Afghanistan and Central Asia

If this comes to fruition, it is the best news of the day:

According to official news reports, a Turkish construction firm has been awarded a Multiple Award Construction Contract (MACC) for building mother and child wellness “Ene Myahri” centers in Mary (Merv), Lebap, Dashuguz, and Balkan.  These four cities are the capitals of Turkmenistan’s districts.  Construction should commence in July; the facilities, according to Turkmenistan’s official news agency, will open by December 2008.  In addition, the centers will be fully stocked and staff fully trained.  In the last years of President Niyazov’s reign, Turkmenistan’s health care system dissolved.

The firm’s name is: Turkish company MACC [?-possible translation error] Insaat Sanayi Yatyrym we Tijaret Limited Sikreti.  In 2006, they were also awarded a USD 8.9 million contract to build an eight-story school for 600 pupils in Ashgabat.

Photo: BBC 

Last Thursday, April 19th, Kyrgyzstan’s opposition promised a “decisive day” against Bakiev’s government. At least that much is true:  the nine-day long protests in Bishkek ended in violence.   Therefore the protests, which were a call to reduce the power of the executive branch in the Constitution, may well result in increased presidential power.

According to Russia’s Regnum, opposition leaders sent the most intractable protesters to the vicinity of Kyrgyzstan’s White House, about 200 youths, although the crowd numbered 1,000 in surrounding areas and parks.  al-Jazeera puts the number at 1500; but on the 19th, the crowd was enlarged.  The larger number was also not under the control of the united opposition leadership, either.

According to Ria Novosti reports, Kyrgyzstan police used teargas and stun grenades to disperse a crowd that was becoming violent.  Official reports from the Health Ministry state that six protesters and two policemen were admitted to the hospital for related injuries.  Thirty-five people were arrested, and the offices of an opposition newspaper (headquarters of Ar-Namys party) raided.  The newspapers for the day were confiscated.  Reuters also reports that banners, flags, and computers, documents, and archives were also taken.  One wonders to what evidentiary purpose these records will be put–and about the future of Ar-Namys.

By far, the best description of the opposition’s leadership failures comes from Mirsulzhan Namaliev at neweurasia.net.  His account is available in English and in Russian.  To me, the most significant is that the effort to arrange media “damage control” was more sustained than the effort to do “crowd control” when the mood became ugly.  It’s pretty clear, unlike the Regnum report noted above, that the opposition leaders did not ’send’ hostile elements outward.  Rather, they failed to prevent the hostility.

Yes, it involves physical risk to confront the crowd.  It would also have been a proof of democratic leadership: to take responsibility for the actions of those who are acting in your name; to plan for and strategize ways to head off extreme developments; to stand for order and stability; to unite people under a legitimate purpose.  Failing to make the attempt represents the opposition’s true failure.  This may not be a fair assessment from someone behind a keyboard: I agree it is a lot to ask: but the strategy put in motion by the opposition should have been accompanied by planning for worst-case scenarios. In this way, leaders protect their legitimate aims, their constituency, and the nation at large. 

Some effects: The entrenched leadership of Bakiev has a legitimized claim for using violence against the crowd, opening investigations of both criminal activity and legal opposition members.  Daniel Sershen, writing for Eurasianet, noted that arrests continued over the weekend.  Human rights defenders noted a lack of due process for detainees. 

Second, regional tensions may be underscored between North and South, as Mirsulzhan noted, as protestors from the north return home and talk about the violence or inhospitable behavior of those near Jalalabad or in Osh. 

A third problem, the same one that surrounds all such unrest in Kyrgyzstan: how does one separate opposition, which is democratic and legal, from unrest that facilitates criminal elements?  Mr. Bakiev has the chance to be a statesman, something beyond politics.  To manage this well, he will have to confine his investigations and purges to the larger dangers while remaining true to democratic principles. 

Self-serving leaders, organized crime–these have far more potential to derail Kyrgyzstan than popular protest.

Photos: BBC (from a different set of demonstrations); University of Massachusetts-Amherst (without crowds).

The Honorable Kevin Rudd,  Leader of the Opposition in the Australian House of Representatives, spoke today at The Brookings Institution.  The topic:  US diplomatic engagement with China.  His remarks focussed almost completely upon issues of East Asia and the Pacific, but some of his comments apply quite well to US-Chinese diplomacy concerning Central Asia.

China’s Priorities
Most Central Asia watchers will nod their heads in agreement with Mr. Rudd’s assertion of China’s five priorities: 1. national unity (Taiwan); 2. peaceful regional order, including the settlement of all border disputes with neighbor states and internal order; 3. better living standards; 4. energy security; and 5. environmental degradation.  As Mr. Rudd noted, “free trade and democracy are not on this list.”  Nevertheless, China’s increased world presence has made the state an important stakeholder in world events, and diplomatic representations toward human rights, democratization, and the environment can be made through moderate modes of expression.

Relevant to Central Asia
U.S. articles on China’s ambitions in Central Asia tend to emphasize energy security, but much of China’s activities with Russia and Central Asia also emphasize regional security with its Northeastern province, Xinjiang.  One avenue to bettering Xinjiang’s economy and living standards includes increased trade with Central Asian states.  Furthermore, as China becomes increasingly involved with environmental issues, the Central Asian region may well become a focus of new environmental ideas as proposed by Beijing.

Collective security
Mr. Rudd noted that China’s rapid growth and emergence into the world economy has also been accompanied by basic agreement on some major issues, such as nuclear non-proliferation in North Korea.  The Six-Party Talk agreements may not been fully implemented, but existing results are far better than the alternative.

China’s diplomatic forays are marked by not just better bilateral relations but an increase in effective multilateral diplomacy.  Organizations such as APEC, ASEAN, and Central Asia’s own Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are pertinent examples.  To this list, one could add China’s increasing diplomatic and aid efforts through the Asian Development Bank, which constitutes a diplomacy with financial markets as well as states and regions.

Mr. Rudd emphasized that these developments created a gateway for increased engagement with China over developing world issues.  The U.S. and others should neither expect an “automatic peace” or an “inevitable conflict”.  Following a middle road that nurtures China-U.S. relations could set the stage for new kinds of cooperation.   Likewise, in areas of disagreement, “megaphone diplomacy” is counterproductive.  Concerns over Sudan should be broached in moderate tone and recognize China’s priorities, in order to obtain lasting, decisive agreement. 

Multiparty alliances over nuclear proliferation can form the basis of new multilateral initiatives.   One such aid regime proposed by Mr. Rudd would create military cooperation between the U.S., China, India, and Australia in the event of devastaing tsunami or other natural disasters.  Training in disaster remediation would be a trust-building measure that in turn builds greater cooperation.

Central Asian Multi-State Alliances
In essence, the SCO, composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are already implementing some of these trust-building measures in Central Asia.  The SCO holds military exercises in Central Asia.  One prestigious result for Kazakhstan: China has asked Kazakhstan for the assistance of their military to help provide security during China’s hosting of the Olympic games. 

Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also train with Central Asia’s military.  Possible avenues of cooperation include observer delegations and, as Mr. Rudd suggested for the Asia-Pacific, new disaster preparation regimes and other useful modes of international cooperation for the Central Asian region.

In short, the U.S. could develop better relations with China through regional cooperation in Central Asia as well as East Asia and the Pacific.   China has learned a multilateral model from the world community; in turn, it is teaching these lessons to the world community.  If properly cultivated, existing diplomatic achievements will build future international cooperation.

Not yet up but soon available at Brookings: a transcript of the speech
Rudd to visit the U.S. April 19 through 21 at Australian Labour Party Web site

Many thanks to The Brookings Institution for hosting this event for the public.

Photo: Australian Newspaper, The Age
Map: YangtzeRiver.org

Yesterday, an article about agricultural practice in the Ferghana Valley brought me up short, because the numbers in it just sounded wrong.  However, I am no agricultural expert:  I spent a good part of the day talking to some wonderful people who know and study cotton at Texas A & M University.  In particular, I spoke with Dr. Kevin Bronson, a soil fertilizer specialist who spent part of two different spring seasons in Uzbekistan with the Winrock International NGO, advising cotton farmers.  It was quite evident that he enjoyed his two tours of Uzbekistan: he particularly noted the hospitality of Uzbekistan’s people.

Ferghana cotton yields, practices vs. U.S. cotton standards
Here is the official Uzbekistan television report.  Parenthesis and brackets are my mathematical conversions and clarity edits.

The program informed [us] that from 13765 hectares (34,014 acres) of cultivated area in the district, 7318 hectares (18,083 acres) are allocated for cotton. At the present moment, 89242 kilos (196,745 pounds) of cotton seeds have been delivered from Pakhtaabad cotton factory’s warehouse to the farms.  The delivery was accompanied by law enforcement officers.  An area of 1394 hectares (3,445 acres) was seeded [from that shipment] at the rate of sixty seven kilos of seeds per each hectare.  (67 kilos per hectare = 59.77 pounds per acre).  Today fifty-two tons of cotton seeds and six tons of cellophane film, used [for the work of] sowing are available at the factory’s warehouse.  . (. . . .)

Sixty pounds of cottonseed per acre is far more than is required to seed cotton fields.  In the U.S. the seeding rate runs about 15 pounds of cottonseed per acre.  However, over-seeding appears to be a compensatory process based upon other over-inputs, and procedural choices:

1. Scheduling: The cotton planting described in the news article starts far too early.  Though the Ferghana Valley is more northern in latitude than, say, Texas, Texas has not yet sown cottonseed.  Soil temperatures dictate the proper moment for planting; seeds germinate best in soil whose temperature has is 65 degrees for at least four days.  Therefore, that six tons of cellophane, which is used to warm the soil after the seed has been planted, would be unnecessary if cotton farmers waited another four weeks to plant.  Some soil thermometers would be a better purchase.

2. Over-input of water: Cotton is a crop that is prone to fungus and insect infestation, and one sure way to cut down the incidence of infestation is to use water strategically.  Cotton does not need to be watered for the first month; according to Dr. Bronson, not only is early watering unnecessary, but counterproductive, stunting the seedlings’ growth.  Once irrigation commences, however, sufficient soil moisture is obtained by using alternate furrow irrigation.  Alternate furrow irrigation sounds just like it is: not running water down every channel of the cotton field, but every other one.

3. Other prodigal inputs: Here is another paragraph from the article:

Chemicals and fertilizers, especially saltpeter, are also taken under strict account by Departments of Internal Affairs and delivered to farms from regional chemicals warehouses, always accompanied by a militiaman.

Since over-input of water causes cotton seed to run off out of the ground, stunts seedling growth, and contributes to fungal infestations, then it is also a root cause of other “waste of input”, as Dr. Bronson called it.  Fertilizer is applied to cotton fields in two-to-four times the quantity necessary.  In India and Pakistan, around 120 pounds of nitrogenous fertilizer is applied per acre; in the Ferghana Valley, at least twice this much.  Likewise, preventing root rot, etc, by limiting water is far less expensive than applying fungicide.

Note: The use of militiamen in fertilizer distribution possibly has to do with the type of saltpeter, which is not a technical term, but rather any of three basic substances.  It suggests that rather than using urea or sodium nitrates, potassium nitrate is applied.  Potassium nitrate can be used to make explosives. 

On the off-chance that any Ministers of Agriculture are out there, reading this:  There’s an expert or two out there, maybe in the U.S., India or Pakistan, who can look at this information and verify it or amend it to your actual conditions. 

References:
Dr. Kevin Bronson and Dr. Jackie Smith of Texas A & M University graciously spent a good part of their day on this information and gave me other leads for sources.  Gig ‘em, Aggies! Thank you so kindly for the Texas hospitality—and the sufferance of my inexperience . . . .

Other sources:
FAO on Water User Associations & Khorezm
Texas A & M University System Agriculture and Research and Extension Center
The Cotton Corporation of India (state agricultural enterprise)
Cottonexperts.com, an agribusiness site with interesting reports, especially:
The first 40 days: Expert recommendations

Photos: Wildco.com, FAO

Conflict between journalists and the Minister of Culture and Information Mr. Ermukhamet Ertsybaev has been a constant theme since May of 2006, when journalists protested the Minister’s “authoritarian methods”.  Last month, protest erupted again when Mr. Ertsybaev had television journalists from the station ERA ejected from a March 2 event.  By Monday, March 5, journalists were calling for Mr. Ertsybaev’s resignation; by March 8, ejected journalist Yuliya Isakova, had filed a lawsuit against the Minister; and by March 14, Prime Minister Karim Masimov had publicly supported Mr. Ertsybaev but also publicly advised him to apologize to Ms. Isakova.   To me, this all sounds like good news, or, perhaps, at least familiar. . . . everybody does their job . . . . differences settled by lawyers and not weapons . . . . .  and everybody gets to have an opinion .

A reporter for the Law and Justice newspaper, Oralgaisha Omarshanova, has been missing for twenty days.  Previously, Ms. Omarshanova had moved in response to receiving threats via telephone.   What makes this especially troubling: Ms. Omarshanova often focussed upon business and corruption stories.  She had been investigating the possible criminal links of an ethnic Chechen family allegedly involved in the March 17th mass brawl  in Malovodnoye and Kazatkom townships.  

Poster, World Freedom Day 2006: UNESCO
Event news, RFE/RL Newsline, multiple dates

The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), met today in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan.  They met in order to analyze their work, celebrate successes, and most of all, to formulate policy for 2008.

The meeting was opened by Russia’s Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, who gave the opening remarks.  Mr. Fradkov suggested that there were many integration processes left unresolved.  He also delivered an overview on EurAsEC progress.

Statistics
Aggregate GDP of EurAsEC reached USD 1200 billion in 2006; trade turnover surged over 30% to USD 36.3 billion.

Customs Union
Both an “unnamed source in the Russian delegation” said privately–and Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister, Karim Masimov, publicly–that a main priority of the meeting was to develop a basis for common customs union law.  The customs union envisions no duties or taxes for export-import between the states.  Only Belarus, Russia, and Kazakhstan have sufficiently coordinated their documents to join the EuraSec customs union.

Common customs is required for WTO accession.  Russia has been working on full accession to the WTO since 1993; Kazakhstan since 1996.

Energy paranoia, maybe justified
Some reports suggest that an energy coordination mechanism was proposed; however, the quotes concerning energy coordination were prompted from a Question at a press briefing, and were not, at least publicly, a main agenda item.  Within a common customs union, there can be No Doubt that further energy coordination will arise as a strategic/economic issue. 

Attendance by the Prime Minister(s) of the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Mr. Akil Akilov of Tajikistan and Mr. Amzabek Atambaev of  Kyrgyzstan.  Deputy Prime Ministers represented Belarus and Uzbekistan.  Observer states include Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine.  The next meeting of this very important collective security organization will be held in Moscow in October, 2007.

Umida Niyazova will be on trial in Uzbekistan April the 19th.  According to Ferghana.ru News Agency:

Umida Niyazova is charged with illegal border crossing, smuggling, manufacturing or distribution of subversive literature with the help of financial or other aid, received from religious organizations and also from foreign states, organizations and citizens.

Ms. Niyazova is a journalist who was taken into custody as she travelled between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.  She was interviewing Uzbekistan nationals still living in Kyrgyzstan after the Andijan Massacre.  As a journalist, she would have had literature, certainly.  She might also have been paid for her work.

She has been in detention since January 22, 2007.  Ferghana.Ru also reported on February 2 that Ms. Niyazova has been tortured in detention and describes some of the regulations attending her incarceration.

Human Rights Watch, with whom Ms. Niyazova worked, has been kicked out of Uzbekistan just in time to leave Ms. Niyazova without their advocacy.  Check their press release for their position and insights.

One of Ms. Niyazova’s film clips can be found here.  The last video on the right belongs to her.

This blog will have updates on Ms. Niyazova’s trial–check back.
Background posts: April 16th-HRW exits Uzbekistan
April 9th–EU rapprochement v. Niyazova charge
March 28th–Timeline of media harrassment in Uzbekistan

Registan.net has a new post on EU relations with Uzbekistan
Recommended:  International Crisis Group has an executive summary/recent report on Uzbekistan and EU sanctions regime, November 6, 2006.

Currently,  Turkmenistan’s President Berdymukhammedov is visiting Saudi Arabia to arrange for oil and gas cooperation.  Before that, he entertained OSCE representatives who proposed aid in environmental, educational, political and economic venues.

More diplomatic envoys over gas exports but little else about Turkmenistan whatsoever:

President Berdymukhammedov has said that long-term gas export agreements with China, Russia, and Iran must be met.  At the same time, he is receiving delegations from other states who also wish supplies:

1. Georgia, still on the outs with Russia and “burning bridges” with its neighbor to the North, would like to see Turkmenistan’s gas to Europe via pipelines running across the Caucasus.  Georgia owes Turkmenistan USD 40 million already, which it will pay off over the next ten months, but Georgia also wants to initiate some bilateral investment between the two states.

2. Kazakhstan, with no bridges burnt but lots of contracts, would like to partner with Turkmenistan in northward natural gas distribution.  Once Turkmen gas goes north, it could travel further northward into Russia; west in a Trans-Caspian line; or east, linking up to pipelines into China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region.  Under this formulation, Turkmenistan can fulfill its April 2006 contract with China for 30 billion cubic meters of gas/year over the next 30 years.  Turkmenistan also has a 25-year contract with Gazprom at a low price. 

3. Ukraine is more than willing to buy Turkmenistan’s gas, even at a 32% increase in price to $58 per thousand cubic meters (kcum).

4. Corporate or state diplomacy, or both?  Dragon Oil opened the first foreign-owned refinery in Turkmenistan, adding a value-added component to Turkmenistan’s largely resource-based exports.  The company is 52% owned by a United Arab Emirates national oil company, but is registered in Ireland (figure that one out).  Dragon Oil is also currently developing wells in Turkmenistan.

Barriers to Turkmenistan’s new export opportunities:
1. Investment comes before revenue:  First, existing pipeline networks are crying out for upgrade, and new distribution will be needed for new export contracts.  The next five years of pipeline development are going to determine who gets the gas.  The next five years are critical for Turkmenistan’s growth. 

2. The next ten years are going to decide how much gas Turkmenistan owns to fill its contracts.  Existing and new wells cost money and time, also.  Both Russia and Iran are interested in investing in Turkmenistan’s energy infrastructure.

3. Two trans-Caspian lines are in the planning stages.  One, initially developed in the 1990’s from Turkmenistan to Baku, the TCP, was scrapped by Niyazov when he learned that he would have to defer income until it was built.  The second one, from Kazakhstan to Baku, has some logistical and political challenges.  A new pipeline from Turkmenistan that accesses Kazakhstan without use of Gazprom is also a weighty, multilateral political challenge.

4. The legal framework of the Caspian Sea is still disputed, with Iran objecting to Caspian partition (and Russia also).  Keeping the Caspian in condominium is best for environmental concerns, fisheries, and navigational trade.  However, de facto partition is in place, since Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan all claim offshore oil and gas fields–even Iran has a few.  This may look like a done deal, but the devil is in the details, which have yet to be worked out.  Iran and Turkmenistan also have some existing border disagreements in offshore Caspian fields which have yet to be settled, even if some portion of condominium v. partition is arranged.

President Berdymukhammedov has abolished the old Energy Ministry and undertaken its administration himself.  Given that this move is undemocratic, can anyone doubt energy is a major priority?  And it is Turkmenistan’s main lever (a good one) to developing a diversified economy.  Cotton, though critical to Turkmenistan’s economy, continues to be a losing proposition because of water issues.

Turkmenistan plans to boost 2007 gas production by 20%, oil production by 15%.  This is a bid for more income and more friends, but shortens the window of income for Turkmenistan over the long haul. 

Recently Turkmenistan announced a new, significant gas find, but did not say where it was.  The international market remains skeptical.  But given the amount of dollars needed in Turkmenistan, the number of customers clamoring for a share of Turkmen gas, and the need to fund pensions and other social services, and the increased rate of production, it is easy to see why Turkmenistan would make such an announcement. 

It seems pretty clear that Turkmenistan without petroleum is a Turkmenistan without international friends.  Note to friends: That OSCE list has some diversified propositions, and is a good place to start.  Turkmenistan needs you now, and not just for gas and oil.  One passport in might be non-petroleum related infrastructure, or support for Turkmenistan’s stated domestic priority of better education. 

Let’s hope the OSCE continues to develop a nuanced, multivalent effort.  It doesn’t look like there’s a lot of nuance thick on the ground thus far.

RFE/RL Newsline provided much of the event reporting

Photos: NASA; NRCU, Ukraine state broadcasting

A recent article in Perspectives on Politics discusses the study of ethnic, religious, national, and other kinds of collective identity.  Specifically, Abdelal, et al note that political scientists use words like “ethnicity”, “religious group”, and “national identity” without regard to analytic rigor.  They present six different methods to ascertain group affiliation and bring scholarship back to earth. 

Nevertheless, I found myself reflecting less on methodology and more on the authors’ descriptions of the components of identity.   These components are also relevant to domestic lawmaking, diplomacy, and cross-cultural policy prescription. 

A. Collective identity, whether ethnic, national, linguistic, religious, gender-based or class-based, varies in content—what it means, for instance, to be Muslim or Kazakh or Irish-American. 

1. Group membership pre-conditions choices that individuals make.  They define boundaries and distinct practices.  These “rules” may be conscious ones, such as deciding to vote in a way that is consistent with one’s religious values.  The rules may be fleetingly conscious, such as “I’m just using common sense when I hire people that share my habits and practices”.  Or these rules may be so ingrained that each of us does not even realize how much we have assimilated the rules of our identity.

2. Collective identities have social purpose: they provide goals and the means to goals.  For instance, Russian-speakers across the CIS and Eastern Europe can seek others with like language skills to develop international and regional business.

3. Identity also involves comparison and contrast to other groups:  “Unlike these others (fill in the blank), we know how to (fill in another blank). ” I would say that comparison can be a part of strength, but also a means to complacency or discrimination.

4. Last of all, all of these aspects of identity make the frame and a lot of the picture in an individual or collective world view.

B. The next part of their description of identity has to do with its cohesiveness within.  Under global exchange, we can see that the agreement about identity within groups is beginning to change.  In some cases, the fidelity can become more marked; in others, more varied.  With globalization, individuals world-wide find themselves deciding which of their many affiliations are the most important.  As always, force may impel others to affiliate, but good politics makes affiliation compelling.

Recent Identity-Related Central Asian Political Events:
President Rahmon’s recent decision about his name and his intent to go on the Hajj bespeaks a change in identity for himself and possibly for national identity.

One could look at Uzbekistan’s recent persecution of Akramiya as counter-productive because it tends, through persecution, to highlight the otherness between Akromiya members and the government.  Group persecution also strengthens collective identity under adversity.  Some also say that persecution of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, from the UK to the Russian Federation to Central Asia, falls in this category.

Under identity-based criteria, forbidding Kyrgyzstani girls to attend school in hijab (or in French students or students from Minneapolis, for that matter) focuses identity at the point of the identity marker—identity as shown by contrasting dress.  By forbidding school attendance, they miss the opportunity to foster multiple identity: as common speakers, as educated, or as national citizens (Kyrgyz or French or Americans); as readers of Vecherny Bishkek, Le Figaro, or The New York Times. 

Psychologically, identity is highly ingrained, right after food, water, and shelter.  Policies which seem well-crafted by its authors, may unduly challenge identity and create conflict.  These new policy prescriptions look like a blunt stick, battering those who must live them.  At the same time, politicians cannot always avoid goals obstructed by identity politics, norms, and practices.  But considering identity affiliation can only help craft better policies and procedures. 

Understanding the components of identity also serves to show just how well we know our neighbors and ourselves.  It also helps us analyze how far each of us have come, individually and as part of numerous collectives, in our world relationships and views of others.

See Sourcenotes: General, for Abdelal, et al
Cathryn Cluver writes extensively on France’s politicization of identity and its hazards, posted on FPA’s Migration blog

Photo:  Trinity College
Map: University of Texas, Perry-Castaneda Library (Map link, Central Asian Newsroom) 

As of Friday, April the 13th, Human Rights Watch cannot remain in Uzbekistan, because its director has ”exceeded her authority” and “worked outside the charter”.  The new permitting regime was tightened after the Andijan Massacre.  Many NGOs, press organizations, businesses, and military personnel have been asked to leave. 

Throwing the foreign rascals out, by date:

June 6, 2005:  Peace Corps suspends activities in Uzbekistan, after the visas of 52 volunteers were not renewed by Uzbekistan’s government.

September 13, 2005: The U.S.-based International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) has its activities suspended in Uzbekistan by court order, after a difficult year in which some workers were not approved.  IREX was active in the region for forty years, first under Soviet and then post-Soviet regimes; it often works with USAID funds.  Its mandate includes education, independent media, and civil society initiatives. 

November 5, 2005:  British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) , the first foreign news agency to set up a bureau in Uzbekistan, leaves.  Monica Whitlock, a BBC journalist, is accused of ‘complicity with terrorists’.

December 12, 2005: Uzbekistan refuses to prolong or renew RFE/RL ’s press accreditation.

February 10, 2006: Freedom House loses its last appeal to remain in Uzbekistan; a six month moratorium is imposed on their activities.  Freedom House is a well-respected NGO that works toward transparent elections and government procedures.  In May of 2005, some Freedom House meetings were disrupted and Freedom House was incredibly accused of being Wahhabist.

March 6, 2006: Eurasia Foundation, which promotes media freedom and democratic initiatives, leaves after being accused of improper registration and meetings held without Uzbekistani permission.

March 17, 2006: The government of Uzbekistan advises the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that their services are unnecessary, and that they should leave within 30 days.

April, 2006:  American Bar Association/Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI) is asked to leave for providing legal aid to unregistered organizations.

 May 2, 2006: Counterpart International, an NGO funded by USAID, was asked to leave Uzbekistan.  During their Uzbekistan operations, they distributed USD 80 million in humanitarian and medical aid. 

May 31, 2006: Global Involvement Through Education is banned for proselytizing youths.  The American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study(ACCELS) is shut down for illegally sending more than 100 Uzbekistani students to the U.S. for education–unbeknownst to the Uzbekistani government–and also failing to keep appropriate financial records.

IRIN’s article about ACCELS also mentions two other NGOs under Uzbek fire:  Hungary’s faith-based NGO Magyar Okumenikus Szeretetszogalat, working with disabled women and families with disabled children, was under investigation. 

France’s COFUTIS, operating since 1996 in Uzbekistan, was engaged in sand-stabilization projects to mitigate airborne erosion around the Aral Sea.  Their activities were also called into question.

July 8, 2006: Winrock International charged with illegal publishing activities and insulting the Muslim beliefs.  Winrock is an aid organization that helps develop infrastructure, particularly in rural areas.  Winrock first came to Uzbekistan in 1994, and was involved in increasing grain yield/production.  In August of 2006, the government announced an investigation into Winrock.  They had published manuals available to other NGOs and another manual called “Islam and Women.”   Since I have not seen this manual, I am only assuming it was supposed to bring Winrock’s aggregate experience with Islamic communities to the many experts who volunteer their time to Winrock’s excellent programs.

July 12, 2006: Urban Institute is charged with moving outside their purview during a homeowner rights conference, by discussing socioeconomic conditions in Uzbekistan.

July 14, 2006: Central Asian Free Exchange (CAFE) is closed down due to proselytizing, apparently including activities in towns they say they have never entered; having an unregistered logo; and lacking an internet license. 

August 9, 2006: Internews, an NGO that specializes in developing news outlets around the world, has its Uzbekistan bank accounts frozen.  Two of its journalists sentenced for illegal distribution of videos–however, their sentences were commuted.  By October 19, 2006, Internews was asked to leave Uzbekistan.

August 23, 2006: Crosslink International forbidden to operate in Uzbekistan.  They have worked with microfinance and poor rural families in the state since 1992.  They were charged with activities inconsistent with their charter, donating funds without recourse to Uzbekistan banks, and giving aid to a church under the cover of another grant.  Crosslink is a faith-based NGO. 

August 29, 2006: The Partnership in Academics and Development (PAD)  is charged with ‘proselytizing‘ and making internet available without a license.  PAD was set up in 1999 to aid Uzbekistan’s professors in developing internet skills and world contacts with others in academia.

This article from Mosnews also states that two NGOs from the Republic of Korea,  the Korean Foundation for World Aid and the Institute of Asian Culture and Development, were forced to leave. 

February 26, 2007: WorldVision International is asked by Uzbekistan to supply more information about their activities. 

Today: One can only wonder how Human Rights watch lasted as long as it did.

Legislation Online has a complete rendering of Uzbekistan’s NGO regulations in English and Russian.
Registan has a partial history of NGO shutdowns as of February 28, 2007;
NewEurasia has a timeline from the domestic perspective as of June 6, 2006.
Felix Corley & Igor Rotar of Forum 18, a group that tracks religious freedom, has also written on this issue.

Last of all, as much as these actions have displaced foreign aid workers and  journalists, it is these organization’s Uzbekistan nationals who have suffered the bulk of the inquisition and harrassment.  Of course, to draw attention to them by name can sometimes put them in jeopardy.

RFE/RL has two wonderful timelines running on Andijon events and Harassment issues.

Illustrations: MaxUnderground.com