Central Asia

For those of you who read my post on Mark Seidenfeld’s incarceration and trial delay, the article by Ilan Greenberg has been corrected at the NYT site (I linked to the International Herald Tribune version of NYT piece).  As noted by comments received, Mr. Seidenfeld’s employer was improperly attributed.  

In the details of the legal case, no changes were made.  The correction in its entirety:

Correction: April 30, 2007
An article last Monday about the prosecution of an American business executive in Kazakhstan on charges he stole $40,000 from his company omitted the company’s name and misidentified its owners. The company is Arna Inc., and it is owned by GIMV, a Belgian investment company; the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and Murat Zhunussov, a Kazakh investor. Arna is not a Kazakhstan subsidiary of Golden Telecom, a Moscow-based Internet and telecommunications company.

I am still looking at other aspects of the Seidenfeld case and communicating with those who wrote in to comment.

Photo: Gonka.com, Turkey

Bermet Akaeva, the daughter of ousted Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akaev, recently continued her odd-yssey of reinstatement in Kyrgyzstan’s political life.  On March 23 of this year, she filed to run as a candidate for national legislature from the northern Kemin district.  More than a month of legal challenges in Kyrgyzstani courts ensued.  On April 27, her candidature was declared invalid. 

Now her supporters have become the latest target of the post-demonstration purges in Bakiev’s administration.  Akaeva was herself hospitalized after a 9-hour interrogation concerning her part in fomenting the demonstrations on her behalf.

Triple play was tipping point
Ms. Akaeva was previously elected to a parliamentary seat representing Bishkek’s University district, in the same set of elections where her brother, Aidar, was elected representative of Kemin, a city approximately 11 miles from Bishkek.  That same day, Bermat’s father was re-elected Kyrgyzstan’s President. 

The general elections so obviously failed to meet “free and fair” standards, that they were overthrown on March, 24, 2005, by that popular revolt known as the Tulip Revolution.  Election fraud, and a sense that Akaev was grooming his children to succeed him in office, proved to be the political tipping point against Akaev.  Economic issues underlay the electoral and succession conflict.  Kyrgyz citizens had noted, with increasing sense of injury, that not only government, but the economy, was non-transparently controlled by Akaev family members and associates. 

Ousted President Akaev left for Russia with his wife, son, and daughter, where he was granted asylum by President Vladimir Putin.  At least publicly, he continues to defend his reign and his perhaps eventual return to Kyrgyzstan.  Yet of the four Akaevs, only Bermat has made any effort to return.

What was she thinking?
On April 14, 2005–a scant three weeks after the Tulip Revolution–Ms. Akaeva showed up to take her place in Parliament.  During and immediately after President Akaev’s ouster, the new Kyrgyzstan government had compiled a list of businesses allegedly owned by her father, brother and her husband.  All were due to be investigated for improper practices.  Once she took an oath of office, she would have had parliamentary immunity; however, that was forestalled by stripping her of office on May 16, 2005. 

Since that time, she has lived primarily in Russia, although she does return to Kyrgyzstan on an intermittent basis.

Throughout the aftermath of the Tulip Revolution, Bermat Akaeva has insisted upon the complete and utter blamelessness of her father, brother, and husband in any corrupt dealings, wealth amalgamation, or other unsavory elements of the Akaev ascendancy.   

Background/timeline:
On April 21, 2005, shortly after returning to Kyrgyzstan, she granted RFE/RL an interview in which she stated that her father “owned no businesses”, and so therefore had not garnered any cash by that method.  Her husband, Kazakhstan native Adil Toigonbaev, did own extensive business interests, but was equally honest and aboveboard in his business dealings.  Mr. Toigonbaev was indicted on August 19, 2005 for alleged fraud, embezzlement and tax evasion. 

In September of 2005, Aidar Akaev was stripped of parliamentary immunity and an indictment was prepared against him for alleged extortion and money laundering.  An extradition request was sent by the new Kyrgyz government to Russia, which was not granted.  In March of 2006, Aidar Akaev was officially removed from his parliamentary post, which due to criminal investigations and fear for his physical safety, he had never occupied.

Only Akaeva has attempted to return, and one has to admire her persistence.  In April 2006, Bermet Akaeva was detained and questioned by the National Security Services for over three hours during a visit to the state.  Eleven months later, she filed for office.

We are now at the point where this article started–with Ms. Akaeva accused of paying a voter 200 som (USD 5.00) for a vote, and fomenting dissent on her own behalf.  No article I have read says anything about investigating the anti-Akaeva demonstrators who jostled her at the court.  Apparently her interrogators are to be reprimanded for interrogating her after 10 pm at night.

Activities that push Ms. Akaeva into the hospital are more likely to win her proponents rather than enemies.  But most of all: nobody comes out of this affair looking intelligent or credible, whether by word, deed, or outcome.

Photos: BBC; Zeenews.com ; Kommersant

Thirty-three officials representing four Central Asian states, the European Union, and the UN High Commission on Refugees held a meeting called “Institutional and Capacity-Building Activities to strengthen the Asylum System in Central Asia”. 

A stateless person is any person living without state acknowledgement.  In underserved outlying areas, these may be children without birth certificates; a great many are refugees from other states and other conflicts.  The known number of stateless persons is 20,000, but it is believed there are many more.  Many were displaced and then not claimed as citizens after the fall of the Soviet Union, and still subsist with old Soviet passports.  Others are refugees from the Tajkistan Civil War of 1992-1997.  Without papers, one cannot access government services for education, health, or employment, nor legally travel. 

For states, resolving the status of stateless persons involves investigation of areas where refugees or other stateless persons may live, and efforts at nationalization for adults, issuance of papers, and other assessments for health care.  The cost to local communities in increased school attendance and health care may increase, but issues of public health, security and crime prevention are better resolved when statelessness is minimized.  Both Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan naturalized refugees during the Tajikistan Civil War, but there remains a large outreach effort remaining to be accomplished.   

The Reuters article went on to say that a number of meetings, 80% funded by the EU, will continue until December, 2007, to help resolve this economic, security, and human rights issue.

UN News Service has a slightly different article, with quotes from attendees and links to international law documents;
Cathryn Cluver & Rich Basas feature a weekly roundup of migration issues on the FPA Migration blog: links at right.

Photo: Electronic Museum of Canada; BBC, 2001.

Strictly speaking, Mr.Repin’s work does not belong in a Central Asia blog.  Ilya Repin was an ethnic Russian who grew up in the Ukraine and eventually settled in Belarus.  Yet Mr. Repin painted a series of four works that described the conflict between Tsarist secret police and Russian revolutionaries that still resonates today. 

For our time, this series shows so much about rents in social fabric: in particular, the psychology of people of conscience who rebel against autocratic regimes, whether punctilious or searching or outraged; powerlessness against, and defiance of, authority.  The last painting shows the cost to both prisoner and those who must somehow get by in their absence. 

The Revolutionary Meeting (1883)

Arrest of a Propagandist (1880-1892)

Refusal to Confess (1879-1885)

They Did Not Expect Him (1884)

For those of us who have not endured this kind of conflict, this is one of the ways we learn to understand: through the enduring power of art.

Three internet Biographies of Ilya Repin (I liked Wikipedia just fine): 24 digital, Olga’s Gallery, Wikipedia

Photos: First four, Olga’s Gallery; Last one, Auburn University

Though Foreign Minister Zafiri has stated that Tajikistan has an “open door policy” to foreign investment, barriers do remain:

A. Two official comments from the United States:
On April 13, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum announced that Tajikistan’s investment climate is hindered by its high level of corruption, and the continued lack of democracy, rule of law, and press freedoms.  He also announced a 53% increase in U.S. aid to Tajikistan, to USD 50 million, directed toward infrastructure and less to humanitarian relief.  Basic math: That would mean that previous annual aid was below USD 33 million. 

Ten days later, US Ambassador to Tajikistan Jacobsen reiterated the problems of corruption in Tajikistan as a barrier to Western investment.  Twenty-two different organizations regulate and permit business in Tajikistan.  Entrepreneurial start-ups therefore take 60 days, as opposed to the U.S. average of about five.

B. In related news, sometimes contradictory to US official statements:
In a kind of triple dynamic between mining investment, hydropower utilities, and bilateral state-to-statediplomacy, Tajik investment appears to rely less on Russia and China.  Iran’s investment in Tajikistan seems to be increasing, along with increased potential investment from other Middle Eastern states.

Tajikistan traded a northward neighbor as an investment partner in Tajikistan’s aluminum to seek a more Westerly one—in Dubai.  On a visit to the United Arab Emirates, His Excellency President Rakhmon visited Dubai Aluminum (DUBAL) on April 12th; Tajikistan and Russian aluminum (RUSAL) decided not to continue their joint investment on the Rogun hydroelectric power plant on April 24th.  It remains to be seen if DUBAL picks up the deficit in hydropower or aluminum mining.  It could be that aluminum extraction infrastructure required Rogun plant upgrades.

But if not, power plants remain a focus for investment.  Iran’s news agency IRNA reports that Iran might help develop Tajikistan’s Sangtoudeh-2 power plant. 

The TajIran venture in tractor production, however, has hit some snags due to lack of investment and unfettered tariffication for imported parts.  IRNA reported no changes in tariffication, but new banking measures will be undertaken so that Tajikistan’s farmers may purchase tractors.  Would this be at the high, tariff-added price?  If so, can Tajik agriculturists take the hit?

About that free trade: maybe Ambassador Jacobsen has a point. 

Photos: U.S. Department of State; enrin.grida.no 

A universal picture of human rights treats each profession equally in the call for due process of law.  Yet human rights organizations focus upon the treatment of journalists in repressive regimes for good reasons.  First, the treatment of journalists reflects our own belief in the importance of steady, trustworthy information.  Second, examining the treatment of journalists also provides a focus and indicator of human rights—if a regime treats those who can speak out in such a way, how much worse can it be for the voiceless?  In another way, speaking out for journalists reflects our entry point into a culture.  These journalists often bridge the gap between local communities that we do not know and the wider world.  They are more than reporters: they serve as our interpreters, bringing unfamiliar cultures forward in order that we may compare and contrast them with our own.

A still more sophisticated approach to securing media freedom considers all aspects of media: not just those who manufacture its content, but those who provide for its distribution.  This would include business employees and entrepreneurs, particularly those who operate or facilitate the work of publishing houses and telecommunications.  Journalists provide the content: media outlets provide the means that make the content available.

Today, Mark Seidenfeld’s trial was delayed another week.

The frame-up
Mr. Seidenfeld is a 39-year old telecommunications executive who has been arrested for stealing USD40,000 worth of assets from his firm, the Kazakhstan branch of Golden Telecom, Incorporated.  The equipment he has been charged with stealing has been found, by independent auditors, to be on the property of Golden Telecom, and presumably, still in use.  The independent auditor is Pricewaterhouse Cooper (PwC): with an office in Kazakhstan staffed by both expatriate and local Kazakhstan executives.  As independent auditors, PwC is not covering up for expat Seidenfeld.

For what reason would Mr. Seidenfeld be charged?  Ilan Greenberg at the New York Times suggests that Mr. Seidenfeld was arrested for insisting upon free-market sale rather than forced sale of assets.  The resulting free-market auction cost the Kazakhstan businessman who purchased it an added USD five million.

Looks like: privatization.  Feels like: expropriation.
In 2002, the biggest telecommunications provider in Kazakhstan was Kaztelecom (KT), which was built upon the existing Soviet infrastructure, and incorporated in 1996.  60% of KT was owned by the government; another 30% was owned by Kazkommertsbank; and 10% was split between European and U.S. investors.  Its market share, while clearly the largest, was largely based on fixed telephony.  It did not provide the newest infrastructure in mobile telephony, data transmission (internet services) and fiber-optic technologies.  Since the 1990’s, new technology provision created a niche for other operators such as Golden Telecom, and other joint ventures between Turkish and Kazakhstani firms.

In 2003, Kazakhstan announced that it would sell 50% of its ownership in KT, so that it might “blossom in the hands of private operators.”  By January 2004, independent telecommunications executives were viewing the liberalization with dread.  A new media law insisted than any foreign investment in telecommunications be limited to 10%, or that investor would have to be vetted by the government.  Furthermore, market access was limited to “backbone companies,”—which have turned out to be affiliates of state-owned companies such as the national railway company, and Kaztranscom, which is owned by Kazakhoil. 

Mr. Seidenfeld is one businessman who spoke up:  “If these changes go through,” he remarked in 2004, “it will kill any innovation in the telecom market.”  He noted that the new media law on liberalization increased the probability of monopoly in Kazakhstan. 

The motives for restricting foreign telecommunications ownership by law are titularly those of national security.  Nevertheless, the true reason is in profitability: Kazakhstan’s telephony and internet market is considered to be seriously underserved.  The number of potential customers is therefore enormous.  Telecommunications networks, built up by Golden Telecom and others, in some cases financed by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (and for a time, part owned by the EBRD until loans were secured), are in much better shape to access a largely untapped market for cellular phones. 
In the third quarter of 2004, after the redistribution of telecommunications ownership, the communications market grew by one-third.

The bottom line
Seidenfeld’s incarceration and trial points to another, more fundamental legal problem in Kazakhstan: a failure of the rule of law.  For Mr. Seidenfeld, as for many others, partisanship within the legal system means that a fair trial cannot be obtained.

Just as human rights watchers note the harassment of independent journalists, they should take note of the harassment of other aspects of media service provision—and this includes the harassment of businessmen and entrepreneurs in telecommunications, publishing, and electronics.  Recently, Registan.net has noted the way that Uzbekistan has silenced opposition by shutting down distribution/transmission avenues, especially electronic ones: the Web sites for opposition parties Erk and Berlik, the broadcasts of Ferghana.ru news agency, and others.  Kazakhstan’s media law controls access and broadcast of foreign outlets and foreign content, limiting its percentage of ownership and percentage of play, respectively.

If it is still difficult to feel outrage over the failed telecoms in Kazakhstan, and the plight of those megabuck suits who developed it:

Imagine that your journalists have their phones and internet cut off.  They are still walking the street; no operative has a hand over their lips; but they are gagged all the same. 
Imagine how they must feel, unable to complete their work, unable to tell someone what is going on. 
Imagine them looking over their shoulder, wondering what comes next.

Additional information from the European Commission Market Access Database.  Photos: a2mediagroup.com; peopledaily.com; Zhaksy.com

An event that has implications for EU position on Uzbekistan’s “softening” of human rights violations;

An event which may aid Umida Niyazova in her ongoing trial for border violations and accepting money from foreign news agencies;

Human Rights Watch has had their residency re-affirmed for another six months.

For energy strategists around the Caspian: Sergei Blagov has written an article about President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov’s two day visit to Russia.  President B. declined to rubber-stamp President Putin’s offers for increased energy cooperation. 

I don’t even want to muddy the waters by commenting further.  You can read the article at Eurasianet, linked here.

For background, read my previous (April 17th) post on energy diplomacy vis-a-vis Turkmenistan here.

Photo: Neweurasia.net

Tsetseegee Munkhbayar received a top award for environmental activism yesterday, for initiating and building the Onggi River Movement.  Mr. Munkhbayar is a self-educated yak herdsman who has insisted upon accountability in Mongolia’s mining industry.

The story has captured international attention and can be found at Taipei Times, al-Jazeera, and elsewhere.

The Goldman Prize Organization web site has some great pictures.

President Nazarbaev’s diplomatic agility remains critical in Kazakhstan’s military affairs.  New military reform efforts have been bolstered this year, showing that Kazakhstan intends to glide past both domestic and international constraints with as much friendliness, and as many partners, as possible. 

Domestic issues
Early this year, Kazakh Defense Minister Mukhtar Altynbaev was recalled from his post.  Through April, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbaev has continued to make changes in Ministry of Defense organization.  The newly appointed Minister of Defense, Daniel Akhmetov, is charged with revitalizing Kazakhstan’s military reform to overcome at least two constraints: inefficient fund allocation and dwindling re-supply.  On April 5, Mr. Nazarbaev appointed a new deputy defense minister for economy and finance.  Mr. Oynarov was previously a deputy finance minister and deputy chairman on the State Agency on Regulating Natural Monopolies and Protecting Competition.  This appointment lends credence to the belief that much of this defense ministry shakeup involves anti-corruption measures and a kind of “trust-busting” of unofficial monopolies.  Despite ten years of attention to military reform, Kazakhstan has not achieved the supply and readiness goals it has paid for. 

Minister Akhmetov made further changes after troop inspections to enhance readiness and (looks like) to match skill to job.  RFE/RL Newsline wrote on April 17:

 [New Ministry of Defense] appointments come in the wake of a recent first-ever inspection of each of Kazakhstan’s regional army commands by Defense Minister Daniyal Akhmetov, Kazakh Television reported on April 14. The move stems from a broader effort to bolster Kazakhstan’s military capabilities and follows an almost 75 percent increase in the 2007 defense budget, to some 143 billion tenges ($1.1 billion). Of that total, 54 billion tenges is specifically earmarked for the modernization of existing weapons systems and new procurement plans . . . . Nazarbaev appointed Kazhimurat Mayermanov as deputy defense minister, elevating him from his previous post as an army artillery-and-missile-battery commander, and named Nikolai Pospelov as the new eastern regional commander but relieving him of his deputy ministerial position. Bulat Darbekov was also named the new southern regional commander, replacing Bakhtiyar Syzdykov.

Amidst these staff changes, Kazakhstan revealed its new military security strategy.  According to Roger McDermott of the Jamestown Foundation, the new policy stresses its partnerships with Russia, China, and the United States.  In particular, the policy clarifies what Central Asian watchers have already seen: that Kazakhstan is coordinating its military policy within collective security organizations such as the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Both Russia and China, as strong neighbors, are more natural partners for Kazakhstan in military cooperation; both CSTO and SCO military training and “war games” occur on regular schedule in Central Asian military affairs at large.

Vigorous NATO or U.S. military training in Kazakhstan would no doubt be seen as inappropriate by both China and Russia, but Kazakhstan also means to bolster its relations with the West in military cooperation, particularly in the area of technological upgrades.  As of 2004, NATO has enabled a military language institute, which gives Kazakhstani military personnel the chance to study military English, Turkish, and Chinese.

Re-supply and upgrades
One component of diplomacy between states is the sale and transfer of military equipment, a profitable manufacture that Russia, the U.S., and other states try to promote.  Kazakhstan’s military has not just been bedeviled with corruption, but also a lack of domestic defense industry.  As Marat Yermukonov notes, parts and supplies for existing Soviet or Russian-made equipment have been hard to obtain. 

Kazakhstan’s reaffirmation of CSTO military priorities is at once diplomatic and rooted in defense spending economics.  In many ways, Kazakhstan’s diplomacy with Russia over military affairs must soothe hard-line security experts, who distrust the knowledge transfer implied in collective security, while they arrange for trade in military goods.  Russia needs Kazakhstan to be militarily capable.  Institutionally, they cannot always permit themselves to allow it. 

Kazakhstan is therefore lobbying in Russia for the majority of its equipment, which would help coordinate their mutual efforts, but also making strategic purchases from other states where Russia’s technology is lacking.  They must also get parts re-supplied, or existing equipment will continue to be unsafe or substandard.

Kazakhstan has approached Spain and other OSCE countries for military assistance. This diplomatic effort seeks to engage not just bilateral cooperation but cooperation among other European collective security organizations.  In particular, Kazakhstan’s interest in OSCE leadership is well known.  But Roger McDermott lets Mr. Nazarbaev speak for himself:

Our cooperation with the USA never runs counter to Russian interests.  By working together with Russia or China, we never go against the USA or Europe.  Over the past 15 years Kazakhstan has always had a consistent, clear-cut policy in relation to others.

The policy may be clear-cut, but the execution of that policy is not.  Instead, it’s a balancing act well worth observing; an inch-by-inch dance through a minefield of competing domestic and international interests.

References, by date of publication:
Roger McDermott .  (2004, August 11).  Kazakhstan’s military reform creeps forward.  Eurasia Daily Monitor.
Marat Yermukanov.  (2007, March 7).  Kazakhstan seeks Russian assistance to modernize its army.  Cacianalyst.
Roger McDermott .  (2007, April 18).  Kazakhstan launches ambitious military reform plan.  Eurasia Daily Monitor
and as always: RFE/RL Newsline, April 7, 10, 17, and other dates.

The February 2007 issue of Silk Road Studies has a longer article by Mr. McDermott here.  You can access Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, in the links at right.

Photo: Kazakhstan’s Embassy to the United States; Kantei.go.jp; Bill Steber’s wonderful photo at AliciaPatterson.org