, should Mr. Nazarbaev sign this law, he would still have to proceed under Parliamentary law, which brings us to the next branch of government, the legislature.

The legislature
Mr. Nazarbaev proposed constitutional changes from a strong executive branch to a presidential-parliamentary system.  The number of seats in the legislature has been raised from 116 to 154 members, giving the opposition a chance at further representation while raising the number of elections they must organize.  Should they obtain a sizeable minority, they can still be neutralized.  The dissolution of Parliament can be ordered by the president after consultation with the its Premier and the speakers.  At that time, new elections can be ordered, or, the Majilis (lower body of Parliament) can be replaced by the upper chamber.  This appears to leave power in the hands of the President, as a minimal number of legislators make an obstacle to starting over with a new, hand-picked crew.  The pressure on opposition legislators who make it to the upper chamber looks formidable.  Therefore, it appears that presidential power is left intact under this new system. 

A second concern for Kazakhstan’s legislature under this new framework is “party-list voting”.  According to the ACE Encyclopedia (see below), party-list proportional representation can be structured to be more inclusive of opposition and minority groups, but it can also consolidate power within minorities of each party and cut parliament members off from their constituencies.  Likewise, Wikipedia (also below) has a long list of different kinds of party-list representation, so by itself, party-list representation is not uncommon.  None of the articles on Kazakhstan thus far have described whether this party-list system is an open system or a closed one.  If it is an open system, then it should allow for stable change to a multi-party system.  It will also likely be approved of by OSCE members.  If it is a closed system, then it could be the change that is no change at all.

The legislature passed this bill in a reported 17 minutes, which could demonstrate that the compliments and powers granted Mr. Nazarbaev are, uh, unanimously agreed; it could demonstrate a non-transparent carrot-and-stick matrix of which we are not aware; it could also demonstrate a difference in what Kazakhstan perceives as a decorous lawmaking procedure.  After listening to U.S. legislators in countless hearings on C-span, I am convinced that one should not confuse public contention with real political dispute, either. 

Nevertheless, the law’s signing could be decided by international or domestic contention.  I think that OSCE countries could reasonably inquire through diplomatic channels whether this is open or closed parliamentary representation, and make their preference for an open system known.  They could also ask Mr. Nazarbaev if he plans to sign any bill that gives him unlimited electability, and what he envisions for a post-Nazarbaev succession.

Ultimately, the question does come to Mr. Nazarbaev and how he envisions his historical legacy.  It is already one full of personal accomplishment, as the president-for-life accolade shows.  Mr. Nazarbaev could also leave a legacy of forbearance.  In the U.S., the first president, George Washington, set a 150-year custom that Presidents would not serve unlimited terms.  Mr. Nazarbaev could certainly do the same: not because he wishes to emulate an American icon, but to ensure the unfolding, long-range democratization that he has heralded for Kazakhstan.

News stories on developments:
Ria Novosti, May 18, also linked above
Baltimore Sun, May 19
Vremya Novostei, May 21, also linked above
Jamestown Foundation, May 21
(**) Update: President Nazarbaev signed the law on May 22, 2007.

References on the Parliamentary System:
Wikipedia:
Parliamentary procedure
Party-list proportional voting
ACE Project Encyclopedia: all from ACE, “the electoral knowledge network”:
List Proportional Representation: Advantages, Disadvantages
Effect of electoral systems on Party system

Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections, passed by the Inter-parliamentary Union (1994)

Photos: WedgewoodBC.org; Caspian Partnership for the Future, Azerbaijan; Reuters/BBC; EducationSynthesis